Detention without trial: historical evolution, states' authority and international law by Zamani, Masoud
Zamani, Masoud (2015) Detention without trial: historical 
evolution, states' authority and international law. PhD 
thesis, University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/28202/1/zamani%20thesis.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
  
Detention without 
Trial: Historical 
Evolution, 
International Law ǯ 
Masoud Zamani L.L.B(University of 
Isfahan) L.L.M (University of 
Nottingham) 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted to the University of      
Nottingham for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy (July 2014)  
 
                                                     Abstract 
 
 
 
In the wake of the US detention policy in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, the practice of detention without trial has gained a degree of 
attention unparalleled in the history of common law tradition. Legal 
analyses of all kinds have ensued, and countless policy plans and 
guidelines have been created. Yet, despite the pedigree of detention 
without trial, the historical dimension to the practice of detention without 
trial has not been invested with the scrutiny that it deserves. Drawing on 
the history of detention without trial in Britain, this research seeks to draw 
a roadmap for the evolving features of detention without trial. It will be 
argued that it is by virtue of this historical understanding that we can 
make sense of the modern laws governing the practice of detention 
without trial and its associated features.
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                                                  Introduction 
1. Background 
 
The problem of detention without trial has become so enlarged today that it is no longer 
of interest to only detainees, lawyers, judges and the executive. This problem and its 
associated features have gone so far and wide as to become a component of modern 
popular culture. If the shocking pictures of the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers 
can be said to occupy an ever-lasting and traumatic presence in our imaginations, the 
disturbing footage emerging from Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib also serve as some 
of the most vivid signifiers of the opening chapters of the twenty-first century. It is 
largely because of the documentation of these abuses by visual means that the practice 
of internment 1 most readily presents itself as one of the horrors of the twenty-first 
century. However, a closer look at the problem at hand reminds us of a truth, too bitter 
to accept, and yet, too obvious to disregard, and that is, the history of civilisation in its 
entirety is filled with outrageous practices of detention without trial, ranging from the 
famous story of internment of the Hebrew slave Joseph for an indefinite period of time 
by Potiphar, as recounted in the book of Genesis2, to the continuing internment of the 
remaining detainees in Guantanamo Bay. 
However, it would be unfair to say that detention without trial has been a constant 
struggle in the history of civilisation without adding that, at least as soon as an 
institutionalised practice of internment took shape in modern history, attempts were 
made to curtail or remove the unlawful ± or, as it was later recognised, arbitrary ± forms 
of this practice. For example, in the context of internments exercised in England, the 
earliest manifestations of these attempts took place in the course of such valuable 
documents as the Magna Carta 1215,3 and the Petition of Rights 1628, which banned the 
LPSULVRQPHQWRIDIUHHPDQH[FHSWIRUZKHQµWKHODZIXOMXGJHPHQWRIKLVSHHUVRUWKH
                                                          
1 TKHWHUPVµGHWHQWLRQZLWKRXWWULDO¶µLQWHUQPHQW¶DQGSUHYHQWLYHµGHWHQWLRQ¶DUHXVHGLQDV\QRQ\PRXVPDQQHU
in this thesis. For definition of internment, refer to section 2.  
2 V. P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 18±50 (Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1995) at 475.  
3 Magna Carta Libertatum 1215, The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. 15th ed. 1998.  
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law of the land necessitates it¶.4 Another example of attempts to put restraints on the 
powers of the executive in England stems from a series of habeas corpus acts passed by 
Parliament in the seventeenth century onwards.5 The strongest wave of protecting the 
right to liberty arrived with the advent of the post Second World War era, when it was 
recognised that the issue of detention without trial had long since become a worldwide 
phenomenon. In this era, significant moves towards limiting some particular forms of 
internment were made by the international community via the regimes of international 
human rights law and humanitarian law. 
Yet despite the historical pedigree of detention without trial, fundamental disagreements 
among academics and legal practitioners remain as to the question of how to deal with 
this problem. In fact, a high degree of controversy emerging from the policies of the 
Bush Administration in its so-FDOOHGµZDURQWHUURU¶ZDV\HWDQRWKHUVWURQJUHIOHFWLRQRI
these fundamental disagreements.  
1.1. Detention and necessity  
For the proponents of the sweeping powers of the executive in resorting to detention 
without trial, necessity is the principal factor, which is echoed in a different voice of law 
in times of crisis.6 In response to the sharp criticisms directed towards his one-sided 
action in suspending the writ of habeas corpus at the peak of the American civil war, 
Lincoln askedµAre all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go 
to pieces, lest that one be violated?¶7 These assertive words of Lincoln have, over time, 
become something of a mantra for those making a case for the priority of necessity over 
the laws of liberty. The exact same logic was employed by Justice Robert Jackson in his 
famous dissenting opinion in a freedom of expression context:  
The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order 
and anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the Court does not temper 
                                                          
4 House of Commons, Petition of Rights, 3 Car. I, c. 1, 1628. 
5 We will examine some of the habeas corpus acts in the said periods in chapter I, section 4.1.  
6 W. H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), at 225. 
7 )XOO WH[W RI µ$ FRPSLODWLRQ RI WKH PHVVDJHV DQG SDSHUV RI WKH 3UHVLGHQWV ±¶ DYDLODEOH DW
https://archive.org/stream/cu31924092593353/cu31924092593353_djvu.txt. 
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its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the 
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.8 
That the constitution is not a suicide pact has also turned into a kind of catchphrase for 
some authors. This is particularly true for those scholars who find themselves in a 
relative degree of agreement with the formulation of detention powers in a broad 
manner, with particular reference to the US detention policy in the wake of the 
September 11 attacks.9  
When placed in a detention without trial context, the foregoing arguments purport to 
create the following general pattern for the exercise of detention without trial: the 
executive must have the latitude to suspend such judicial remedies as the writ of habeas 
corpus; the executive can single-handedly articulate the grounds for detention without 
trial; there must be no time limit for the suspension of habeas corpus, or more 
practically, there must be no time limit on the duration of detention; the judiciary must 
either refuse to intervene in such cases, or in the case of intervention, its level of 
intervention must be limited, and shall not amounWWRDVWULFWVFUXWLQ\RIWKHH[HFXWLYH¶V
decisions and conduct; the executive bodies must be put in place to take on the role of 
the judiciary; and finally, some of the safeguards afforded to detainees, such as access 
to lawyers or evidence brought against them, must be limited or adjudicated against the 
needs of different situations, whilst the executive can appoint hearsay evidence or refuse 
to disclose some or all evidentiary grounds against detainees, once again in accordance 
with the variances of a particular situation.10  
As will be explored in the historical investigations of this thesis, the British executive 
must be credited with employing the initial steps in creating the first constituent parts of 
the pattern mentioned above. However, as will be argued in due course, the different 
                                                          
8 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, per Justice Jackson dissenting.  
9  R. Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003) at 293 or B. 
Wittes, Detention and Denial: the case for condor after Guantanamo (Washington, Brooking Institution Press, 
2010) at 37. For a great critique of using such rhetoric and language in this context refer to, 7&RUFNHUµ6WLOO
:DLWLQJIRUWKH%DUEDULDQV¶Law and Literature 303.  
10 For sources from which this pattern can be extrapolated, M. Malkin, In Defense of Internment: The Case for 
µ5DFLDO 3URILOLQJ¶ LQ:RUOG:DU ,, DQG WKH:DURQ7HUURU (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2004), B. Wittes, 
Detention and Denial: the case for condor after Guantanamo (Washington, Brooking Institution Press, 2010), 
6&%OXPµThe Necessary Evil of Preventive Detention in the War on Terror: A Plan for a More Moderate and 
6XVWDLQDEOH6ROXWLRQ¶ (New York, Cambria Press, 2008).  
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varieties of this pattern became a worldwide phenomenon largely owing to its export by 
means of colonialism.  
1.2. Persistent problems associated with detention  
Throughout the history of detention without trial, a constant and consistent opposition to 
some forms of this practice has been formed. One of the earliest examples of a serious 
dislike for this practice can be found in parliamentary records of England in the 
seventeenth century. As will be seen infra,11 this was the age in which some significant 
doubts had been sparked as regards the nature and scope of the sovereign power in 
England. Such doubts mounted, when five members of Parliament in England were 
LQWHUQHG DV SDUW RI &KDUOHV ,¶V EURDG GHWHQWLRQ SROLF\12 When the matter reached the 
attention of the House of Commons, it was viewed with a great degree of fury and 
revulsion. Accordingly, a number of MPs elaborated on the evils of detaining subjects 
without specifying their charges or a time limit for their internment. For example, Sir 
Edward Coke noted that in order for a given instruction to become law, determinacy of 
its terms is a necessity. This determinacy is non-existent in the case of indefinite 
detention of subjects, µIRU KDG WKH ODZ LQWHQGHG VXFK D WKLQJ LW ZRXOG KDYH QDPHG D
time¶.13 Others embarked on the value of liberty, and that thHVRYHUHLJQ¶VSRZHUcannot 
and must not curtail ZKDWZDVWKHQSHUFHLYHGDVWKHVXEMHFW¶VPRVWSUHFLous inheritance, 
namely, liberty.14 
Moreover, additional concerns have come into existence since the end of the 
seventeenth century. For example, at the time when Charles I impulsively resorted to 
the practice of detention without trial, there was no perception of the separation of 
                                                          
11 Refer to chapter I, sections 4 and 5.  
12 Proceedings on the Habeas Corpus, brought by Sir Thomas Darnel et al DWWKH.LQJ¶V-Bench. Charles I A. D. 
1627 in A Complete Collection of State Trials (1816). 
13 R. C. Johnson et al, Commons Debates 1628 Volume II: 17 March±19 April 1628 (London: Yale University 
Press, 1977) at 195.  
14 Ibid., at 199.  
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powers. Even though the legislature and the judiciary were present, they were viewed as 
branches flowing from the same fountainhead that was monarchical power.15  
As will be seen in the next section, detention without trial is exercised by the executive. 
In so doing, the executive operates in an independent manner, and does not concern 
itself with the question of whether there is a judicial indictment or a prosecuting order in 
place.16 Moreover, the executive often tends to establish barriers against the possibility 
of judicial review of internment.17 Terms such as µH[WUD-judicial detention¶, µsemi-judicial 
detention¶, µDGPLQLVWUDWLYH GHWHQWLRQ¶, and µH[HFXWLYH GHWHQWLRQ¶ are often used 
interchangeably with detention without trial or internment, and are indicative of a 
phenomenon not so sensitive and responsive to the requirements of the separation of 
powers. Here, the opponents of the practice of detention without trial argue that by 
obscuring the principle of the separation of powers, internment serves as either a step 
towards tyrannical governance or a means to sustain an unjust order.18 In the historical 
part of this thesis, many examples will be provided to signify how the practice of 
detention without trial is an indicator of the existence of an unchecked and unbalanced 
mode of authority. In one of the most broadly invoked cases concerning detention 
without trial in history, this aspect of the problem of emergency powers and detention 
without trial was captured in the words of Attorney Dudley Field: 
Is it true, that the moment of declaration of war is made, the executive 
department of this government, without an act of congress, becomes absolute 
master of our liberties and our lives? Are we, then, subject to martial rule, 
administered by the President upon his own sense of the exigency, with 
nobody to control him, and with every magistrate and every authority in the 
land subject to his will alone?19 
Finally, it is said that detention without trial often falls a long way short of providing 
justice to the individuals subjected to it. When the executive is placed as the sole 
                                                          
15 P. Halliday, Habeas Corpus from England to Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), at 25±27 
and 163.  
16 For a description of this process, see, for example, D. Bonner, Executive Measures, Terrorism and National 
Security: Have the Rules of the Game Changed (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2007). 
17 Two recent examples of this trend consist of the military detentions exercised by the American executive in 
Guantanamo Bay and Bagram detention centres.  
18  3 0DUJXOLHV µ7UXH %HOLHYHUV DW /DZ 1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW\ $JHQGDV the Regulation of Lawyers and the 
6HSDUDWLRQRI3RZHUV¶Maryland Law Review 1, at 68.   
19 U.S. Supreme Court, Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) 71 U.S. 2 (Wall.). 
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operator and judge, whilst exercising detention, detainees cannot but find themselves at 
the mercy of their captors. So often, detainees of this kind are held without having any 
information on such crucial issues as the cause of their internment, the possibility of 
their release, or their access to a lawyer, judge or any other agent of the justice system. 
The denial of such elementary rights to detainees is often coupled with other forms of 
injustice, such as withholding evidence from them, subjecting them to prolonged and 
coercive interrogations, producing them before either administrative or military bodies, 
and refusing their right to appeal. 20  In such an environment, the level of distress 
weighing on the administrative detainees simply goes beyond imagination.21  
2. Definition of internment and the issue of terminology 
 
There is no treaty-based definition of detention without trial. Even in the world of legal 
academia, it is relatively rare to witness a scholar venturing to provide a definition for 
WKHFRQFHSWRI µLQWHUQPHQW¶A rare and brief description of internment can be found in 
the Commentary on Protocol I relative to international armed conflicts. Therein, the ICRC 
CRPPHQWDU\SURYLGHVDPHDQLQJIRUWKHWHUPµLQWHUQHG¶:  
µ,QWHUQHG¶ WKLV WHUP JHQHUDOO\ PHDQV GHSULYDWLRQ RI liberty ordered by the 
executive authorities when no specific criminal charge is made against the 
individual concerned.22 
Two particular elements stand out in the above description. First of all, the detaining 
authority in the case of internment is the executive. Secondly, when a person is 
interned, there exists no criminal charge against him. Therefore, interments must never 
be confused with penal imprisonments or, more importantly, prolonged pre-trial 
detentions. 23  For example, in the last decade, due to the collapse of many civic 
institutions in Haiti, the courts of this country have not been able to process a 
                                                          
20 SeeIRUH[DPSOH50XUSK\µ3ULVRQHURI:DU6WDWXVDQGWKH4XHVWLRQRIWKH*XDQWDQDPR%D\'HWDLQHHV¶
(2003) 3 Human Rights Law Review 257. 
21 See, for example, M. Begg, (QHP\&RPEDWDQW$%ULWLVK0XVOLP¶V-RXUQH\WR*XDQWDQDPRDQG%DFN (Britain: 
Free Press, 2006).  
22 C. Pilloud et al, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 (Geneva: International Committee of 
the Red Cross, 1987) para 3063.  
23 Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of International Humanitarian Law, and its 
interaction with international human rights law (Hague: MNP, 2009) at 484.  
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substantial number of cases involving individuals held in pre-trial detention.24 This has 
prolonged the duration of pre-trial detentions, which must under normal circumstances 
be served for a short period of time by detainees. However, this should not mislead one 
to conclude that when a pre-trial detention is prolonged, its status will be transformed 
into internment, for the former is practised on the basis of some prima facia criminal 
charges, and the latter involves no charge at all. It is thus that some authors use the 
WHUPµGHWHQWLRQZLWKRXWFKDUJH¶DVDV\QRQ\PIRULQWHUQPHQW25  
Another conceptual issue surrounding internment is the issue of fragmented terminology, 
which may at times act as a source of confusion. This is because different actors and 
authors have employed different words to refer to this practice. Some of these varying 
terms are: preventive detention, administrative detention, executive detention, extra-
judicial detention, non-criminal detention, military detention, security detention, 
detention without trial, administrative internment and finally, internment. In general, it 
must be noted that the scope RIWKHWHUPµGHWHQWLRQ¶LVPXFKEURDGHUWKDQLQWHUQPHQW
7KH WHUP µGHWHQWLRQ¶ is frequently used in the context of criminal law.26 This is why in 
RUGHUIRUWKHWHUPµGHWHQWLRQ¶WRZLHOGWKHVDPHPHDQLQJDVLQWHUQPHQWLWPXVWDOZD\V
be coined with a descriptive attribute such as administrative or preventive. However, 
even then, caution is called forVLQFHWKHWHUPµSUHYHQWLYHGHWHQWLRQ¶FDQ also be used to 
imply a type of detention serving a preventative purpose, without implicating national 
security in the sense that is implied in the usage of internment. For example, in a 
FULPLQDO ODZ FRQWH[W WKH WHUP µSUHYHQWLYH GHWHQWLRQ¶ RIWHQ DOOXGHV WR WKH GHWHQWLRQ RI
mentally disabled individuals or particular forms of quarantine.27  
For the purposes of determining the scope of this thesis, it is of vital importance to 
discern that there also exists a special type of internment for those referred to in the 
laws of armed conflict as Prisoners of War (POWs). This type of detention is governed by 
                                                          
24 A. Fuller et al, µ3URORQJHG3UH-triaOGHWHQWLRQLQ+DLWL¶5HVHDUFK3DSHU9HUD,QVWLWXWHRI-ustice, 2002).  
25 -*ROGVPLWKµ/RQJ-7HUP7HUURULVW'HWHQWLRQDQGD861DWLRQDO6HFXULW\&RXUW¶LQ%:LWWHVed) Legislating 
The War On Terror: An agenda for reform (Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2009) at 77. 
26  F. Bouchet-Saulnier et al, The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 2007) at 226. 
27 6HH3+5RELQVRQ µ3XQLVKLQJ'DQJHURXVQHVV&ORDNLQJ3UHYHQWLYH'HWHQWLRQaV&ULPLQDO -XVWLFH¶ 
114 Harvard Law Review 1429. 
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the Third Geneva Convention, and must be distinguished from the practice of security 
detention in the sense employed in this thesis. Of course, whenever the need arises, we 
will speak of the relevant rules governing the special regime of PoW internment. But in 
general, the internment of PoWs goes well beyond the focus of the present research. 
This brings us to clarification of WKHVFRSHRIWKHWHUPµLQWHUQPHQW¶RULWVRWKHUV\QRQ\PV
as described in this thesis. The utilisation of the terms µLQWHUQPHQW¶/preventive 
detention/detention without trial or the similar concepts in this thesis only points to the 
type of detention without charge ordered by the executive for preserving national 
security.  
3. History of detention without trial: a lost dimension  
 
For most of the twenty-first century, the analysis of internment has been couched in 
VXFK WHUPV DV µSRVW-September 11 detention policy¶ µSRVW-September 11 detention 
SRZHUV¶DQGPDQ\RWKHUVLPLODUFRQFHSWVWDNLQJ6HSWHPEHUDVWKHVWDUWLQJpoint of 
analyses of internment.28 At the heart of this language lies a presupposed dichotomy in 
the mode of practice, structure and purpose of internment between the pre- and post-
September 11 eras. Of course, no one can deny that internment, as exercised in the 
aftermath of 9/11, carries some unique features. At the same time, it is definitely wrong 
to divorce the post-September 11 detention policies from the history of internment in 
general and view it in a secluded manner from the rest of the history of internment. 
Such an isolationist conception of detention disregards the evolving features of 
internment through a very complicated historical process. Once this historical sight is 
lost, one inevitably seeks dysfunctional and short-lived answers to some of the problems 
associated with internment.  
It seems that in the midst of the authorities¶ and analysts¶KDVWHWRfind an answer to the 
question of how to deal with internment, one must pause and turn to the history of 
                                                          
28 See-0&KDFRQµ7KH6HFXULW\0\WK3XQLVKLQJ,PPLJUDQWVLQWKH1DPHRI1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\¶LQ$&
G¶$SSROORQLDed), Immigration in Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008) at 158. 
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detention without trial, instead of creating endless policy plans for potential 
implementation in an indefinite future. It is only by this turn to the history of detention 
without trial that we can discern how we arrived at this point, which in turn helps us to 
gain a better view of what is at stake now. In the same way, while a historical enquiry 
does not necessarily administer immediate prescriptions to the uncertainties and 
maladies at hand regarding internment, it assists us in asking the right questions. For 
example, it is by dint of a return to the historical lessons of detention without trial that 
one could ask why the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) chose to use the term 
µDUELWUDU\GHWHQWLRQ¶, when they could easily have seWRXWDSURKLELWLRQRIµXQODZIXOQHVV¶
UDWKHU WKDQ µDUELWUDULQHVV¶ 29  Moreover, a historical examination of the concept of 
internment makes us more familiar with the origin and the original functions of many 
features associated with detention without trial. Some of these concepts follow as: the 
writ of habeas corpus, administrative boards, military courts, alien enemies, alien 
friends, and enemy combatants.  
Furthermore, the importance of gaining a historical insight into the subject of internment 
is amplified in common law jurisdictions such as the UK and the US, where in order for 
FRPPRQODZ\HUVµWRPDNHVHQVHRIFDVHODZDQGHVFKHZFRGLILFDWLRQWKH\PXVWORRNWR
WKHSDVW¶30 An example of the importance of such historical materials in the context of 
internment is the case of Ex Parte Quirin, which conjured the language of µHQHP\
combatants¶ and linked it to indefinite detention.31 Later, this decision came to set a 
precedent for the Bush AGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VGHWHQWLRQSROLF\32 However, a common lawyer 
with an invested interest in legal history would first contextualise the decision of the US 
Supreme Court in its historical setting and posit whether that setting bears some 
relevance to the present situation. The next task is to go further back in time and see 
                                                          
29 Article 9, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, Vol. 999. 
30 0/REEDQµ,QWURGXFWLRQ7KH7RROVDQGtKH7DVNVRIWKH/HJDO+LVWRULDQ¶LQ$/HZLV and M. Lobban (eds), 
Law and History (Oxford: OUP, 2003) at 14.  
31 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S Supreme Court.  
32 S. I. Vladeck, µThe Detention Power¶ (2004) 22 Yale Law and Policy Review 153, at 168.  
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what historical background lies behind a decision like Quirin. The ultimate point of this 
multi-layered journey is to realise how our contemporary understanding of the relevant 
concepts and practices have been fashioned, and where a particular line of legal 
conception has gone in a misguided direction. The reach of this logic is not only confined 
to common law courts. Rather, it can encompass any court in any given system, since 
DIWHUDOOµ>H@YHU\WULDOFRQVWUXFWVDKLVWRU\DQGPDUVKDOVHYLGHQFHWRDQVZHUDSDUWLFXODU
question, and for the purpose of a public resolution¶.33 This includes international and 
regional tribunals associated with the different regimes of international law. Such 
tribunals constantly refer to their past rulings on particular subject-matters. However, in 
so doing, they occasionally make interpretative mistakes in their reconstructions of past 
judgments.34 Here, a lawyer with an interest in internal and doctrinal historical enquiry 
can at best detect the mistakes of these jurisdictions, and supply an account of the 
changing interpretations of different concepts over time.   
4. Historical enquiry and methodology of this research 
 
The present research takes the historical enquiry of internment as one of its three 
constituent themes. The other two are: the international law standards governing 
internment, and how history iV IDFWRUHG LQWR WRGD\¶V practice. These three dimensions 
are deployed to supply a comprehensive vision of exercising internment in the past and 
present. Little will be said on what internment could or should look like in the future, and 
the reason for this lack of view on internment is that it is impossible to predict the future 
of this practice or even formulate a direction for it, unless we (and not even fully) 
become sufficiently aware of the particularities of the roadmap that has taken us thus 
far.  
                                                          
33 Lobban, above note 30, at 31.  
34 A clear example of these interpretative mistakes in the context of internment stems from the Strasburg 
&RXUW¶V GHDOLQJV ZLWK LWV RZQ YHU\ ILUVW MXGJPHQW QDPHO\ WKH Lawless case. In its reconstruction of the 
Lawless case, the Strasburg Court has repeatedly stressed that this judgment takes Article 5(1)(c) to have 
entailed a prohibition of detention without trial in times of non-emergency. However, as shown in chapter III, 
neither Article 5(1)(c) nor the Lawless case prohibits the use of detention without trial as such. Rather, what 
they prohibit is internment without judicial review. For a detailed discussion, refer to chapter III, section 4.1.  
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As can be gathered from the title of this thesis, its underlying purpose is to trace an 
evolving thread of the practice running through modern history into contemporary 
practice. For our purposes, however, it is vital to remember that the lens through which 
we conceive the history of internment is predominantly a positivist one, with the focus 
on the legal dimensions to the historical narrative. This is how our analysis can be 
differentiated from a strict historiography of internment, or what, in the language of 
legal historians, is called external legal history. 35 It must be noted that there is no 
scarcity of legal literature on the subject of detention without trial in domestic and 
international law. Both the exponents and proponents of the practice of detention 
without trial have produced voluminous books and articles on the subject of detention 
along the divisions of the different legal canons. The interest in this topic particularly 
increased in the aftermath of 9/11, when hardly a day went by without headlines about 
the Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and Bagram detention camps, or even the alleged CIA 
unacknowledged detention sites in Europe and elsewhere. Accordingly, different scholars 
have subscribed to different points of view, and have scrutinised the practice of 
detention from a host of perspectives. These divergent approaches range from doctrinal 
analyses to pure policy arguments and legal philosophy, and have even spread to the 
field of international relations.36 To the extent that the copious scholarly academic pieces 
have focused on creating a perceived ideal for the future of detention, there is a general 
tendency on their part to be more prescriptive in terms of law and policy rather than 
descriptive of what we already have at our disposal. As has been remarked before, this 
inattention towards description can lead to radical misperceptions and ill-funded 
conclusions. Yet, a constructive turn to description cannot be made possible without 
taking account of the history of a given subject. In the particular case of detention, there 
also exists a good breadth of historical literature. Notably, Simpson has authored scores 
                                                          
35 ',EEHVWRQµ:KDWis Legal History a History oI"¶LQ$/HZLV and M. Lobban (eds), Law and History (Oxford: 
OUP, 2003) at 33.  
36 In different sections of this thesis, various examples of literature will be provided and analysed on their 
merits.  
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of valuable historical findings on the subject of detention.37 To this must be added the 
historical excavations of the habeas corpus historians, who have embarked on the 
subject of detention due to its close proximity to habeas corpus.38 However, the work of 
legal historians on the topic at hand has mostly been concerned with the external 
dimensions of history. This has created a discord between the historical studies of 
detention and the abounding doctrinal analyses of this matter. One of the premises of 
this research is to bridge this gap, and form a historically informed doctrinal analysis. 
Crucially, this is not an endeavour alien to the common law tradition. As Poole has 
argued with rigor: 
 
Constitutional argument often involves consideration of the past, a fact to 
which British constitutional lawyers are of necessity well attuned. Absent a 
constitutional text, the past becomes the main repository of constitutional 
principles, principles that need almost continual updating and refinement by 
means of a process of sifting through the historical material.39  
 
The great advantage of undertaking a historically informed analysis is that through 
discovering the threads of continuity and points of departure inherent in the evolution of 
a legal subject, some patterns can also be speculated to govern the future direction of a 
practice. For this to happen, one needs to read between the lines of history and law with 
a view to drawing the frames of practice, whose sufficient repetition and return in history 
has turned them into dominant legal patterns. Thus, by having run the themes of law 
and history together, this research seeks to advance the thesis of the subjective and 
objective systems of determination, and clarify its many aspects.  
The historical queries of this thesis are focused on the practice of detention in England, 
and the British Empire from the early seventeenth century to the end of the Second 
World War. Here, we must briefly state the reasons for our choice of place and time. As 
will be shown, the evolution of the practice of detention without trial has constantly 
                                                          
37
 A. :%6LPSVRQ$:%µ5RXQG8p the Usual Suspects: The Legacy of British Colonialism and the 
European &RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV¶Loyola Law Review 630. A. W. B. Simpson, Human Rights 
and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention (Oxford: OUP, 2001), A. W. B. 
Simpson, In The Highest Degree Odious: Detention without Trial in Wartime Britain (Oxford: OUP, 1992).  
38
 P. D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2010), A. D. R. 
Zellick et al, The Law of Habeas Corpus (Oxford: OUP, 2011).  
39 73RROHµ-XGLFLDO5HYLHZDWWKH0DUJLQV/DZ3RZHUDQG3UHURJDWLYH¶ (2010) 60 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 81, at 91.  
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revolved around two central themes: order/power/authority versus liberty (or, as it will 
later be discussed, subjective system of determination versus objective system of 
determination). The former has been deployed behind all practices of internment 
couched in the language of necessity, and the latter has been used to constrain the 
powers of the executive by such means as varying safeguards manifesting themselves in 
the language of checks and balances. At the same time, the same two themes have 
acted as the driving forces of modern constitutional development. 40 Drawing on this 
undisputed assumption, it is reasonable to conclude that the history of internment is 
closely tied to the history of modern constitutional development and reform. 41  No 
wonder, then, that one of the earliest and most serious modern constitutional crises 
RFFXUUHG LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH.LQJ¶V prerogative to intern subjects, and that was the 
dispute between Charles I and Parliament in the early 1620s. The struggle between 
authority and liberty is extremely visible in the constitutional history of England, and has 
been acknowledged, and elaborated in detail, by such writers as Skinner,42 Halliday,43 
Simpson,44 Loughlin,45 Philip Reid,46 and many more prominent writers taking on the 
constitutional history of England.  
This visible tension between authority and liberty in the constitutional history of England 
has influenced the evolution of detention without trial in two major ways: 1) the mode in 
which the power of internment is exercised; 2) the mode in which the power of 
internment is constrained.47 The former entails such essentials as the assertion of a 
constitutionally driven authority to intern, and a regulatory framework by which this 
authority comes to manifest itself. The latter consists of the institutional framework by 
which the authority to intern becomes channelled and limited.  
                                                          
40 M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010) at 313.  
41 For proving this point for yourself, you can see, N. Hussain, The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism 
and the Rule of Law (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2003). 
42 See, Q. Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: CUP, 1998).   
43 See, P. D. Halliday, above note 38 (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2010).  
44 See, A. W. B. Simpson, above note 37 (Oxford: OUP, 2001).  
45 See, Loughlin, above note 40.  
46 See, J. Philip Reid, The Concept of Liberty in the Age of American Revolution (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1988).  
47 This will be evidenced in chapter I.   
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Due to the predominance of the authority versus liberty theme in its power politics, 
England pioneered in developing an institutional framework for either exercising or 
limiting the power to intern subjects. For this claim, there exist a number of examples, 
which we shall briefly enlist here, and address in detail in the ensuing parts of this 
thesis: the ban of imprisonment without a prior conviction as early as 1215 in the Magna 
Carta; the emergence of the writ of habeas corpus as an instrument for the judiciary to 
keep an account of the causes of detention; the opposition of Parliament to the authority 
of Charles I and the issuance of the Petition of Rights; the emphasis of the Petition of 
Rights on the prohibition of detention without a stated cause; the enactment of a series 
of habeas corpus acts in 1641 and 1679; the emergence of the practice of parliamentary 
suspension acts in the late seventeenth century and its continuance through the 
eighteenth century; formalising methods other than the suspension of habeas corpus in 
the aftermath of the eighteenth century; the use of the concept of necessity in a legal 
sense for the purpose of authorising internment; developing a rather sophisticated legal 
framework for the internment of aliens; and, finally, creating administrative bodies for 
making decisions on the release of internees.48 
The importance of a historical study of internment in Britain will be increased, when it is 
considered that internment in the form developed in the realm was exported to a host of 
other parts of the world by colonialism.49 Many of the former British colonies continued 
to exercise internment after their independence. 50  What is interesting, are the 
similarities of their post-independence exercise of internment to the original mode of 
internment, as introduced to them by Britain. Taking this into account, one could say 
that taking on the history of internment in Britain does not confine us to the 
particularities of this practice within the geographical demarcations of the realm. Rather, 
it also helps us to understand the practical foundations of internment in many states to 
its colonial root.  
                                                          
48 All of these historical companions of the practice of internment in Britain will be discussed in detail in chapter 
I, section 10.  
49 See, 6LPSVRQµ5RXQG8SWKH8VXDO6XVSHFWV, above note 37.  
50 For the most detailed account of internment in the post-colonial states, see, A. Harding and J. Hatchard 
(eds), Preventive Detention and Security Law: A Comparative Survey (Hague: MNF, 1993).  
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These different sub-pieces of the practice of detention without trial as orchestrated by 
the British practice also shaped a considerable part of the background against which the 
post Second World War  movement of internationalism codified new standards governing 
the subject of internment. This is not to conclude that the adoption of the new laws on 
the matter of internment was a direct reaction to the modalities of internment as 
practised throughout the British Empire. However, as will be examined in the respective 
chapters, the exercise of internment in the British state definitely influenced the course 
taken by the regimes of international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law. This brings us to the second theme of this thesis, which will be expressed below.  
5. International law and internment  
 
The second central theme of this thesis follows the changes made by the two main sub-
branches of international law, namely, international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law. Such changes, for the largest part, occurred in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. This was when the passion for limiting the subjective political 
authority of states, and replacing it with (in an idealistic manner) objective, normative 
and concrete rules of international law, was at its greatest.51 Of course, to the extent 
that international law developed in the immediate wake of the Second World War, a new 
capacity was recognised for international law to come to grips with the rights of 
individuals as opposed to states. This primarily manifested itself in the legal regime of 
international human rights law, and later came to open a new era of humanitarianism in 
the laws of armed conflict as well.52 One of the primary reasons for this revolutionary 
change was that the conception of the rights of individuals in times of peace or armed 
conflict was no longer confined to scholarly treatises on the laws of nature, or 
contrasting declarations on the rights of man.53 Rather, in this new era, there was an 
increase in the written embodiments of international law dealing with individuals in the 
                                                          
51 M. Koskenniemi, The Politics Of International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) at 38±39.  
52 See, 70HURQ µ7KH+XPDQL]DWLRQRI+XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ¶  American Journal of International Law 
239. 
53 This point will be analysed in detail in chapter II of this thesis.  
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form of international treaties.54 These treaties contain a wide range of international law 
prescriptions as to when and how states must exercise internment. However, the 
answers provided by international law to the questions of how and when to intern are 
relatively different in its two branches of human rights and humanitarian law. For 
example, the human rights instructions on internment are cast in the language of 
arbitrariness, about which we will supply a detailed analysis in chapter III.55 This is 
whilst international laws of armed conflict entail no reference to the language of 
arbitrariness. Equally true is the obligation of judicial review of internment imposed by 
such treaties as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.56 However, the 
laws of armed conflict include no such obligation.57 The point is, that even decades after 
the adoption of the relevant treaties, some important parts of their content and their 
interaction with the other regimes of international law remain contested. The second 
theme of this thesis is composed of its commitment to discuss what these international 
law obligations were in their historical context, what they are in their contemporary 
understanding, how they have contributed to the existing legal dialectic surrounding 
internment, and how states have received or otherwise resisted them.  
Another purpose of locating our focus on international law is to highlight the conflict of 
interests between states and international law. To elaborate more on this point, it must 
be said that there is a natural tendency amongst states to take matters at their own 
discretion, and to use their own subjective judgement on such questions as who to 
intern, when to intern and how to intern. At the same time, international law, whilst 
recognising states as its principal actors, aspires to regulate the activities of states when 
they adversely affect the rights of individuals.58 Such contrasting trends of international 
                                                          
54 Chapters III and IV will enlist and analyse these treaties in detail. Here, it must briefly be mentioned that in 
our analysis of international law, our focus will be placed on treaty-based international law, as dealing with the 
issues of customary international law goes beyond the limited space of this thesis. That said, whenever 
questions of custom arises, such as whether the obligation of judicial review must be treated as jus cogens, 
they will, albeit very briefly, be dealt with in this thesis.  
55 Article 9, ICCPR, above note 29. 
56 A detailed discussion of such issues can be found in chapter IV, section 9. 
57 Compare and contrast Article 9 of the ICCPR to Articles 43 and 78 of GC IV (Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287).  
58 On the point of this conflict between international law and states, M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870±1960 (Cambridge: CUP, 2001) at 360.  
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law and states at times become very visible on the front of internment. For example, the 
heavy reliance of the US executive on the constructed category of µHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶
was done only to create a unique grey space insulated from the reach of international 
law. As will be seen in the example of µHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶VWDWHVRIWHQUHVRUWWRYHU\
sophisticated mechanisms disguised by an appearance of law precisely to circumvent the 
international rule of law. Here, an added dimension for studying the legal history of 
internment can be recognised, and that is, the legal history of internment can reveal a 
lot about the techniques and the mechanisms states have used on the subject of 
internment to supersede their legal obligations under domestic and international law, 
and this automatically directs us to the third theme of this thesis.  
6. How the history of internment informs contemporary practice  
 
Even though the advent of the post Second World War era signifies a ground-breaking 
point of departure in the history of internment, it is very important to trace both the 
places in which contemporary practice can be dichotomised from historical practice, and 
in what areas there is a thread of continuity between historical and contemporary 
practice. Without realising and distinguishing these points of departure and continuity, 
we are likely to create mistaken and misguiding classifications. Once again, a perfect 
example of these historical and analytical mistakes stems from the claims of the Bush 
Administration in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, that countering terrorism 
in this new age requires new weapons and new laws, 59  whilst, in effect, the Bush 
Administration employed very old techniques and laws, such as the language of the 
µHQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ HPHUJLQJ IURP the Quirin case in its so-FDOOHG µZDU RQ WHUURU¶
Therefore, in dealing with the contemporary issues in chapters III, IV and V, we make 
the linkages between past and present exercises crystal clear whenever the need arises. 
Here, we have put forward some contemporary concepts regarding internment for 
                                                          
59 Secretary of Defense '+5XPVIHOGµ$1HZ.LQGRI:DU¶SXEOLVKHGLQWKHNew York Times, September 27, 
2001.  
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understanding, which is necessary as well as useful in going back to the history of 
internment.  
1) The meaning of the test of arbitrariness as laid down in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
2) Understanding the difference between objective judicial review of internment, and 
sham reviews deferring the powers of the executive under any circumstances and 
at any cost.  
3) The persistence of some post-colonial states such as India in exercising 
internment and their interaction with the contemporary human rights standards.  
4) Understanding the emergency clauses of the international and regional human 
rights treaties.  
5) Detecting the origin of the language employed in some of the relevant articles of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention relating to internment.  
6) Tracing the origins of creating categories for different internees, VXFKDVµGLVOR\DO
citi]HQV¶µXQODZIXOHQHP\XQSULYLOHJHGFRPEDWDQWV¶.  
7) Detecting the origin of such features as military commissions and advisory boards 
in the practice of internment.  
7. Research questions and the structure of this thesis  
 
Drawing on the central themes of this thesis, the primary questions underlying this 
research are as follows:  
1) What were the first regulatory methods of authorising internment in the common 
law tradition, and how were such methods exported to other parts of the world? 
What were the legal thresholds moving the authorities to resort to internment, 
and how was the conflict between the subjective discretion of sovereigns and the 
requirements of the rule of law in interning individuals mediated in the common 
law tradition? These questions will be examined in chapters I and II.  
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2) Did international law play any role in regulating the law of internment before the 
emergence of international human rights law, and what was the role of the 
sovereign prerogative in interning aliens? These questions will be answered in 
chapter II. 
3) How did human rights law contribute to the humanisation of the rules associated 
with internment? What is the meaning of the test of arbitrariness on the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention, and how can this be applied in different cases 
of internment? Do the standards of human rights on internment change in the 
cases of emergency, and how does this affect the test of arbitrariness? These 
questions will be addressed in chapter III.   
4) What were and are the legal bases for internment under the traditional laws of 
war and the contemporary international laws of armed conflict? In what ways and 
to what extent can the human rights law standards governing internment be 
exploited to govern internment in armed conflict situations? Such questions will 
be explored in chapter IV. 
5) How did the history of internment in the common law tradition, the legal 
standards arising from international law and the natural tendency of the 
executive to tip the balance in favour of its discretion, factor into the American 
µFRXQWHU-WHUURULVP¶UHVSRQVH? This will be our concluding question for chapter V.  
Finally, on account of addressing and analysing the questions posed above, the 
concluding remarks of this thesis draw a summary pattern for the evolution of 
detention without trial, which links the historical investigations of this thesis and the 
practice of detention without trial as it is known and exercised today.
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                                                       Chapter I 
The Historical Evolution of the Practice of Detention without Trial 
in the Common Law Tradition  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The many constitutional crises which occurred in England in the 
seventeenth century, required a theoretical revision of a number of 
concepts in the political discourse. The effects of this revision did not only 
occur at theoretical levels. They were also visible at the level of political 
decision-making.1 In the seventeenth century, when arbitrary uses of the 
prerogative by Charles I, Charles II and James II in order to exercise 
detention without trial were criticised by Parliament, there emerged an 
implicit review of the contours of arbitrary power in the political discourse 
requiring an articulation of the boundaries of the use of prerogative. It was 
by the virtue of such boundaries that the scope of deference to liberty or 
the measures aimed at containing licentiousness would be determined.2  
Two opposing practices in the modern history of England would determine 
the limits of liberty in a confrontation against licentiousness and these 
were habeas corpus and detention without trial. The former was tasked to 
HQVXUH WKDW WKH VXEMHFWV¶ ORVV RI OLEHUW\ZDV XQGHUWDNHQ RQ WKH EDVLV RI
reasons standing compliant to the known law of the realm. The latter was, 
however, a legal vehicle generated by necessity, specifically utilised for 
depriving subjects of their physical liberty. That is to say, when 
licentiousness was to gain ground, necessity would force authorities to 
resort to detention without trial for containing the liberty of individuals. 
                                                          
1 G. Robertson, Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (London: Penguin 
books, 2006) at 4-16.  
2 See, J. Philip Reid, The Concept of Liberty in the Age of American Revolution (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1988) at 33-36.  
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This chapter starts its quest of determining the conceptual and practical 
FRPSRQHQWV RI µWKH ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶ ZLWK the Magna Carta. It briefly 
describes the role of the Magna Carta in shaping the discourse governing 
the issue of detention without trial. Gaining an appreciation of this role is 
particularly important in that it aids us to set the context for the 
constitutional crises of the seventeenth century, which led to an 
institutionalisation of the practice of detention without trial, as we 
recognise it today. Accordingly, the second section of this chapter will 
illustrate how the practice of detention without trial in the early 
seventeenth century became linked to the writ of habeas corpus. In so 
doing, a heavy reliance is made upon the historical findings of the major 
historians of habeas corpus. Having done that and drawing on the valuable 
scholarship of the legal historian A.W.B. Simpson on detention without 
trial, 3  this chapter identifies three primary methods for authorising 
detention without trial from the eighteenth century onwards. These 
methods are suspension of habeas corpus, martial law, and special 
regulations. It must be noted that the British experiences of colonial 
governance (from mid eighteenth century to the end of the Second World 
War) is essential in terms of appreciating the evolving methods of 
detention without trial. It was in the context of colonial uprisings that the 
British counter-insurgency methods developed. Some authors have even 
gone as far as contending that colonies more often than not served as 
µFRQVWLWXWLRQDOWHVWJURXQGV¶IRUPDQ\SUDFWLFHVthat Britain favoured to put 
in place.4 It is safe to argue that colonialism played a vital part in terms of 
promoting different devices for dealing with emergencies. Given this 
importance, this chapter is divided into two different parts. The first part 
(which follows a strict chronological order in the seventeenth and 
                                                          
3 For example, A. W. B. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the 
Genesis of the European Convention (Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
4  See, for example, P. Costa, D. Zolo, The Rule of Law, History, Theory and Criticism 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2007).  
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eighteenth century) pays regard to detention without trial in England and 
the second part combines the experiences of emergency situations in 
England with those of the colonies.    
2. Magna Carta: Where it all began  
  
As is widely known, the Magna Carta came into existence as a result of a 
long-lasting conflict between King John and the barons, 5  and it was a 
direct response to the crimes of King John as well as the entire tradition of 
µ$QJHYLQ.LQJVKLS¶6 The ultimate value of the Magna Carta was to enforce 
WKHLGHDWKDWµWKHNLQJZDVQRWDERYHWKHODZ¶7 In so doing, the content of 
the Magna Carta was directed by its authors to put particular limits on the 
powers of the King, when infringing upon the liberties of subjects. Among 
these restraints was the freedom of subjects from seizure or 
imprisonmHQWµH[FHSWE\WKHODZIXOMXGJments of his equals/[peers] or by 
WKHODZRIWKHODQG¶2IFRXUVHWKHQRWLRQRILPSRUWDQFHKHUHLVµWKHODZ
oIWKHODQG¶8  
Despite its clear purpose of placing some rudimentary restraints upon the 
IUHHGRPRIWKH.LQJWKHSKUDVHµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶was not susceptible 
WRSUHFLVHPHDQLQJ,WZDVWKXVWKDWWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶
became a moving target over the centuries. Many questions persisted. To 
VWDWHD IHZRI WKHVHTXHVWLRQVZKDW LID VHHPLQJO\ µLOOHJDORUGHU¶E\ WKH
.LQJ WRRN WKH IRUP RI ZULWWHQ ODZ" :DV µWKH ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶ WR EH
XQGHUVWRRGLQWKHOLJKWRILWVSDLUWHUPµODZIXOMXGJPHQWV RISHHUV¶RUYLFH
YHUVD" :HUH WKH SKUDVHV µWKH ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶ DQG µMXGJHPHQW RI SHHUV¶
                                                          
5 See, D. Levy, The Signing of Magna Carta (United States: Twenty-First Century Books, 
2008).  
6 N. Vincent, Magna Carta: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OUP, 2012) at 35-36.  
7  C. Daniell, From Norman Conquest to Magna Carta: England 1066-1215 (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2003) at 51.  
8 Magna Carta Libertatum (1215), chapter 29.  
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meant to convey an equivalent meaning?9 What about the occasions, on 
which the King alleged to be the victim of treason himself? What about the 
time of war in which laws were considered to fall silent?10 Questions such 
as these invariably determined the trajectory of the concept of the rule of 
law in the common law tradition. More particularly, they punctuated the 
evolving process of the laws governing the practice of internment.  
 
$V µWKH ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶ SURYHG WR EH IDU IURP UHSUHVHQWLQJ D FRQFUHWH
concept, different attributes in separate periods stood out to signify the 
PHDQLQJDQGVFRSHRI µWKH ODZRI WKH ODQG¶)RUH[DPSOH7KRPSVRQKDV
argued that the notion of lex terrae/the law of the land was used in a 
V\QRQ\PRXVPDQQHUZLWKµGXHSURFHVVRIODZ¶LQWKHIRXUWHHQWKFHQWXU\11 
,WZDVWKLVHPSKDVLVRQµGXHSURFHVVRIODZ¶WKDWLQFUHDVHGWKHLPSRUWDQFH
of the common law writs in general, and the writ of habeas corpus in 
particular. However, as Thompson has remarked, the fact that the 
FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ µWKH ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶ DQG µGXH SURFHVV RI ODZ¶ ZDV
highlighted from the fourteenth century onwards did not mean that there 
immediately emerged a set of rules and procedures set in stone for the 
purpose of realising where the king could exceed its authority. 
Accordingly, Thompson has provided many examples through which, one 
could see invocations of dubious procedures to the benefit of the king in 
the name of law.12 Some common law historians have argued that lex 
terrae ZKHQ WUDQVODWHG LQWR µGXH SURFHVV¶ GLG QRW LQWHQG WR KLQW DW DQ\
form of standard procedure. Rather, so long as there existed a procedure 
or process for a given action of the King, no matter how minimal, that 
                                                          
9 R. Turner, Magna Carta: Through the Ages (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2003) at 
71-72.  
10 F. Thompson, Magna Carta: Its Role in the Making of the English Constitution 1300-1629 
(London: the University of Minnesota Press, 1948) at 72.  
11 Ibid., at 68-69.  
12 Ibid., at 74.  
24 
 
DFWLRQFRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGDVEHLQJFRPSDWLEOHZLWKµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶13 
,Q RWKHU ZRUGV LW ZDV µQRW WKH PDQQer of judicial procedure, but the 
FRPSOHWHDEVHQFHRI LW¶14 which formed an anti-thesis to requirements of 
µWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶7KLVPLJKWZHOOKDYHEHHQWKHLQLWLDOLPSUHVVLRQOHIW
by the test of lex terrae in the first few centuries succeeding the issuance 
of Magna Carta. However, in the first half of the seventeenth century, 
there emerged signs of change in the predominant legal conceptions of the 
day, as King Charles I learned in the dispute caused by the Five Knights 
case, which will be considered in greater detail later in this chapter.15 
3. The emergence of habeas corpus  
 
As already mentioned, the fourteenth century witnessed an amplification 
of legal procedures and new legal institutions in England. Among the 
institutions added to the law enforcement machinery of England in the 
fourteenth century were the Justices of the Peace (JPs). These were 
appointed as a replacement for custodias pacis, or conservators/keepers of 
the peace, whose powers were generally more limited than the JPs.16 In 
general, the JPs possessed very broad arresting powers.17 In short, the 
broad powers of the JPs offered a route to their abuse of power. What was 
DWVWDNHLQWKH-3¶VDEXVHRIGLVFUHWLRQZDVVRPHWKLQJH[WUHPHO\YDOXDEOH
in the realm of English politics and law, namely, the liberty of the bodies of 
subjects. To understand the importance of the physical liberty of subjects, 
we must look to an important attribute of subjecthood which has been 
GHVFULEHG E\ +DOOLGD\ DV µD FRQGLWLRQ RQH HQWHUHG E\ FRPLQJ LQWR D
                                                          
13 W. S. McKechnie, Magna Carta: A Commentary on the Great Charter of King John with an 
Historical Introduction (Glasgow: Maclehouse, 1914) at 447-448.  
14 &+0F,OZDLQµ'XH3URFHVVRI/DZLQ0DJQD&DUWD¶Columbia Law Review 27, 
at 30.  
15 Section 4.  
16 See%3XWQDPµ7KH7UDQVIRUPDWLRQRIWKH.HHSHUVRIWKHPeace into the Justices of the 
Peace 1327-¶Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 19.  
17 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (New York, E. Duycknick et al, 1827) 
at 260. 
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particular kind oIUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHNLQJKLVSURWHFWLRQ¶18 However, the 
protection of the king could only be spread to subjects, if they would in 
turn commit their bodies to protect the king. 19  The meaning of this 
formula was that a jailed subject by the arbitrary imprisonment orders of 
the JPs could not commit his body to protect the king. Thus, it was the 
NLQJ¶VQHHGWRKDYHDQDFFRXQWRIWKHFDXVHRIKLVVXEMHFWV¶GHSULYDWLRQRI
liberty that gave rise to the writ of habeas corpus as an instrument by 
which judges couOGHQTXLUHLQWRWKHFDXVHRIVXEMHFWV¶GHWHQWLRQ20  
However, no matter what motives were deployed behind the formulation 
of habeas corpus, the writ of habeas corpus, even in its ad subjiciendum 
form, changed the practice of confinement in ways never witnessed 
before. Firstly, on the return of the writ of habeas corpus to judges who 
issued it, jailers were to express the cause of confinement. This in turn 
reduced the ability of actors such as sheriffs and justices of the peace to 
resort to false imprisonments. As a result, the emergence of habeas 
corpus certainly necessitated strong evidentiary grounds for such actors to 
invoke their detention powers.  
However, one question persisted to create a slight sense of unease among 
the judges, who issued habeas corpus; what about the imprisonment 
orders made by the King or the King in council (Privy Council)?21 In such 
situations the courts would continue to issue habeas corpus for the 
LPSULVRQPHQWRUGHUVPDGHE\WKH.LQJ¶VRIILFLDOV+RZHYHUVRPHRIWKHVH
writs would return to the judge, who issued the writ, without mentioning 
the cause of detention in them. When faced by the return of habeas 
corpus without a cause, the courts would exercise judicial deference to the 
                                                          
18 P. D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2010)  
at 35.  
19 Ibid., at 74-84.  
20 Halliday, above note 18, at 9.  
21 Privy Council was the main body of government, which served as the historical antecedent 
to cabinet government.  
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will of the detaining power.22 It is fair to say these types of detentions 
without an alleged cause are the true modern ancestors of the practice of 
detention without trial, as we know today.23 The practice of returning the 
writ of habeas corpus with no stated cause for the detentions exercised by 
the Privy Council seems to have been quite acceptable at least by the end 
of the first quarter of the seventeenth century. So much so that Sir 
Edward Coke(who later joined on the forefront of criticising Charles I for 
the same practice) had argued at one point that the cause of detention, 
when not stated by the detaining power on the return of habeas corpus 
PXVWEHDVVXPHGWREHµarcana imperii¶RUµVHFUHWRIHPSLUH¶24 This resort 
WR WKH H[FXVH RI µarcana imperii¶ ZDV XVXDOO\ XVHG E\ WKH GHWDLQLQJ
authority in the early seventeenth century in cases involving the crime of 
treason.25 
4. The case of Five Knights and differing conceptions of the 
powers of the sovereign  
 
In 1626, King Charles I found himself in the middle of a serious financial 
crisis caused by his aid to his relative and strategic ally, Christian IV of 
'HQPDUN 7KH VLWXDWLRQ UDSLGO\ ZRUVHQHG DV &KDUOHV¶ DOOLHV VXIIHUHG
consecutive defeats, and therefore, he was compelled to seek an urgent 
ZD\RIUDLVLQJUHYHQXHV7KLVILQDOO\UHVXOWHGLQ&KDUOHV¶ LPSRVLWLRQRIKLV
forced loan policy upon his subjects. Knowing that there was no real 
prospect of a repayment of their paid loans to them, many subjects, and 
                                                          
22 Halliday, above note 18, at 154, and M. Kishlanski, Tyranny Denied: Charles I, Attorney 
General Heath, and 
7KH)LYH.QLJKWV¶&DVHThe Historical Journal 53, at 57-58. For the opposite view, 
see, J. A. Guy, µ7KH2ULJLQVRIWKH3HWLWLRQRI5LJKWV5HFRQVLGHUHG¶ (1982) 25 The Historical 
Journal 289. 
23 The ancient ancestors being detention of the followers of Christ such as Paul and Peter, 
Apostles, Acts 25:27  
24 Bod. Rawlinson C. 382 cited in Halliday, above, at 398.  
25 For example, &RXQWHVVRI 6KUHZVEXU\¶V &DVH, (1612) 12 Coke Reports 94 77 E.R. 1369 
and Blanchflower v Atwood, (1607) Yelverton 107 80 E.R. 73. 
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particularly most English elites resisted the forced loan policy. 26  In 
UHVSRQVHWRWKLVUHVLVWDQFHE\WKH.LQJ¶VFRPPDQGPHQWPDQ\LQGLYLGXDOV
were detained. Among such individuals were the five knights, who 
requested the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for enquiring into the 
lawfulness of the cause of their detention. The writ was issued. However, 
instead of specifying the cause of their detention, the Privy Council briefly 
posited that the detentions in question had been exercised by the kinJ¶V
µVSHFLDOFRPPDQGPHQW¶ 
 
With one of the knights having withdrawn from the case, the other four 
remaining plaintiffs requested the grant of bail on the basis that they must 
be informed of the cause of their detention in accordance with the law of 
the land.27 7KLVFDVHUHQHZHGWKHROGFRQIXVLRQVDERXWWKHPHDQLQJRIµWKH
ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶ DV DUWLFXODWHG LQ0DJQD&DUWD $FFRUGLQJO\ ERWK SDUWLHV
invoked Magna Carta for their own cause. The defence for the plaintiff 
GUHZRQ0DJQD&DUWDDQGDUJXHG µ,IWKLVUeturn [without specifying any 
cause for detention] shall be good, then his imprisonment shall not 
FRQWLQXHRQIRUDWLPHEXWIRUHYHU¶28  
 
At the other end of the spectrum was Attorney General Heath, who was of 
WKH RSLQLRQ WKDW µWKH ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶ UHFRJQises the absolutism of the 
.LQJ¶VSRZHUVZLWKUHJDUGWRSDUWLFXODUPDWWHUV 
[T]here is a great difference between those legal commands 
and that absoluta potestas that a sovereign hath, by which a 
king commands. However, when I call it absoluta potestas, I do 
not mean that it is such a power as that a king may do what he 
pleaseth, for he hath rules to govern himself by, as well as your 
Lordships, who are subordinate judges under him The 
difference is, the king is the head of the same fountain of 
justice, which your Lordship administers to all his subjects.29 
 
                                                          
26 See, R. P. Cust , The forced loan and English politics (Oxford: OUP, 1987).  
27 Proceedings on the Habeas Corpus, brought by Sir Thomas Darnel et al DWWKH.LQJ¶V-Bench 
in Westminister hall: Charles I A. D. 1627 in A Complete Collection of State Trials (1816). 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid. 
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On close scrutiny, one can identify striking parallels between the language 
employed by Heath and the words of Gentili in his famous piece, the 
µ$EVROXWH3RZHURIWKH.LQJ¶30 To tip the balance of power in favour of the 
monarchy in its continued clashes with religious institutions, Gentili 
aligned himself with the concept of the absolute power of the sovereign, 
and thereby he argued,  
Sovereignty is absolute and perpetual power[«]. This 
sovereignty means that the prince never finds anything above 
KLPQHLWKHUKXPDQEHLQJQRUODZ«7KLVSRZHULVDEVROXWHDQG
ZLWKRXWOLPLWDWLRQ«7KDWWKHµ3ULQFHLVQRWERXQGE\ODZ¶LVODZ
DV LVDOVRWKDW µ/DZLVZKDWSOHDVHVWKHSULQFH¶$QGWKLV LVQR
barbarian law but Roman law, the first and foremost among 
KXPDQ ODZV« $QG VR ZKDW LV FDOOHG UHJDO SUHURJDWLYH LQ
England is absolute power.31 
 
$OWKRXJK +HDWK¶V GHIHQFH RI WKH .LQJ¶V SUHURJDWLYH ZDV FDSWXUHG LQ D
much more constraining fashion than that expressed by Gentili, the 
ultimate result was somehow the same as that which Gentili intended to 
deliver, namely, reserving the absolute power of the sovereign in certain 
domains such as detention.32  
 
4.1. Detention without trial in Parliament  
The controversies in Parliament surrounding detention without an alleged 
cause, and its underlying justification, namely absoluta potestas, gathered 
pace in the politically charged atmosphere of the 1620s. This particularly 
holds true in the aftermath of tKHGHFLVLRQPDGHE\ WKH.LQJ¶V%HQFK LQ
the Five Knights¶FDVHLQZKLFKWKHMXGJHVDSSURYHGWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
LPSULVRQPHQW DW WKH GLVFUHWLRQ RI WKH .LQJ DQG GLG VR LQ RUGHU µWR
VWUHQJWKHQ WKH SUHURJDWLYH¶ 33  Chief Justice Hyde, who delivered the 
opinion of the court in the case in question, mapped out broad areas of 
                                                          
30 CLWHGDQGDQDO\VHGLQ0.RVNHQQLHPLµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQGUDLVRQG¶pWDW5HWKLQNLQJWKH
3UHKLVWRU\RI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶in B. Kingsbury, B. Strauman (eds), The Roman Foundations 
of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire (Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
31 Ibid.  
32 C. W. Brooks, Law, Politics And Society in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), 
at 162.  
33 R. P. Cust, above note 26, at 238. 
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MXGLFLDOGHIHUHQFHWRWKH.LQJ¶VFRPPDQGV+LVZLGHO\FLWHGZRUGV LQWKLV
UHJDUG ZHUH µLI QR FDXVH RI WKH FRPPLWPHQW EH H[SUHVVHG LW LV WR EH
presumed to be for matter of state, which we caQQRWWDNHQRWLFHRI¶34  
 
The result of the precedent established by Hyde was simple: when a 
GHWHQWLRQZDVH[HUFLVHGE\WKH.LQJ¶VRIILFLDOV WKHZULWFRXOGVWLOO IROORZ
However, if on the return no cause was expressed, prisoners could still be 
held. Therefore, the final judgment of the court did not favour the request 
of the four knights. Observing fairness in analysing the judgment delivered 
by Hyde has historically proved to be a difficult task, and it goes far 
beyond the scope of this thesis. In short, LIZHDFFHSWWKDWWKHWHUPµWKH
ODZRI WKH ODQG¶ UHTXLUHGFRPSOLDQFHRQ WKHSDUWRI WKH.LQJRUKLVSULY\
council with some form of standard procedure, the inevitable conclusion 
would be that Hyde was mistaken in making a judgement in favour of the 
King. However, as mentioned above, most historians seem to suggest that 
there did not exist a standard procedure for the purposes of determining 
what lex terrae meant. In any case, the decision of Hyde did not specify 
ZKDWPHDQLQJFRXOGEHDVVLJQHGWRµWKHODZRI WKHODQG¶HLWKHU 
 
All the imprisoned loan refusers were released in the last days of the year 
1627, but too late for the monarchy as the debates of Parliament in 1628 
were centered on the issues surrounding imprisonment without a cause 
shown. The greatest concern of many MPs in this respect involved the 
excessive power of the King in his evocation of the prerogative to 
indefinitely detain subjects without charge. 35 Unsurprisingly, MPs in the 
House of Commons were divided on the matter. However, the majority of 
MPs opposed the stance that gave more weight to the prerogative of the 
                                                          
34 Five Knights Case, above note 27, at 57. 
35 6HH6:LOOPV µ7KH)LYH.QLJKW¶V&DVHDQG'HEDWHV LQ WKH3DUOLDPHQW of 1628: Division 
DQG6XVSLFLRQ8QGHU.LQJ&KDUOHV,¶Constructing the Past 92. 
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.LQJ WKDQ WKH OLEHUWLHV RI (QJOLVK VXEMHFWV DQG DUJXHG µ>O@LEHUW\ LV WKH
VXEMHFW¶V LQKHULWDQFH¶36 Sir Edward Coke took a more legal approach and 
argued that inter alia the element of indefiniteness inherent within the 
detentions ordered by the King would place such exercise outside the 
ERXQGVRIODZµIRUKDGWKHODZLQWHQGHGVXFKDWKLQJLWZRXOGKDYHQDPHG
DWLPH¶37  
All in all, the debates in the House of Commons finally led to the adoption 
of the Petition of Rights 1628, which banned the exercise of detention 
without any cause shown. Nevertheless, the Petition of Rights entailed the 
VDPH YDJXH UHIHUHQFHV WR µWKH ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶ ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WKH
Petition of Rights did not specify whether its limitations restrained the King 
or his officials, when they exercised detention under the auspices of the 
prerogative. Of course, the context in which the Petition of Rights was 
DGRSWHGHQFRXUDJHVRQHWRFRQFOXGHWKDWµHYHQWKHTXDOLILHG suggestion of 
such a supra-legal prerogative was strenuously opposed by the 
FRPPRQV¶ 38  However, what happened in practice seemed to be quite 
different.39  
7KH.LQJ¶V LPSXOVH LQFRQWLQXLQJWKHGHWHQWLRQRIVXEMHFWVHVSHFLDOO\WKH
Members of Parliament without an alleged cause moved Parliament in 
1641 to adopt the Habeas Corpus Act of 1641.40 The Habeas Corpus Act of 
1641 in general entailed more precision than the Petition of Rights. It 
DLPHG WR HOLPLQDWH WKH GHOD\V PDGH E\ WKH MXGJHV RI .LQJ¶V %HQFK LQ
issuing the writ of habeas corpus.41 More importantly, this statute was 
                                                          
36 R. C. Johnson et al, Commons Debates 1628 Volume II: 17 March-19 April 1628 (London: 
Yale University Press, 1977) at 199.  
37 Ibid., at 195, even though as mentioned above, it appears that Coke had expressed legal 
opinions in favour of detention with no alleged cause, whHQH[HUFLVHGE\WKHNLQJ¶VRIILFLDOV
GXULQJWKHUHLJQRI&KDUOHV¶IDWKHU 
38 /-5HHYHµ7KH/HJDO6WDWXVRIWKH3HWLWLRQRI5LJKW¶The Historical Journal 257, 
at 271.  
39 Halliday above, at 139.  
40 Charles I, 1640: An Act for the Regulating of the Privy Council and for taking away the 
Court commonly called the Star Chamber.', Statutes of the Realm: volume 5: 1628-80 
(1819) Sec 8. 
41 Ibid.  
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explicitly addressed to the Privy Council, and stipulated that detention 
orders issued by the Privy Council could not be placed beyond judicial 
review.42 7KHUHVXOWRIWKLVSURFHVVZDVµDWUansformation in the conception 
RI µODZIXO LPSULVRQPHQW IRU UHDVRQV RI VWDWH¶43 From 1641 onwards, one 
witnesses a practice of parliamentary detention orders for reasons of 
state. The meaning of this transformation was that parliamentary 
detention orders were to be considered as being insulated from judicial 
review.  
5. Parliament assumes the detention powers of the King  
 
 In the wake of the civil war in the 1640s, Parliament, and more 
specifically Cromwell, the Lord Protector, resumed all the powers of the 
King for their own cause. The extensive use of imprisonment orders by the 
Protector was intertwined with undermining the independence of the 
courts issuing habeas corpus and requiring its return expressing the cause 
of detention. Similarly, in a case concerning detention, Cromwell blatantly 
GLFWDWHGWKDWWKHMXGJHVVKRXOGUHPHPEHUµZKRPDGHWKHPMXGJHV>DQG@
ZKHWKHU WKH\ KDG DQ\ DXWKRULW\ WR VLW WKHUH EXW ZKDW KH JDYH WKHP¶44 
Cromwell did everything in his power to circumvent the judicial scrutiny of 
the detentions ordered by him. Throwing the prisoners into overseas 
SODFHVZDVRQHRIWKH LQQRYDWLRQVFUHDWHGE\&URPZHOO¶VFRXQFLO LQRUGHU
to block the reach of habeas corpus.45 Parliament questioned the legality 
of placing the prisoners outside the jurisdiction of English courts, and 
consequently, Parliament was dissolved.46 &URPZHOO¶VWDFWLFRIXVLQJSODFHV
                                                          
42 See DOVR(-HQNVµ7KH6WRU\RIWKH+DEHDV&RUSXV¶Law Quarterly Review 64.  
43 Halliday, above note 18, at 226-227.  
44 E. H. Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, Volume III, Part 2 
(London: Clarendon Press, 1807) at 986. 
45 P. Gregg, Free-Born John: A Biography of John Liburne (London: Dent, 1961) at 244-2456.  
46 E. Bernstein, Socialism and Democracy in the Great English Revolution (London: Frank 
Cass, 1963 first published in 1930) at 156.  
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outside the reach of habeas corpus was continued after his death and after 
the restoration of the monarchy.47  
The limited space of this research prevents us from tackling the wide 
political and legal disagreements over the destiny of the writ of habeas 
corpus, and its role in supervising such imprisonments exercised in this 
period. In short, after a laborious conflict between Parliament, the courts 
and the Crown, Parliament enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.48 The 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 was an achievement only in the sense that it 
clarified some jurisdictional and procedural matters concerning the 
operation of habeas corpus. Furthermore, it included an exclusionary 
clause which prevented the return of habeas corpus detained on the 
VXVSLFLRQ RI µIHORQ\ RU WUHDVRQ SODLQO\ H[SUHVVHG LQ WKH ZDUUDQW RI
FRPPLWPHQW¶DQGµSHUVRQVFRQYLFWHGRULQH[HFXWLRQE\OHJDOSURFHVV¶49 In 
the wake of the political chaos of the late 1680s, Parliament would itself 
pioneer the suspension of habeas corpus in 1689. This suspension of 
habeas corpus provided the Privy Council with the power to pursue 
arrests, and detentions without any legal obstacle.50  
At the time of introducing the bill of the suspension of habeas corpus in 
May 1689, Parliament engaged in more serious debates as to whether an 
act of suspension was really required by the grievances of the situation. In 
this regard, one MP VWDWHGµ>Z@HDUHLQZDULIZHPDNHRQO\use of that 
remedy as if we were in full peace, you may be destroyed without 
UHPHG\¶51 On the other hand, the opposition put greater emphasis on the 
+DEHDV&RUSXV$FWDQGDUJXHGµ,IZHSDUWLWWZLFHLWZLOOEHFRPHTXLWHD
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48 Parliament of England, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679). 
49 Ibid.  
50  See ' + 2DNV µ/HJDO +LVWRU\ LQ WKH +LJK &RXUW- +DEHDV &RUSXV¶ 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-1966) 64 
Michigan Law Review 451.  
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common whore. Let us not remove this land-mark of the nation, for a 
FXUVHDWWHQGVLW¶52  
Two features in the debates of Parliament stand out as most interesting; 
1) the role of Parliament in forming a framework for the suspension of 
habeas corpus and 2) the debate on the impact of the urgent situation on 
the resort to detention upon the suspension of habeas corpus. As regards 
the former feature, some speakers insisted that a balanced action of 
UHFHGLQJIURPVXEMHFWV¶OLEHUWLHVZRXOGEHMXVWLILDEOHLILWLVGRQHWKRXJKD
parliamentary intervention. That would in effect provide legitimacy for the 
suspension of habeas corpus. 53  Parliamentary intervention for enacting 
emergency laws turned out to be a credible justification for the suspension 
of habeas corpus upon which the authorities in England relied for 
subsequent centuries to justify their departure from normal procedures of 
law. As regards the latter feature, the difference between the governing 
legal imperatives in the time of peace and war found a great expression in 
the arguments of both groups of speakers, namely, the advocates of a 
further suspension of habeas corpus and the opposition to it. For example, 
&DSHODUJXHG µLW LV WKHZLVGRPRIDOOJRYHUQPHQWVQRWWREHVWUDLW-laced 
XSRQDQ\HPHUJHQF\¶54  
The debates generated in Parliament in May 1689 on the suspension of 
habeas were the earliest of their kind in modern history and reveal how 
the severity of the situation in times of political discomfort can make an 
impact on the resort to detention without trial. Despite the controversies 
generated by the parliamentary suspension of habeas corpus, there were a 
couple of advantages in employing the particular method of suspending 
habeas corpus by Parliament for authorising detention without trial. First 
of all, suspension of the writ of habeas corpus would help reduce some of 
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WKHFRQIXVLRQDERXWWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶LQWKHFRQWH[W
of detention. This would be made possible by introducing the test of 
µQHFHVVLW\¶ DV D SUHUHTXLVLWH IRU GHSDUWLQJ IURP VRPH RI WKH QRUPDO
proceGXUHVLQKHUHQWZLWKLQWKHµGXHSURFHVV¶FRPSRQHQWRIµWKHODZRIWKH
ODQG¶55 That is to say, the parliamentary suspension of habeas corpus was 
a move towards the institutionalisation of the idea that in times of crisis, 
WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV RI µWKH ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶ PD\ EH FKDQJHG (TXDOO\
important was that of the suspension of habeas corpus as Parliament could 
DUWLFXODWHWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKDGHSDUWXUHIURPWKHNQRZQQRUPVRI µWKH
ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶ ZDV SHUPLVVLEOH 7KH IROORZLQJ VHFWLRQVZLOO H[SORUH WKH
specific features of the suspension of habeas corpus as well as other 
subsequent regulatory frameworks aimed at authorising detention without 
trial.    
6. Early Years of the eighteenth century and the use of 
suspension technique in home and the colonies   
 
The opening years of the eighteenth century signified a period in which 
England was at the brink of many political crises. The post-revolutionary 
divisions of the English society showed no signs of disappearance. On 
many levels, rebellion, treason and plots which had overshadowed England 
in 1688 continued to exist. 56  The frightening possibility of a Catholic 
uprising against the sovereign was still present. Although James II died in 
1701, his allies inside, and outside the realm were still alive, and 
presented challenges to the sovereign institutions. Furthermore, the 
Eighteenth century Jacobitism was, for example, a great generator of 
anxiety among the authorities. Under these circumstances, patience for 
the operation of habeas corpus would not last for long. In 1707, the Treaty 
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of Union between England and Scotland gave rise to a new wave of unrest 
in Scotland.57 ,Q WKH VDPH \HDU 3DUOLDPHQW HQDFWHG OHJLVODWLRQ WLWOHG µDQ
act to empower her Majesty to secure and detain such persons as her 
Majesty shall suspect are coQVSLULQJDJDLQVWKHUSHUVRQDQGJRYHUQPHQW¶
The year 1707 signified the start to a long-lasting wave of parliamentary 
suspension acts in the first half of the eighteenth century running through 
the years for separate incidents, 1715, 1716, 1722, 1744, 1745, 1746, 
1747. There are two important points, which must be clarified regarding 
the suspension of habeas corpus and the practice of detention without trial 
in the said periods. The first important factor is that although each law for 
the suspension of habeas corpus had different factual surroundings, the 
underlying theme for the suspension of habeas corpus in all these periods 
remained the same, namely, perceived necessity. As Halliday has 
articulated in his account of habeas corpus:  
From 1689 to 1747, Parliament followed a formula, whether the 
QHFHVVLW\RFFDVLRQLQJVXVSHQVLRQZDVD³detestable conspiracy´ 
by papists and other rebellious persons for invading the realm 
from France to the utter subversion of the protestant religion 
and the laws and liberties of this kingdom.58   
5HIHUHQFHV WR µFRQVSLUDF\¶ IRU MXVWLI\LQJ WKHVXVSHQVLRQRIKDEHDV FRUSXV
began in 1696, when King William III brought the attention of Parliament 
to the discovery of an assassination plot against himself.  On the 24th of 
February 1696, King William made a speech in Parliament, informing Peers 
DQG&RPPRQVRI µWKHGLVFRYHU\RIWKHDVVDVVLQDWLRQSORWDJDLQVWKLPVHOI¶
DQGDOVRWKHWKUHDWRIµDVXGGHQLQYDVLRQ¶IURPWKHHQHPLHVRIWKHUHDOP
The evidence enclosed with WKH .LQJ¶V DGGUHVV VKRZHG WKDW WKH
assassination of the King and the threat of invasion were linked.59  
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Also, one of the features of the suspension acts was that they would 
determine a time limit for the suspension of habeas corpus. However, this 
time limit could be extended if the members of Parliament felt a need for 
doing so. Therefore, the suspension of habeas corpus in some years was 
not exercised by separate suspension acts. Rather, suspensions were often 
extensions of the previous suspension acts. The standard time frame for 
the suspension of habeas corpus was five months.60 This changed in 1722, 
and again by certain appeals to the magnitude of conspiracies threatening 
the Kingdom, Parliament decided to suspend habeas corpus for one year.61  
7. The rise of executive power  
 
The many crises which punctuated the first half of the eighteenth century 
required concrete state machinery for efficient responses. As time went by 
(and with an increase in foreign and internal conflicts), the executive 
branch too came to accumulate more powers. As Harris notes:  
The wars saw a major transformation in the machinery of 
executive government: a dramatic expansion of administrative 
personnel, the creation of new government departments, 
professionalization and a more scientific approach of 
government.62 
This transformation of the executive government also manifested itself in 
a dramatic increase in arresting and detention powers. As regards the 
arresting powers, it must be noted that such powers were more related to 
the general policing of the society.63 The effects of the transformation of 
the executive power were even more visible on the front of detention 
ZLWKRXW WULDO 2YHU WLPH DV +DOOLGD\ QRWHV µVXVSHQVLRQ RSHUDWHG QRW E\
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62 T. Harris, Revolution: The Great Crisis of British Monarchy, 1685-1720 (London: Penguin 
Books, 2007) at 492. 
63 F. McLynn, Crime and Punishment in the Eighteenth Century England (Oxford: OUP, 1992) 
at 19.  
37 
 
suspending habeas corpus, but by expanding GHWHQWLRQSRZHUV¶64 We can 
spot the dramatic increase of detention powers in two separate bills. The 
ILUVW ELOO ZDV SDVVHG LQ  IRU DOORZLQJ WKH NLQJ µWR GHWDLQ DQG VHFXUH
persons charged with/or suspected of high treason committed in North 
America or on the high seas, or RISLUDF\¶7KHVHFRQGUHOHYDQWGRFXPHQW
was the Aliens Act of 1793.  
7.1. Detention against Revolutionary Americans 1777 
For a long time, the British government was determined to levy duties in 
America on the same materials charged with tax in Britain. However, due 
to the lack of enough information as to the consequences of this new 
economic policy in America, the proposals for introducing new duties were 
delayed. Finally, the Stamp Act was passed in 1765 by Parliament.65 Over 
the years in which Parliament and the British government were involved in 
drafting new taxation polices, the debate both in the minds of colonial 
authorities and population shifted to something much more fundamental. 
The principal question among the American colonists somehow became 
whether Parliament had a right to tax colonies or not?  
Such questions on the authority of the British Parliament were 
immediately taken to new levels, such as the conflict between the 
PHWURSROLWDQDQGFRORQLDOSULYLOHJHVRUWKHH[WHQWRI&URZQ¶VSUHURJDWLYe in 
the colonies and these all became new subjects of dispute.  
The tensions concerning the Stamp Act was nothing short of a 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO FULVLV ,Q IDFW WKH PDLQ WKHPH RI WKH FRORQLVWV¶ UHVLVWDQFH
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was based on constitutional contentions. This at least held true of the 
American resistance until 1776.66  
A new wave of draconian measures arrived in the early 1770s.67 These 
measures radicalised colonists to the point that their constitutional 
defiance was transformed into a full-scale revolution. This finally in the 
mid-1770s resulted in the American war of independence. Right from the 
early stages of war, detention without trial was found to have 
overwhelming use as a war tactic. The impetus driving this tactic was to 
put pressure on American detainees, especially those of captive seamen, 
such that they will be faced with the dilemma of either remaining in 
detention or assenting to join the Royal Navy. In so doing, by building 
treason and piracy into the mould of the 1777 suspension bill, any 
prospect of providing American detainees with POW status was ruined. 
This suspension bill indicates one of the most important examples of 
employing crimes such as treason or piracy which can deprive one of his 
prisoner-of-war status. The suspension bill of 1777 signified some wide-
ranging changes in the practice of detention without trial. Above all, unlike 
other suspension acts, it did not define a time frame for its functions.68 
As mentioned above, the parliamentary suspension acts sharply 
determined the duration in which habeas corpus could not operate. 
However, the new suspension bill clearly retreated from the well-
established custom of Parliament concerning the time frame for the 
suspension of habeas corpus. Interestingly, some MPs applied a great 
amount of caution and at the same time, revolt towards the very 
possibility of executive privilege which had the effect of diminishing the 
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liberties of subjects. OQH03 DUJXHG µLI WKH SUHVHQW%LOOZDV WR KDYHQR
other evil than establishing a precedent for future ministers to come to 
3DUOLDPHQWRQWKHVDPHHUUDQG,VKRXOGEHDJDLQVWLW¶69  
6HFRQGO\KDYLQJVWDWHGWKDWLWVUHDFKRQO\H[WHQGVWRWKRVHFDSWXUHGµRXW
RIWKHUHDOP¶WKHVXVSHQVLRQELOORISODFHGJUHDWHPSKDVLVRQZKHUH
capture takes place. As a result, the bill evidently contained a 
discriminatory view of the detainees arrested in America, or on the high 
seas. An interesting aspect of this discriminatory practice is that the basis 
of discrimination on this exceptional occasion did not turn on the 
nationality of the detainees, since an emphasis on the idea that the 
American rebels were indeed enemy aliens (for the purposes of denying 
habeas corpus to them) would imply the recognition of American 
independence, an essentially damaging act in the process of reclaiming 
America. Of course, the same would be true if the Pow status was given to 
them.  
Finally, the most obvious characteristic of the 1777 suspension bill was its 
heavy reliance on suspicion. In fact, the bill elucidated no criteria for 
making a suspicion rHOLDEOH$FFRUGLQJO\TXHVWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJµWKHGHJUHH
RISUREDELOLW\DWWHQGLQJWKHVXVSLFLRQ¶µWKHGHJUHHRIJXLOW¶DQGµWKHPRGH
RI UHGUHVV¶ UHPDLQHGXQDQVZHUHG LQ WKH ELOO 6LPLODUO\ QR WKUHVKROGZDV
defined as to the admissibility of the evidence prHVHQWHGWRWKHµPDJLVWUDWH
RIFRPSHWHQWDXWKRULW\¶VRDVWRRUGHUGHWHQWLRQ70  
Great numbers of civilians were detained. This aroused the opposition of 
the revolutionary leaders. The only solution proposed by British officials 
was the exchange of the American non-combatants with the British 
military officers. This proposition was immediately declined by the 
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American war leaders. However, it is clear that British authorities were not 
legally restrained in confining civilians. 71  This was in fact the tactical 
advantage of employing treason in the 1777 legislation.   
7.2. Detention of Aliens 1793 
Under different pretexts, detention without trial was exercised in the last 
decade of the eighteenth century. Although once again the exercise of 
detention without trial in the 1790s was motivated by necessity of the kind 
caused by the threat of war, the role of confinement in managing the 
internal politics became more visible in this period. On this note, Halliday 
ZULWHVµ>E@HJLQQLQJLQWKHVVXVSHQVLRQEHFDPHMXVW one part of the 
ZLGHU VWDWXWRU\ FDPSDLJQV DJDLQVW SROLWLFDO GLVVHQW LQ DOO IRUPV¶ 72  The 
French Revolution in particular gave rise to paranoia on the part of the 
British nobles.73 Moreover, the flow of French immigrants was becoming 
an increasing source of concern.  
The issue of the legal position of aliens will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter.74 In short, insofar as the position of aliens in the common 
law tradition was concerned, an important precedent had been established 
by a ruling of the KinJ¶V%HQFK LQ75 According to the ruling of the 
FRXUWLQWKLVFDVHµDOLHQ¶LVDVSHFLILFOHJDOstatus and there were two kinds 
of aliens, alien enemies and alien friends. The former referred to 
foreigners, whose nation of origin was in a state of war with England, and 
the latter consisted of those whose home state was at peace with the 
UHDOP $IWHU WKLV IXQGDPHQWDO FODVVLILFDWLRQ WKH &RXUW UXOHG µ,I DQ DOLHQ
enemy come into England without the queen's protection, he shall be 
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seized and imprisoned by the law of England, and he shall have no 
advantage of the law of EngODQG¶ 76  Needless to say, the kind of 
imprisonment in question is basically no different from detention without 
WULDO VLQFH µQR DGYDQWDJH RI WKH ODZ RI (QJODQG LQFOXGHV DQ H[SOLFLW
H[FOXVLRQRIDOLHQHQHPLHVIURPWKHZULWRIKDEHDVFRUSXV¶77  
In the light of the arrival of French immigrants to England from 1789 and 
the threat of post-revolutionary France, the first modern legislation 
regarding the treatment of aliens, namely, the Aliens Act was passed in 
1793.  The primary aim of this act was to deal with the threats posed by 
the French Revolution. The fear of French revolutionary spies in particular 
led to the restrictive measures enshrined in the act.78 Under the provisions 
of the Aliens Act, foreigners were prohibited to arrive in England without 
prior permission and had to declare their arrival to the alien-office so as to 
be provided with an area of residence, outside the limits of which, they 
could not travel without a passport. Detention and transportation were laid 
down as immediate sanctions for a breDFK RI WKH $FW¶V SURYLVLRQV
$OWKRXJK WKH WHUP µVXVSHQVLRQ RI KDEHDV FRUSXV¶ GLG QRW DSSHDU LQ WKH
final Act (as some opposers of the Act discerned), this Act of 1793 brought 
with it a suspension of habeas corpus.79 
The Aliens Act signified a sweeping enhancement of the powers of the 
executive. In fact, the Aliens Act unequivocally expanded the scope of the 
SUHURJDWLYH,WFDSWXUHGDXVHRIµWKHSUHURJDWLYHSRZHUWREDUDQGGHSRUW
SROLWLFDO XQGHVLUDEOHV¶ 80  Even those legal scholars defending the 
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prerogative RIWKH&URZQWRµH[FOXGHDQGH[SHO¶DOLHQVKDYHFULWLFLVHGWKH
extent of the use of prerogative in the aliens act.81 
7.3. Suspension of habeas corpus: Beyond 1793  
As was stated above, the French Revolution awakened the enthusiasm of 
many for political reform in England. Innumerable reformist and 
revolutionary societies were formed in this period throughout Britain. 
Nevertheless, the political establishment in Britain was not side-lined by 
the increase of opposition in Britain. The hold of laws on treason and 
sedition were stretched. Also, a parliamentary committee of secrecy was 
founded. Soon, trials for treasonable and seditious acts ensued and 
considerable numbers of dissidents were produced before such trials.82 In 
the view of judicial complicity with the endeavours of government, there 
was no need at first to suspend habeas corpus, as any prosecution would 
meet with success. 
In May 1794, the Parliamentary Committee of Secrecy presented its first 
UHSRUW WR 3DUOLDPHQW µUHVSHFWLQJ VHGLWLRXV SUDFWLFHV¶ ,Q this report, the 
Committee expressed great concern towards the activities of the two of 
most prominent societies, namely, the society for Constitutional 
Information and the London Corresponding Society. The Committee of 
Secrecy was of the opinion that the ultimate purpose of the societies in 
TXHVWLRQ ZDV µWR VXSHUVHGH >3DUOLDPHQW@ LQ LWV UHSUHVHQWDWLYH FDSDFLW\¶
under the guise of parliamentary reform.83 Immediately after the delivery 
RIWKHUHSRUWRIWKH&RPPLWWHHWKHH[HFXWLYH¶VSOHDVIRUWDNLQJFRQFUHWH
actions started.84  Some important members of Parliament, such as Burke, 
lent their full support to the enactment of this new suspension bill. For all 
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such supporters, necessity was once again the principal factor for 
justifying another departure from the writ of habeas corpus.85 Therefore, 
WKHELOO µWRHPSRZHUKLV0DMHVW\WRVHFXUHDQGGHWDLQVXFKSHUVRQV
as his Majesty shall suspect are conspiring against his person and 
JRYHUQPHQW¶ ZDV SDVVHG 86   Once again, the 1794 suspension bill 
established a direct linkage between the suspension of habeas corpus and 
treason.  
This suspension bestowed enough time upon government agents to collect 
as much evidence as possible to secure a conviction for the popular 
leaders of the society for Constitutional Information, and the London 
Corresponding Society, namely, Horne Tooke and Thomas Hardy. They 
were held for six months. Thomas Hardy in his famous trial made a 
complaint about his detention; 
We have been six months in close confinement, without being 
able yet to imagine what was the nature of the charges to be 
brought against us, nor have we been able to discover it from 
the indictment found against us.87 
All in all, the assessment of the British executive turned out to be wrong. 
The trials of Hardy and Tooke were conducted in fairness and they were 
DFFRUGLQJO\ DFTXLWWHG IURP WKH WUHDVRQ FKDUJHV E\ MXULHV¶ YHUGLFWV $V D
result, the failed prosecution of the figures in question moved the 
authorities to broaden the definition of treason. The suspension of habeas 
corpus and detention without trial remained as credible measures by which 
to circumvent the judiciary.88 As Halliday puts it: 
 µ>V@XVSHQVLRQE\PDQ\QDPHVLQPDQ\IRUPVSUROLIHUDWHGLQ
England and beyond, now in combination with other measures: 
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³FRHUFLRQDFWV´LQ ,UHODQG³VHGLWLRQDFWV´DWKRPHDQGDFWVIRU
³SUHVHUYLQJWKHSHDFH´DFURVVWKHHPSLUH¶89 
To conclude this section, it must once again be remarked that the 
suspensions of habeas corpus, as analysed above, point to the 
earliest modern examples of a regulatory framework designed to deal 
with emergencies. One implicit realisation underlying all of the 
VXVSHQVLRQ DFWV ZDV WKDW WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV RI µWKH ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶
can change pro tempore in times of crisis. Notably, the difference 
between detentions ordered by the King (ingrained by returning the 
writ of habeas corpus with no expressed cause) and parliamentary 
suspension acts was that the former would justify detention without 
trial by referring to the absolutism of the powers of the King and the 
latter would authorise detention without trial as a matter of 
emergency. The following section will explore other methods of 
detention without trial with a stronger focus on the colonies.  
8. How detention without trial was exported to colonies: 
General observations   
 
As some modern historians of the British colonialism have argued, the 
techniques employed by the British Empire in its colonies consist of 
diverse measures adjusted against the different requirements of localities 
in which the empire was operating.90 Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly 
some practices, which find similar expressions in nearly all colonies. 
Detention without trial can definitely be characterised as one of the 
measures, which in such major colonies as Ireland, India, Kenya, Egypt, 
South Africa, Malaysia, Burma and Palestine was used.91  
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For the sake of clarity, one can classify the modes of the authorisation of 
detention without trial in colonies into three main groups: 1) detention by 
the parliamentary suspension bills; 2) detention by declaration of martial 
law; and 3) detention by special provisions. As was often the case, 
different modes of authorisation could be implemented in one colony in 
different periods, and we shall now turn to consider each of these 
possibilities in some detail.    
8.1. The Parliamentary Suspension of Habeas Corpus and its decline  
Exporting habeas corpus in new dominions of the Crown was an important 
SDUWRIWKHH[WHQVLRQRI(QJOLVKFRPPRQODZ$VDFRQVHTXHQFHHYHQµWKH
old exempt jurisdiction, the Cinque Potts, Counties Palatine, and Berwick-
upon-7ZHHG ZHUH QRW H[HPSW IURP WKH ZULW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV¶92 Soon, 
ranging from Ireland, to the Channel Isles, to New Virginia, to Calcutta, to 
Quebec, the writ of habeas corpus was exported to all lands 
acquired/conquered by England. Nevertheless as Halliday notes, 
But as the Habeas Corpus Act passed into the law of new 
dominions in various forms, so too did suspension and other 
statutory practices that constrained the writ by restraining the 
judges who used it.93 
The typical example for the authorisation of detention without trial by the 
suspension of habeas corpus in colonies is Quebec. Nonetheless, in the 
wake of the French Revolution, when the revolutionary divisions had 
reached as far and wide as Quebec and in the very same period when the 
fear of the French aliens had haunted the political environment in the 
mother country, the Legislative Council passed an alien act of its own in 
1794.  Widely modelled upon the English Alien Act of 1793, the Quebec 
Alien Act bestowed an expanded detention and deportation power upon 
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the executive, and as such, suspended habeas corpus.94 As Greenwood 
UHSRUWV µ>I@URP 0D\ WR 1RYHPEHU  ILIW\ DQG RQH KXQGUHG SHUVRQV
ZHUH LPSULVRQHG IRU YDU\LQJ SHULRGV¶ 95  Many were not tried at all. 
QuebeF¶V VXVSHQVLRQ FRQWLQXHG XQWLO  ZKHQ WKH DXWKRULWLHV ZHUH
convinced that the threat of a French invasion had significantly 
diminished.96 
For a long time, the suspension of habeas corpus served as the principal 
way by which detention without trial could be authorized. However, it 
seems that by the end of the eighteenth century the suspension technique 
lost much of its appeal both in England and the Empire. Consequentially, 
new techniques emerged as more speedy and efficient alternatives. It 
must once again be noted that the leading factor in rendering these 
alternatives more viable than the legislative suspension of habeas corpus 
was the sweeping increase in the executive powers.  
Expansive powers were often conferred upon the executive in the light of 
emergencies arising from the political disturbances. For example, in the 
first decades of the nineteenth century in Ireland, the use of the legislative 
suspension steadily declined, and instead, coercion and insurrection acts,97 
of which one side-effect was the dismantling of habeas corpus, were 
increasingly employed. 98  The same pattern unfolded elsewhere in the 
Empire too. Paramount among the new set of measures to replace the 
suspension of habeas corpus was martial law. The Petition of Rights in 
particular showed a very strong hostility to the idea of martial law as a 
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VXEVWLWXWHIRUµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶when the civil courts were in operation. 
Blackstone concisely explained the reasons for the disavowal of martial 
law in the British legal tradition:  
For martial law, which is built upon no settled principles, but 
which is entirely arbitrary in its definitions, is, as Sir Matthew 
Hale observes, in truth and reality no law, but something 
indulged, rather than allowed as a law.99  
It must be borne in mind that disagreements as to the meaning of martial 
law persist as late as the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, based on the 
historical exercise of martial law, Simpson provides a summary description 
of the core functions of martial law,  
Martial law necessarily suspends habeas corpus. Martial law 
belongs to a world in which, in effect, government makes war 
on those who do not accept its authority and makes no bones 
about what it is doing.100 
In this view, the suspension of habeas corpus in the nineteenth century 
was for most parts replaced by martial law, employed in such colonies as 
Jamaica, Barbados, India, South Africa, Canada and so on.   
9. Martial law and detention without trial 
 
Beginning from the early years of the nineteenth century, a significant 
number of Lower Canadians started to reflect on the virtues of the British 
constitution, and the liberties of subjects. Drawing on their experiences 
with the American colonists and different reform societies in England, 
British colonial authorities were familiar with this political language. 
Nevertheless, using the language of constitution to their advantage, some 
political parties succeeded in securing a prominent majority in the Lower 
Canada House of Assembly. The demands of the Assembly gradually 
became radicalised in the 1830s. Mass meetings for constitutional reform 
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was organised by the Assembly. After the failure of a series of mediations 
by Britain, the situation became more hostile than ever. British troops 
were deployed to counter the emerging threats. In the summer of 1837, 
tactics of the colonial opposition groups shifted from boycotting the British 
products to mass rallies and from political rallies to armed rebellion. 101 
Governor Gosford remained reluctant for some time to appoint the 
executive emergency power.102 However, finally he imposed martial law in 
December 1837. Shortly after the declaration of martial law, many were 
imprisoned without trial, since the suspension of habeas corpus was 
inherent within the imposition of martial law.  
Not long after the suppression of first wave of rebellions in Lower Canada, 
martial law was again imposed in November 1838. Although martial law 
would in effect erect a barrier to the exercise of habeas corpus, authorities 
LPSRVHGDµSURYLQFLDORUGLQDQFH¶VXVSHQGLQJKDEHDVFRUpus for such cases 
DVµVXVSLFLRQRIKLJKWUHDVRQPLVSULVLRQRIKLJKWUHDVRQDQGWUHDVRQDEOH
SUDFWLFHV¶103 Nevertheless, this Ordinance by The Special Council made 
the matters all the more complicated, for references to treason would 
bring the detention of suspects within the provenance of criminal laws. 
6RPHMXGJHV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHRSHUDWLRQRIKDEHDVFRUSXVLQFULPLQDO
cases was strictly contrary to that of the executive. One of these judges 
was Vallieres de Saint-Real, who upon a request for the issuance of 
habeas corpus by a detainee named, Clestin Houde ruled,  
It suffices in the present case, to adjudge that notwithstanding 
WKH VXVSHQVLRQ RI WKH 3URYLQFLDO 2UGLQDQFH >«@ WKH\ DUH VWLOO
existing in the province by force of the British statute of 1774, 
laws in which subjects of the Queen, being deprived of their 
liberty on criminal accusations.104 
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The defence of Vallieres de Saint-Real of the writ of habeas corpus was 
directed on several fronts. First, as it is clear from the above quotation, he 
was of WKHRSLQLRQWKDWDµ3URYLQFLDO2UGLQDQFH¶WRWKHHIIHFWRIVXVSHQGLQJ
habeas corpus was not compatible with the constitutional criteria. He 
noted that The Special Council, as a legislative authority, could not go 
beyond the substance of the British statute of 1774, according to which 
the issuance of habeas corpus for criminal cases is taken for granted.105 
More importantly, the judge in question implied that that his district was 
not affected by rebellions and the courts in his district were functioning 
attested to the fact that habeas corpus could not be suspended by the 
claim that the Lower Canada was in its entirety under martial law.  It is 
vital to notice that the judgement of Vallieres de Saint-Real was delivered 
in a context permeated by martial law. His judgement had all the 
potentials to revive a serious discussion about the true nature of martial 
law in London. Nevertheless, the subject of martial law did not attract a 
full-scale scholarly attention until the Jamaica affair.  
In the history of colonialism, Jamaica is often cited as one site, which at 
times, suffered from all the colonial problems combined. 106 This took a 
fatal toll in October 1865, when a black peasant was found guilty of 
µWUHVSDVVLQJ RQ WKH SURSHUW\ RI DQ DEVHQWHH SODQWDWLRQ RZQHU¶ 107  This 
resulted in a violent protest of almost three hundred black men led by Paul 
Bogle. An arrest warrant was issued for Bogle, and many other protestors. 
When policemen proceeded to arrest such figures, they were confronted 
with hundreds of black proWHVWRUV DUPHG ZLWK µVWLFNV DQG FXWODVVHV
SUHSDUHGWRDVVLVWWKRVHFKDUJHGLQUHVLVWLQJDUUHVW¶108 The encounter soon 
turned into a violent one. Troops opened fire on the rioters, the crowd was 
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GULYHQWRµWKHFRXUWKRXVHDPLGVWFULHVRIµ:DU¶DQGWKHEXLOGLng was set on 
ILUH¶109  
When the word of the uprising was given to the Governor Eyre, he, upon 
the advice of the Council of War, proclaimed martial law.110 The exercise of 
martial law in Jamaica lasted for a month. During this period, executions 
after summary trials, and extra-judicial killing were common place.111 So 
high was the death toll of the events in Jamaica that the exercise of 
detention without trial by the troops was hardly noticed by the critics of 
the Governor Eyre. Also, it is fair to say that compared to other 
emergencies faced by other colonial governments, the number of people 
detained by the colonial government of Jamaica was relatively lower. This 
low deployment of detention without trial was not, of course, motivated by 
humanitarian incentives. Rather, two key factors played a major role in 
the decline of detention without trial in Jamaica. The first factor was that 
the widespread use of firearms had practically rendered targeting of 
suspects a measure of first resort. In the second place, the jurisdiction of 
military tribunals during the emergency in Jamaica was broadened so as to 
try every suspect, be that an active armed rebel, or an ordinary subject.112 
In fact, as Townshend has argued, the Jamaica affair set the precedent for 
a legal decision LQµZKLFKUHPRYHGDPDMRUUHVWULFWLRQRQWKHH[HUFLVH
of martial law powers by declaring that the fact of the ordinary courts 
EHLQJRSHQGLGQRWRILWVHOIEDUWKHWULDORIFLYLOLDQVE\PLOLWDU\WULEXQDOV¶113 
In the rulings of military tribunals, nearly all suspicions resulted in great 
convictions. In such an atmosphere, detaining suspects for prolonged 
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periods seemed to be a waste of the already limited sources of 
government.  
Nevertheless, the Jamaica affair caused the foremost jurists of the 
nineteenth century to strive for mapping out the contours of martial law. 
There once again stood ambiguities about the meaning of such key 
FRQFHSWVDVµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶RUµGXHSURFHVVRIODZ¶&RXOGPDUWLDOODZ
EHFRQVLGHUHGDVSDUWRIµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶"Or it was merely an extra-
legal practice committed to protect it at times when no one could 
SUDFWLFDOO\PDNHDQ\ERQHVDERXWµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶114 Of course, none 
RI WKHVH XQFHUWDLQWLHV DERXW WKH ODZIXOQHVV RI µPDUWLDO ODZ¶ IRXQG D
concrete resolution or a consistent model in the legal thinking of the day. 
As late as the early twentieth century, Dicey was famously of the opinion 
WKDW PDUWLDO ODZ LV µXQNQRZQ WR WKH ODZ RI (QJODQG¶ 115  Therefore, for 
Dicey, the only response surviving the test of lawfulness was the 
temporary suspension of specific legal norms, such as habeas corpus.  
Dicey failed to take an account of the colonial reality. Furthermore, his 
writings would be of little help to colonial authorities, who did not wish to 
fall into the same trap as Governor Eyre once did. For such authorities, the 
matter of special interest was a guide to the question of necessity, and 
other practicalities surrounding martial law. That said, some efforts had 
been made by the authorities in Britain to clarify the threshold of necessity 
for the proclamation of martial law. Townshend reports that the fourth Earl 
of Carnarvon, the Secretary of State for Colonies, strived to clarify the 
imperatives of martial law more than once. Of particular importance in this 
regard was the supplementary letter of Carnarvon containing 19 rules 
governing martial law. As Townshend writes,  
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[the governor]must be satisfied that there was armed 
resistance which could not be dealt with by troops acting 
merely in aid of the civil power in the ordinary manner and that 
martial law should not be proclaimed over a wider district than 
the necessities of public safety require.116   
There are two points in the passage reported by Townshend. First of all, 
&DUQDUYRQ¶V VSHFLILHV D TXDOLI\LQJ FULWHULRQ IRU QHcessity of the kind 
rendering a situation liable to the application of martial law and the 
FULWHULRQ LQ TXHVWLRQ LV YHU\ FOHDUO\ VWDWHG WR EH µDUPHG UHVLVWDQFH¶ 1RW
RQO\ GRHV &DUQDUYRQ¶V OHWWHU GHILQH D FULWHULRQ IRU QHFHVVLW\ EXW DOVR LW
specifies a threshold for the translation of necessity into martial law. That 
is to say, armed resistance must reach a level, in which civil machinery, 
and mainly ordinary courts are the most important example, is totally 
dismantled. Putting an emphasis on this threshold was in fact a reiteration 
of the principles manifested in the Petition of Rights for determining 
whether a given situation would amount to war. However, whether the 
executive officers, especially colonial authorities complied with this 
formulation of necessity is another question.   
9.1. Martial law and detention beyond Jamaica  
Perhaps, the largest scale of the imposition of martial law in the 
nineteenth century occurred in South Africa, annexed as a colony of 
Britain in 1877. This was a period in which conflicts between the 
expansionary interests of the European empires was becoming more 
visible than ever before. Given this, the imbalanced division of population 
in South Africa had in effect rendered this region one of the main 
forefronts of the European clashes. On one hand, there were British 
subjects (including many Indian workers) labouring in South Africa. On the 
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other hand, there were whites of Dutch origin, who viewed the growth of 
British enterprise in South Africa as a disruptive rival.117  
Unlike other colonial disturbances, the Anglo-Boer war was not only an 
unrest caused by sporadic rebellions, it was a regular war.118 Martial law 
was declared in the conquered territories immediately after each 
annexation by colonial governors. Under martial law, military officers were 
provided with such powers as restriction of movement, issuance of passes, 
detention of individuals, forced removal of people from their farms, and 
confiscation of properties.119  
An interesting aspect of the operation of martial law in South Africa was 
that civil courts remained in operation. This was clearly contrary to the 
doctrine that, as argued above, instilled in the letter of Carnarvon that 
martial law could only be resorted to if the civil machinery was inept to 
operate as a result of given exigencies. Nevertheless, during the conflict in 
South Africa, courts continued to function. However, the functioning of 
courts did not mean that detentions exercised by the military officers could 
be subjected to judicial scrutiny.120 Therefore, the threshold for applying 
martial law virtually became a concept without substance, subject to 
change, if desired so by sovereign. The contradiction arising from the 
imposition of martial law in South Africa was raised in a case, produced 
before Privy Council. According to this case, David Francois Marais, a 
subject of the Crown, was arrested without charge and warrant by military 
officers in Paarl. He was then transferred to Bedford West, and detained 
there. After an unsuccessful application for release in the Cape Supreme 
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Court, the applicant reached out to the Privy Council.121 The Privy Council 
ruled in the Marais case: 
Martial law had been proclaimed over the district in which the 
petitioner was arrested and the district to which he was 
removed. The fact that for some purposes some tribunals had 
been permitted to pursue their ordinary course is not conclusive 
that war was not raging.122  
The implications of the Marais case were twofold. The first implication was 
for the meaning of necessity. First of all, according to this ruling, the 
condition of necessity exposing a particular situation to martial law was no 
longer contingent upon the inability of ordinary courts. The second 
implication was that the undertakings of military during the reign of 
martial law could not become susceptible to judicial scrutiny.  
As regards the first implication, the decision of The Privy Council 
generated a wide range of scholarly opinions. 123  The primary question 
posed after the ruling of the Privy Council was whether the functioning of 
ordinary Courts would preclude a given situation to be classified as war. 
After that The Privy Council delivered its decision in the Marais case, Cyril 
Dodd wrote in the Law Quarterly Review,  
The argument that, because for some purposes the Courts are 
permitted to sit and perform their functions they must be 
permitted by the military authorities to perform all functions, 
even those injurious to public safety, seems hardly to appeal to 
modern ideas.124 
The missing point in the analysis of many authors delivering their opinions 
on the Marais case in 1902 was that the operation of martial law was not 
necessarily contingent upon the existence of a regular war. The situation 
in Canada and Jamaica would drive this point home. In general, a 
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proposition made by Hussain seems to have captured the essence of the 
ruling on the Marais FDVHUHJDUGLQJWKHFRQGLWLRQRIQHFHVVLW\µ>W@KHFDVH
of Marais [..] continues a tendency in English law from the mid-nineteenth 
FHQWXU\RQZDUGWRZLGHQWKHVFRSHRIWKHFRQGLWLRQRIQHFHVVLW\¶125 
As was argued above, the Marais case also entailed the implication that 
the validity of the decisions of military commanders could not be subjected 
to the examination of courts. This was indeed a reiteration of the words of 
Justice Hyde, as mentioned above in the Five Knights case. The result of 
this deference to the decisions of military authorities was the recognition 
of an absolute and unchallengeable authority for the detaining power in its 
practices of detention. Erle Richards, inter alia, provides an important 
reason for the exclusion of military undertakings from judicial intervention. 
According to Erle Richards, it is basically beyond the capacity of ordinary 
courts to interfere with the decisions of military nature in times of crisis. 
Not least, because secrecy more often than not is an inherent component 
of such decisions, and judicial interventions per se run against the element 
of secrecy.126 Drawing on the sweeping powers of military officers, Erle 
Richards concluded that civil courts in times of war lack efficiency even in 
terms of civil matters.127 The overarching contradiction here is that in the 
view of the absurdity (in the view of Erle Richards) of the judicial 
performance in times of war, why the absolute closure of courts could not 
be evoked as an objective test to ascertain the existence of war or the 
condition necessity for imposing martial law, as was enunciated in the 
Petition of Rights. Again, Hussain has provided a persuasive counter-
argument to the defence of the ruling in the Marais case, as made by Erle 
Richards, 
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[f]or Erle Richards, war is self-evident and the fact that courts 
may continue to sit cannot prevent the existence of war. 
Reading the case, however, it would seem that war is anything 
but self-evident.128  
The Marais case also determined the destiny of habeas corpus in the 
context of the imposition of martial law. The answer to the question of 
whether detainees were entitled to employ habeas corpus for their release 
lied in the general formula, on which the Privy Council observedµQRGRXEW
has ever existed that where martial law prevails the ordinary courts have 
QRMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUWKHDFWLRQRIWKHPLOLWDU\DXWKRULWLHV¶129  
 Inasmuch as the expanded contours of necessity and the increased 
powers of military were foreshadowed by the theoretical uncertainties, 
their effects were far too real for the inhabitants in the Cape colonies. The 
severe imposition of martial law in South Africa was even by the standards 
of the nineteenth century unprecedented. 130  The confinement of 
individuals in mass numbers proved to unfold a new style of the 
deprivation of liberty, which became one of the defining factors in the 
most tragic atrocities of the twentieth century. The use of concentration 
camps in South Africa is one of the most severe examples of such camps 
in history.131 
Despite the mal-IXQFWLRQLQJ HIIHFWV RI PDUWLDO ODZ LQ 6RXWK $IULFD µWKH
English political class remained broadly disengaged from the problem of 
PDUWLDO ODZ¶132 Martial law continued to be a measure by which to quell 
unrest in the colonies. This was further reinforced by World War I, when 
some colonies such as Egypt were immediately targeted by martial law.133 
Nevertheless, this disengagement from the problematique of martial law 
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was again to be a source of embarrassment for the Empire in 1919, when, 
LQ3XQMDELWOHGWRZKDW6LPSVRQKDVFKDUDFWHULVHGDVµWKHPRVWQRWRULRXV
RIDOOLPSHULDOPDVVDFUHV¶QDPHO\WKH$PULWVDUPDVVDFUH134  
In the aftermath of the great embarrassments caused by the Amritsar 
massacre, one once again witnesses a growing distaste for the use of 
martial law in colonies, in much the same way that martial law was 
criticised after the Jamaica affair.135 In consequence, British policy makers 
arrived at the conclusion that so many confusions surrounding martial law 
left any commander or soldier on the ground bewildered regarding a 
proportionate response in times of necessity. This is why, according to the 
French, senior soldiers were far from wanting [martial law].136 With the 
antipathy for martial law on rise, its importance was reduced to merely a 
symbolic one. 137  However, such practices as martial courts or military 
commissions associated with martial law remained alive, especially in the 
former British colonies, including the United States of America, to which 
we shall return in the final chapter of this thesis.138   
10. Special Regulations   
 
Special regulations for authorising detention without trial could take the 
form of a provision in a broad statute, or a statute squarely devoted to the 
matter of detention without trial. The earliest example of the former is the 
East India Company Act of 1793. This act was part of a chain of attempts 
by the central government in England to specify and also restrict the 
SRZHUV RI WKH (DVW ,QGLD &RPSDQ\ D µRQH ERG\ SROLWLF DQG FRUSRUDWH¶
WLWOHGWKH(DVW,QGLD&RPSDQ\DQGHPSRZHUHGE\VXFKPHDQVDVµEHQHILW
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RI WUDGH SRZHUV SULYLOHJHV DQG DGYDQWDJHV¶ IRU µWUDGLQJ LQWR WKH (DVW
,QGLHV¶139  
According to the 1793 Act, the Governor-General was authorised to order 
detention against thoVHUHVSRQVLEOH IRU µLOOLFLWFRUUHVSRQGHQFHRUDFWLYLWLHV
prejudicial to the interests of British Settlements and possessions in 
,QGLD¶140   The Act did not set out a time limit for suspect detentions. 
However, detainees could be informed of their charges and produce a 
defence before the Governor-General. Some of these remedies were 
eliminated in the subsequent acts.141  
The mode of confinement manifested in the East India Company Act of 
1793 was followed by such regulations as the Bengal Regulation III of 
1818, which for more than a century became the main legal source of 
detention powers. 142  Simpson notes that the Bengal Regulation is the 
earliest example of free-standing provisions. The authorisation of 
detention without trial in the Bengal Regulation was not part of a broader 
HPHUJHQF\ FRGH DQG DV VXFK µWKH >GHWHQWLRQ@ SRZHU FRQIHUUHG ZDV QRW
limited to times of emergency, it was a permanent feature of the legal 
ODQGVFDSH¶143  
The Bengal Regulation left no space for judicial proceedings, and instead 
put in place an executive board to review the detention orders twice a 
year. 144  This statutory authorisation of using executive boards as an 
alternative to judicial proceedings was one of the earliest examples of 
building administrative reviews into the pillars of detention without trial. In 
fact, one can conclude that the enactment of Bengal Regulation III of 1818 
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can be taken as the beginning of an era in which the primitive 
characteristics of confinement implicit in our imagination of ancient, 
medieval and pre-modern Black Holes are apparently transformed into a 
practice legalised, legitimised and rationalised by 
administrative/institutional semi-remedies such as review boards. 
However, in an overwhelming majority of cases, such measures have 
served as an apology of circumventing an independent judicial review, 
thereby becoming a prelude to increasing the severity of detention 
conditions. Executive boards became one of the least efficient methods of 
providing checks and balances against the arbitrary exercise of detention 
without trial. One of their mal-functioning side-effects was to deprive civil 
courts of their supervisory role without having to proclaim martial law.145 
 The model of freestanding provisions, as built in the Bengal Regulation, 
was used in a number of other colonial sites for different reasons. Major 
examples of similar provisions are Madras State Prisoners Regulation II of 
1819, and the Bombay State Prisoners Regulation XXIV of 1827, Native 
Courts Regulations of East Africa 1897, and Political Prisoner's Detention 
Ordinance of 1922 in Egypt.146  
10.1. Special Regulations and Emergency Legislation in England and the 
colonies during the First World War  
The pattern of special regulations in the early twentieth century took a 
departure from the direct involvement of Parliament in enacting 
emergency regulations. In the words of Simpson: 
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The regulations would become law through Orders in Council, 
authorised by a parent Act of Parliament, which would confer 
upon the executive to legislate in this way.147   
The end result of this process was the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) 
passed by Parliament without debate in August 1914. Ranging from the 
authorisation of detention without trial to provisions aiming at alcohol 
consumption, the inroads made by DORA to the normal course of British 
life were by all means unparalleled in the history of Britain.148 Regulation 
14B of DORA concerned detention without trial. According to this 
regulation,  
Where, on the recommendation of a competent naval or 
military authority or of one of the advisory committees 
hereinafter mentioned, it appears to the Secretary of State 
that, for securing the public safety or the defence of the realm, 
it is expedient in view of the hostile origin or associations of any 
person that he shall be subjected to such obligations and 
restrictions as are hereinafter mentioned, the Secretary of State 
may by order require that person, forthwith or from time to 
time, either to remain in, or to proceed to and reside in, such 
place as may be specified in the order and to comply with such 
directions as reporting to the police, restriction of movement 
and otherwise as may be specified in the order or to be interned 
in such place as may be specified in the order.149  
 
Again, great weight was given to the executive boards entrusted with 
supervisory and advisory roles regarding detentions. These boards were 
under direct control of the Secretary of State, who had the ultimate say 
over the exercise of detention and the release of detainees.150   
It must be noted that regulation 14B provided a legal tool by which to 
detain the British subjects. Before the inclusion of this regulation in DORA 
in 1915, there was no such tool. On the other hand, there were a set of 
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aliens acts, authorising the internment of enemy aliens, which will be 
scrutinised in the next chapter.151  
 Habeas corpus did not have a fixed status in regulation 14B. The question 
was if the detention scheme as built in regulation 14B was authorised by a 
simultaneous suspension of habeas corpus. The case of R v. Halliday 1917 
represented an occasion on which the judiciary was to provide 
authoritative answers to the uncertainties involving the question of 
detention without trial.152  
The applicant in R. v. Halliday challenged the legality of regulation 14B. He 
argued that the authorisation of regulation 14B was beyond the authority 
of the executive. Furthermore, such settled requirements as the 
reasonableness of suspicion and the standard of proof held no place in 
regulation 14B. Having circumvented these requirements, the regulation 
also entailed a reversal of the burden of proof.153  
It is interesting to note that the defence for the appellant in Ex parte Zadig 
did not argue that the power to detain subjects without trial was per se 
XQODZIXO5DWKHUWKHDUJXPHQWZDVWKDWµLIWKHSRZHURILPSULVRQPHQWLV
WR EH FRQIHUUHG DW DOO LW RXJKW WR EH FRQIHUUHG E\ H[SUHVV ZRUGV¶ 154 
Drawing on this consideration, the defence concluded that such express 
limits were present in the suspension acts of Parliament in the eighteenth 
century largely due to the time limits inherent in most of these suspension 
acts.  However, such acts as DORA could not be considered as putting 
express limits on the power of the executive to detain, in that they 
delegated broad powers to the executive to regulate its own conduct. This 
argument, however, did not appeal to the law Lords, as they said that 
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DORA simply represents another method by which Parliament has opted 
µIRU DFKLHYLQJ WKH VDPHSXUSRVHV¶ DV WKH VXVSHQVLRQ DFts.155  Underlying 
this conclusion was a very far-reaching conception of the powers of 
Parliament with regard to the constitutional laws of England, or in the 
ZRUGVRI0DJQD&DUWDµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶/RUG'XQHGLQPDGHFOHDUZKDW
this underlying perception was: 
But the fault, if fault there be, lies in the fact that the British 
constitution has entrusted to the Houses of Parliament, subject 
to the assent of the King, an absolute power untrammelled by a 
written instrument, obedience to which may be compelled by 
some judicial body.156  
One can only be struck at the level of similarity between the words of Lord 
Dunedin about the absolute powers of Parliament, and those expressed by 
the Attorney-General Heath and Chief Justice Hyde about the powers of 
King in council in the case of Five Knights. As regards the question of 
habeas corpus, the court was of the view that while habeas corpus was 
not suspended by regulation 14B, this could not affect the lawfulness of 
detentions exercised under regulation 14B.157 This was also similar to what 
happened in the case of Five Knights, in which the writ of habeas corpus 
could be issued without making any change in the internment of 
detainees. Lord Shaw noticed this fallacy inherent within the context of 
detentions exercised in the First World War, and in his dissenting opinion 
criticised the danger of evacuating such procedural safeguards as habeas 
corpus out of their substance by showing deference to the detention 
powers of the executive,  
It is not that the habeas corpus has been repealed; it is not, as 
in so many varying periods of history, that it has been 
suspended. There is a repeal and a suspension much more 
drastic than that. There is a constructive repeal which has, so 
far as I am aware, no parallel in our annals ± a getting behind 
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the habeas corpus by an implied but non the less effective 
repeal of the most famous provision of habeas corpus itself.158   
We must repeatedly return to this point in the following sections of this 
chapter and the subsequent chapters of this thesis to expand on this 
particular mechanism of upholding minimal procedural safeguards in 
detention cases without placing any substantive restraints on the powers 
of the executive.  
The pattern used in DORA and regulation 14B came to constitute a 
standard emergency scheme for other colonies. British India was the first 
colonial site at which this new emergency scheme was deployed. 
Accordingly, legislations such as the Ingress into India Ordinance (1914) 
and the Defence of India Act (1915) were passed. The Ingress into India 
Ordinance came into operation to deal with Indians returning to India in 
the wake of war. Under the authority of this act, the governor-general 
DVVXPHG µFHUWDLQ JHQHUDO SRZHUV RI FRQWURO RYHU DOO SHUVRQV HQWHULQJ
,QGLD¶ 159  Internment and confining persons to reside and move in a 
designated area were among such powers.160 The Defence of India Act was 
cast in relatively broad terms. Section 3 of this Act invested local 
JRYHUQRUV WRGHWDLQ µDQ\SHUVRQUHDVRQDEO\VXVSHFWHGRIEHLQJRIKRVWLle 
origin or of having acted, acting or being about to act, in a manner 
prejudicial to the public safety or interest or to the defence of British 
,QGLD¶161  
10.2. Special Regulations and Emergency Legislation during the Second 
World War  
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Less than two decades after the expiry of defence regulations in Britain, 
World War II gave rise to the enactment of similar regulations by 
Parliament. Here, we must point to some of the important features of the 
detention powers in this period. The main source of emergency powers in 
Britain of World War II was the Emergency Defence Act 1939. The first 
section of this statute posited that:  
Subject to the provisions of this section, His Majesty may by 
Order in Council make such regulations (in this Act referred to 
as "Defence Regulations") as appear to him to be necessary for 
securing the public safety, the defence of the realm, the 
maintenance of public order and the efficient prosecution of any 
war in which His Majesty may be engaged and for maintaining 
supplies and services essential to the life of the community.162 
Therefore, once again, one witnesses a broad use of delegation power in 
order that the regulation could not become subjected to judicial 
intervention, a fact which was in part due to the result of the case of R v. 
Halliday. At the same time, the language manifested in some of the 
regulations had left the potential prospect of judicial intervention fairly 
open. Of special importance in this regard was regulation 18B of the 
Emergency Defence Act 1939 concerned with detention of citizens. 
According to regulation 18B,  
Where it appears to the Secretary of State with respect to any 
particular person as to whom the Secretary of State is satisfied 
(a) that he is a person of hostile origin or associations; or (b) 
that he is concerned in the preparation or instigation of acts 
prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm that 
is necessary, for the purpose of preventing him acting in any 
manner prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the 
realm, the Secretary of State may make an order.163  
7KHVXEMHFWRIWKH6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH¶VRUGHUVFRXOGYDU\IURPSURKLELWLRQ
RI WKH SRVVHVVLRQ RI µVSHFLILHG DUWLFOHV¶ E\ VXVSHFWV WR WKHLU GHWHQWLRQ164 
Some parliamentary members later became worried about the loose terms 
upon which the regulation 18B was laid. Therefore, 18B was modified by 
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WKHLQVWLOODWLRQRIWKHSKUDVHµUHDVRQDEOHFDXVH¶LQRUGHUIRUDVXVSLFLRQWR
result in detention.165 The alterations, especially the new introduction of 
WKHWHUPµUHDVRQDEOHFDXVHWREHOLHYH¶ZHUHHQRXJKWRJLYHULVHWRDQHZ
wave of judicial questions Cotter summarises these new questions and 
writes,  
Was the changed wording intended to introduce an objective 
criterion to guide executive action, and could the courts 
measure the degree to which the executive adhered to this 
objective criterion? If "reasonable cause to believe" introduced 
the obligation upon the part of the executive to meet an 
objective standard enforceable by the courts, then the courts 
must determine not only the reasonableness of the executive's 
cause to believe certain factually ascertainable things such as 
hostile origins, associations or actions, but also the 
reasonableness of the belief that it was necessary to detain the 
individual as a security risk.166 
In other woUGVDVWULFWUHDGLQJRIµUHDVRQDEOHFDXVH¶FRXOGEHWDNHQDVD
restricting factor in terms of the vires assigned to the executive.  
Such matters were posed to the House of Lords in Liversidge v. 
Anderson. 167  In this case, the applicant chose to bring an action for 
damages for false imprisonment. This could help Liversidge better in his 
cause, namely, challenging the grounds on which he had been detained 
(and of which he was not informed while in detention). Therefore, the 
applicant based his arguments on the WHVW RI µUHDVRQDEOH FDXVH¶ DQGDV
such, the court was compelled to allocate a major portion of its arguments 
WRWKHTXHVWLRQRIµUHDVRQDEOHFDXVH¶ 
The main opinion in the Liversidge v. Anderson refused to entertain the 
claims of Liversidge, and it held that the test for determining the legality 
RIGHWHQWLRQVRQ WKHEDVLVRI µUHDVRQDEOHFDXVH¶DVVHWRXW LQ UHJXODWLRQ
18B, was merely subjective. That is to say, the court did not possess the 
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power to enquire into the objective reliability of the grounds rendering a 
cause for suspicion as reasonable cause. One of the reasons for giving 
countenance to this subjective decision was said to be that the person 
entrusted with detention was the Secretary of State (and not ordinary 
constables), who could benefit from the recommendation of advisory 
committees. Also, the Secretary of State was compelled to send monthly 
reports to Parliament regarding the particulars of detention cases under 
his purview.168 Neither the decisions of advisory boards, nor parliamentary 
opiQLRQVFRXOGKDYHDELQGLQJHIIHFWRQWKH6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH¶VGLVFUHWLRQ
in detention cases. Such excuses for assigning unchallengeable credibility 
to the subjective decisions of the executive showed how the incomplete 
and ineffective safeguards such as advisory boards, and routine reports to 
Parliament could justify the inroads into individual liberties and settled 
principles of common law. Emphasis should be made on the fact that it is 
the Secretary of State, who is entrusted with such powers and he did not 
have a significant part in the real process of decision-making as to 
detention cases. In fact, as Allen pointed out in The Times,  
[s]ince it is absurd to suppose that a Minister has time or 
opportunity to examine personally 1,700 cases in all their 
details, it follows that the detentions under Regulation 18B are 
matters of Departmental routine and are administered with 
neither more nor less wisdom than other matters of routine.169 
According to the ruling of the court in Liversidge v. Anderson, the only 
grounded proposition which could challenge the subjective decisions of the 
Secretary of State on the detention matters was to show that such 
decisions were not taken in good faith, a test which in effect made the 
challenging of the exercise of detention impossible. 170  Therefore, this 
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decision indeed deprived the judiciary of its supervisory role insofar as the 
wartime executive measures were concerned.171  
10.3. Regulation 18B, conditions of detention, and Bureaucratic duality  
Pursuant to the passing of the Regulation 18B, some procedural rituals in 
the practice of detention were specified. One striking ritual was to have 
official and unofficial standards of treatment for detainees. In the context 
of the Regulation 18B, this divide was manifested in the issuance of the 
propagandistic White Paper of the Home Office on the conditions of 
detention, and Emergency Orders of the Prison Commissioners. According 
WRWKHIRUPHUµDVSHUVRQVGHWDLQHGLQSXUVXDQFHRI5HJXODWLRQ%DUHVR
detained for custodial purposes only and not for any punitive purpose, the 
conditions of their confinement will be as little as possible oppressive, due 
regard being had to the necessity for ensuring safe custody and 
PDLQWDLQLQJRUGHUDQGJRRGEHKDYLRXU¶172 )XUWKHUPRUHµ>W@KH:KLWH3DSHU
contained no more than administrative departmental instructions which 
could not, and were not, intended to confer any rights on persons. There 
was no obligation to communicate them to Parliament, still less to the 
SULVRQHU¶173 However, the unofficial and more assertive standards of the 
GHWDLQHHV¶ WUHDWPHQW ZHUH WKRVH VXEVWDQWLDWHG E\ WKH 3ULVRQ
Commissioners through their secret Emergency Orders. As Simpson 
UHSRUWV µWKHVH VHFUHW RUGHUV ZHUH LQ IRUFH ZKHQ WKH :KLWH 3DSHU ZDV
issued, and thereafter. It was simply propaganda¶ 174  Therefore, as 
witnessed in the case of detentions exercised under the auspices of 
regulation 18B, one can spot the rise of a bureaucratic duality aiming to 
divert the attention of public from what actually occurs in the course of 
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detention. To make it clear, on one hand, authorities would issue 
reassuring, and yet unenforceable documents fleshing out high standards 
of treatment, and on the other hand, would issue secret orders in the form 
of emergency orders, or secret memorandums, they would take the 
TXHVWLRQRIGHWDLQHHV¶WUHDWPHQWLQWRWKHLURZQKDQGV 
The same technique somehow holds true for the upholding of habeas 
corpus. As it was noted in the case of R v. Halliday, the court 
enthusiastically held that regulation 14B could not affect the operation of 
habeas corpus. However, at the same time, detention powers assigned to 
the executive were high such that habeas corpus could not question their 
legality. In much the same way, regulation 18B did not rule out the 
possibility of submitting DZULWRIKDEHDVFRUSXVWRFRXUWVEXWIUDPHGµWKH
PDQQHURI WKH >GHWHQWLRQ@H[HUFLVH¶ LQD IRUP WKDWPDGH FKDOOHQJLQJ WKH
legality of detentions nearly impossible. When seen in this light, one is to 
ask if this was not keeping the appearance of the rule of law and 
subverting it in substance. Interestingly, this minimal understanding of the 
rule of law did not remain hidden from the eyes of Lord Shaw, the 
dissenting judge in R v. Halliday. Accordingly, he argued, that broadening 
the discretionary powers of the executive in the context of detention 
without trial, and at the same time, leaving the possibility of the resort to 
VXFKMXGLFLDOUHPHGLHVDVKDEHDVFRUSXVPHDQWWRµJLYHGXHIRUPDOUHVSHFW
to the procedure of the remedy, but to deny the remedy itself by infecting 
the repeal of those very fundamental rights which the remedy was meant 
WR VHFXUH¶175 That is to say, by allowing the judiciary to reconsider the 
reach of judicial remedies in the context in question, the procedural 
dimensions to the rule of law were somehow honoured. Yet, the hesitation 
of the House of Lords to monitor the performance of the executive caused 
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the law lords to fall short of a substantive engagement with the questions 
of the rule of law and liberties. Lord Atkin drives this point home in his 
dissenting opinion in Liversidge:  
I view with apprehension the attitude of judges who on a mere 
question of construction when face to face with claims involving 
the liberty of the subject show themselves more executive 
minded than the executive. Their function is to give words their 
natural meaning, not, perhaps, in war time leaning towards 
OLEHUW\>«@ ,QWKLVFRXQWU\DPLGWKHFODVKRIDUPVWKH ODZV
are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the same 
language in war as in peace.176 
The construction of the judicial deference to the actions of the executive 
subsequently became something of a mantra for many different legal 
systems in the post-World War II era and the post-colonial world. The 
development of this theme in the context of detention without trial will 
particularly analysed in the so-FDOOHGµZDURQWHUURU¶LQWKHILQDOFKDSWHURI
this thesis.177  
10.4. Special Regulations in Colonies During and After WWII 
  At the time when World War II was spreading fast-forward in Europe, 
some colonies were on the path of decolonisation and insurrections were 
becoming common place in such colonies. Once again, India was the first 
recipient of special regulations. The Defence of India Act, 1939 was in 
effect a copy of its British counterpart, Emergency (Defence) Act of 1939. 
Rule 26 roughly resonated the words of regulation 18B RI «, with the 
difference that in Rule 26 the mere satisfaction of Government and there 
was no reTXLUHPHQW RI µUHDVRQDEOH FDXVH¶ IRU GHWHQWLRQ +RZHYHU WKH
mere satisfaction of the executive was not ab initio the test for making 
detention orders. In the first draft of the Rule 26, the test for detaining 
suspects was stated to be that individuals subjected to detention must be 
µUHDVRQDEO\VXVSHFWHG¶RIKDYLQJKRVWLOHOLQNVWRWKHVDIHW\RIWKHHPSLUH
                                                          
176 Liversidge, above note 167, at 243.  
177 Refer to chapter V, section 3.4.  
70 
 
This in the watershed case of Keshav Talpade v. King Emperor was 
interpreted as a limitation to the executive powers by a Federal Court in 
India.178 The ruling of the Indian Court led to a great anxiety on the part 
of the British government. In this regard, De writes: 
The British government presented the view that the Federal 
Court had merely pointed out a legal technicality which would 
be corrected by subsequent amendment. [..] the viceroy issued 
an ordinance amending the legislation to make the subjective 
satisfaction of the official the only requirement to justify an 
RUGHU RI GHWHQWLRQ¶ µ)DWHV RI SROLWLFDO OLEHUDOLVP LQ WKH %ULWLVK
post-colony179  
In the aftermath of this amendment detention powers were again 
challenged in a very similar case to Liversidge v. Anderson. The arguments 
of the Indian Court mirrored the arguments of the House of Lords in the 
Liversidge FDVH+HQFHWKHUHVXOWZDVWKDWµWKH&RXUWwas not competent 
to investigate the sufficiency of the materials or the reasonableness of the 
grounds of satisfaction of the Government for detaining a person under 
5XOH ¶180 It must be noted that the use of detention powers in India 
were by and large more severe than their parallel powers in Britain. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR6LPSVRQ µWKH SHDN WRWDO RI GHWDLQHHVZDV DQG WKH
peak number of those in prison was 29,043, the number of detention 
RUGHUVZDVDURXQG¶181  
Palestine provides another example which was repeatedly subjected to 
special regulations since 1936. The severity of emergency laws put in 
place by British authorities came to border on the imposition of martial 
law. However, martial law was never imposed. Instead, the Palestine 
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Martial Law (Defence) Order in Council 1936 was passed. The appearance 
RIWKHWHUPµPDUWLDOODZ¶PHUHO\KDGDV\PEROLFVLJQLILFDQFH182  
The result was the establishment of what Townshend has characterised as 
µVWDWXWRU\ PDUWLDO ODZ¶183 Hence, from 1936 onwards, one statute after 
another increased the powers of High Commissioner in Palestine to deal 
with rebellions, or the threat of rebellions.184 The regulation 17 of these 
regulations authorised detention without trial, and at the same time, 
regulation 17B conferred the power of detaining enemy aliens upon the 
High Commissioner. The reason for preserving a distinct category for 
enemy aliens in Palestine was that Palestine had been made an ideal 
destination for Arab workers from other states, and more importantly, the 
large-scale flow of Jewish emigrants, which went far beyond the British 
emigration control.185 There is not much written on the administration of 
these two regulations. However, it is clear that the primary difference 
between regulation 17 and regulation 17b lies in the exclusion of habeas 
corpus for enemy aliens.186  
In the immediate aftermath of the conclusion of the British mandate in 
Palestine, British military and civil officers were recruited in other colonies 
such as Malaya, Nyasaland, Cyprus, and Kenya.187 What all these colonies 
had in common was a broad-ranging division among their inhabitants. As 
a result, the pattern established by special regulations in Palestine was set 
as the standard emergency model for such colonies. The pattern was to 
FUHDWH D VHW RI UHJXODWLRQV DPRXQWLQJ WR µVWDWXWRU\ PDUWLDO ODZ¶ ZKLFK
µJDYH WKH VHFXULW\ IRUFHV PRVW RI WKH DGYDQWDJHV RI PDUWLDO ODZ¶ ZLWK
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Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases 1941-1942 Vol. 10 (London: 
Butterworth, 1942) at 450.  
187 French, above note 136, at 249.  
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higher exactitudes regarding their powers. 188   Needless to say, the 
particularities of special regulations for each colony had manifest 
GLIIHUHQFHV 1HYHUWKHOHVV DOO RI WKHP VKDUHG WKH FRPPRQDOLW\ RI µWKH
SRZHUWRGHWDLQLQGLYLGXDOV¶189  
11. Conclusion  
 
This chapter considered the history of detention without trial in England, 
and assessed the chronological and thematic evolution of this practice 
from the adoption of Magna Carta to the end of the Second World War.  It 
was argued that many constitutional questions as regards the practice of 
detention without trial emerged soon after the adoption of Magna Carta. 
As argued above, the chapter twenty-ninth of Magna Carta sought to limit 
WKHGHWHQWLRQDXWKRULW\RIWKH.LQJE\UHIHUHQFHVWRµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶
One potential reading of this restraining clause was that in terms of the 
constitutional order of England and for the purposes of protecting the 
OLEHUWLHVRIVXEMHFWVµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶RFFXSLHGDPRUHSULYLOHJHGSODFH
than the King. That is to say, the King in person or in council could under 
QR FLUFXPVWDQFHV SDUW ZLWK WKH µGXH SURFHVV¶ RI ODZ 7KDW Ls why the 
practice of detention without trial in England was not only a simple or 
exceptional legal practice, but also one directly tied with the constitutional 
order of England. It was thus that the crisis caused by the case of Five 
Knights promptly turned into arguably the most significant political and 
legal dispute in the history of England.  The so-called Five Knights case 
was only a beginning to a long-lasting series of disputes between the King 
and Parliament. Such disputes in the short term resulted in the restriction 
of the powers of the King, and the entrenchment of the right to liberty 
through legislation such as Petition of Rights of 1628 and the Habeas 
                                                          
188 Ibid. 
189 A. W. B. Simpson, µEmergency Powers and Their Abuse: Lessons from the End of the 
British Empire¶ (2004) 33 Israel Year Book of Human 219, at 220.  
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Corpus Act of 1641. After the victory of Cromwell in the civil wars however 
the pattern was once again reversed towards the absolute power of the 
sovereign in their authority to confine individuals without charge. Once 
again, confinement was used as a technique by which to eliminate the 
political dissents. Additionally, it was in this period that authorities 
systematically used overseas locations to detain individuals in order to 
erect a barrier to the reach of habeas corpus; a technique which finds 
interesting parallels in the twenty-first century. However, for all the broad-
ranging political and legal conflicts generated by the practice of detention 
ZLWKRXW WULDO WKH UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ WKH VRYHUHLJQ¶VDXWKRULW\DQG µWKH
ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶ ZDV QHYHU FODULILHG 'LG µWKH ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶ Gerive its 
force from the authority of sovereign? Did the alleged absolutism of the 
SUHURJDWLYHVRIWKHVRYHUHLJQSODFHLWLQDKLJKHUKLHUDUFK\WKDQµWKHODZRI
WKHODQG¶":DVWKHUHRQHFRQFUHWHµODZRIWKHODQG¶RUZHUHWKHUHGLIIHUHQW
laws for emergencies? Every now and then, these questions would come 
to pose a great degree of discomfort to the sovereign in England and the 
colonial governors. The authorisation of martial law, for example, 
represented one of the challenging concepts with regard to which no legal 
scholar or practitioner could with great certainty assert what the correct 
SRVLWLRQZDVXQGHUµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶ 
In general, both at home, and in colonies, the history of detention without 
trial in Britain was caught in the middle of two different endeavours. The 
first endeavour was the liberty of subjects. As one colonial authority in 
British-$PHULFDVWDWHGµ>O@HWDQ(QJOLVKPDQJRZKHUHKHZLOOKHFDUULHVDV
PXFKRIODZDQGOLEHUW\ZLWKKLPDVWKHQDWXUHRIWKLQJVZLOOEHDU¶190 No 
VXUSULVHWKHQWKDWWKHWHUPµWKHHPSLUHRIOLEHUW\¶ZDVDPRQJWKHPRVWDll-
pervading self-constructed images by the British ruling elites. Habeas 
                                                          
190 The Calcutta Monthly Journal (1836) at 184.  
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FRUSXV ZKLFK ZDV PRUH RIWHQ WKDQ QRW UHIHUUHG WR DV µWKH SDOODGLXP RI
OLEHUW\¶ KDG ORQJ VLQFH EHFRPH WKH PRVW SURPLQHQW LQGLFDWRU RI WKH
VRYHUHLJQ¶V FDUH IRU WKH OLEHUW\ RI VXEMHFWV Due to the role that habeas 
corpus played in the political uprisings of the seventeenth century, it had a 
nostalgic dimension to it in Britain too. In colonies, however, habeas 
corpus was a prominent part of projecting the image of imperial 
benevolence so as to gain legitimacy.  
The other side of the coin of the British rule was the problem of public 
order. Insofar as the politics of the realm was concerned, post-
revolutionary political alliances, territorial reunions with Scotland and 
Ireland, the Catholic suppression, the elites centered political structure 
DQGWKHSRWHQWLDOSURVSHFWµFRQWDJLRQ¶RIWKH)UHQFK5HYROXWLRQSURYRNHGD
wide-range of dissents posing real challenges to the sovereign 
establishment in the eighteenth century. The answer to these challenges 
lied in compromising the liberty of subjects with the requirements of the 
public order.  Thereafter, it was easy to argue that to uphold the essentials 
of public order, the sovereign is on some occasions pressed to take a 
departure from normal standards.  
Especially in the first half of the eighteenth century, authorities would 
consult great caution in their resort to detention without trial. As a result, 
detention powers could not be recalled, unless there was an explicit 
parliamentary suspension of habeas corpus. Parliamentary suspension acts 
would erect some rudimentary limitations on the detention powers of the 
executive, such as a limited time frame for the suspension of habeas 
corpus. However, in the second half of the eighteenth century, Parliament 
shifted from its timeworn convention regarding the suspension of habeas 
corpus. Suspension acts became more ambiguous in their wordings. Time 
limits disappeared and the executive powers were enlarged.   
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However, one of the premises of this chapter was to demonstrate that the 
utility of instruments such as habeas corpus or detention without trial was 
not contingent upon their objective value, but the context in which they 
were resurrected. More importantly, the vital pillar of the context which 
would determine the prevalence of either habeas corpus or detention 
without trial was the conception of necessity. The formulation of necessity 
proved to be fluid, situational, and subjective. Even when there were 
attempts to define objective criteria and thresholds for the translation of 
necessity into the suspension of certain norms, officials did not remain 
loyal to those conceptions.  
Martial law in particular required a categorical clarification of necessity. It 
was demonstrated that martial law could not necessarily be tantamount to 
the existence of a war. Rather, martial law was regularly invoked for 
supressing uprisings and rebellions. From the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, there were attempts to clarify the tenor of necessity justifying the 
functioning of martial law.191  When seen in the light of the Petition of 
Right, this meant that the closure of courts was a prerequisite to the 
introduction of martial law. Nevertheless, there were many inconsistencies 
ZLWKWKLVWKUHVKROG(YHQLQ%ULWDLQ¶VVKLIWWowards emergency regulations 
as a primary counter-insurgency method, expediency played a much more 
SURPLQHQWSDUWWKDQJHQXLQHFRQFHUQVIRUµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶8OWLPDWHO\
the result for the population affected by emergency regulations was not so 
different. Such colonial catastrophes as civilian slaughters in Mau Mau 
detention camps can well attest to this fact.     
It was also argued that in the wake of World War II, the administrative 
machinery revolving around the practice of detention without trial came to 
represent a higher importance than ever before. As a result, varying set of 
                                                          
191 Fifth Report on the Affairs of the East India Company, House of Commons (London: Black, 
Parry, Co, Booksellers, 1812) at 106. 
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commissions and boards emerged to govern the exercise of detention. The 
administrative complex surrounding detention without trial bestowed 
legitimacy upon the executive circumventions of constitutional norms. As 
such, they played a key role in terms of justifying extended durations of 
the governance of emergency regulations. Finally, it was by dint of such 
machinery that the doctrine of judicial deference, as manifested in cases 
of Halliday and Liversidge, took shape. In other words, such institutions as 
advisory boards came to ease the judicial conscience so as not to 
embarrass the executive by its consecutive interventions. This pattern was 
swiftly exported to other colonies too, and remained alive in the post-
colonial world. As a result, the standard understanding of the rule of law in 
times of necessity merely became procedural. That is to say, insofar as 
procedural remedies are upheld, the executive actions can be dismissed 
from judicial scrutiny. One consequence of this was that in the most 
modern instances of the exercises of detention without trial, the prior 
suspension of habeas corpus would not serve as a necessary prelude to 
the lawfulness of detention without trial. We must return to this question, 
whilst outlining our analysis of detention without trial with a view to the 
so-called war on terror.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
Detention of Aliens: The Interaction between the 
prerogative and international law in Britain prior to the 
age of human rights 
 
1. Introduction  
 
After considering the early modern accounts of detention without trial, one 
may ask the question whether international law could have any role to 
play at all in determining the boundaries of detention powers. Before 
answering this question, one must make a distinction between two 
different classes of people. The first class consisted of the nationals of a 
state. Insofar as the nationals of a state were concerned, it was 
undisputed that international law could not undertake any restrictive view 
towards the behaviour of states. In this regard, it must be borne in mind 
that the era in question is the one prior to the emergence of human rights 
law as a distinct legal regime within public international law.1 In this era, 
even the so-FDOOHGFRQFHSWRIµULJKWVRIPDQ¶ZKLFKZDVGHYHORSHGE\WKH
Institute of International Law as early as 1929) was not accorded any 
official significance in international law.2 As a result, the only recognised 
legal authority to deal with the rights and wrongs of nationals was the 
sovereign. However, the same formula did not strictly prove to be 
consistent for the second class of persons composed, namely, aliens. The 
fact that aliens owed allegiance to different sovereigns and the subjection 
                                                          
1 S. Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2010) at 
176-180. 
2 E. Bourchard µ7KH0LQLPXP6WDQGDUGRIWKH7UHDWPHQWRI$OLHQV¶Michigan Law 
Review 445, at 458. 
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of them to ill-treatment could potentially provoke the protest of their 
sovereigns gave rise to an interstate dimension, which was of a potentially 
restrictive function to the authority of sovereigns receiving aliens. This 
dimension gave rise to an international law concerning  treatment of 
aliens.3  Nevertheless, the practical impacts of international law on the 
rights of aliens prior to the age of human rights remain the subject of 
controversy as late as the twenty first century. The main premise of this 
FKDSWHULVWRGLVFRYHUWKHUROHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLQJRYHUQLQJWKHVWDWHV¶
conduct in a manner which influenced the rights of aliens.  
Naturally, if international law fully submits to the powers of states for the 
purposes of detaining aliens, it follows that states can establish means of 
control, exclusion and expulsion at their own discretion. If domestic law 
too refrains from any further restraints on these powers, the predictable 
result is the flow of certain discretionary powers, which are not susceptible 
to judicial control. In the context of the treatment of aliens, these 
discretionary measures normally consist of detention of aliens, restrictions 
RQDOLHQV¶IUHHGRPRIPRYHPHQWDQGWKHLUIRUFHGUHPRYDO.4  
We cannot fully appreciate the link between the authorities of international 
law and sovereign powers without having first established how 
international law was invoked in the domestic jurisprudences apropos the 
sovereign prerogative. It is for this purpose that after describing the 
doctrines of international law on the point of the treatment of aliens, we 
shall refer to the laws and practices in Britain prior to the emergence of 
the human rights law regime. Since the reign of Charles I, the scope of the 
royal prerogative particularly for the purpose of detaining individuals had 
signified one of the most prominent pre-occupations of the legal 
                                                          
3 A. H. Roth, International Law Applied to Aliens (London: University College London, 1949) 
at 23.  
4 I. A. Shearer, Extradition in International Law (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 
1971) at 76.  
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establishment in England. However, the reach of the prerogative as 
regards aliens was hardly an issue of legal clarity. This generated lengthy 
legal discussions, parliamentary debates and many disputes in Britain.5 By 
subjecting these historical materials to a legal scrutiny, this chapter 
intends to outline the evolving contours of the prerogative, its interaction 
with international law and the effect that this interplay brought about for 
the exercise of detention.   
2. ǯǣ
Internment 
 
It is tautological that maintaining independence and sovereignty of states 
requires the concession of certain exclusive powers to the central 
establishment of states, also referred to as the sovereign establishment. 
In most states, written constitutions usually serve as documents 
embodying these powers in an enumerated fashion.6 In other states such 
as Britain, which lack a codified constitution, it is not always easy to assert 
the precise scope of these powers and the extent to which they are bound 
E\ZKDW WKHFRQWHPSRUDU\ ODZ\HUV FKDUDFWHULVHDV µWKH UXOHRI ODZ¶ 7KLV
point was in particular highlighted in the previous chapter in our discussion 
RIµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶7 To gain a better understanding of this issue, it is 
useful to asses some of the attributes of the powers of sovereign.  
The choice of terms employed to hint at the exclusive powers of 
sovereignty is broad and may differ in accordance with the context in 
which such terms are utilised. For example, in the context of the powers of 
WKH $PHULFDQ SROLWLFDO EUDQFKHV WKH WHUP µSOHQDU\ SRZHUV¶ KDV PRUH
frequently been referred in a synonymous manner to the exclusive 
                                                          
5 Refer to chapter I, section 4.  
6 See, for example, Marbury v. Madison, the U.S Supreme Court (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
7 Refer to chapter I, sections 1 and 8.1.  
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sovereign rights. 8   In Britain, the usage of such terms as the royal 
prerogative, the prerogative of the Crown or simply the prerogative has 
gained more frequency in the legal literature.  
Again, depending on the context, the meaning of these terms can vary. 
Therefore, sovereign rights can be invoked for exclusive, pre-emptive, 
controlling or regulating purposes. 9  They can also be used for the 
assertion of particular rights in an absolute manner.  However, all 
sovereign rights share a common characteristic, that is, they must pertain 
to the matters of public interest.10  
From the characteristics described above for the powers of sovereignty, it 
is logical to assume that the issue of aliens is a perfect fit for falling under 
the auspices of the authority of states. Therefore, for example, insofar as 
the conception of the prerogative in the laws of Britain was concerned, 
Chitty wrote in 1820:  
[a]lien friends may lawfully come into the country without any 
licence or protection from the Crown, though it seems that the 
Crown, even at common law and by the law of nations 
possesses a right to order them out of the country, or prevent 
them from coming into it, whenever his majesty thinks 
proper.11  
This language of reference to the issue of control of aliens is of great 
significance for us in order to come to grips with the different components 
RI WKH VWDWH¶V DXWKRULW\ LQ GHDOLQJ ZLWK DOLHQV 2UGHULQJ WKHP RXW RI WKH
country refers to the measure of expulsion and preventing them from an 
entrance into the country hints at the measure of exclusion.12 The main 
components of expulsion were deportation, removal of aliens and 
                                                          
8 For the use of the concept of plenary powers in the context of aliens immigration control, 
see 7 $ $OHLQLNRII µ'HWDLQLQJ 3OHQDU\ 3RZHU 7KH 0HDQLQJ DQG ,PSDFW RI Zadvydas v. 
Davis¶-2002) 16 Georgia Immigration Law Journal 365.  
9 D. E. Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S Supreme Court (United States: the 
University of Texas Press, 1997) at 25-26.  
10 J. Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown (London: Law Booksellers, 
1820) at 163.  
11 Ibid., at 49.  
12 Shearer, above note 4, at 76.  
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internment/detention without trial. The latter was a component of 
exclusion, in that it would exclude an alien detainee from entering into the 
borders of his destination.13 However, internment could also serve as a 
supplementary practice to expulsion in the form of detention pending 
deportation.  
As regards the measure of internment of aliens, it must be stated that the 
language of detention in the context of the treatment of aliens did not gain 
sufficient traction, since detention was a subsumed part of the bundle of 
the prerogative. Therefore, whenever there is the talk of exclusion and 
expulsion in the context of the treatment of aliens, the authorisation of 
internment is implied. The clearest proof of this statement is the ruling of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Wong Wing v. United States14, in 
which the validity of internment for the purposes of exclusion and 
expulsion was in question. Accordingly, the Court posited that:  
We think it clear that detention or temporary confinement, as 
part of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for 
the exclusion or expulsion of aliens would be valid. Proceedings 
to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused could not be 
held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character and 
while arrangements were being made for their deportation.15 
As it will be seen in the subsequent sections,16 the same argument found 
expression in the U.K courts. As it is clear from the argument of the U.S 
Supreme Court, once used for the purposes of exclusion and expulsion 
detention without trial loses its penal character. It becomes a means of 
control for other measures, or as the U.S Supreme Court vividly put it, 
µWKH PHDQV QHFHVVDU\ WR JLYH HIIHFW WR WKH H[FOXVLRQ RU H[SXOVLRQ >RI
DOLHQV@¶ 
                                                          
13 C. Vincenzi, Crown Powers, Subjects and Citizens (London: A Cassell Imprint, 1998) at 95, 
naturally, however, the terms exclusion and expulsion have been used interchangeably. The 
reason for this manner of using the two term is that there is an exclusion implicit in any act 
of expulsion and the end result of many of the acts of exclusion has been expulsion.  
14 Wong Wing v. United States - 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
15 Ibid., at 163.  
16 Sections 5-6.  
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Prior to the emergence of the human rights regime as one of the main 
departments of public international law, individuals could not be 
considered as direct subjects  of WKHODZVRIQDWLRQV7KLVUHQGHUHGVWDWHV¶
authority as the only medium through which international law could 
grapple with the rights of individuals, which meant that the liberties of 
individuals (in this case) aliens could only emerge at the point that there 
was a restraint placed on the authority of states. The immunisation of 
aliens from internment was no exception to this rule. However, neither in 
principle nor in practice, did there exist a clear-cut conception of the 
powers of states with regard to aliens in the domain of international law. 
For example, in a nonbinding resolution regarding the international 
regulations governing the admission and expulsion of aliens, the Institute 
of International Law stipulated in 1892 that, in principle, a state cannot 
restrict access to its territory to certain kinds of immigrants, particularly 
stateless persons.17  This was quite inconsistent with an earlier resolution 
adopted by the same Institute of International Law, in which no duty had 
been conferred on states to admit aliens and by which the absolute power 
of states in excluding and expelling aliens had secured an official 
recognition in international law.18 It was most probably due to these broad 
confusions and contradictions, that whilst being presented with an 
RSSRUWXQLW\RIPDNLQJFODULILFDWLRQVRQWKHVFRSHRIWKHVWDWHV¶DXWKRULW\
the Permanent Court of International Justice chose not to touch upon this 
matter.19 
,QWKHDEVHQFHRIDFRKHUHQWDQGFRQVLVWHQWGRFWULQHJRYHUQLQJWKHVWDWHV¶
authority regarding aliens, selective invocations of different passages 
                                                          
17 ,QVWLWXWHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZµ,QWHUQational Regulations on the Admission and Expulsion of 
$OLHQV¶$UW.  
18  ,QVWLWXWH RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ µ3URMHW GH 'pFODUDWLRQ LQWHUQDWLRQDOH UHODWLYH DX GURLW
G
H[SXOVLRQGHVpWUDQJHUV¶$Uticle1.  
19  Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in Danzig 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44 (Feb. 4), at 42.  
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became common place in different jurisprudences. A general inquiry of the 
practice in Britain can highlight that the acceptance of the absolutism of 
the rights of states by the law of nations was taken for granted and how 
this acceptance of absolute authority came to justify the wholesale 
detention of aliens.  
3. From Doctrine to Practice  
 
The norms governing the treatment of aliens in Britain were predominantly 
occupied by the distinction between war and peace. This can be proven by 
a number of important cases, of which Sylvester¶V FDVH 20  in the early 
eighteenth century would determine the path for others.  
The importance of 6\OYHVWHU¶V case for our purposes is that it shows that 
WKHHQWLWOHPHQWRIDOLHQVWRWKHVRYHUHLJQ¶VSURWHFWLRQ LV LQWHUWZLQHGZLWK
his/her status as an alien enemy or alien friend when in the territory of 
another sovereign. 21  While the state authority over alien enemies is 
applicable in an absolute capacity, the alien friend can enjoy the 
protections embodied in municipal laws. However, even the absolute 
authority of states, as applied against alien enemies could be restricted by 
deeds of international law such as mutual agreements or letters of safe 
conduct.22 The ruling in 6\OYHVWHU¶V case was consistent with the dominant 
opinion of some jurists in international law. On this point, Bynkershoeck 
argued in his treatise on the law of war that unless protected by a mutual 
agreement or a letter of safe conduct, an alien enemy possesses no 
µpersona standi in judicio¶23  That is to say, alien enemies cannot produce 
                                                          
20 6\OYHVWHU¶VFDVH (7 Mod. 152), 1702. 
21 ,QWKHOHJDOOLWHUDWXUHWKHSKUDVHVµDOLHQHQHPLHV¶RUµDOLHQIULHQGV¶KDYHDOVREHHQUHIHrred 
WRDVµHQHP\DOLHQV¶DQGµIULHQGO\ DOLHQV¶,QWKLVWKHVLV both forms are used interchangeably.  
22 6\OYHVWHU¶VFDVH, above note 42. Also, J. Chitty, A Treatise on the Laws of Commerce and 
Manufactures Vol. III (London: Strahan, 1824) at 59.  
23 C. Van Bynkershoeck, A Treatise on the Law of War (New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange 
Ltd, 2007) at 55 and 191. 
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a case in the courts of the country at war with their home state.24 Also, 
enemy aliens have an absolute lack of legal persona. This absolute lack of 
judicial persona justifies extra-judicial actions, of which the first one is 
detention without trial.   
The precedent established by 6\OYHVWHU¶V case was followed by British 
courts for many years 25  and it was accepted as a natural part of the 
VRYHUHLJQ¶V ZDU SRZHUV WR GHDO ZLWK VXFK PDWWHUV DV KRVWLOH HQWU\
aggression and alien spies. However, in the course of scrutinising these 
cases, one can discern that the role of international law in determining the 
extent of state power did not always remain at an impotent level. In an 
interesting case concerning a Hollander aligned with France in a war 
DJDLQVW %ULWDLQ LQ  WKH FRXUW RI .LQJ¶V %HQFK LQYRNHG FXVWRPDU\
international law arguments to grant fair treatment to this dHWDLQHH¶>W>KLV
defence is founded on an idea of a right in the conqueror to reduce his 
SULVRQHUVWRVODYHU\ZKLFKLVFRQWUDU\WRWKHODZRIQDWLRQV¶26 
There were also other customary practices putting explicit limits on the 
authority of states. In this regard, some international customs as to the 
protection of the PoWs stood as an example in which the wholesale denial 
of rights to alien enemies could not have been good policy. This is mainly 
because subjecting POWs to ill-treatment by British authorities could 
endanger the lives of British subjects held captive by the adversaries. The 
solution was to bring POWs under the protection of the laws of the 
realm.27 This generous approach towards the rights of the POWs marked 
an important privilege that they held over other classes of interned aliens. 
They could sue and be sued in the British courts and held all the 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 See, The King v. Superintendent of Vine Street Police Station [1916] 1 K.B. 268. 
26 Sparenburgh v. Bannatyne 126 E.R. 837 (1797), 839.  
27 Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2010) at 172.  
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protections that subjects of the Crown were entitled to including the right 
of habeas corpus. Nevertheless, since most prisoners of war were likely to 
be exchanged quickly, the tendency among them to use the remedy of 
habeas corpus remained slim.28  
3.1. The legal position of alien friends: confusion escalates 
7KH LVVXHRI WKHQRUPVJRYHUQLQJVWDWHV¶ FRQGXFW UHJDUGLQJDOLHQ IULHQGV
was much more unsettled. This controversy was largely due to the fact 
that within the ambit of war powers, suspension of legal norms such as 
habeas corpus could be justified. However, when it came to the treatment 
of aliens, the norms were by no means transparent. Arguments in 
international law normally ranged from the existence of an absolute state 
authority to exclude aliens to the strictly controlled powers of state.29   
Insofar as the scholarly opinions were concerned, some prominent British 
authors in the eighteenth century supported the absolute authority of 
states to exclude aliens, be those alien friends or enemies. For example, 
%ODFNVWRQH SODFHG WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI DOLHQV DW WKH VWDWH¶V PHUF\ DQG
considered the prerogative of the King as extending to the exclusion of 
alien IULHQGVLQDQDEVROXWLVWYHUVLRQµZKHQHYHUWKHNLQJVHHVRFFDVLRQ¶30 
The identification of such an alleged constitutional authority in the laws of 
Britain was essential. If it existed, this authority, would serve as a bar to 
any legal action by a perceived excluded alien.  
However, in one of the most forceful queries of the position of the laws of 
Britain on alien friends, Craies noted that the Crown held no prerogative 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 
29 See-5$1DI]LJHUµ7KH*HQHUDO$GPLVVLRQRI$OLHQVXQGHU,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶
American Journal of International Law 804. 
30 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
M.DCC.LXV) at 251.  
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by the law of constitution so as to detain or deport alien friends.31 The lack 
of the prerogative in question meant the availability of habeas corpus and 
other judicial remedies for aliens. This meant that alien friends could not 
be barred from judicial remedies ±± most importantly, the writ of habeas 
corpus, which significantly reduced the scope of the permissibility of 
internment against alien friends, insofar as the constitutional limits in 
Britain were concerned. Referring back to the international law argument 
even Craies concluded that international law did not refute the right of 
sovereigns on taking exclusionary measures against aliens.32  
One may argue that this understanding of international law was strictly 
confined to the late nineteenth century, since as Nafziger has shown, 
µEHIRUHWKHODWHWKFHQWXU\WKHUHZDVOLWWOHLQSULQFLple, to support the 
DEVROXWHH[FOXVLRQRIDOLHQV¶33 +RZHYHU&UDLHV¶ HVVD\FDQEH LQYRNHG WR
exemplify a significant shift towards the recognition of the absolutism of 
VWDWHV¶DXWKRULW\E\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZUHJDUGLQJDOLHQVLQWKHVHFRQGKDOIRI
the nineteenth century.34 This shift of perception signified confusions and 
inconsistencies in the conceptions of the legal position of aliens in different 
frames of time, which begs the question of how detention without trial 
could operate in the view of such divergent perceptions of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of sovereigns.  
4. The contested reach of the prerogative in Britain, and the 
renewed waves of exclusion and expulsion  
 
                                                          
31 :)&UDLHVµWKHULJKWRIDOLHQVWRHQWHU%ULWLVKWHUULWRU\¶Law Quarterly Review 
27, at 34-37. 
32 Ibid., at 36-37.  
33 Nafziger, above note 29, at 808-809.  
34 It must not be neglected that the second half of the nineteenth century signifies a period in 
which positivist schools of law, which took a maximalist approach to the powers of sovereigns 
were on a very speedy rise. See, H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International 
Community (Oxford: OUP, 2011).  
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To understand the imperatives governing the protection of aliens, it is 
necessary to deviate from our chronological order and shortly move back 
to the late seventeenth and fifteenth century. Holdsworth noticed the 
effect of the expansion of industries on the rights of aliens, as Britain was 
on the verge of entering into the era of industrial revolution and explained 
WKDW µDW WKH FORVH RI WKH VHYHQWHHQWK FHQWXU\ WKH PRUH HODERUDWH
RUJDQLVDWLRQRIFRPPHUFH¶QHFHVVLWDWHGPRGHUDWLRQVDQGPRGLILFDWLRQV LQ
the treatment of aliens, especially alien enemies. Holdsworth also noted 
that the rights of alien friends followed progressive milestones from the 
fifteenth century onwards and identified a very important connotation 
originating from such changes:  
This admission of the capacity of alien friends to bring personal 
actions for torts has had one very important consequence in our 
constitutional law. It follows that they have gained the same as 
that accorded to subjects, not only against private persons, but 
also against the king and his servants.35  
The protection against the king and servants points to the sanction of the 
arbitrary use of the prerogative against alien friends. However, even the 
rights of alien friends in Britain were not as settled as they would appear 
in the words of Holdsworth. The issue of the prerogative of the Crown 
regarding the expulsion of aliens remained a matter of controversy for 
many decades and the practice remained far from clear. For example, as 
HDUO\ DV  DQGXSRQ WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RIPRGLILFDWLRQV IRU WKH µSHDFH¶
Alien Bill of 1816, Home Secretary Peel and the dominant opinion in 
3DUOLDPHQWKHOGWKDW µLWPDWWHUHGOLWWOHZKDWWKHSUHURJDWLYHRIWKH&URZQ
was, since it had at present no power but that which it received from 
3DUOLDPHQW¶ 36  In fact, the power in question constituted a statutory 
prerogative, a prerogative conferred and approved by parliamentary 
statutes. However, this statutory prerogative could hardly resolve the 
                                                          
35 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law Vol. IX (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1972) at 97-
98.  
36 &REEHWW¶V Parliamentary Debates, 1362.  
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confusions arising from taking exclusive measures against alien friends in 
peace time.37 The retreat of the Secretary Peel from the view that the 
Crown possessed a prerogative to exclude and expel alien friends 
regardless of a parliamentary affirmation was indeed a step forward. This 
restrictive reading of the prerogative dominated the legal mind-set for 
much of the nineteenth century.38  
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, some judicial decisions 
reformulated the prerogative in an expansive mould and threw renewed 
confusions into the reach of the prerogative of expulsion. Accordingly, in 
1891, the Lord Chancellor of the Privy Council in his passing remark 
concluded that the Crown had possessed a prerogative to prevent aliens 
from landing in Britain and its dominions.39 The act of exclusion in this 
case took the shape of detention on a board ship.40 This obiter of the Lord 
Chancellor came to establish a precedent for a number of subsequent 
decisions, which took the existence of the prerogative of expulsion for 
granted. Most notable among such cases was Canada v. Cain. In delivering 
the judgment of the court in thLVFDVH/RUG$WNLQVRQSRVWXODWHGWKDWµWKH
&URZQ XQGRXEWHGO\ SRVVHVVHG WKH SRZHU WR H[SHO DQ DOLHQ¶41 Moreover, 
WKLVSRZHUFRXOGEHGHOHJDWHGWRFRORQLDOJRYHUQRUVµZKLFKLQFOXGH>G@DQG
authorise[d] them to impose such extra-territorial constraint as is 
QHFHVVDU\ WR H[HFXWH WKH SRZHU¶ 42  To justify the validity of the 
prerogative of the Crown, Lord Atkinson gave great weight to international 
law arguments. In this regard, he argued: 
But as it is conceded that by the law of nations the supreme 
power in every State has the right to make laws for the 
                                                          
37 Ibid.  
38 & + 5 7KRUQEHUU\ µ'U 6REOHQ DQG WKH $OLHQ /DZ RI WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶ 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 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 414. 
39 Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy [1891] A.C. 272. 
40 Ibid., at 276.  
41 Attorney-General for the Dominion of Canada v Everett E. Cain [1906] A.C. 542, at 543.  
42 Ibid. 
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exclusion or expulsion of aliens, and to enforce those laws, it 
necessarily follows that the State has the power to do those 
things which must be done in the very act of expulsion.43 
As Lord Atkinson explicitly acknowledged, one measure falling within the 
DPELW RI µWKRVH WKLQJV¶ ZDV GHWHQWLRQ ZLWKRXW WULDO IRU WKH purpose of 
exclusion:44 
The Crown had power to remove a foreigner by force from the 
island of Mauritius, though, of course, the removal in that case 
would necessarily involve an imprisonment of the alien outside 
British territory, in the ship on board of which he would be put 
while it traversed the high seas. 
/RUG$WNLQVRQ¶VDUJXPHQWVZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHFORVHWLHEHWZHHQWKHSRZHUV
of detention and the powers of removal is very illuminating, in that they 
make it explicit that exclusion and expulsion often go hand-in-hand. This 
ZDVWKHFRUHRI/RUG$WNLQVRQ¶VQH[WDUJXPHQW 
If entry be prohibited it would seem to follow that the 
Government which has the power to exclude should have the 
power to expel the alien who enters in opposition to its laws.45 
Insofar as the invocation of international law for the approval of exclusion 
and expulsion was concerned in this case, it must be noted that this 
understanding of international law in the late nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries was not uncommon. Even, in the case of Musgrove v 
Chun Teeong Toy, 46  there was an explicit recognition by all parties 
involved in the case that international law had mapped out a great margin 
of deference to the absolute authority of states in dealing with immigrants. 
However, there was one major difficulty undermining this argument. 
The first problem with an absolute deference to the prerogative of 
sovereigns by international law was that there was no consensus on the 
                                                          
43 Ibid, at 547.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy, above note 39. 
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part of international legal scholars. As it was argued above,47 even, Vattel, 
who was regularly invoked by the British courts to justify the prerogative 
of expulsion, had accounted for some exceptions with a restrictive effect 
on the rights of sovereign in expelling and excluding aliens.48  
Interestingly, some British authors in the late nineteenth century were 
quite conscious of the contradictions arising from the international law 
analysis on the issue of aliens. Haycraft in particular provided a 
FRQVWUXFWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI9DWWHO¶VZULWLQJVZKLFKZDVTXLWHFRQVLVWHQW
with the case-by-case approach to the admission of aliens. He wrote: 
The principle laid down by Vattel is so consistent with common 
notions of justice as to be acceptable to every kind of rational 
mind and leaves us only to inquire, not whether exclusion of 
any kind is justifiable, but whether the grounds of exclusion 
proposed are such particular and important reasons as would 
justify legislation.49 
Specifying explicit grounds for exclusion would necessitate legislation, of 
which one implication was to limit the prerogative. The only exception to 
the limiting effect of legislations for the prerogative would occur if such 
legislations brought within their fold delegation of powers to the executive. 
However, the judicial approach in the leading cases regarding the 
prerogative of expulsion was only predicated upon general, vague and 
misconstrued readings of the authority of states in international law. This 
acceptance of the absolute prerogative of the Crown meant that 
legislations would only carry a supplementary weight to the perceived pre-
existing executive authority for excluding aliens.  
                                                          
47 Section 2.1.  
48 $V1DI]LJHUKDVUHIOHFWHGRQWKHYLHZVRI9DWWHOµ>W@KHH[FHSWLRQVWRWKHULJKWWRH[FOXGH
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qualified right of making use of the things that belong to others, the right of passage and for 
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of these are premised on the notion of a primitive state of communion and the Grotian right 
RIQHFHVVLW\¶1DI]LJHUabove note 29, at 813.  
49 7:+D\FUDIWµ$OLHQ/HJLVODWLRQDQGWKH3UHURJDWLYHRIWKH&URZQ¶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5. The effect of absolute authority on the exercise of 
detention without trial 
 
 
If the possession of absolute authority is recognised, the natural 
conclusion will be that the exercise of such powers cannot on any grounds 
be challenged in the form of lawsuits brought by aliens. In other words, 
the acts of officials with regard to aliens are protected by an absolute 
impunity from the judicial scrutiny, insofar as they relate to the expulsion 
and exclusion of aliens. The Lord Chancellor referred to this precedent in 
the case of Musgrove v Chun Teeong Toy: 
Their Lordships cannot assent to the proposition that an alien 
refused permission to enter British territory can, in an action in 
a British Court, compel the decision of such matters as these, 
involving delicate and difficult constitutional questions affecting 
the respective rights of the Crown and Parliament and the 
relations of this country to her self-governing colonies.50 
Therefore, an act of state automatically negates the right of aliens to 
judicial remedies, which is a conclusion supported by the case of Poll v. 
Lord Advocate.51 This indeed precluded the criminal justice system from 
having any say on the detention of aliens. Therefore, detaining aliens 
could not have been possibly exercised as a punishment against the 
infringement of particular rules by such people. Rather, the exercise of 
detention without trial was deemed to only serve exclusionary, preventive 
and administrative purposes. 
The real character of detaining immigrants in the early twentieth century 
assumed confusion in Britain. This confusion primarily stemmed from the 
vague wording of the Royal Commission report on the exclusion of 
undesirable aliens. According to this report:  
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Provision should be made for the immediate determination of 
any proceedings taken before a court of summary jurisdiction 
on the arrival of the immigrant pending which the immigrant 
may be placed on the suitable charge.52  
It is not clear that the decisions of this court of summary jurisdiction 
would afford a punitive character to the measures of exclusion and 
expulsion and if so, how this would affect that nature of detention arising 
from such decisions. This complication could be intensified by paying 
attention to the fact that the measures suggested by the Royal 
Commission were to inform an alien bill for regulating (or restricting) the 
entry of Jewish immigrants from the Eastern Europe. A note made by the 
Secretary of State in 1905 upon the introduction of the alien bill is of some 
relevance: 
[t]he second part of the Bill deals with the expulsion of 
undesirable aliens in our midst. To secure this the Secretary of 
State may make an expulsion order requiring an alien to leave 
the United Kingdom within a time he fixes and thereafter to 
remain out of it. But the Secretary of State can only act on the 
certificate of a court of summary jurisdiction.53 
More or less, the same terms were employed in the 1905 alien bill for 
outlining the process of expulsion:  
The Secretary of State may, if he thinks fit, make an order (in 
this Act referred to as an expulsion order) requiring an alien to 
leave the United Kingdom within a time fixed by the order, and 
thereafter to remain out of the United Kingdom. 
(a) If it is certified to him by any court (including a court of 
summary jurisdiction) that the alien has been convicted by that 
court of any felony of any felony, or misdemeanour, or other 
offence for which the court has power to impose 
LPSULVRQPHQW«54 
The decision of this court of summary jurisdiction served as an 
administrative prerequisite for the expulsion of aliens either enemy aliens 
or alien friends. Given such state of affairs, one may ask if the type of 
questions arising from the decision of the summary court of jurisdiction 
                                                          
52 The Report of the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration Appointed (August, 1903) at 31.  
53 &REEHWW¶VParliamentary Debates 1905.  
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was administrative or penal. Referring to the words of the Royal 
Commission, Wilsher elaborates on the nature of such a detention: 
This is the first official mention of a system of administrative 
detention for immigrants in UK law. The reference is oblique 
and the Commission did not explore the justification for such 
custody in legal or political terms. Nor was there any attempt to 
reconcile such administrative detention with traditional concepts 
of habeas corpus and judicial control. Detention was conceived 
as an inevitable part of the mechanism of control rather than a 
distinct measure.55  
It is not certain why the executive were so determined to establish an 
elaborate administrative complex for the exclusion and the final expulsion 
of aliens, while they could utilise a claim of having absolute authority over 
DOLHQV IRU WKH DXWKRULVDWLRQ RI GHWHQWLRQZLWKRXW WULDO LQ WKH  DOLHQ¶V
bill. One can only speculate that using such bureaucratic methods as the 
court of summary jurisdiction could tame the worries of the strong liberal 
RSSRVLWLRQWRWKHDOLHQ¶VELOODQGOHDGWRWKHLUVXEVHTXHQWSDFLILFDWLRQ
in Parliament. Furthermore, admission of the jurisdiction of a court for the 
purpose of exclusion and expulsion of aliens could temporally impede more 
questions as to the prerogative of the Crown from being raised. Therefore, 
caution called for not spoiling the royal prerogative by a bill, whose 
success was by no means guaranteed.56 It was against this background 
that Oppenheim wrote:  
The British Government had, until December 1919, no power to 
expel even the most dangerous alien without the 
recommendation of a court, or without an act of Parliament 
making provisions for such expulsion, except during war or an 
occasion of imminent national danger or great emergency.57  
                                                          
55 D. Wilsher, Immigration Detention: Law, History, Politics (Cambridge: CUP, 2012) at 37.  
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6. The Prerogative and the Wholesale Detention of Aliens: 
Where did alien enemies stand? 
  
In the aftermath of 1905, anti-alien sentiments gathered pace in British 
society. 58  ,Q  6HFUHWDU\ RI 6WDWH IRU :DU LQ DQ µLQDFFXUDWH DQG
DODUPLVW¶ UHSRUW FRPPHQWHG WKDW µQR GRXEW WKDW DQ H[WHQVLYH V\VWHPRI
*HUPDQ HVSLRQDJH H[LVWHG LQ WKLV FRXQWU\¶ 59  Similar reports could be 
found in all sectors of the intelligence community in Britain. 60  Such 
misperceived beliefs had rendered people of German origin the main 
target of public hysteria. In the wake of World War I, the public hysteria 
was translated into coercive legislation. The Aliens Restriction Act61 and 
the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 191462 came to represent 
the primary legal reactions to the perceived enigma of aliens.  
The Aliens Act enabled the executive by order in council to impose such 
UHVWULFWLRQV DV µSURKLELWLQJ DOLHQV IURP ODQGLQJ¶ µHPEDUNLQJ LQ WKH8QLWHG
.LQJGRP¶ DQG µSURKLELWLQJ >WKHP@ IURP UHVLGLQJ DQG UHPDLQLQJ LQ DQ\
DUHDV VSHFLILHG LQ WKH 2UGHU¶ 63  Moreover, this act conferred powers of 
detention, deportation and assignment of areas of residence to the 
executive.64 The scope of the act covered all aliens and it reversed the 
EXUGHQRISURRIVRWKDWµWKHRQXVRISURYLQJWKDW>D@SHUVRQ>ZDV@QRWDQ
DOLHQ¶ lay upon that person. 65  Furthermore, in order to confirm the 
                                                          
58  A. W. B. Simpson, In the Highest Degree Odious: Detention without Trial in Wartime 
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comprehensive substance of the prerogative, the act emphasised its own 
auxiliary character: 
$Q\SRZHUVJLYHQXQGHUWKLVVHFWLRQ>«@VKDOOEHLQDGGLWLRQWR
and not in derogation of, any other powers with respect to the 
expulsion of aliens, or the prohibition of aliens from entering 
the United Kingdom or any other powers of his Majesty.66   
After establishing the fact that detention powers could come into operation 
as a synthesis of the royal prerogative, the immediate question would be if 
such groups as alien enemies and alien friends could be entitled to the writ 
of habeas corpus. In this regard, there was a great deal of ambiguity 
among the practices of the British courts. Ex parte Weber signified the test 
case for habeas corpus insofar the people of German origin were 
concerned. 67  In this case, the judges discerned that all individuals of 
German origin, including those who have lost the protection of German 
laws by their absence in Germany were to be considered as enemy aliens 
and therefore, they could not be entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.68 
This established a precedent for one of the most striking decisions in the 
legal history of Britain, namely, The King v Superintendent of Vine Street 
Police Station Ex Libmann. 69  This case concerned the interment of a 
denationalised person from Germany, who had not acquired the status of 
a naturalised British subject. The court approved his detention and denied 
his entitlement to the writ of habeas corpus on the basis that he remained 
an enemy alien. Furthermore, the court equated the constructed status of 
the detainee as an enemy alien to that of a prisoner of war. To this effect, 
the Court provided an argument filled with anti-alien sentiments:  
>«@ 6S\LQJ KDV EHFRPH WKH KDOO-PDUN RI *HUPDQ ³NXOWXU´ In 
these circumstances a German civilian in this country may be a 
danger in promoting unrest, suspicion, doubts of victory, in 
communicating intelligence, in assisting in the movements of 
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submarines and Zeppelins - a far greater danger, indeed, than 
a German soldier or sailor.70  
General conclusions drawn from an earlier case in 1915 concerning the 
right of alien enemies to sue in British courts helped the judges to 
construct a formula for determining the entitlement of such persons to 
habeas corpus. According to this case, the legal protection of aliens was 
contingent upon the licence of residence bestowed upon them by the 
Crown. Although granting the licence of residence was a product of the 
prerogative, the question was how judges could ascertain the revocation 
of such licence by the Crown. Judge Low in Ex p. Liebmann found an easy 
way out for this question. He briefly argued that the internment order was 
to be considered as an implicit revocation of the licence and all the 
privileges coming with it.71 This formula entailed many contradictions, and 
as such, did not appeal to the legal minds of some other judges. 
Therefore, in an important case, Lord Cozens-Hardy ruled that: 
The restraint which is imposed upon the personal movements of 
an interned German does not deprive him of civil rights in 
respect of a lawful contract entered into by him before the 
internment.72 
Nevertheless, even the judges in this case who showed their commitment 
to deliver a balanced judgement, were of the opinion that although 
internment could not be taken as a just cause for stripping aliens of all 
their protections, it certainly disqualified them from an entitlement to the 
writ of habeas corpus.73  
6.1. Where did alien friends stand?  
The Aliens Restriction Act had made it clear that there was no limit upon 
the prerogative of the Crown to detain or deport alien friends. The 
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JRYHUQPHQW¶VYLHZZDVWKDWWKLVFRQIHUULQJRIGHWHQWLRQSRZHUVXSRQWKH
executive would automatically abate the issuance of habeas corpus for 
alien friends. The judicial view, however, took the most ambiguous shape 
in The King v Governor of Brixton Prison.74 According to this case, habeas 
corpus could in some cases be issued for alien friends, but a writ of habeas 
corpus could not suspend the legality of any given interment, unless there 
was an abuse of detention powers.75 However, the court did not specify 
any criteria as to how to measure an abuse of detention powers. 
Furthermore, the practice of detention pending deportation was approved 
by this case and as was made clear in some subsequent case, there was 
no substantive, procedural or time limit as to the detention of alien 
friends, whilst waiting for deportation.76 
7. The continued detention of aliens after war and the 
transformation of war powers into alien powers 
 
In general, the absolute nature of the Royal prerogative had doomed 
almost any vision of its meaningful justiciability to absurdity. The rule was 
WKHIXOODSSURYDORIWKHH[HFXWLYH¶VVXEMHFWLYHGHWHUPLQDWLRQDVWRZKRZDV
a danger to its security and who was not and the discharge of aliens from 
the discretionary practices was an exception. With the deference of the 
judiciary to the endeavours of the executive, the only hope for many 
detainees was a remedy of administrative nature, namely, the exemption 
ordeUVRIWKHDGYLVRU\FRPPLWWHHµDQDGYLVRU\ERG\RIDMXGLFLDOFKDUDFWHU
«E\ZKLFKDSSOLFDWLRQVIRUH[HPSWLRQIURPWKHJHQHUDOUXOHRILQWHUQPHQW
>FRXOG@EHFRQVLGHUHG¶77 Here too, the exemption of aliens from detention 
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orders was an exception. More importantly, the procedures followed by the 
advisory committee by no means amounted to a fair hearing.78 
Some may argue that the total support for an absolute state authority 
during World War I was a by-product of war powers of the state in order 
to maintain security and public order. However, as was argued above,79 an 
extensive understanding of the prerogative was not merely cantered on 
the old distinction between war and peace. Rather, the official appraisal of 
the prerogative of the Crown as an absolute power was in operation 
irrespective of the state of war and peace. This conclusion is most clearly 
seen through the continuation of the powers of detention in the aftermath 
of World War I. The legislative scheme for these continued powers was the 
Aliens Restriction (amended) Act, 1919 (an extension of emergency 
powers conferred by the Aliens Restriction Act). This act specifically 
eliminated the importance of the war context in the exercise of the 
prerogative and made provisions for the deportation of every former alien, 
not exempted from internment or repatriation. If one desires to echo this 
state of affairs in terms of the standards of the Grotian principles of the 
laws of nations, it will follow that the Grotian distinction between war and 
peace for the purposes of legitimising certain acts had lost its significance 
in domestic jurisdictions. This disregard towards the distinction between 
war and peace for the purpose of deciding on the permissibility of certain 
acts such as detention was the result of the absolutism that the legal 
establishment in Britain attributed to the sovereign powers.  
As it became clear through the case of The King v. Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs, Ex parte Same, the susceptibility of alien friends to the 
measures of detention without trial and deportation was no less than alien 
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enemies. The court concluded in this case that detention and deportation 
powers of the Secretary of State against alien friends were intra vires and 
the judiciary was in no position to comment on whether the orders of the 
Secretary of State were conducive to the public good.80 With a view to the 
continued detention of aliens, regardless of the state of war and peace, 
Wilsher posits that with the advent of the twentieth century, what was 
previously known as the concept of war powers transformed itself into 
alien powers.81 Wilsher explains that the renewed use of detention in the 
post-ZDUHUDLQ%ULWDLQKDGDQLPSRUWDQWPHDQLQJZKLFKZDVµ>G@HWHQWLRQ
was now seen as ancillary to the power to control alien entry and 
UHVLGHQFHRYHUZKLFKWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VGLVFUHWLRQZDVPD[LPDO¶82 In other 
words, detention as a means of control could only be justified through 
PD[LPXP JRYHUQPHQW¶V GLVFUHWLRQ DQ DFXWH V\QRQ\P IRU WKH DEVROXWH
prerogative of the Crown.  
8. The Absolute prerogative, detention, and the 
international responsibility of states  
 
By the early decades of the twentieth century, the issue of the 
responsibility of states, as a result of its treatment of foreign nationals, 
had a matter of principal importance in the public international law. This 
was a period pervaded by the repeated acts of nationalisation and large 
quantity of expropriations of properties belonging to foreign nationals in 
developing countries.83 Interestingly, the issue of the liberties of foreign 
nationals never assumed the same degree of importance, as much as the 
expropriation did. Nevertheless, as the issue of the international 
                                                          
80 The King v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Ex parte Same [1920] 3 KB 72.  
81 Wilsher, above note 55, at x and 57.  
82 Wilsher, above note 55, at 54.  
83 Roth, above note 3. 
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responsibility of states was gaining momentum, the likelihood for a better 
protection of aOLHQV¶SK\VLFDOOLEHUW\FRXOG become stronger.  
There were many attempts to designate criteria by which states could 
stand responsible for their treatment of aliens. On the practical side, 
Article 9 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 
provided that: 
Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the 
law and the national authorities and foreigners may not claim 
rights other or more extensive than those of the nationals.  
This was indeed a short translation of one of the clearest doctrines for 
extrapolating the responsibility of states, namely, the Calvo Doctrine. The 
core principle of the Calvo Doctrine was that aliens could not enjoy a 
better treatment than the nationals of a given state within its territorial 
jurisdiction. 84  There was nothing inherent in the Calvo Doctrine which 
would contradict or impede the absolute authority of states. In fact, the 
Calvo Doctrine placed the municipal law of countries as the only standard 
RIWKHVWDWHV¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\ 
The real source of contradiction of international law requirements with the 
prerogative would occur, when states were under treaty or customary 
obligations. In that view, the primary question was whether the 
prerogative was capable of superseding the obligations to which the state 
would assent through explicit terms of international treaties. Again, the 
views widely differed on the point of the reach of the prerogative. For 
example, in 1909, Hodgins reported an important incident, in which the 
use of state authority was not acceptable:  
When Russia in 1871 sought to revoke the provision in the 
Berlin Treaty of 1856, which was in perpetuity to the flag of war 
the Black Sea and its coasts. The protocol of the signatory 
                                                          
84 For a useful guide on this matter, see, A. P. Newcombe and another, Law and Practice of 
Investment: Standards of Treatment (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2009) at 13.  
101 
 
Powers to the original Treaty declared that it is an essential 
principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate itself 
from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations 
thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting Powers, by 
means of an amicable arrangement.85  
Here, Hodgins notes that the objections of other contracting parties were 
well-grounded, since the treaty obligations in questions signified matters 
of international importance. However, when it came to the use of the 
prerogative of expulsion, the governing principles appeared to be different. 
For example, Haycraft was of the opinion that once it is established that 
the prerogative for the purposes of expulsion and exclusion lies among the 
full sovereign rights, there will remain no ground for the responsibility of 
states. 86  This view was somehow quite consistent with the practice 
developed by U.S Supreme Court touching upon the interaction between 
the requirements of international law and the authority of states regarding 
aliens. In 1866, the U.S and China signed an agreement referred to as 
Burlingame Treaty. Under article 5 of this treaty, the two states 
recognised  
the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home 
and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free 
migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects 
respectively from the one country to the other, for purposes of 
curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents.87  
Nevertheless, from the beginning, the American Congress did not favour a 
generous policy towards Chinese immigrants. After making several 
XQVXFFHVVIXODWWHPSWVWRLQWURGXFHUHVWULFWLYHODZVµ)LIWHHQ3DVVHQJHU%LOO¶
was enacted by Congress.88 As President Hayes noticed, this act entailed 
the abrogation of Article 5 of the Burlingame Treaty.89 Interestingly, as 
                                                          
85 7+RGJLQV µ7KH3UHURJDWLYH5LJKWRI5HYRNLQJ7UHDW\3ULYLOHJHV WR$OLHQ6XEMHFW¶ 
XXIX The Canadian Law Times 105, 106.  
86 Haycraft, above note 49, at 172-173.  
87  See, S. H, J. Dong, The Rocky Road to Liberty: A Documented History of Chinese 
Immigration and Exclusion (Saratoga: Javin Press, 2010) at 154.  
88 Ibid., at 163.  
89 Veto Message of President Rutherford Hayes of the Fifteen Passenger Bill, March 1, 1879, 
1879 Congressional Record±House 2275±2277. 
102 
 
early as 1804, the American judiciary had entertained a restrictive view 
towards the obligations assigned by international law and therefore, 
-XVWLFH 0DUVKDOO KDG VWDWHG µDQ DFW RI &RQJUHVV RXJKW QHYHU WR EH
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
UHPDLQV¶90 This was totally disregarded by Congress in the passing of the 
Fifteen Passenger Bill in 1879. As a result, a new wave of exercises of 
detention and deportation arrived.  
The power of Congress in excluding Chinese immigrants was challenged in 
Chae Chan Ping v. U.S.91 The U.S Supreme Court in this case posited that 
an act of Congress which was in contravention of the U.S treaty 
obligations was valid VLQFH µ7KH WUHDWLHV ZHUH RI QR JUHDWHU OHJDO
REOLJDWLRQWKDQWKHDFWRIFRQJUHVV¶92 Therefore, the acts of Congress with 
D UHSHDOLQJ HIIHFW RQ WKH WUHDW\ REOLJDWLRQ ZHUH WDNHQ WR PHDQ µWKH ODVW
H[SUHVVLRQ RI WKH VRYHUHLJQ¶ 93  which must under any circumstances 
prevail. Thereafter, invoking a ruling in an earlier case (of different nature) 
the court expressly stipulated the effect of the prerogative upon the treaty 
obligations:  
While it would always be a matter of the utmost gravity and 
delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was 
prerogative, of which no nation could be deprived without 
deeply affecting its independence.94  
Again, in the view of the absolute nature of the prerogative, no space 
could be left for such measures as diplomatic protection or condemnation 
of the expulsive or exclusive measures against aliens.95 In this light, the 
RQO\ DFFHSWDEOH IRUP RI µGLSORPDWLF UHPRQVWUDQFH¶ ZDV WKH UHFLSURFDO
                                                          
90 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
91 Chae Chan Ping v. U.S. 130 U.S. 581.  
92 Ibid., at 599.  
93 Ibid.  
94 Ibid. 
95 H. W. Halleck, International Law or Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and 
War Vol. I (London: Nostrand, 1861) at 494.  
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withdrawal of the injured state from the amended/repealed treaty.96 To 
justify this line of argument, it was said that concluding treaties with other 
nations could not amount to a concession of the prerogative powers 
signifying the very fact of sovereignty. International agreements could not 
be considered as a superior entity to the inherent powers of sovereignty. 
According to Hodgins, the superiority of the prerogative holds even more 
strongly true for the treaties concerning aliens, for that such treaties must 
EHWUHDWHGDVµVHFRQGDU\FODVV¶WUHDWLHV97  
9. Conclusion 
 
In the context of the internment of aliens, the invocation of international 
law could often serve as a double-edged sword. In some cases, the 
international law arguments were exploited to limit the grip of states on 
matters relating to aliens. In this sense, the core function of international 
law was to invalidate the claim that sovereigns could subject aliens to 
particular measures according to their pleasure. However, this function of 
international law could not reach so far as to place a ban on the exercise 
of the prerogative. On this note, one premise of this chapter was to show 
that highlighting the areas in which the exercise of the prerogative against 
aliens bordered on arbitrariness was important in the view of the claim of 
the absolute nature of the sovereign prerogative. This brings us to the 
second usage of international law arguments. More often than not and far 
IURP UHVWULFWLQJ WKH VWDWHV¶ SRZHUV LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZZDV FRQFHLYHG LQ D
manner such as to support the absolute prerogative of states. So much so, 
that the express treaty obligations would easily lose their power in a 
confrontation against the absolute authority of states.  
                                                          
96 Ibid.  
97 Hodgins, above note 85, at 129.  
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Without any restraints on the authority of states, the use of detention 
powers against aliens was an issue of expediency and not that of principle. 
The only supreme entity was self-preservation and to that end, every 
means seemed justified. The limited space of this chapter would not let us 
reach into the personal profiles of many detainees during World War I and 
World War II in Britain. However, some authors who have provided more 
details on the alien detainees of the World Wars have shown that nearly all 
of them were far from presenting any danger to the security of Britain 
during great wars. The lesson from these unprecedented exercises of 
detention powers is easy and significant. When absolute powers came to 
correspond to the public sentiments, the results were catastrophic.  
'LG WKH PRGH RI LQWHUDFWLRQ EHWZHHQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ DQG WKH VWDWHV¶
prerogative change in the wake of the development of such regimes as 
international humanitarian law, and international human rights law? This is 
a question to be answered later in this thesis. 
105 
 
 
Chapter III 
Detention without Trial: History and Human Rights Law 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the wake of the conclusion of the Second World War, international law 
was subjected to far-reaching reforms and changes. It was no longer an 
entity solely concerned with governing the relationship between states; 
rather, in this new era, individuals also occupied some legal spaces within 
the arena of international law.1 In fact, two important articles of the UN 
Charter attest to the fact that from 1945 onwards, individual rights were 
to be taken more seriously,2 and to this end a distinct regime dedicated to 
the cause of individual rights in international law was to emerge.3 Thus, 
public international law became home to the new sub-category of 
international human rights law.  
Certainly, the right to liberty was not considered as a valuable commodity 
by warring states during the Second World War either at home or abroad. 
The US had the mass internment of the Japanese±American civilians. 
Britain had frequent recourse to the internment of civilians at home and in 
                                                          
1 See5+LJJLQV µ&RQFHSWXDO 7KLQNLQJDERXW WKH ,QGLYLGXDO LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ 
British Journal of International Studies I. 
2 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Arts 55, 56. 
As regards the inclusion of these articles within the UN Charter, Benjamin Cohen writes, 
µ6RPHRIXVEHFDPHFRQFHUQHGWKDWWKH&KDUWHUWRZDUGVZKLFKZHZHUHZRUNLQJPLJKWOLNH
the Constitution of the United States as it emerged from the Federal Convention, omit any 
mention of the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms. We were told, 
however, that to inject this subject into the Charter would cause the Soviet Union to fear 
intervention in its domestic affairs. We were told that the British would fear that reference to 
fundamental freedom would somehow have serious complications for their colonial 
relationships. However, we persisted and succeeded in incorporating a brief reference in the 
Charter to the responsibility of the United Nations to promote respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 7KH JUHDW SRZHUV WKXV EHFDPH FRPPLWWHG % 9 &RKHQ µ+XPDQ
5LJKWVXQGHUWKH81&KDUWHU¶Law and Contemporary Problems 430, at 431. 
3  O. De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2010) at 11. 
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its many colonies. The Soviet record was (and continued to be for another 
decade) filled with the practice of Gulags and finally, Nazi Germany was 
responsible for one of the most abhorrent forms of deprivation of liberty in 
the entire history.  
In the post Second World War era, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) became the first major international instrument to include 
the protection of the right to liberty by putting an emphasis on the 
importance of physical liberty and the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and 
detention.4 As the human rights regime thrived in the following decades to 
the adoption of the UDHR, an elaborate body of human rights standards 
emerged to govern the issues of the right to liberty and its deprivation in 
the form of detention without trial. Thus, Article 9 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),5 Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 6  Article 7 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),7 and Article 6 of the African Charter 
RI +XPDQ DQG 3HRSOHV¶ 5LJKWV (ACHPR) have in turn encompassed 
international and regional standards regulating the matter of deprivation 
of liberty.8 Each and every one of these articles is followed by a complex 
set of principles and interpretive mechanisms developed by the concerned 
international and regional bodies during the last couple of decades.9 
This chapter outlines the human rights standards relating to the question 
of detention without trial and at the same time an attempt will be made to 
identify the threads of historical continuity and the effects of the history of 
                                                          
4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), Article 9. 
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, Article 9. 
6 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, Article 5. 
7 American Convention on Human Rights ³Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica´ (B-32), 22 January 
1969, Article 7.  
8 African Charter on Human and Peoples¶ Rights (³Banjul Charter´), 27 June 1981, 21 I.L.M. 
58 (1982), Article 6. 
9 See DOVR $ 'H =D\DV µ+XPDQ 5LJKWV DQG ,QGHILQLWH 'HWHQWLRQ¶   International 
Review of the Red Cross 15. 
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detention without trial in shaping the way that international human rights 
law has regulated this practice.10 However, the purpose of this chapter is 
QRW WR EHFRPHD FRPSHQGLXPRI DOO KXPDQ ULJKWV V\VWHPV¶ UXOHV RQ WKH
issue of detention without trial. Rather, our discussions must be focused 
on the most developed international and regional human rights practices 
in the context of detention, which have definitely emerged from the 
jurisdictions of the European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Committee. Of course, wherever the need arises, contributions from other 
jurisprudences (most notably the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) 
will be recalled.  
2. UDHR and detention without trial 
 
Insofar as the measure of detention without trial is concerned, three 
articles in the UDHR bear a particular importance. Article 3 states that 
µ>H@YHU\RQHKDVWKHULJKWWROLIHOLEHUW\DQGVHFXULW\RISHUVRQ¶. According 
WR $UWLFOH  µQR RQH VKDOO EH VXEMHFWHG WR DUELWUDU\ DUUHVW GHWHntion or 
H[LOH¶, DQG$UWLFOHSRVLWVWKDWµ>H@YHU\RQHLVHQWLWOHGLQIXOOHTXDOLW\WRD
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the 
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge 
against him¶. 
In terms of the exercise of detention without trial, Article 9 is more explicit 
than the two other articles of the UDHR regarding the right to liberty. The 
FHQWUDO JUDYLW\ RI $UWLFOH  PXVW EH ORFDWHG DURXQG WKH WHUP µDUELWUDU\¶
The text of the UDHR does not provide us with a specific meaning 
regarding the concept of arbitrariness. However, some inexplicable 
                                                          
10  Please note that in this chapter, such terms as preventive detention, internment and 
detention without trial are used in a synonymous manner. For more details on the question of 
terminology, refer to the Introduction.  
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properties of the concept of arbitrariness can be identified through the 
travaux préparatoires of the UDHR.  
The final text of Article 9 is in fact very different from the initial proposals 
made for the content of this article. The most elaborate draft of Article 9 
was formulated by Professor Cassin, the French representative in the 
+XPDQ5LJKWV&RPPLVVLRQ¶V:RUNLQJ*URXSZKR, after a wide range of 
suggestions made by the delegates of such states as Cuba, Chile and 
Panama, combined his own simplified version of this article with a 
proposed draft from President Roosevelt and posited the content of this 
article to be as follows:  
No one shall be deprived of his personal liberty or kept in 
custody except in cases prescribed by law and after due 
process. Everyone placed under arrest or detention shall have 
the right to immediate judicial determination of the legality of 
any detention to which he may be subject and to trial within a 
reasonable time or to be released.11 
Here, Bienenfeld from the World Jewish Organisation insisted on a danger 
that he perceived to be hidden in an outright invocation of the concept of 
legality in the UDHR: µ>X@QGHU WKH 1D]L UHJLPH WKRXVDQGs of people had 
been deprived of their liberty under laws which were perfectly valid¶.12 His 
suggestion was to add a qualification to the concept of law so as to render 
LWµODZFRQIRUPLQJWRWKHSULQFLSOHVRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV¶.13 
Later on, such respected figures as Malik (the representative of Lebanon) 
LQWKH6HFRQG'UDIWLQJ6HVVLRQSUHIHUUHGWKHWHUPµDUELWUDU\¶UDWKHUWKDQD
YDJXHDSSHDUDQFHRI µWKHQRWLRQRI ODZ¶.14 One of the virtues of the term 
µDUELWUDU\¶ZDVWKDWLWFRXOGOHQGLWVHOIWRDQH[WHQGHGXQderstanding of the 
OLPLWV RI VWDWHV¶ SRZHUV %\ GLQW RI WKLV EURDG DSSUHFLDWLRQ RI WKH WHUP
                                                          
11 D. Weissbrodt and M. Hallendorff, µ7UDYDX[ Préparatoires of the Fair Trial Provisions ± 
Articles 8 to 11 ± RI WKH8QLYHUVDO'HFODUDWLRQ RI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶  Human Rights 
Quarterly 1061, at 170.  
12  J. Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999) at 50. 
13 Ibid., at 50. 
14 Ibid. 
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µDUELWUDU\¶WKH%ROLYLDQGHOHJDWHDUJXHGWKDWWKHLQFOXVLRQRIDUELWUDU\DVD
prohibitive qualification would also add moral weight to this provision, 
since arbitrariness hints at the state of conscience, and this would elevate 
the requirement beyond the confines of lawfulness, open to abuse by 
authoritarian regimes.15 Once the test of arbitrariness seemed appealing 
to some of the representatives, its inclusion was advocated for some other 
articles too. It was in the midst of discussions on the inclusion of the term 
µDUELWUDU\¶LQ$UWLFOHWKDW0DOLNFRQFOXGHG 
The word µarbitrarily¶ was not synonymous with µillegally¶; it had 
a wider scope. The Commission had wished to use a general 
term suggesting a criterion above and beyond the laws of 
States, to which those laws should conform.16 
Such encounters in the drafting process of the UDHR later came to 
guide bodies like the Human Rights Committee to give a meaning to 
the test of arbitrariness (infra).17 
2.1. Understanding the test of arbitrariness in the light of the history of 
detention in common law   
As was discerned in the historical investigations of the previous chapters, 
the exercise of detention without trial has, since the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, been contingent upon the modalities of the 
relationship between the powers of sovereign and law.18 With regard to 
this relationship in the common law tradition in Britain, it was discussed 
that it hardly becaPHFOHDUZKHWKHU µWKH ODZRI WKH ODQG¶KDG UHFRJQLVHG
the absolute powers of sovereign in certain areas or not. 19  These 
uncertainties on several occasions meant that no one knew what the 
FRUUHFWSRVLWLRQXQGHUµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶ZDVDVUHJDUGVWKHSRZHUV and 
                                                          
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid., at 356. 
17 Section 7.  
18 Refer to chapter I, sections 2±4. 
19 Ibid.  
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rights of sovereign. 20  When the attributes of law in its view of the 
exclusive rights of sovereign were punctuated by doubt, it could only be 
natural to expect uncertainty, inconsistency and confusion about the 
FRQWRXUV RI µXQODZIXOQHVV¶ RU HVWDEOLVKPHnt of unlawful acts as well. 
%HVLGHV VRPHWLPHV WKH PDQQHU LQ ZKLFK WKH YHU\ WHUP µODZ¶ ZDV
employed could become problematic by itself. The clearest example of this 
ZDVWKHSUDFWLFHRI µPDUWLDO ODZ¶, which commentators ranging from Hale 
to Blackstone charDFWHULVHGDVµQRODZEXWVRPHWKLQJUDWKHULQGXOJHGWKDQ
allowed as a law¶.21 Here once again, one witnesses a fading line between 
opposing conceptions RI µODZ¶ DQG WKXV µODZIXOQHVV¶ DQG µXQODZIXOQHVV¶
*LYHQ WKLV HPSOR\LQJ WKH WHVW RI µDUELWUDULQHVV¶ LQVWHDG RI µXQODZIXOQHVV¶
signifies something more than simply a different choice of vocabulary. 
Rather, it must be viewed as a response to a long-lasting historical 
problem of the rule of law, which was the vicious circle created by the 
conflicts between law and the rights of sovereign. This was especially 
significant, when one considers that the Nazi regime of Germany had 
painted an image of lawfulness for its abhorrent practices.22  
It is useful to note that from the seventeenth century onwards, lawyers 
and politicians alike in England had abundantly used the adjective 
µDUELWUDU\¶WRSRLQWWRFHUWDLQPHDVXUHVRU, to put it more correctly, powers 
ZKLFKZHUHQRW LQFRPSOLDQFHZLWK µWKH ODZRI WKH ODQG¶. For example, in 
the Petition of Grievances of 1610 formulated by Sir Edward Coke, it was 
VWDWHG WKDW (QJOLVK VXEMHFWV ZHUH µWR EH JXLGHG DQG JRYHUQHG E\ WKH
FHUWDLQ UXOHRI ODZ >«@DQGQRWE\ DQ\uncertain and arbitrary form of 
government¶.23 On more than one occasion, Parliament had recourse to 
such phrases as µDUELWUDU\ SRZHU¶ WR FRQGHPQSDUWLFXODU FRQGXFWV RI WKH
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765±1769), Book I, at 400.  
22 See, W. E. Scheuerman (ed), The Rule of Law under Siege (London: University of California 
Press, 1996). 
23 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge, 1960) at 168.  
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King. 24  Also, ranging from Locke 25  to Dicey, 26  English legal writers 
SUHIHUUHG WR LQYRNH WKH TXDOLILHU µDUELWUDU\¶ UDWKHU WKDQ µXQODZIXO¶ WR
describe certain actions and powers of sovereign. For instance, in the 
writings of Dicey, arbitrariness was very frequently associated with 
XQIHWWHUHGGLVFUHWLRQRIWKHH[HFXWLYHµZKHUHYHUWKHUHLVGLVFUHWLRQWKHUH
is room for arbitrariness, and that in a republic no less than under a 
monarchy, discretionary authority on the part of the government means 
insecurity for legal freedom on the part of the subjects¶. 27  As well as 
'LFH\ RWKHU ODZ\HUVXVHGVXFKSKUDVHVDV µDUELWUDU\SRZHU¶ RU µDUELWUDU\
JRYHUQPHQW¶WRDOOXGHWRDQH[FHVVLYHFRQFHSWLRQRIH[HFXWLYHGLVFUHWLon. 
For example, Lord Shaw in his dissenting opinion in R (Zadig) v. Halliday 
VDLG µ,QVRIDUDV WKH >H[HFXWLYH@PDQGDWHKDVEHHQH[FHHGHG WKHUH OXUN
WKH HOHPHQWV RI D WUDQVLWLRQ WR DUELWUDU\ JRYHUQPHQW¶ 28  Nevertheless, 
despite the frequent usage of the coQFHSWRIµDUELWUDULQHVV¶LQWKHSROLWLFDO
and legal texts of common law and contrary to what commentators such 
DV+D\HNKDYHDVVHUWHGLWLVIDLUWRVD\WKDWµDUELWUDULQHVV¶GLGQRWDPRXQW
to a legal concept before the end of the Second World War.29 In fact, it 
VHHPVWKDWVXFKSKUDVHVDVµDUELWUDU\SRZHU¶RUµDUELWUDU\JRYHUQPHQW¶LQ
the common law tradition were frequently appointed as figures of speech 
rather than concrete or exclusive legal concepts. At best, they provided a 
medium through which law could speak to politics or vice versa. Drawing 
                                                          
24 P. D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire (Harvard: Belknap Press, 2010) at 
244±245.  
25 J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Raleigh: Alex Catalogue, reprinted in 2001) at 
12.  
26 A. V. Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: 
Macmillan, 1885).  
27 Ibid., at 184. In this regard, it is interesting to pay attention to the etymological origin of 
WKH WHUP µDUELWUDU\¶, which stems from Latin, arbitrarius (depending on the will, uncertain), 
and old French, arbitraire GHFLGLQJE\RQH¶VRZQGLVFUHWLRQ1RZRQGHr, then, Sir Edward 
&RNH VHHPV WR KDYH HPSOR\HG WKH DGMHFWLYH µDUELWUDU\¶ LQ D V\QRQ\PRXV PDQQHU WR
µXQFHUWDLQ¶LQWKH3HWLWLRQRI*ULHYDQFHVDQG'LFH\KDVRIWHQVTXDUHGKLVXVHRIDUELWUDU\E\
discretionary power. Another way of putting this is to argue that discretionary power can 
frequently be equated to uncertain rules and consequences. For tracing the etymological root 
RIµDUELWUDU\¶, refer to, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=arbitrary. 
28 R. (Zadig) v. Halliday, [1917] A. C. 260. 
29 For how legal concepts can be distinguished from non-legal ones, refer to A. W. B. 
Simpson, Legal Theory and Legal History: Essays on the Common Law (London: The 
Hambledon Press, 1987) at 347.  
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on this background, an additional layer of importance must be ascribed to 
WKH DSSHDUDQFH RI WKH DGMHFWLYH µDUELWUDU\¶ LQ WKH 8'+5, and that is the 
IRUPDOLVDWLRQ RI WKH WHVW RI µDUELWUDULQHVV¶ DV D legal concept at an 
international law level. The best proof for this is that (as will be seen 
infra)30 WKH WHVW RI µDUELWUDULQHVV¶ DV XVHG LQ $UWLFOH  RI WKH 8'+5 KDV
become susceptible to having certain legal characteristics. The following 
sections for the most part purport to outline the different characteristics of 
µDUELWUDU\¶ DQG µQRQ-DUELWUDU\¶ GHWHQWLRQ DV XVHG LQ WKH UHOHYDQW KXPDQ
rights documents.   
3. Adoption of the ECHR and formulation of Article 5 
  
Article 5 of the ECHR signified one of the locations in which civil and 
common law traditions went hand in hand in order to provide a rather 
detailed framework for freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention.31 It is 
essential to note that in 1949, the European authorities had the draft 
Convention of the Human Rights Covenant before them,32 and they were 
able to foster their own preferences for the ECHR on the basis of their 
reservations towards the relevant articles of the draft Covenant. 
Many states were not pleased with the wording of Article 9 of the draft 
Covenant, which concerned the right to liberty. Britain (as it will be argued 
infra), 33  in particular, echoed its dissatisfaction with the first two 
paragraphs of Article 9 of the draft Covenant, which read as follows:  
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention;  
                                                          
30 Sections 7±12. 
31 A. H. RobertsonµThe European Convention for the 3URWHFWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶ (1950) 27 
British Yearbook of International Law 145, at 151±152.  
32 Although the Covenant draft was ready as early as 1949, the objections of the US, UK, 
USSR, China, Iran and Egypt over the inclusion of a right of individual petition were serious, 
such that reaching an agreement with the delegations in favour of this right could not be 
PDGHSRVVLEOH7KHUHZHUHDOVRRWKHUSRLQWVRIVXEVWDQWLDOGLVDJUHHPHQWVXFKDVµGHURJDWLRQ
in time of war¶. See, A. W. B. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the 
Genesis of the European Convention (Oxford: OUP, 2001) at 494.  
33 Section 7.   
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2. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and 
in accordance with such procedures as established by law.  
The objections to this choice of language were that, first of all, the term 
µDUELWUDU\¶ ODFNHG SUHFLVLRQ34 Secondly, the first and second paragraphs 
did not seem compatible. That is to say, it was not clear whether 
µSDUDJUDSK  UHSHDWV H[SDQGV RU OLPLWV SDUDJUDSK ¶.35  Finally, it was 
VWDWHG WKDW WKH TXDOLILFDWLRQ RI µDV HVWDEOLVKHG E\ ODZ¶ PD\ RIIHU
justification to dictators for their impingements upon Article 9.36 On the 
basis of these perceived inadequacies, Britain pressed for a more detailed 
framework on the right to liberty by the ECHR and in particular, it took a 
leading role in introducing exceptional grounds to the right to physical 
liberty37 and hence Article 5 as it stands today.38 
3.1. Analysing the meaning of lawfulness under Article 5 and the inevitable 
use of the test of arbitrariness 
                                                          
34 Simpson, above note 32, at 518.  
35 Council of Europe, Preparatory Work on Article 5 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, DH 56(10) at 6.  
36 Ibid., at 7. 
37 Ibid., at 14. 
38 1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. 
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law: 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a 
court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; 
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before 
the competent legal authority of reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or 
when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing 
after having done so; 
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his 
lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, 
of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts, or vagrants; 
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry 
into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation 
or extradition. 
2) Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, 
of the reasons for his arrest and the charge against him. 
3) Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this 
article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise 
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending 
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 
4) Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and 
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
5) Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions 
of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation. Is all of this needed? 
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The most obvious implication of Article 5 is that it does not view the right 
to liberty as an absolute right. Therefore, the deprivation of physical 
liberty on the basis of the grounds enlisted exhaustively in Article 5 is 
SHUPLVVLEOH$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHWHUPµODZIXO¶LVDQLPSRUWDQWIHDWXUHRI
Article 5, which must be employed as a factor germane in interpreting this 
DUWLFOH,QWKLVYLHZLWLVHVVHQWLDOWRQRWHKRZWKHWHUPµODZIXO¶KDVEHHQ
interpreted by the European Court on Human Rights.  
Principally, the requirement of lawfulness implies that the laws regulating 
detention of individuals must possess the properties of the rule of law in 
general. One result of this compliance with the requirements of the rule of 
law is the principle of legal certainty. 39  In the context of the laws 
governing arrest and detention of individuals, the European Court of 
Human Rights notes that legal certainty encompasses two crucial features. 
Firstly, legal certainty requires that sufficient precision be built into 
µZULWWHQ¶RUµXQZULWWHQ¶ODZV40 Secondly, by dint of this sufficient precision, 
D FLWL]HQ LV HQDEOHG WR DVVHVV WKH UHDVRQDEOHQHVV RI µWKH >OHJDO@
consequences which a given action may entail¶.41 
The compatibility of detention with the purpose of Article 5 represents 
another test for measuring the lawfulness of detention. It has been stated 
WKDWWKHSXUSRVHRI$UWLFOHLVµWRSURWHFWLQGLYLGXDOVIURPDUELWUDULQHVV¶.42 
It is interesting to see that, notwithstanding the early resistance of the 
IUDPHUVRIWKH(&+5WKHWHUPµDUELWUDU\¶LVYHU\IUHTXHQWO\XVHGZLWKLQWKH
discourse surrounding detention. Of course, the question is if the European 
&RXUW RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV KDV XVHG µDUELWUDULQHVV¶ DV D V\QRQ\P IRU
µXQODZIXOQHVV¶, or if µDUELWUDULQHVV¶ LPSOLHVDEURDGHUSURKLELWLYH WHVW WKDQ
                                                          
39 K. Reid, $ 3UDFWLWLRQHU¶V *XLGH WR WKH (XURSHDQ &RQYHQWLRQ RQ +XPDQ 5LJKWV (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2012) at 342.  
40 Steel and others v. United Kingdom 1998 (67/1997/851/1058) at para 54.  
41 Ibid. 
42 See, for example, Kemmache v. France 1994, 296-C, para 42. 
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µXQODZIXOQHVV¶. If interpreted restrictively, the applicability of 
µXQODZIXOQHVV¶FDQRQO\EHFRQILQHGWRDFWLRQV LQEUHDFKRIGRPHVWLF ODZ
In that sense, µDUELWUDULQHVV¶VLJQLILHVDEURDGHUQRWLRQWKDQµXQODZIXOQHVV¶
since a domestic legislation can, for example, be considered as lawful in 
terms of its compliance with domestic constitutional requirements and yet 
arbitrary in that it is underlined by an utter sense of injustice. At the same 
time, one can define the concept of lawfulness so broadly as to cover 
national as well as international rule of law. This latter conception of 
ODZIXOQHVV FRQIRUPV PRUH WR WKH 6WUDVERXUJ &RXUW¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI
these terms: µODZIXOQHVV LVGHWHUPLQHGE\UHIHUHQFHWRERWKQDWLRQDODQG
international law¶. 43  When conceived in this way, the meanings of 
µXQODZIXOQHVV¶ DQG µDUELWUDULQHVV¶ FRPH WR EH YHU\ FORVH WRJHWKHU LI QRW
synonymous. There are two important upshots to this broad formulation of 
lawfulness. First of all, understanding lawfulness with a view to the 
requirements of international rule of law saves us from the vicious circle 
created by the conflicts and complexities arising from the relationship 
between constitutional law and exclusive rights of sovereignty. Some of 
these conflicts were highlighted by our historical study of detention 
without trial.44  
Also, onFHZHDSSUHFLDWHWKDWµLQWHUQDWLRQDOUXOHV¶PXVWSOD\DSDUWLQRXU
FRQFHSWLRQRIODZIXOQHVVLWZLOOIROORZWKDWWKH\FDQDOVRµUHLQIRUFHDQGRQ
occasions [«] institute the rule of law internally¶.45 In the case of detention 
without trial, this in effect means that international law rules pertaining to 
deprivation of liberty are part of the applicable law against which the 
executive must adjust its practice and mode of practice. This conclusion is 
supported by the European Court in the most explicit terms:  
                                                          
43  F. De Londras, 'HWHQWLRQ LQ WKH µ:DU RQ 7HUURU¶ &DQ +XPDQ 5LJKWV )LJKW %DFN? 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2011) at 57.  
44 Refer to chapter I sections 4±6. 
45 -&UDZIRUGµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQGWKH5XOHRI/DZ¶Adelaide Law Review 3, at 
8.  
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the ³lawfulness´ of an ³arrest or detention´ has to be 
determined in the light not only of domestic law but also of the 
text of the Convention, the general principles embodied therein 
and the aim of the restrictions permitted by Article 5 par. 1 
(art. 5±1)46  
One of the most significant results of putting this restriction upon the 
detaining authority is that its powers cannot be deemed to be absolute 
and therefore free from normative legal constraints. This is particularly 
true with regard to areas where states have historically reserved exclusive 
rights of sovereignty for themselves, such as the issue of exclusion and 
expulsion of foreign nationals.47 This is an important point, to which we 
shall return later on in this chapter.48  
As the years have gone by, the European Court has become more 
tentative to employ the language of arbitrariness instead of lawfulness in 
the same mode as used in the ICCPR (infra).49 Thus, the Court in 2009 
concluded:  
7KH QRWLRQ RI ³DUELWUDULQHVV´ LQ $UWLFOH    H[WHQGV EH\RQG
lack of conformity with national law, so that a deprivation of 
liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary 
and thus contrary to the Convention.50 
This inevitable return of the Strasbourg Court to the language of 
µDUELWUDULQHVV¶ RQFH Dgain epitomises the fact that, especially in the 
FRQWH[W RI GHWHQWLRQ ZLWKRXW WULDO WKH DGMHFWLYH µDUELWUDU\¶ LV PRUH
DFFHVVLEOHDQGWUDQVSDUHQWWKDQVXFKWHUPVDVµXQODZIXO¶RUµLOOHJDO¶ 
                                                          
46 Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, Application No. 7906/77, Judgement of 24 June 1982, para 
48.  
47 Amuur v. France, Reports 1996-111, para 43, Contracting States have the undeniable 
sovereign right to control aliens¶ entry into and residence in their territory. The Court 
emphasises, however, that this right must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of 
the Convention, including Article 5.  
48 Section 5.  
49 Section 7 onwards.  
50 A and others v. United Kingdom 2009 (Application no. 3455/05) para 164. 
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4. Preventive detention and Article 5 
 
It is fair to say that the dominant position among scholars of ECHR is not 
receptive towards the idea that Article 5(1)(c) recognises the legality of 
the exercise of preventive detention.51 According to this view,  
A person may be detained within the meaning of Article 5(1)(c) 
only in the context of criminal proceedings, for the purpose of 
bringing him before the competent legal authority on suspicion 
of him having committed an offence.52 
The decision of the Strasbourg Court in the very first case brought before 
it, namely the Lawless case, is often cited as authority for this 
interpretation.53 The case of Lawless concerned an Irish individual who 
was self-DGPLWWHGO\ D PHPEHU RI WKH ,5$ DQG EDVHG RQ KLV µJHQHUDO
FRQGXFW¶DQGKLVSDVWFULPLQDOUHFRUGZDVVXEMHFWHGWRGHWHQWLRQZLWKRXW
trial for a period of five months. The Irish government argued that Article 
5(1)(c) explicitly sanctions preventive detention and, according to them, 
the nature of preventive detention automatically excluded the obligation of 
judicial review spelled out in Article 5(1)(3).54 
The Court did not accept this reading of the interaction between Article 
5(1)(c) and Article 5(3), which also ran against the textual interpretation 
of Article 5(3). Thereafter, the Court explicitly stated that making a 
disjunction betweHQ WKHVH WZR SDUDJUDSKV RI $UWLFOH  µZRXOG OHDG WR
conclusions repugnant to the fundamental principles of the Convention¶.55  
Some scholars have considered that this ruling of the Strasbourg Court 
leaves the permissibility of preventive detention out of the scheme of 
                                                          
51 See, F. G. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975), D. J. Harris et al, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 
2009), P. Van Dijk and C. Van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1998).  
52 D. J. Harris et al, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 
at 146. 
53 Lawless v. Ireland 1961, 332/57.  
54 Ibid., para 10. 
55 Ibid., para 14. 
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Article 5(1)(c).56 The result of this interpretation is that the exercise of 
any preventive detention under the ECHR is as such arbitrary. This reading 
of Article 5(1)(c) is characterised by Macken as a narrow interpretation of 
this article.57 In effect, the narrow interpretation of Article 5 takes the 
VHFRQG SDUDJUDSK RI $UWLFOH F QDPHO\ µZKHQ LW LV UHDVRQDEO\
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after 
having done so¶, to authorise pre-trial detention.58  
4.1. The broad interpretation: Article 5(1)(c) embraces non-arbitrary 
preventive detention  
The weakest point of the narrow construction is that it runs against the 
wording of Article 5(1)(c). Accordingly, in this mode of interpretation, the 
SKUDVH µZKHQ LW LV UHasonably considered necessary to prevent his 
FRPPLWWLQJDQRIIHQFH¶ LVWRWDOO\QHJOHFWHG7KLVGLVUHJDUGIRUWKHWH[WXDO
base obviates the essential rules of treaty interpretation, which afford 
SULPDF\WRWKHµQDWXUDODQGRUGLQDU\¶PHDQLQJRIWUHDW\SURYLVions.59 Here, 
one may again encounter a difficulty in terms of interpretation. That is, the 
natural and ordinary meaning cannot necessarily be taken as an accurate 
interpretation of words and phrases in an isolated manner from the rest of 
a treaty.60 TherefoUH LI D µQDWXUDO DQG RUGLQDU\¶ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RIIHUV DQ
unreasonable understanding of some elements of a treaty, they must be 
                                                          
56 Harris, above note 52, at 147.  
57  C. Macken, µPreventive detention and the right to personal liberty and security under 
Article 5 ECHR¶International Journal of Human Rights 195, at 201.  
58 For example, in the case of Ciulla v. Italy WKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWVVDLG µ,Q
WKH&RXUW¶V YLHZ WKHSUHYHQWLYHSURFHGXUHSURYLGHG IRU LQ WKH/DZZDVGHVLJQHG IRU
purposes different from those of criminal proceedings. The compulsory residence order 
authorised by section 3 may, unlike a conviction and prison sentence, be based on suspicion 
rather than proof, and the deprivation of liberty under section 6 which sometimes precedes it 
(as in the instant case) accordingly cannot be equated with pre-trial detention as governed 
by Article 5 para 1 (c) (art. 5-1-FRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶Ciulla v. Italy [1152/84].  
59 C. Macken, above note 57, at 201.  
60 Refer to, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1155, article 31 (1): [a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.  
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rejected.61 Does applying this logic lead to a rejection of the acceptance of 
preventive detention per se by Article 5(1)(c)? To answer this question, 
we must look back to the purpose of Article 5.  
As mentioned above, the purpose of Article 5 is stated to be protecting 
individuals from arbitrariness. The narrow interpretation of Article 5 views 
preventive detention as necessarily an arbitrary measure. The reason for 
this presumed arbitrariness is that, based on the Lawless case, the narrow 
interpretation posits that preventive detention inevitably negates judicial 
review. However, legal history shows that the exercise of preventive 
detention or internment (detention without trial) in general has not always 
been espoused by the denial of judicial review. As argued in previous 
chapters, in England particularly, there were many cases of internment, in 
which habeas corpus could still issue.62  
Furthermore, in the Lawless case, the Court did not refute the fact that 
Article 5(1)(c) contemplated the permissibility of preventive detention. 
Rather, it argued that the denial of judicial review to Mr Lawless opposed 
the purpose of Article 5.63  Therefore, the fact that Articles 5(1)(c) and 
 IRUP D µZKROH¶ WRJHWKHU 64  does not make preventive detention 
impermissible. If this formulation is accepted as valid, the normal 
conclusion will be that preventive detention must be divided into two 
important categories, arbitrary preventive detention and non-arbitrary 
preventive detention. 65  What is authorised under Article 5(1)(c) is 
preventive detention of the kind embracing other guarantees set out by 
the ECHR. Such detention is considered as being non-arbitrary. 
                                                          
61 G. G. Fitzmaurice, µThe Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty 
Interpretation aQG&HUWDLQ2WKHU7UHDW\3RLQWV¶ British Yearbook of International 
Law 1, at 10.  
62 Refer to chapter I, section 10.1 and chapter II, section 6.1.  
63 Macken, above note 57, at 208.  
64 The Lawless case, above note 53, para 14.  
65 De Londras, above note 43, at 56. 
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Notwithstanding these plausible evidences as to the permissibility of non-
arbitrary preventive detention, some inconsistencies continue to 
foreshadow the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court as to the content of 
Article 5(1)(c). For example, in the famous case of A and Others v. United 
Kingdom, the Court ruled:  
The Court recalls that it has, on a number of occasions, found 
internment and preventive detention without charge to be 
incompatible with the fundamental right to liberty under Article 
5 § 1, in the absence of a valid derogation under Article 15.66 
Again, Lawless served as the immediate case of reference for this 
conclusion. However, based on the above arguments, it is clear that this 
reading of the Lawless case is not warranted by the reasoning of the Court 
in that case. Furthermore, this ruling of the Court is in contradiction with 
its interpretation of Article 5(1)(c) in such cases as De Jong v. 
Netherlands 67  and Brogan.68  In the latter case in particular, the Court 
consoled itself with the fact that not every detention under Article 5(1) 
must follow by levelling charges against detainees.69 This in effect means 
that punitive and pre-trial detentions are not the only permissible forms of 
confinement, when it comes to interpreting Article 5(1).      
5. Clarifying the contours of arbitrariness  
 
When preventive detention is exercised, no charge is brought against 
detainees. Therefore, the question is how judicial review can take place, 
when preventive detention often involves no charge. The Lawless case also 
answers this question in the following terms:  
                                                          
66 A and others v. United Kingdom, above note 50, para 172. 7KHQRWLRQRIµGHURJDWLRQ¶ZLOO
be dealt with shortly hereinafter.  
67  De Jong, et al v. The Netherlands  µ$UWLFOH  SDUD 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c) sets out three 
alternative circumstances in which detention may be effected for the purpose of bringing a 
person EHIRUH WKH FRPSHWHQW OHJDO DXWKRULW\¶ 7KHVH WKUHH PRGHV RI GHWHQWLRQ IROORZ DV
punitive detention, pre-trial detention and preventive detention. 
68 Brogan and others v. the United Kingdom, 11209/84, paras 49±54. 
69 Ibid.  
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Whereas paragraph 3 (art. 5-3) stipulates categorically that 
³everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article (art. 5-1-c) shall be 
brought promptly before a judge«´ and ³shall be entitled to trial 
within a reasonable time´; whereas it plainly entails the 
obligation to bring everyone arrested or detained in any of the 
circumstances contemplated by the provisions of paragraph 1 
(c) (art. 5-1-c) before a judge for the purpose of examining the 
question of deprivation of liberty or for the purpose of deciding 
on the merits >«@.70 
According to these words, preventive detention must be made susceptible 
to judicial review for examining the grounds of detention.71 Therefore, this 
type of judicial review is employed so as to examine the need for the 
continuation of detention on the basis of the grounds alleged by the 
executive.  
It is definitely wrong to conclude that in order for a preventive detention 
to be viewed as non-arbitrary, it must only be subjected to judicial review 
in place. In fact, judicial reviews for examining the grounds of preventive 
detention, if not done with enough caution, can end up justifying the most 
abhorrent forms of detention. For example, the great lesson of the history 
of detention without trial in the UK (as it has been examined in the 
previous chapters) is that judicial reviews could take such a deferential 
approach that they could completely lose their rationale and meaning.72 As 
early as 1917, Lord Shaw discerned that upholding procedural guarantees 
with taking a deferential approach towards the executive should not be 
deemed appropriate.73  
5.1. Judicial review and the two historical obstacles  
Our inquiry of the history of detention without trial makes clear two 
interconnected barriers blocking the possibility of effective judicial review. 
                                                          
70 Ibid.  
71 Macken, above note 57, at 210. 
72 R. (Zadig) v. Halliday , above note 28, and also see, Liversidge v. Anderson [AC] 1942 
206. 
73 R. (Zadig) v. Halliday discussed in detail in chapters I and II.  
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The first barrier is the over-utilised defence of the executive that the 
issues surrounding security detention are questions for the political 
branches of government and not the judiciary. As was seen in the first 
chapter of this thesis, as early as the seventeenth century, Justice Hyde 
gave legitimacy to this assertion in the case of Five Knights.74 Another 
historical form of showing deference to the executive by the judiciary in 
common law was to argue that the reasons for a given detention fell within 
the ambit of arcana imperii, or the secrets of state, and therefore could 
not be disclosed.75 Having recourse to these apologetic arguments cannot 
only be confined to historical cases of detention. In the famous Belmarsh 
case,76 one of the central arguments of the British executive was that 
decisions pertaining to the questions of national security such as detention 
PXVWEHFRQVLGHUHGDVµWKHGLVFUHWLRQDU\DUHDRIMXGJHPHQW¶EHORQJLQJWR
the executive.77 In response to the arguments of the British executive in 
the Belmarsh case, Lord Bingham referred to the requirement of the 
ECHR, and concluded: 
The Convention regime for the international protection of 
human rights requires national authorities, including national 
courts, to exercise their authority to afford effective 
protection.78  
Even though this statement is a very general emphasis on the necessity of 
MXGLFLDOUHYLHZLWVHHPVWKDWWKHµHIIHFWLYHSURWHFWLRQ¶RIULJKWVHQXQFLDWHG
in Article 5 cannot be fulfilled, unless courts make substantive inquiries in 
their review of detention cases. This can be verified by the decisions of the 
                                                          
74 Proceedings on the Habeas Corpus, brought by Sir Thomas Darnel et al DWWKH.LQJ¶V-Bench 
in Westminster hall: Charles I A. D. 1627 in A Complete Collection of State Trials (1816). 
75 Refer to chapter I, section 3.  
76 The Belmarsh case concerned the indefinite detention of nine foreign nationals in the UK. 
The detainees in question had been held under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001, which authorised the detention of suspect foreigners. In this case, the 
House of Lords withheld the legality of the detention of foreigners, and at the same time, it 
issued a declaration of incompatibility as regard the discriminatory scheme built into section 
23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act.  
77 A (and others) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, para 37.  
78 Ibid., para 40.  
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Strasbourg Court in the case of Chahal.79 This case concerned detention 
and deportation of an Indian national in Britain, who had been deemed to 
pose a threat to the security of the detaining power.80 Even though Chahal 
had received a writ of habeas corpus, and his detention was subjected to a 
judicial review, the reviewing court had fully succumbed to the subjective 
nature of the determination of the executive to the effect of keeping 
&KDKDOLQGHWHQWLRQRQWKHEDVLVWKDWKLVFDVHLQYROYHGµVHFUHWPDWWHUV¶81 
This approach of British courts was criticised by the Strasbourg Court in 
the following terms: 
The Court recognises that the use of confidential material may 
be unavoidable where national security is at stake. This does 
not mean, however, that the national authorities can be free 
from effective control by domestic courts whenever they choose 
to assert that national security and terrorism are involved.82  
The second barrier encountered by judicial reviews of detention cases is 
the invocation of the prerogative for the purpose of justifying detention. As 
was identified in the previous chapter, practices undertaken within the 
auspices of the prerogative have historically been espoused by non-
justiciability.83 The reason for this is that the prerogative of states has 
always been underlined by an absolutism of the kind inherent within the 
powers of sovereign.84 It was seen that the common law tradition has 
normally considered detention and deportation of aliens as practices 
justified by the prerogative of the Crown. To understand the view of the 
Strasbourg Court on this issue, we must first establish how this body 
interprets Article 5(1)(f) of the European Convention.  
                                                          
79 Chahal v. The United Kingdom [1996] (22414/93), para 131.  
80 One of the distinctive features of the case of Chahal was the fact that his detention had 
been motivated by security reasons, yet he had been held on an immigration detention 
scheme, which will be analysed infra.  
81 5HFRJQLVLQJWKHOHJDOLW\RIDGHWHQWLRQEDVHGRQµVHFUHWPDWWHUV¶DQGµVHFUHWHYLGHQFH¶KDV
served as the modern version of the historical argument of µDUFDQD LPSHULL¶ LQ WKHFRPPRQ
law courts.  
82 Chahal v. The United Kingdom, above note 79, para 131. 
83 Refer to chapter II, section 8.  
84 Ibid.  
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5.2. Article 5(1)(f) and the deferential approach of the Strasbourg Court  
Article 5(1)(f) governs the issue of immigration detention for the purposes 
of exclusion and expulsion. Accordingly, it authorises detention of aliens 
for two distinct purposes: GHWHQWLRQ IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI µHIIHFWLQJ DQ
XQDXWKRULVHG HQWU\¶ DQG GHWHQWLRQ IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI GHSRUWDWLRQ 7KH
former category of immigration detention was considered by the European 
Court in the case of Saadi. Accordingly, in this case the Court elaborated 
on some of the conditions, which must be observed in pre-admittance 
detentions:  
Such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be 
closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised 
entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of 
detention should be appropriate.85 
However, the Court remained silent as to whether necessity could play any 
role in detention of unauthorised aliens. The position of the Court is 
clearer, when it comes to detention pending deportation. This position is 
VWDWHGWREHWKDWGHWHQWLRQRILPPLJUDQWVFDQFRQWLQXHVRORQJDVµDFWLRQV
are being taken with a view to [their] deportation¶.86 What is striking here 
is the broad manner in which the Strasbourg Court has interpreted Article 
5(1)(f). That is to say, the only condition imposed upon the detaining 
power for having recourse to detention pending deportation is the 
existence of deportation proceedings. No other prerequisites, including 
QHFHVVLW\WRHIIHFWDGHWDLQHH¶VIOLJKW, are put in place to limit the authority 
of states to exercise pre-deportation detention. This loose interpretation of 
Article 5(1)(f) signifies a turn-EDFN WR WKH EURDG FRQFHSWLRQ RI VWDWHV¶
powers to the pre-human rights era.87 Recall that in that era, the powers 
                                                          
85 Saadi v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 13229/03), para 74.  
86 Article 5(1)(f).  
87 D. Wilsher, Immigration Detention: Law, History, Politics (Cambridge: CUP, 2012) at 148±
150.  
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of states with regard to the issues of exclusion and expulsion would be 
read in the most expansive form possible.88  
Obviously, the StrasbRXUJ &RXUW¶V DSSURDFK WR WKH PDWWHU RI SUH-
deportation detention is in contravention of its attempts to factor 
arbitrariness or an extensive understanding of unlawfulness in the 
schemata of Article 5. 89  Even though, as was mentioned above, the 
Strasbourg Court has put emphasis on the importance of judicial review in 
this context, it is not clear how judicial review can make a difference in 
view of such expansive detention powers. The dissenting opinion of six 
judges in Saadi noticed the implication of such a reading of Article 5(1)(f) 
and reminded the Strasbourg Court about the preferable approach of the 
Human Rights Committee on this matter.90  
5.3. Other procedural safeguards  
One of the important safeguards regarding judicial review is explicitly 
identified in the wording of Article 5(3), and that is, that detainees must 
be brought promptly before judicial tribunals, as undue delays can cause 
indefiniteness in the exercise of detention. Therefore, the appearance of 
WKH WHUP µSURPSWO\¶ HQWDLOV D FHUWDLQ GHJUHH RI urgency.91  Notably, the 
ECHR does not impose any criteria in order to specify what is meant by 
promptness. In fact, the question of time limits on judicial review has been 
decided using a case-by-case approach by the European Court of Human 
Rights.92 The case-by-case appreciation of promptness gives rise to the 
LQFOXVLRQ RI VRPH IOH[LELOLW\ WKRXJK WKH (XURSHDQ&RXUW KDV VWDWHG µWKH
                                                          
88 Refer to chapter II, section 5. 
89  * &RUQHOLVVH µ+XPDQ 5LJKWV IRU ,PPLJUDWLRQ 'HWDLQHHV LQ 6WUDVERXUJ /LPLWHG
6RYHUHLJQW\RUD/LPLWHG'LVFRXUVH"¶European Journal of Migration and Law 93, at 
101±102.  
90 Saadi v. United Kingdom, above, per dissenting opinion. 
91  D. &KDW]LYDVVLOLRX µ7KH *XDUDQWHHV RI -XGLFLDO &RQWURO ZLWK 5HVSHFW WR 'HSULYDWLRQ RI
Liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights: An Overview of the 
Strasbourg Case-/DZ¶Era Forum 499, at 505.  
92 Brogan and others v. the United Kingdom, 11209/84, para 57. 
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scope of flexibility in interpreting and applying the notion of promptness is 
very limited¶.93  
Article 5(3) conveys that detaiQHHV µVKDOO EH EURXJKW SURPSWO\ EHIRUH D
judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power¶. Can 
WKH PHDQLQJ RI µRWKHU RIILFHU¶ H[HUFLVLQJ MXGLFLDO SRZHU EH H[WHQGHG WR
include executive boards? The answer to this question is extremely 
important for many issues associated with detention without trial. From 
the eighteenth century onward, executive boards mostly with advisory 
functions have been appointed to substitute the supervisory roles of the 
common law courts. One of the tactical advantages of these boards was to 
legitimise the suspension of habeas corpus. 94  Unsurprisingly, these 
administrative bodies never ceased to arouse suspicion on the part of legal 
scholars in the history of common law. Dicey, for example, viewed these 
tribunals as MXVWLILFDWLRQV IRU µZLGH DUELWUDU\ RU GLVFUHWLRQDU\ SRZHU RI
government¶. 95  1HYHUWKHOHVV WKHVH µDOWHUQDWLYH DGMXGLFDWRU\
PHFKDQLVPV¶96 continue to appeal to such common law states as Britain 
and the US for deciding upon detention cases.  
In a case that concerned the judicial character of a District Attorney, the 
European Court was provided with an opportunity to clarify the meaning of 
µRWKHURIILFHU¶97 In this case, by a comparison between Article 5(3) on the 
one hand, and Articles 5(4) and 6 (1) on the other, the Court concluded 
WKDWWKHWHUPVµMXGJH¶DQGµRIILFHU¶DUHQRWLGHQWLFDOEXWHVVHQWLDOO\VKDUH
                                                          
93 Pantea v. Romania 2003, Application no. 33343/96, para 59. 
94 Refer to chapter I, section 10.  
95 P. M. 0FGHUPRWW µ,QWHUQPHQW GXULQJ WKH *UHDW :DU ± $ &KDOOHQJH WR WKH 5XOH RI /DZ¶
(2005) 28 University of New South Wales Law Journal 330, at 334.  
96 -+DIHW]µ,PPLJUDWLRQDQG1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\/DZ&RQYHUJLQJ$SSURDFKHVWR6WDWH3RZHU
Individual Rights, anG -XGLFLDO5HYLHZ¶  Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 625, at 631.  
97 Schiesser v. Switzerland 1979, Application no. 7710/76. 
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some identical characteristics, which, according to the Court, are 
independence, procedural and substantive requirement.98 
The Court has strengthened its appreciation of independence so as to 
GLVTXDOLI\WKHSURVHFXWLQJDXWKRULWLHVIURPWKHVFRSHRIµRIILFHU¶DVODLGRXW
in Article 5(3). 99  Even without this expanded interpretation of 
independence and impartiality, the executive boards could not be 
considered to be either independent or impartial in their acts of judicial 
review for the purposes of Article 5(3). Exceptionally, in the case of 
Chahal, once the European Court ascertained the independent setting of a 
quasi-judicial panel, it discerned that the said review panel provided an 
important safeguard against arbitrariness. Even in that case, the Court 
made it clear that due to its advisory character, the panel in question 
FRXOG QRW µRIIHU VXIILFLHQW SURFHGXUDO VDIHJXDUGV¶ IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI
remedying the violation of rights laid down in the ECHR.100  
It is also necessary to examine what kind of obligations procedural and 
substantive requirements entail for judges and officers. According to the 
Strasbourg CRXUW SURFHGXUDO UHTXLUHPHQW µSODFHV WKH ³officer´ under the 
obligation of hearing himself the individual brought before him¶.101 As a 
result, the authorities within the meaning of Article 5(3) do not have any 
OHHZD\LQµLQMXGJLQJWKHGHVLUDELOLW\RIKHDULQJWKHGHWDLQHGSHUVRQ¶.102 
Additionally, the substantive UHTXLUHPHQW FRQVLVWV RI µREOLJDWLRQV RI
reviewing the circumstances militating for or against detention, of 
deciding, by reference to legal criteria, whether there are reasons to 
MXVWLI\GHWHQWLRQDQGRIRUGHULQJUHOHDVH LI WKHUHDUHQRVXFKUHDVRQV¶103 
                                                          
98 Ibid., paras 32±38.  
99 Skoogström v. Sweden (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. CD263. 
100 Chahal v. United Kingdom, above note 79, para 154.  
101 Schiesser v. Switzerland, above note 97, para 33.  
102 Winterwerp v. The Netherlands (Application no. 6301/73) para 63. 
103 Schiesser v. Switzerland, above note 97, para 31.  
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In fact, this substantive requirement overlaps with the obligations laid 
down in Article 5(4). That is to say, the focus of substantive requirement 
seems to be placed on the legality of detention and its function is to 
enable the judicial authorities to assess the cause of detention. 
6. The derogation system under the ECHR and detention 
without trial  
 
Various international and regional instruments of the international human 
rights law regime have recognised and regulated emergencies. Far from 
undermining the objectives of international human rights law regime, this 
UHFRJQLWLRQ VHHNV WR µDFFRPPRGDWH¶ HPHUJHQFLHV ZLWKLQ WKH QRUPDWLYH
framework of international human rights law. The first and most far-
UHDFKLQJFRQVHTXHQFHRIWKLVµDFFRPPRGDWLRQ¶LVWKDWHPHUJHQFLHV cannot 
be viewed as issues external to law in general and international law in 
particular.104 Hence, it is widely accepted in the sphere of human rights 
law that different determinations of the executive in times of crisis are not 
generally excluded from legal scrutiny and judicial control. This in itself is 
a serious antithesis to the doctrines that have sought to establish an 
extra-legal character for emergencies and the powers of sovereigns. 
Perhaps, it is fair to say that the seeds of this doctrine were planted by 
Hobbes and Locke, but its fruits ripened in the writings of Carl Schmitt 
between the 1920s and 1940s.105 In this regard, one must not ignore the 
way Locke defined the prerogative:  
The power to act according to discretion for the 
public good, without the prescription of the law and 
sometimes even against it.106  
 
                                                          
104 O. Gross, F. N. Aolain, Law in Times of Practice: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2006) at 263.  
105 See, O. Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt's Theory of 
Emergency: Powers and the "Norm-([FHSWLRQ'LFKRWRP\¶-2000) 21 Cardozo Law 
Review 1825.  
106 J. Locke, above note 25, at 84. 
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However, never did law reach such a weakened and ambivalent position as 
in the work of Schmitt, who based his ideas on the prevalence of the state 
of exception, and defined sovereign as µKHZKRGHFLGHVRQH[FHSWLRQ¶107 In 
this model of emergency powers, the law could do no more than indicate 
µZKRFDQDFW¶LQDJLYHQFDVH108 According to Schmitt, legal norms are far 
too crippled as well as indeterminate to exercise a restraining effect on the 
powers of sovereign. In the universe of Schmitt, exception cannot simply 
EH LGHQWLILHG DJDLQVW WKH EDFNJURXQG RI QRUPDOF\ µ([FHSWLRQ LV
HYHU\WKLQJ¶ DQG WKLV µHYHU\WKLQJ¶ HVFDSHV FRGLILFDWLRQ LQ DQ\ SHUFHLYHG
legal order and by any norms.109  
Without goinJ LQWR GHWDLOV DERXW WKH VWUHQJWKV DQG LOOV RI 6FKPLWW¶V
conception of exception, it suffices to say that his view is not shared by 
WKH KXPDQ ULJKWV ODZ UHJLPH µ7KDW ZKLFK LV H[FHSWLRQ¶ LV QDPHG VR LQ
human rights law, and points of demarcation have been drawn between 
normalcy and emergency.110 This allows for the survival of a rudimentary 
objective system of determination for recognising, regulating and to some 
extent terminating emergencies. In this sense, emergencies are both 
µVKLHOG DQG VZRUG¶ ZLWKLQ WKH realm of human rights law.111 As a result, 
even though human rights law accepts a degree of flexibility in times of 
HPHUJHQF\DVZHOODVGHURJDWLRQVRIVRPHRILWVSDUWLFXODUQRUPVVWDWHV¶
actions are still limited by the essential characteristics of human rights 
ODZ µXQLYHUVDOLW\ QRQ-GLVFULPLQDWLRQ DQG WKH UXOH RI ODZ¶112 This alone 
gives rise to a modicum of objective rules governing the conduct of states 
and, as such, limits the subjective discretion of sovereigns. This has the 
                                                          
107 C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty translated by 
G. Schwab (Cambridge: MIT Press 1985) at 5.  
108 -)UHUHMRKQ33DVTXLQRµ7KH/DZRI([FHSWLRQ$7\SRORJ\RI(PHUJHQF\3RZHUV¶
2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 210, at 226.  
109 Schmitt, above note 107, at 15-20.  
110 See, De Londras, above note 43. 
111 ))'DYLV)'H/RQGUDVµ&RXQWHU-7HUURULVW-XGLFLDO5HYLHZ%H\RQG'LFKRWRPLHV¶
Durham Research Online, at 3.  
112 De Londras, above note 43, at 101.  
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effect that international human rights law does not view the issue of 
emergencies as a merely political question alien to the existing legal order.  
Having this background in mind, we will analyse some of the attributes of 
laws governing detention without trial and emergencies within the 
framework of ECHR.  
The making of the ECHR was undertaken in an era pervaded by the 
FRORQLDOUHVLVWDQFHDQGWKHUDGLFDOSUREOHPVRIWKH&ROG:DU,Q6LPSVRQ¶V
ZRUGV µ>WKLV@ VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKLV ZDV QRW WKH WLPH IRU JRYHUQPHQW WR
weaken the powers thought necessary to contain the threat¶.113 The end 
result of this pragmatic thinking was Article 15 of the ECHR. With the 
H[FHSWLRQRIIRXUDUWLFOHV$UWLFOHDOORZHGµDQ\KLJKFRQWUDFWLQJSDUW\¶WR
GHURJDWHIURPWKHULJKWVHQXQFLDWHGLQWKH(&+5µLQWime of war or other 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation¶. Also, a procedural 
REOLJDWLRQ ZDV GLUHFWHG DW VWDWHV WR µNHHS WKH 6HFUHWDU\-General of the 
Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and 
the reasons therefor¶. British authorities soon found a solution to render 
ineffectual the procedural obligation of Article 15(3), which required 
providing the Council of Europe with the measures taken and the reasons 
for such measures. The solution was to keep these notices as brief and as 
general as possible so that no one could make a legal enquiry into the 
particularities of the practices and the reasons underlying such 
practices.114 This practice was soon imitated by other governments such 
as Ireland.115 
In the 1950s, when Britain was facing a new wave of anti-colonial 
resistance, its counter-insurgency methods reached a degree of severity 
                                                          
113 Simpson, above note 32.  
114 Ibid.  
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that had hardly been witnessed before.116 It was in the same period that 
the sweeping emergency measures in Cyprus aroused fury among some 
other members of the European Council, notably Greece. The result was a 
case brought before the European Commission of Human Rights by Greece 
alleging that the UK was responsible for violating different provisions of 
the ECHR, particularly Article 5.117 The Commission was confronted with a 
question, which could not easily be resolved. On the one hand, offering 
legitimacy to unlimited powers of emergency would exhaust the ECHR in 
its entirety in times of crisis. On the other hand, demoralising emergency 
powers could also increase the risk of the ECHR losing its practical weight 
and thereby encourage a wholesale non-compliance by the European 
states. Consequently, the Commission devised a doctrine, which has not 
ceased to generate controversy since then.118 The Commission ruled that 
HYHQWKRXJKDGHURJDWLRQPXVWEH µVWULFWO\UHTXLUHGE\WKHH[LJHQFLHV¶, it 
WXUQVRQWKHPHPEHUVWDWHVWRGHWHUPLQH µWKHH[WHQWVWULFWO\UHTXLUHGE\
the exigencies of the situation¶.119 This discretion in assessing the extent 
to which the emergency powers must be employed was referred to as the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation.  
An important observation needs additional emphasis here. As mentioned 
DERYHWKHSKUDVHµWRWKHH[WHQWVtrictly required by the exigencies of the 
VLWXDWLRQ¶ UHIHUV WR WKH WHVW RI SURSRUWLRQDOLW\ ,W PXVW EH QRWHG WKDW
observing the principle of proportionality for the purpose of temporary 
departures from certain legal obligations is not an invention of 
international human rights law. There are ample examples of either direct 
or indirect references to the requirement of proportionality in the history 
of common law. In fact, as Townshend has noted,  
                                                          
116 See, A:%6LPSVRQµ(PHUJHQF\3RZHUVDQG7KHLU$EXVH/HVVRQVIURPWKH(QGRIWKH
%ULWLVK(PSLUH¶Israel Year Book of Human Rights 219. 
117 The Cyprus Case, (1959) 2 Year Book of the European Convention on Human Rights 174. 
118 See, Simpson, above note 116.  
119 The Cyprus case, above note 108, at 176.  
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[a]ll nineteenth-century commentators agreed that the Crown 
(and indeed all lawful citizens) had under common law the right 
DQGWKHGXW\ WR UHSHO IRUFHZLWK IRUFH >«@DQH[HFXWLYHRIILFHU
was bound to use exactly the degree of force which was needed 
to terminate the danger ± not a jot more or less.120 
The crux of the issue is that proportionality has served not only as a guide 
for the executive officers in employing force, but also as an objective test 
enabling the judicial authorities to establish responsibility for those 
employing excessive force. 121  However, it taken to its extreme, the 
GRFWULQH RI µPDUJLQ RI DSSUHFLDWLRQ¶ FDQ WRWDOO\ XQGHUPLQH WKH REMHFWLYH
function of the test of proportionality. The reason for this is the potentially 
XQFKDOOHQJHDEOH FUHGLELOLW\ WKDW µPDUJLQ RI DSSUHFLDWLRQ¶ DVVLJQV WR WKH
subjective discretion of the executive.  This unchallengeable credibility 
may mean the non-justiciability of the executive subjective determinations 
in practice.   
The margin of appreciation in effect creates a positive presumption in 
favour of the defendant state in terms of assessing first of all whether a 
public emergency exists or not.122 If taken to its extreme, the margin of 
appreciation can also bestow a very broad degree of discretion upon 
member states in taking counter-emergency measures. The extreme 
conception of the margin of appreciation transforms the power of 
derogation to a prerogative, which immunisHV WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V
appreciation of events and its response to a given situation.123 What is at 
stake here is exactly a genuine and objective understanding of the test of 
SURSRUWLRQDOLW\GHSOR\HGLQWKHODQJXDJHRIµWRWKHH[WHQWVWULFWO\UHTXLUHG
by the exigencies of the situation¶.  
                                                          
120 & 7RZQVKHQG µ0DUWLDO /DZ /HJDO DQG $GPLQLVWUDWLYH 3UREOHPV RI &LYLO (PHUJHQF\ LQ
Britain and the Empire, 1800±¶The Historical Journal 167, at 171.  
121 A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, para 42.  
122 &6 )LQJROG µThe Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation and the European Convention on 
+XPDQ5LJKWV¶±1978) 53 Notre Dame Law 90, at 92.  
123 H. C. Yourrow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human 
Rights Jurisprudence (Dedrecht: Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995) at 20.  
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However, mapping out a rather unlimited terrain for the reach of the 
margin of appreciation in the early jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court 
carried with it the dangers of debilitating the ECHR as a whole in 
emergencies. The Court noticed this far-reaching danger nearly a decade 
after the Lawless case, and in the context of surveillance laws in Germany, 
it said: 
The Court [«] affirms that the Contracting States may not, in 
the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, 
adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate.124 
Subsequently, the Court made an attempt to moderate its early 
conception of the margin of appreciation insofar as the invocation of 
Article 15 was concerned. Therefore, in the case of Ireland v. United 
Kingdom, the Strasbourg Court concluded,  
>«@ %\ UHDVRQ RI WKHLU GLUHFW DQG FRQWLQXRXV FRQWDFW ZLWK WKH
pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in 
principle in a better position than the international judge to 
decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the 
nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it. In this 
matter Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1) leaves those authorities a 
wide margin of appreciation. 
Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in 
this respect. The Court, which, with the Commission, is 
responsible for ensuring the observance of the States¶ 
engagements (art. 19), is empowered to rule on whether the 
States have gone beyond the ³extent strictly required by the 
exigencies´ of the crisis. [«] The domestic margin of 
appreciation is thus accompanied by a European supervision.125 
Here, the margin doctrine is applied with greater care.126 In practice, the 
only difference between the application of the margin of appreciation in 
Ireland v. United Kingdom and the Lawless case was that there was a 
greater emphasis on the factual background justifying emergency powers 
in the former. In effect, the Court ruled that the factual background in 
1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG MXVWLILHG WKH %ULWLVK JRYHUQPHQW¶V GHSDUWXUH IURP WKH
                                                          
124 Klass v. Germany 1978, (Application no. 5029/71), para 49.  
125 Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 5310/71, para 207.  
126 7$2¶'RQQHOO µThe Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of 
WKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶Human Rights Quarterly 474, at 494.  
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protections of Article 5. In the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, the 
Court heavily relied on the factual background, going so far as citing 
figures provided by the government on the number of terrorist attacks.127 
The difficulty with this approach, as De Londras has noted, is that:  
[it] appears to suggest that emergencies are capable of 
empirical definition; however, an analysis of cumulative 
statistics might call into question the requirement that an 
HPHUJHQF\RXJKWWREHµWHPSRUDU\¶LQVRPHZD\128 
No wonder, then, that due to its excessive reliance on the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, the Strasbourg Court has often been very reluctant 
WR LPSRVH D µWHPSRUDU\ FKDUDFWHU¶ UHTXLUHPHQW XSRQ HPHUJHQF\
measures.129 
Referring back to the case of Brannigan and McBride v The United 
Kingdom WKH &RXUW¶V FRQFOXVLRQV ZHUH HVVHQWLDOO\ WKH VDPH DV WKRVH LQ
Ireland v. United Kingdom. That is to say, member states could enjoy a 
wide margin of appreciation whilst still being susceptible to the supervision 
RI WKH &RXUW DV WR ZKHWKHU µWKH 6WDWHV KDYH JRQH EH\RQG WKH H[WHQW
strictly required by the exigencies of the crisis¶.130 
The Strasbourg Court did not change its conception of the margin doctrine 
in the following years.131 Perhaps the only notable development as to the 
formulation of the margin doctrine occurred in the case of A and others v 
United Kingdom ZKHQ LW VWLSXODWHG WKDW WKH PHDQLQJ RI µQDWLRQDO
authoULWLHV¶ IRU WKHSXUSRVHRIGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUDQHPHUJHQF\H[LVWV
RUQRWPXVWLQFOXGHµWKHGRPHVWLFFRXUWV¶WRR132  
                                                          
127 Ibid.  
128 De Londras, above note 43, at 64.  
129 A and Others v. United Kingdom, above note 50.  
130 Brannigan and McBride v The United Kingdom (Application no. 14553/89), para 43.  
131  Askoy v. Turkey (Application no. 21987/93), Marshal v. United Kingdom (Appn No 
41571/98), A and others v. United Kingdom, above note 50. 
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7. Drafting the ICCPR and the reappearance of the term 
Ǯǯ 
 
The drafting of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
essentially involved the very same organisations and individuals as the 
8'+57KHUHIRUH LW VKRXOGFRPHDVQR VXUSULVH WKDW WKH WHUP µDUELWUDU\¶
once again secured a privileged place in Article 9 of the ICCPR governing 
the right to liberty.133 According to Article 9(1) of the ICCPR: 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall 
be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law.  
This formulation of Article 9(1) was concluded to the particular dislike of 
%ULWDLQ ZKLFK IDYRXUHG µD SUHFLVH GUDIWLQJ¶ 134  According to the British 
representative, the precise drafting would in this context have meant 
providing a long list of exceptions that justified departure from the right to 
liberty in a similar mode to the Article 5 of the ECHR. The difficulty with 
this approach in the context of the ICCPR was that some states were 
pushing for the inclusion of unjustifiable grounds of exception.135 +HQFHµLW
                                                          
133 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds 
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.  
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his 
arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.  
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge 
or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial 
within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting 
trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for 
trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution 
of the judgment.  
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the 
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.  
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable 
right to compensation. 
134 Simpson, above note 32, at 518.  
135 M. J. Bossuyt, Guide to the Travaux preparatoires of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (Dordrecht: MNP, 1987) at 190. For example, see, the grounds that the 
Union of South Africa sought to include within the text of Article 9.  
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was said that even if such a list could be made complete, its adoption 
might not be considered desirable¶.136 
One curious objection of the British representative was that the use of the 
WHUPµDUELWUDU\¶ LQ$UWLFOHZRXOGREVFXUHWhe relationship between its 
second and third sentence.137 In other words, it was not clear whether the 
meaning of arbitrary is identical with measures going beyond the limitation 
RIµLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKVXFKSURFHGXUHDVDUHHVWDEOLVKHGE\ODZ¶. The most 
important note with regard to the meaning of arbitrariness in the drafting 
history of the ICCPR is the following passage:  
%\ XVLQJ WKH ZRUG µDUELWUDU\¶ DOO OHJLVODWLRQ ZRXOG KDYH WR
conform to the principle of justice. On the basis of such an 
interpretation, the third sentence of paragraph 1 would qualify 
the fundamental idea set forth in the second sentence: the 
deprivation of liberty should not only conform to the principle of 
justice, it should also be on such grounds and in accordance 
with such procedure as are established by law.138 
Nevertheless, the British objections also targeted the elasticity of the 
criterion of arbitrariness. However, with the benefit of hindsight, we can 
reject the British argument on two grounds. The first ground is that the 
use of any other term/test such as lawfulness, legality, the rule of law, 
fairness or even legitimacy in the passage of Article 9(1) could carry either 
the same amount or very possibly a much greater degree of vagueness. 
One of the significant lessons of the history of internment is that the 
phenomenon of internment is a symptom of the uncertainties inherent 
within the concept of the rule of law. As Hassan has written in the context 
of Article 9(1), 
The clear reason for the retention of this sentence was that the 
majority of the members of the [drafting] Commission had 
considered that ³the rule of law did not provide adequate 
safeguards against the possible promulgation of unjust laws´ 
and that accordingly, by using the word ³arbitrary,´ the 
                                                          
136 Ibid., at 193. 
137 Ibid., 195±199.  
138 Ibid., at 198.  
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requirement would be added that all legislation must conform to 
the ³principles of justice´.139 
At the same time, the Human Rights Committee has over time made some 
HIIRUWVWRFODULI\WKHSURSHUWLHVRIµDUELWUDULQHVV¶140 In a case concerning a 
lengthy pre-trial detention, the Committee ruled: 
The drafting history of article 9, paragraph 1, confirms that 
³arbitrariness´ is not to be equated with ³against the law´, but 
must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of 
inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability. This 
means that remand in custody pursuant to lawful arrest must 
not only be lawful but reasonable in all the circumstances. 
Further, remand in custody must be necessary in all the 
circumstances, for example, to prevent flight, interference with 
evidence or the recurrence of crime.141 
On this note, not only do the elements of inappropriateness, injustice and 
lack of predictability render a given exercise of detention arbitrary, but 
they also draw some boundaries for the laws authorising detention. 
7KHUHIRUH µZKHQ the law is vague, broad, or unpredictable¶,142 it will be 
susceptible to criterion of arbitrariness, as these criteria render the law 
XQMXVW7RWKHVHUHTXLUHPHQWVPXVWEHDGGHGWKHHOHPHQWRI µQHFHVVLW\¶
which must lie at the root of each practice of non-arbitrary preventive. 
Altogether, these requirements are intended to provide qualitative criteria 
E\ ZKLFK WKH &RPPLWWHH KDV DVVHVVHG VWDWHV¶ FRQGXFW LQ LWV FRQFOXGLQJ
observation and cases produced brought before it.   
7. Is preventive detention an arbitrary practice under Article 
9(1)?  
 
Unlike Article 5(1)(c) of the ECHR, Article 9(1) of the ICCPR does not 
touch upon the circumstances and motives ascribing lawfulness to 
particular forms of detention. Rather, it just provides a criterion which 
                                                          
139  P. Hassan, µThe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Background and 
Perspective on Article 9(1)¶ (1973) 3(2) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 153, 
at 179. 
140  R. Pati, Due Process and International Terrorism: An International Legal Analysis 
(Dordrecht: MNP, 2009) at 43±64. 
141 WomahMukong v. Cameroon, Communication No. 458/1991, para 9.8. 
142 Pati, above note 140, at 43.  
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governs the enforcement as well as the regulatory mechanisms resulting 
in deprivation of liberty. As elaborated above, that criterion is 
arbitrariness. The exercise of preventive detention is not necessarily 
arbitrary under Article 9(1).143 The Committee also dealt with the question 
of whether preventive detention falls within the category of arbitrariness:  
if so-called preventive detention is used, for reasons of public 
security, it must be controlled by these same provisions, i.e. it 
must not be arbitrary and must be based on grounds and 
procedures established by law (para. 1), information of the 
reasons must be given (para. 2) and court control of the 
detention must be available (para. 4) as well as compensation 
in the case of a breach (para. 5).144 
Therefore, in order for preventive detention to be characterised as non-
arbitrary, it must conform to the procedural and substantive standards as 
manifested in the text of Article 9 and other relevant statements and 
judgments of the Human Rights Committee.  
8. Substantive requirements  
 
As argued above, the Human Rights Committee ruled that 
inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability constitute a tripartite 
pillar for the notion of arbitrariness.  
Unfortunately, the Committee has not gone into great detail about the 
constitutive factors of what practices come to be inappropriate, unjust and 
unpredictable. In the absence of a list of examples, we must subscribe to a 
certain degree of legal imagination. It seems that a common thread 
DPRQJ DOO WKUHH HOHPHQWV RI µLQDSSURSUiateness, injustice and lack of 
SUHGLFWDELOLW\¶ LV D ODFN RI OHJDO FHUWDLQW\ $V ZDV PHQWLRQHG DERYH WKH
principle of legal certainty is one of the most concrete foundations of the 
                                                          
143 See, & 0DFNHQ µ3UHYHQWLYH 'HWHQWLRQ DQG WKH 5LJKW RI 3HUVRQDO /LEHUW\ DQG 6HFXULty 
XQGHUWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RYHQDQWRQ&LYLODQG3ROLWLFDO5LJKWV¶Adelaide Law Review 
1.  
144 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 8 (1994) 
para 4.  
139 
 
rule of law. In the common law tradition, one of the most serious legal 
criticisms towards the practice of indefinite detention was made by Sir 
Edward Coke with a view to the incompatible nature of indefinite detention 
ZLWK WKH SULQFLSOH RI OHJDO FHUWDLQW\ µKDG WKH ODZ LQWHQGHG VXFK D WKLQJ
[detention without an alleged cause] it would have named a time [for 
it]¶.145  
It was also discussed earlier that, in its historical understanding, the very 
WHUP µDUELWUDU\¶ XVHG WREHHPSOR\HGDV V\QRQ\PRXVwith uncertain and 
discretionary. 146  As a result, one way of reading such prohibitive 
quaOLILFDWLRQVDV µLQDSSURSULDWHQHVV LQMXVWLFHDQG ODFNRI SUHGLFWDELOLW\¶ LV
to say that their prohibition points to a high regard for legal certainty.147 
Based on the recurrent issues in the practice of detention without trial, 
three areas can be identified in which the application of legal certainty can 
be said to be at its most paramount: 1) laws authorising detention without 
trial, 2) period of detention, and 3) specific, genuine and precise grounds 
for detention.   
9.1. Laws authorising detention  
It goes without saying that the way in which law authorises detention has 
direct implications for how it is exercised. We monitored in the first 
chapter how different regulatory frameworks for detention impacted the 
practice of detention without trial in Britain and its colonies. The Human 
Rights Committee has also attended upon the question of the laws 
authorising detention. On particular occasions, the Committee has been 
very explicit that vague formulations of law often result in broad arresting 
                                                          
145 Refer to chapter I, sections 8±10. 
146 Section 2.  
147 See also, T. M. Franck, Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990) at 60±80.   
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and detention powers. 148  This also holds true for legislation, which 
provides too much latitude for the detaining authority through extremely 
broad grounds of detention (infra) or the power to delay the judicial 
review of a detainee.149  
9.2.  Period of detention  
There must be a reasonable degree of determinacy in the timeframe 
formulated for keeping and releasing internees. This is because the 
measure of internment at its core signifies a temporary practice employed 
to avert an instant and pressing danger threatening social security. 
Therefore, by an unreasonable prolongation, the practice of detention 
without trial must not take the form of imprisonment.150 More importantly, 
if there exists no reasonable period for the duration of internment, 
internees will be held under an unbearable amount of uncertainty and 
distress. 151  This may well transform the practice of internment to an 
inhuman or degrading treatment targeting the very mental integrity of 
internees.152 
Notwithstanding the importance of having in place a reasonable duration 
for detention, the Committee is yet to specify a standard timeframe for 
non-arbitrary practice of detention without trial. The matter assumes some 
complication when one encounters different approaches of the Committee 
in different cases. 153  For example, the Committee has often criticised 
                                                          
148 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Trinidad and Tobago, 
CCPR/CO/70/TTO, para 16. 
149 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 2010, 
para 13.  
150 /&R[µ7KH/HJDO/LPERRI,QGHILQLWH'HWHQWLRQ+RZ/RZ&DQ<RX*R¶ 
American University Law Review 725, at 749. 
151 See, for example, A. Lorek et alµ7KH PHQWDODQGSK\VLFDOKHDOWKGLI¿FXOWLHVRIFKLOGUHQ
held within D%ULWLVKLPPLJUDWLRQGHWHQWLRQFHQWHU$SLORWVWXG\¶ (2009) 33 Child Abuse and 
Neglect 573. 
152 H. Duffy and S. Kostasµ([WUD-RUGLQDU\5HQGLWLRQ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2012) at 550.  
153 0+DNLPLµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WDQGDUGVIRU'HWDLQLQJ7HUURULVP6XVSHFWV0RYLQJ%H\RQGWKH
Armed Conflict-&ULPLQDO'LYLGH¶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VWDWHVIRUWKHLUUHVRUWWR µXQVSHFLILHG¶154 RU µORQJDQG LQGHILQLWH¶155 periods 
of detention. Yet, in the case of Ahani v. Canada, 156  the Committee 
showed no discomfort with the nine-year detention of Ahani. One may of 
course say that the approach of the Committee in Ahani was justified due 
to the peculiar factual surroundings of his case. Ahani was allegedly a 
PHPEHURIµWKHIRUHLJQDVVDVVLQVEUDQFK¶RIWKH,UDQLDQLQWHOOLJHQFHVHUYLFH
and had admitted to having undergone special training for the purpose of 
carrying out operations abroad.157 Another peculiar feature of the case of 
Ahani was that much of the prolongation of his detention had been caused 
by himself. This was because he had chosen a special route to challenge 
the autKRULW\ RI WKH &DQDGLDQ DXWKRULWLHV¶ GHWHUPLQDWLRQ QDPHO\
contesting the constitutionality of the security certificates issued by the 
officials.158 Therefore, it can be concluded that Ahani cannot be taken as a 
standard test case indicating the general view of the Committee regarding 
the duration of non-arbitrary preventive detention.  
Despite the foregoing arguments, it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
identifying arbitrariness with regard to duration of detention is directly 
linked to the specific facts underlying a practice of detention.159 This is one 
of the inherent ironies of the test of arbitrariness. That is to say, even 
though the test of arbitrariness is designed to reduce general legal 
uncertainties associated with detention and subjective discretion of the 
detaining power, its own application cannot always be accompanied by 
FHUWDLQ FRQFUHWH DQG REMHFWLYH FULWHULD 5DWKHU µDUELWUDULQHVV¶ LQ LWVHOI
signifies a contextual and fact-specific test, and thereby tolerates some 
                                                          
154 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Dominican Republic 
CCPR/C/DOM/5, para 20. 
155 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel 1998 CCPR/C/79/Add.93, 
para 21.  
156 Ahani v. Canada, CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002(2004).  
157 Ibid. 
158 See DOVR*+HFNPDQµ>&RPPHQWDU\RQ@Ahani V. Canada¶American Journal of 
International Law 669.  
159 Hakimi, above note 153, at 388.  
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degree of uncertainty and subjective determination in its application.160 
However, to make this inherent uncertainty tolerable from a legal 
standpoint, the Committee has made every effort to limit the degree of 
VWDWHV¶ VXEMHFWLYH GLVFUHWLRQ RQ WKH OHQJth of detention. As a result, the 
general rule has been that detention can continue so long as states can 
provide justification for such a practice. However, according to the 
Committee, states are compelled to provide credible reasons for the 
continuation of detention. This approach of the Committee is very visible 
in the case of A v. Australia, 
[«] detention should not continue beyond the period for which 
the State can provide appropriate justification. For example, 
the fact of illegal entry may indicate a need for investigation 
and there may be other factors particular to the individuals, 
such as the likelihood of absconding and lack of cooperation, 
which may justify detention for a period.161 
In this particular case, it is also worth attending to the arguments of the 
detaining power. The detainee in the case of A v. Australia, who was an 
µLOOHJDOLPPLJUDQW¶KDGHQGXUHGIRXU\HDUVRIGHWHQWLRQXSRQKLVHQWU\LQWR
Australia. After his release in 1994, he brought a case before the 
Committee against Australia, and, inter alia, contended for the arbitrary 
nature of his detention. Australia referred to the constituent elements of 
arbitrariness and posited that: 
    GHWHQWLRQ LQ D FDVH VXFK DV WKH DXWKRU¶V ZDV QRW
disproportionate nor unjust; it was also predictable in that 
$XVWUDOLDQ ODZKDGEHHQSXEOLFL]HG«>WKHDUJXPHQW@ WKDW LW LV
inappropriate per se to detain individuals entering Australia in 
an unauthorized manner is not borne out by any of the 
provisions of the Covenant.162  
 
Of course, the Committee did not accept the illegality of detention of 
unauthorized immigrants per se. Rather, as was seen above, the 
Committee placed a necessity requirement for this kind of detention and 
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its prolonged duration. The Committee noted that AXVWUDOLD µKDG QRW
DGYDQFHGDQ\JURXQGVSDUWLFXODUWRWKHDXWKRU¶VFDVHZKLFKZRXOGMXVWLI\
KLV FRQWLQXHG GHWHQWLRQ IRU D SHULRG RI IRXU \HDUV¶163 More will be said 
about both the required characteristics of the grounds justifying detention 
and the element of necessity in the next two sections.  
 
As will be seen infra,164 these particular limitations are also very relevant 
to the necessity factor assessments relating to the exercise of detention 
without trial.  
9.3. Specific, genuine and precise grounds for detention 
One of the most vital obligations of the detaining power is to ascribe 
lawfully sound and precise grounds for its exercise of detention. To begin 
with, no exercise of detention can survive the test of arbitrariness without 
having a clear legal basis.165  As a result, when detainees are held for 
reasons of illegal nature such as their value as bargaining chips 166  or 
hostages for ulterior motives of the executive, 167  their detention must 
undoubtedly be viewed as arbitrary. Furthermore, the legal grounds for 
detention must not be so overly broad as to be devoid of specificity. Thus, 
with regard to the exercise of detention in Sudan, the Committee stated in 
1997 that it 
is particularly concerned that the vague and legally undefined 
FRQFHSW RI ³QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\´ DV DSSOLHG LQ WKH 6XGDQ LV
inconsistent with the provisions of article 9 of the Covenant and 
can be used as a basis for arrest and detention of persons 
>«@168 
The Human Rights Committee has as late as 2012 repeated in its Draft 
&RPPHQW 1R  µ>VXFK grounds] should be defined with sufficient 
                                                          
163 Ibid., at 9.4.  
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166 Concluding Observations: Israel, CCPR/C/79/Add.93 1998, para 21.  
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precision to avoid overly broad or arbitrary application¶.169 The importance 
of assigning specific reasons as grounds for detention can truly be realised 
at the stage at which detainees purport to challenge the grounds on which 
their detention has been carried out.  
Finally, a cause stated to justify a given case of detention must be 
genuine. That is to say, the executive must not exploit a particular legal 
scheme to detain persons for ulterior reasons unknown to the used 
scheme. 7KLV LV GXH WR WKH IDFW WKDW DYRLGLQJ WKH HOHPHQW RI µODFN RI
SUHGLFWDELOLW\¶ LQDUELWUDU\GHWHQWLRQVHHPVWR LPSO\DKLJKUHJDUGIRU WKH
µJHQXLQHQHVV¶RIJURXQGVSXWLQSODFHWRMXVWLI\DJLYHQFDVHRIGHWHQWLRQ
To make this point clear, we must concisely pay attention to the material 
witness detention scheme of the US executive in the aftermath of 9/11. 
The material witness detention in principle seeks to secure the detention 
RI µUHOXFWDQW¶ ZLWQHVVHV VR WKDW WKH\ DUH IRUFHG WR DSSHDU LQ FRXrts to 
testify against others. 170  The Bush Administration, however, employed 
material witness detention as a cover to hold terrorist suspects. 171  If 
judged by the words of the Committee on the prohibition of arbitrariness, 
this pretextual use of material witness detention can and must be liable to 
have WKH ODEHORI µDUELWUDU\GHWHQWLRQ¶, in that it does not conform to the 
requirement of predictability. In such cases, a detainee cannot locate the 
reasons for the continuation of his detention, when he is not called to 
testify against another criminal suspect. Nor can he take appropriate legal 
action to challenge the detaining power, when the cause of his detention is 
not clear to him.172 
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10. Necessity  
 
As was observed above, the Human Rights Committee has emphasised 
that a non-DUELWUDU\ µUHPDQG LQ FXVWRG\ PXVW EH QHFHVVDU\ LQ DOO WKH
circumstances¶. 173  This gives rise to an assessment of the necessity 
criterion in our appreciation of a non-arbitrary practice of preventive 
detention. In this regard, it is essential to note that the necessity criterion 
in the sense used by the Human Rights Committee does not merely 
represent an apologetic plea for the governments to justify otherwise 
illegal actions.174 Rather, the Committee seems to have invoked necessity 
as a test committed to limit the authority of the executive in exercising 
detention to the cases that such an exercise is necessary. In this sense, 
necessity becomes an objective and restrictive test, which only allows for 
WKHSUDFWLFHRISUHYHQWLYHGHWHQWLRQ µZKHQQR OHVVUHVWULFWLYHPHDVXUH LV
available¶. 175  Accordingly, in cases of detention, this configuration of 
necessity permits the judicial authority to enquire into whether the 
detaining power could contain the perceived danger emanating from the 
individual detainees by measures less severe than preventive detention. 
This mode of applying necessity also requires attention to the specific facts 
around a given case of detention. As was discerned above, in the cases of 
immigration detention, unlike its European counterpart, the Committee 
has used the test of necessity as an objective prerequisite to the practice 
of detention: 
the fact of illegal entry may indicate a need for investigation 
and there may be other factors particular to the individuals, 
                                                                                                                                                        
0DFQHLO2OLYHUµ0DWHULDO:LWQHVV'HWHQWLRQV$IWHUDO-.LGG¶-2012) 100 Kentucky Law 
Journal 293.  
173 Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, above note 133.  
174 See also, B. C. Rodick, The Doctrine of Necessity in International Law (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1928) at 4±10.  
175 D. Moeckli, Human Rights and Non Discrimination in the War on Terror (Oxford: OUP, 
2008) at 78. 
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such as the likelihood of absconding and lack of cooperation, 
which may justify detention for a period.176 
Thus, it can be seen that each determination of necessity in cases of 
detention has two components: 1) evaluating the threat posed by a 
suspect (including the threat of fleeing in the case of pre-admittance or 
pre-deportation detention), and 2) the issue of whether the threat can be 
neutralised by means less restrictive than detention. However, as Hakimi 
notes, on the point of evaluating the necessity criterion, the Committee 
has rarely challenged the necessity determinations of the detaining 
powers.177 Part of the problem might have been that the Committee has 
not found many occasions to give content to the modalities of 
determination of necessity and the technicalities of adjudicating them. 
Nevertheless, if this reluctance of the Committee turns out to take the 
form of a systematic judicial deference to the subjective determinations of 
the executive, it is fair to say that the whole arrangement of non-arbitrary 
preventive detention will then resemble yet another failure into the overall 
process of the evolution of laws governing detention without trial.  
Once again, it must not be neglected that the history of detention without 
trial tells us that the most robust anti-thesis to non-arbitrariness is the 
absolute, subjective and discretionary power of authorities in detaining 
individuals. Therefore, reluctance and indifference towards the necessity 
determinations of the executive obviates all that the prohibition of 
arbitrary detention strives to achieve and that is putting substantive 
constraints upon the authority of the detaining power.  
11. Procedural safeguards 
 
                                                          
176 A v. Australia, above note 161.  
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The first procedural safeguard against arbitrary preventive detention is set 
RXW LQ WKH ILUVWSDUWRI$UWLFOHDFFRUGLQJ WRZKLFK µ>D@Q\RQHZKR LV
arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his 
DUUHVW >«@¶. The Committee has explicitly noted that this part of Article 
9(2) applies to all forms of deprivations of liberty.178 In its Draft Comment 
35, the Committee states that the requirements of Article 9 apply to 
everyone deprived RI KLVKHU OLEHUW\ µUHJDUGOHVV RI WKH IRUPDOLW\ RU
informality with which the arrest takes place and regardless of the 
legitimate or improper reason on which it is based¶.179 
Unlike Article 5 of the ECHR, Article 9 of the ICCPR does not entail an 
automatic obligation for the judicial review, where preventive detention is 
exercised. Nevertheless, the Human Rights Committee has recognised that 
the means for challenging detention must be made available to the 
detainees held on preventive detention.180 If read within the light of the 
common law tradition, Article 9(4) necessitates the availability of the writ 
of habeas corpus. However, in different legal traditions other mechanisms 
with the same function as habeas corpus can be used.181 
Once again, a return to the history of detention without trial shows that 
when judicial review is merely treated as a matter of formality, it can 
provide no efficient guarantee against the exercise of arbitrary detention. 
The Human Rights Committee has been very cautious about the 
meaningfulness of judicial review. In A v. Australia, the Committee stated 
that: 
While domestic legal systems may institute differing methods for 
ensuring court review of administrative detention, what is decisive 
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context). 
179 Draft General Comment 35, para 24.  
180 Antti Vuolanne v. Finland, Communication No. 265/1987, para 9.6.  
181 Macken, above note 143, at 24.  
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for the purposes of article 9, paragraph 4, is that such review is, in 
its effect, real and not merely formal.182 
 
As a result, such rulings of the Committee signify an increasing tendency 
towards reading the requirement of judicial review in the light of Article 14 
of the ICCPR, which governs the right to fair trial.183 These standards in 
effect warrant a meaningful review of the legality of detention.  
First and foremost, Article 9(4) states that judicial review of detention 
must be carried out by courts. When applying the requirement of 
independence and impartiality to $UWLFOH WKH UHVXOWZLOOEH WKDW µWKH
functions prescribed therein can only be carried out by a judicial body and 
not by quasi-judicial substitutes¶.184 Furthermore, Article 9(4) charges the 
judicial authorities with an obligation ± that is, to decide on the case 
µZLWKRXWGHOD\¶. Again, an unreasonable delay in delivering the outcome of 
judicial review may make an exercise of preventive detention vulnerable to 
becoming indefinite.185 
 
 
12. Reservations to Article 9  
 
The ICCPR does not stipulate any limitations as to the issue of 
reservations. Nevertheless, reservations must be governed by the general 
rules of the law of treaties, as manifested in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT).186 In this regard the Committee has this to say:  
Although treaties that are mere exchanges of obligations 
between States allow them to reserve inter se application of 
rules of general international law, it is otherwise in human 
                                                          
182 A v. Australia, above note 161, para 9.5.  
183 See, Amnesty International, The Human Rights Committee¶V New General Comment on 
the Right to Liberty and Security of Person: Amnesty IQWHUQDWLRQDO¶V Preliminary Observations 
(London: Amnesty International Publications, 2012).  
184 See, & 0LFKHDOVHQ µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQ 5LJKWV RQ 7ULDO ± WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶V DQG
$XVWUDOLD¶VOHJDOUHVSRQVHWR¶Sydney Law Review 275.  
185 Torres v. Finland CCPR/C/38/D/291/1988, para 7.3.  
186 General Comment No 24: Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or 
accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations 
under article 41 of the Covenant CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para 6.  
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rights treaties, which are for the benefit of persons within their 
jurisdiction.  
 
Accordingly, provisions in the Covenant that represent 
customary international law (and a fortiori when they have the 
character of peremptory norms) may not be the subject of 
reservations. Accordingly, a State may not reserve the right to 
engage in slavery, to torture, to subject persons to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to arbitrarily 
deprive persons of their lives, to arbitrarily arrest and detain 
SHUVRQV>«@187 
 
The difficulty, however, starts when it is discerned that some countries 
have entered some reservations upon Article 9, seemingly authorising 
arbitrary arrest or detention.  
Fortunately, reservations against Article 9 have not been made in large 
numbers. 188  Additionally, most reservations have not targeted the 
question of arbitrary arrest and detention, but mostly concern procedural 
incompatibilities between the text of Article 9 and the reserving states.189 
One case of reservation against Article 9 has proved to be extremely 
controversial, and that is the reservation of India. Upon its accession to 
the ICCPR, India discerned that: 
With reference to article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the Government of the Republic of India 
takes the position that the provisions of the article shall be so 
applied as to be in consonance with the provisions of clauses 
(3) to (7) of article 22 of the Constitution of India.190 
 
It is also essential to point out that in accordance with the Indian 
Constitution, the authorisation of preventive detention in India is not in 
any sense dependant on a state of emergency.  
                                                          
187 Ibid., para 8.  
188 06FKHQLQ µ5HVHUYDWLRQV WR WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RYHQDQWRQ&LYLODQG3ROLWLFDO5LJKWVDQG
Its Optional Protocols ± 5HIOHFWLRQV RQ 6WDWH 3UDFWLFH¶ online paper available at 
www.nuigalway.ie/sites/eu.../martin%20scheinin-eng.doc. 
189 A list of reservations to the ICCPR can be viewed at  
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en. 
190 The Indian reservation can be accessed at  
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/73c66f02499582e7c1256ab7002e2533/741ca7c28bb52de
8802567fc0054c5e9?OpenDocument. 
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The constitutional status of preventive detention in India has produced 
more than sixty years worth of cases and statutes, whose consideration 
goes well beyond the scope of this thesis. Jinks has documented and 
analysed the case law stemming from Article 22, and has identified some 
common characteristics underlying the exercise of preventive detention in 
India. A summary of these characteristics can be described as: 1) 
detainees are held on broad grounds such as public order and national 
security, 2) subjective decisions of authorities can form a sufficient basis 
for the legality of detention, 3) administrative boards have replaced 
judicial proceedings and 4) detainees are stripped of their right to counsel 
DQGILQDOO\µJRYHUQPHQWFDUULHVDPLQLPDOEXUGHQRISURRI¶.191 The modern 
practice of preventive detention in India cannot but resonate the most 
severe forms of colonial detentions. It is as if the Indian detention laws are 
still haunted by the infamous Bengal Regulation. It was argued in the first 
chapter that the Bengal regulation introduced detention without trial with 
very slim safeguards without a need for emergency. 192  The Bengal 
regulation was the first free-standing provision authorising detention 
without trial in the history of common law.193  
The Indian reservation brings within its fold the message that states can, 
on the authority of their constitution, resort to arbitrary internment 
without invoking an emergency context. Accordingly, it may send a 
message to such states as Malaysia and Singapore (who are yet to 
become parties to the ICCPR and have very similar constitutional 
provisions to Article 22 of the Indian Constitution)194 that they can still 
                                                          
191 ' 3 -LQNV µ7KH $QDWRP\ of an Institutionalised Emergency: Preventive Detention and 
Personal Liberty in India (2000±2001) 22 Michigan Journal of International Law 311, at 328±
339.  
192 Refer to chapter I, section 10.  
193 Ibid.  
194 6%DUURFORXJKµ7KH'\QDPLFVRI&RHUFLRQLQWKH0DOD\VLDQ3ROLWLFDO3URFHVVHV¶
Modern Asian Studies 797, 812±813.  
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ratify the ICCPR, even though they may continue to exercise arbitrary 
detention in non-emergency contexts.195  
Part of the problem is that the real value of the right to be free from 
arbitrary arrest or detention is not very clear within the hierarchy of 
treaty-based or customary norms in the international human rights law 
system.196 For example, on one hand, the Human Rights Committee puts 
the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention at the same level of 
importance as the prohibition of slavery,197 which moves one to consider 
the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention to be immune from 
limitations imposed by such measures as reservation or derogation.198 On 
the other hand, the content of Article 9 is not enlisted as a non-derogable 
right. One way to mitigate such adverse effects as the Indian reservation 
to Article 9 is to strengthen a cumulative reading of Article 9 and Article 14 
so that states encounter a more tightened space to resort to arbitrary 
detention. Interestingly, the Human Rights Committee exploited this 
measure to remind the government of India of its obligation to a fair 
judicial review for the detainees held on preventive detention. 199  This 
interpretive method upholds the obligation to judicial review in cases of 
preventive detention, even though the application of Article 9 may have 
been rendered limited by virtue of a reservation.  
 
12.1.  The mistaken use of the language of peremptory norms by the 
Committee  
                                                          
195 See, for example, Human Rights Commission of Malaysia, Review of the Internal Security 
Act (Kuala Lumpur: Cetakan Kedua, 2009).  
196 70HURQµ2QD+LHUDUFK\RI,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQ5LJKWV6WDQGDUGV¶American 
Journal of International Law 1, at 15±19.  
197 General Comment 24, above note 186.  
198 It must also be mentioned that some documents of soft law nature such as the Siracusa 
Principles and the Paris Standards assign a peremptory norm of international status to the 
right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention.  
199 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: India CCPR/C/79/Add.81 para 
24.  
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Based on the statements of the Human Rights Committee,200 there has 
increasingly emerged a proposition among some legal scholars that the 
right to challenge the lawfulness of detention or the obligation of judicial 
review as the relevant norm to the prohibition of arbitrary detention must 
be viewed as the peremptory norm of international law or jus cogens, and 
WKHUHIRUHµLQFDSDEOHRIGHURJDWLRQ¶201 However, it is one thing to say that 
a particular right under a certain human rights treaty is non-derogable and 
quite another to assert that that right is a jus cogens norm of international 
law. If one argues that the right to challenge the lawfulness (non-
arbitrariness) of detention before a judicial body is jus cogens, then, 
according to the rules of treaty interpretation as articulated in the Vienna 
Convention, any international law treaty which includes an incompatible 
provision with Article 9(4) of the ICCPR must be considered void in its 
entirety.202 This includes the Fourth Geneva Convention, which allows for 
review of detention by non-judicial bodies. 203  Needless to say, it is 
impossible to find an international law body or a legal commentator that 
would compromise the validity of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the 
basis of the argument that the Human Rights Committee has impliedly 
bestowed a peremptory status upon the obligation of judicial review. This 
is not to conclude that Article 9(4) cannot be made a non-derogable 
provision under the ICCPR. On the contrary, as will be seen in the next 
section, the Committee has been very clear on the point of non-
                                                          
200 General Comment 24, above note 186.  
201  De Londras, above note 43, DW  RU 6 -RVHSK µ+XPDQ 5LJKWV &RPPLWWHH *HQHUDO
Comment 29 (2002) 2 Human Rights Law Review 81, at 91±92.  
202 Article 53, Vienna Convention, above note 60.  
203 Here it can be said that this retroactive application of jus cogens flies against the non-
retroactive nature of VCLT rules, as specified in Article 4. However, it must be noted that this 
UHWURDFWLYHIXQFWLRQµLVKRZHYHUZLWKRXWSUHMXGLFHWRWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIDQ\UXOHVVHWIRUWKLQ
the Vienna Convention to which treaties would be subject under international law 
LQGHSHQGHQWO\IURPWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶&.DKJDQµJus Cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-
Defence¶-1997) 3 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 767, at 792. This 
by itself gives rise to very complex discussions on the question of whether a jus cogens norm 
derives its hierarchical force from the VCLT rules or customary international law. It is on the 
account of these far-reaching complexities that one must avoid assigning a peremptory 
character to such standards as judicial review.    
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derogability of Article 9(4). Nonetheless, this does not follow by automatic 
transformation into a peremptory norm of international law. Some human 
rights law writers have chosen to refer to the non-derogable provisions of 
the ICCPR as inalienable rights.204 This is definitely a much more accurate 
description of non-derogable rights than describing them as peremptory 
norms of international law. The reason for this is that the language of 
inalienable human rights purports to show that some guarantees of human 
rights cannot be suspended, regardless of the legal context in which they 
operate. On the other hand, the status of jus cogens defines a hierarchical 
order in the relationship of a particular norm of international law with 
other norms for the purpose of resolving normal conflicts. 205  This will 
create many difficulties for Article 9(4) of the ICCPR when its application 
relates to an international armed conflict context, where the standards of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention come to govern a given practice of 
internment and clash with the standards put in place by the ICCPR.206    
13. Arbitrary detention and derogation 
  
In the same manner as all other major international human rights treaties, 
the ICCPR has put in place a derogation scheme, according to which the 
application of many rights can be limited or suspended in times of 
emergency. The derogation regime of the ICCPR is articulated in Article 4, 
which states that:  
1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the 
States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures 
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to 
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their 
                                                          
204  & 2OLYLHU µ5HYLVLWLQJ *HQHUDO &RPPHQW 1R  RI WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV +XPDQ 5LJKWV
&RPPLWWHH$ERXW)DLU7ULDO5LJKWVDQG'HURJDWLRQVLQ7LPHVRI3XEOLF(PHUJHQF\¶
Leiden Journal of International Law 405, at 419. 
205 M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and 
Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2011) at 104.  
206 This issue will also be dealt with in the next chapter.  
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other obligations under international law and do not involve 
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion or social origin.  
 
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 
15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.  
 
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the 
right of derogation shall immediately inform the other States 
Parties to the present Covenant, through the intermediary of 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions 
from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was 
actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the 
same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such 
derogation. 
 
As can easily be discerned, with the exception of Article 4(2), which 
identifies seven non-derogable articles, the text of Article 4 is in general 
very similar to Article 15 of the ECHR. Nevertheless, there are notable 
differences between the derogation regimes under the ECHR and the 
ICCPR, principally because the Human Rights Committee has taken a 
different approach from the Strasbourg Court.207 The most notable aspect 
of the CommitteH¶VWDNHRQWKHVWDWHVUHVRUWLQJWRHPHUJHQF\PHDVXUHVLV
that the Committee does not recognise the margin of appreciation 
doctrine. 208  In the absence of such recognition, a rigorous reliance is 
placed on the test of proportionality which, in the words of the Committee, 
implies: 
That [emergency] measures are limited to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation. This requirement 
relates to the duration, geographical coverage and material 
scope of the state of emergency and any measures of 
derogation resorted to because of the emergency.209  
 
Accordingly, as Joseph has argued, the rigorous emphasis of the 
Committee on the proportionality test has secured for the Committee a 
                                                          
207 For a general and useful comparison of the approaches taken by these two bodies in times 
of emergency, see-0/HKPDQQµ/LPLWVWR&RXQWHU-Terrorism: Comparing Derogation from 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on 
+XPDQ5LJKWV¶Online Paper available at http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/V8N1/Lehmann.pdf. 
208 See, for example, Joseph, above note 201, at 86. 
209 General Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 4), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) 
at para 4.  
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µVWULQJHQW GHJUHH RI VXSHUYLVLRQ RYHU GHURJDWLRQV¶, 210  which, unlike the 
6WUDVERXUJ &RXUW¶V DSSURDFK, is not limited to the formalities of the 
emergencies.211  
Also, as a result of having a rigorous regard to the test of proportionality, 
the Committee has concluded that derogation from some safeguards of 
the ICCPR can QHYHUEHPDGH µVWULFWO\ UHTXLUHGE\ WKH H[LJHQFLHVRI WKH
situation¶. The Committee established that these safeguards must be 
considered as the peremptory norms of international law, even though 
they are not mentioned as non-derogable rights in the text of Article 4.212 
Once again, the Committee has invoked the peremptory norms of 
international law argument in a rather misleading fashion. The Committee 
seems to have assumed that the only channel for rendering such 
provisions non-derogable is customary international law.213 From the legal 
perspective, this cannot but be mistaken, since as mentioned above, 
giving a jus cogens force to the standards of fair trial can have far-
reaching and unintended consequences for other treaties. Furthermore, as 
Milanovic has argued,  
Hierarchical rules generally and jus cogens specifically are very 
few in number, and are of little practical relevance. For 
example, that the prohibition of torture [«] is jus cogens does 
not automatically entail that the non-refoulment obligation 
arising from this prohibition is also jus cogens.214  
 
Of course, the criticism made above does not necessarily mean that the 
&RPPLWWHH¶V WXUQ WR WKH UXOHV RI FXVWRPDU\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ IRU WKH
purpose of proving the non-derogability of some provisions is entirely 
wrong. Rather, the statements of customary law must only be used to 
prove the non-derogability of certain provisions and not that such 
                                                          
210 Joseph, above note 201, at 86.  
211  0 'L %DUL µ'HURJDWLQJ IURP +XPDQ 5LJKWV 3URYLVLRQV &RPSDULQJ 6WDWH¶V REOLJDWLRQV
XQGHU8QLYHUVDODQG5HJLRQDO+XPDQ5LJKWV7UHDWLHV¶online paper available at:  
http://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/public/docs/PDU3_2009_A091.pdf. 
212 General Comment 29, above note 198, para 11.  
213 Olivier, above note 204, at 408±409.  
214 Milanvoic, above note 205, at 104±105.  
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provisions necessarily epitomise peremptory norms of international law. 
Given this, assuming that by the statement cited above, the Committee 
intends to prove the non-derogability of the rights at hand, the question 
becomes: what implications follow as a result?  
In its General Comment 29, the Committee made a statement which 
means some particular parts of Articles 9 and 14 must remain immune 
from derogation,215  
In order to protect non-derogable rights, the right to take 
proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without 
delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by 
a State pDUW\¶VGHFLVLRQWRGHURJDWHIURPWKH&RYHQDQW216  
 
Even though the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights on detention has not been considered in this chapter, it is fair to 
argue that in rendering the judicial control of preventive detentions a non-
derogable obligation in times of emergency, the Committee has followed 
the milestones designated by the Inter-American Court. In an elaborate 
advisory opinion in 1987, the Inter-American Commission ruled that:  
[«] the executive branch is under no obligation to give reasons 
for a detention and may prolong such a detention indefinitely 
GXULQJVWDWHVRIHPHUJHQF\>«@ [and] would, in the opinion of 
the Commission, be equivalent to attributing uniquely judicial 
functions to the executive branch, which would violate the 
principle of separation of powers, a basic characteristic of the 
rule of law and of democratic systems.217  
 
On the other hand, the Strasbourg Court has lagged behind both of these 
jurisdictions. It has been argued that statements such as the advisory 
opinion of the IACtHR bestow the force of customary international law 
upon habeas corpus, which must automatically bar states from suspending 
                                                          
215 Joseph, above note 201, at 91.  
216 General Comment 29, above note 209, para 16.  
217  Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2) and 7(6) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, January 30, 1987, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 8 (1987) para 12.  
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their obligation of judicial control under Article 5. However, the Strasbourg 
Court is yet to recognise such a customary status.218  
Again, the importance of judicial review must not be overstated, and as 
such, one must not be deceived by the availability of habeas corpus or 
other mechanisms of judicial review in times of emergency. What really 
matters is a substantive and meaningful judicial review.219  
 
14. Conclusion  
 
The most significant development that the international human rights law 
regime generated in the discourse on the right to physical liberty was to 
devise the test of arbitrariness as a definite denominator to the 
justifiability of various forms of deprivation of liberty. Arbitrariness is not 
just an insignia of a new choice of words. Rather, it is a test by which to 
evaluate and question the very authority upon which a given form of 
deprivation of liberty is predicated. This dimension to the right to physical 
liberty became clear to the drafters of the UDHR from the very early 
stages of the consolidation of thr human rights law regime.  
7KH WHUP µDUELWUDULQHVV¶GLGQRWKRZHYHUDSSHDODVPXFKDV WKH WHVW of 
µODZIXOQHVV¶ WR WKH IRXQGHUV RI WKH (&+5 LQ WKH FRntext of detention. 
Nevertheless, the Strasbourg Court found it necessary to adopt the 
prohibition of arbitrariness in view of the emerging deprivations of liberty, 
which seemed compatible with national laws, but failed to meet the 
towered standards of human rights law.  
Even though the Strasbourg jurisprudence on the permissibility of non-
arbitrary preventive detention is extremely vague and inconsistent, it was 
                                                          
218 De Londras, above note 43, at 212.  
219 Ibid., at 67.  
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discussed that a textual interpretation of the ECHR supports the conclusion 
that preventive detention under the ECHR is not arbitrary per se, provided 
that such a practice is accompanied by a set of safeguards. Here again, 
the language of arbitrariness is instructive in terms of making an 
imperative distinction between arbitrary and non-arbitrary preventive 
detention. In this view, it was concluded that what is prohibited by the 
ECHR is indefinite detention and a non-arbitrary practice of preventive 
detention is necessarily devoid of indefiniteness. It is so because the most 
important component of non-arbitrary preventive is a meaningful and 
substantive judicial review weighed on the member states of the ECHR 
under Articles 5(3) and 5(4). However, inasmuch as the inclusion of the 
prohibition of arbitrariness is a fortunate advancement on the part of the 
Strasbourg Court, it contradicts with its broad permissive stance towards 
the emergency measures of its member states under the guise of its 
widely criticised doctrine of the margin of appreciation. In the narrow case 
of detention without trial, the combination of Article 15 and the margin of 
appreciation with a view to derogating from Article 5 signifies a sharp 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQ ZLWK WKH ODQJXDJH RI µDUELWUDULQHVV¶ 1HYHUWKHOHVV WKLV
dimension of the problem in the European derogation system is not only 
limited to the human rights order in Europe. Rather, as Jinks has argued, 
VXFKLQFRQVLVWHQF\LVV\PSWRPDWLFRIµWKHFRQWH[WDVMXVWLILFDWLRQSUREOHP¶. 
In this regard, Jinks writes that:  
In this sense, these ³accommodation principles´ do not in any 
way mediate substantive disagreements concerning the content 
of primary rules. For example, a rule establishing that arbitrary 
detention may, assuming certain elements are satisfied, be 
utilized in a formal state of emergency does not provide any 
assistance in determining the meaning of ³arbitrary.´220 
It was also discerned that the Human Rights Committee in a far clearer 
fashion than the Strasbourg Court recognises the permissibility of non-
                                                          
220 Jinks, above note 191, at 319.  
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arbitrary preventive detention under the ICCPR. Here again, a practice of 
preventive detention cannot be made non-arbitrary, unless there exist 
concrete protections as to the judicial review of preventive detention. It 
was seen that unlike the ECHR, the ICCPR does not impose an automatic 
obligation of judicial review compelling authorities to produce detainees 
before judicial authorities, regardless of their application for judicial 
review. However, the ICCPR does recognise the right of detainees to 
challenge their detention by the writ of habeas or other instruments with 
the same function.  
The protection of the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention 
under the ICCPR is also exposed to serious threats, which can exhaust the 
rationale behind Article 9 in its entirety. As has been said, the Indian 
reservation to the ICCPR signifies one such threat. The conclusion to be 
drawn from the case of the Indian reservation is that unless the status of 
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention secures a clear 
position with the hierarchy of the international human rights order, such 
threats continue to be posed to this right on a regular basis. Well aware of 
this fact, the Human Rights Committee has made efforts to attach a more 
concrete importance to some parts of Article 9 conducive to the prohibition 
of arbitrary preventive detention. Accordingly, the Committee has 
rendered the obligation of judicial review of detention a non-derogable 
entity under the ICCPR, which conveys that the prohibition of arbitrary 
preventive detention (or indefinite detention) to a large degree remains 
intact even in times of emergency. Therefore, it seems that whilst the 
SUREOHP RI µWKH FRQWH[W DV MXVWLILFDWLRQ¶ LV DQ LQHYLWDEOH FKDOOHQJH LQ WKH
human rights discourse on the prohibition of arbitrary detention, the 
Human Rights Committee has managed to do a relatively better job than 
160 
 
its European counterpart in resolving some of the problems arising from 
µWKHFRQtext as justification problem¶.   
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Chapter IV  
The practice of internment in the laws of armed conflict 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In exploring the evolving constituent paradigms of the practice of 
internment, one must create an important dichotomy between two 
historical eras: the era preceding the end of the Second World War, and 
the post Second World War era. The former epitomised a phase in which 
law could not reach beyond the will of sovereigns, and in any conflict 
between the rule of law and the sovereign authority, the latter would 
prevail. Retaining an upper hand over sovereigns over the rule of law was 
often made possible not merely by the use of brute force, but also by 
employing the most sophisticated legal techniques to turn around the logic 
of the rule of law in favour of sovereigns. There is ample historical 
evidence in different Western states to the effect of proving this point. In 
Britain and its colonies, it was the elastic concept of the Royal prerogative 
manifesting itself in such practices as the suspension of habeas corpus. In 
the US, it was the executive privilege in dealing with crises taking hold in 
VXFKSUDFWLFHVDV/LQFROQ¶VDXWKRULVDWLRQRIPDUWLDOODZ,Q*HUPDQ\LWZDV
WKHVRYHUHLJQ¶VGHFLVLRQRQH[FHSWLRQ OHDGLQJ WR WKH WRWDO FROODSVHRI WKH
Weimar Constitution, and finally, in France, it was an all-inclusive claim of 
sovereign powers resulting in the creation of the state of siege.1 What all 
these explanatory powers shared in common was the temporal or 
indefinite suspension of normal laws, and the authorisation of new laws 
                                                          
1 See, C. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948).  
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tailored to expand the sovereign powers in times of crisis. 2  Another 
commonality shared by these examples was that they would often be 
employed in times of war, where the predominant position among states 
was that the operation of normal laws would cripple their war efforts.  
The second era, however, came into being in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, when the world at large had witnessed the catastrophic 
consequences of uncontrolled powers of states. This era was one in which 
it was conceded that even though states remain the primary actors of 
international law, their powers cannot be unlimited in confronting 
individuals. Therefore, a strong shift towards internationalism took shape, 
as a result of which two different international law regimes came into play: 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law.3 The 
present chapter is focused on the evolving process of international 
humanitarian law and its specific developments on the subject of 
internment. The main premise of this chapter will be to show that the laws 
of armed conflict will on no occasion leave a detainee in armed conflict at 
the mercy of states. That said, a case will be made to highlight some of 
the deficiencies of this regime of international law, and, at the same time, 
it will be shown that the internationalist movement has also confronted 
some deadlocks of its own, such as the fragmentation of international law 
which has created some of the most pressing problems regarding the laws 
of internment. Once again, it must be noted that the purpose of this 
chapter is not to become a compendium of IHL rules on the subject of 
internment. Furthermore, it is far beyond the limited space of this thesis to 
enter into all relevant areas of internment in IHL. Therefore, we must 
exercise a certain degree of selectivity with the areas that this chapter 
                                                          
2  See, N. Hussain, The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law 
(Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2003).  
3 Of course, international humanitarian law came into existence before 1948. However, after 
the Second World War, a revolutionary shift occurred in the pre-existing regime of the laws 
of war, which significantly transformed the substance of this regime.  
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intends to explore. This compels us to leave such topics as internments 
exercised by armed groups and also the modes of regulating the conduct 
of rebels in international humanitarian law outside the scope of this thesis.   
2. A brief historical background to the subject of 
internment and the historical documents of the laws of 
war: The Lieber Code 
 
In the nineteenth century, when legal positivism was gaining more 
currency than ever, the urge for codifying the rules of conducting 
hostilities became more paramount, and therefore, a positivist move 
towards documenting the applicable laws of war (as they were then 
known) came into effect both at national and international levels. In the 
US, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field, or the Lieber Code as it is famously called, signified the most 
progressive shift towards setting out a set of binding rules for the conduct 
of one of the parties to the conflict in the American civil war.4 
The Lieber Code did not make a distinction between internal and external 
enemies of the state, and as such, enumerated a category of principles 
governing the detention of prisoners of war. 5  These protections were 
rooted in the timeworn customs established over the protection of PoWs, 
which distinguished the legal regime governing the detention of PoWs from 
                                                          
4 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code) 24 
April 1863.  
5 Ibid., Article 49: A prisoner of war is a public enemy armed or attached to the hostile army 
for active aid, who has fallen into the hands of the captor, either fighting or wounded, on the 
field or in the hospital, by individual surrender or by capitulation.  
All soldiers of whatever species of arms, all men who belong to the rising en masse of the 
hostile country, all these who are attached to the army for its efficiencies and promote 
directly the object of the war, except such as hereinafter provided first, all disabled men or 
officers on the field or elsewhere, if captured; all enemies who have thrown away their arms 
and ask for quarter, are prisoners of war, and as such exposed to the inconveniences as well 
as entitled for the privileges of a prisoner of war.  
Article 50: Moreover, citizens, who accompany an army for whatever purpose, such as 
sutlers, editors, or reporters of journals, or contractors, if captured, may be made prisoners 
of war, and be detained as such.  
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other forms of deprivation of liberty.6 Some of the essential privileges of 
this detention system in the Lieber Code were as follows: 1) prisoners of 
war cannot be subjected to punishment for being public enemies;7 2) nor 
can they be subjected to any mischief motivated by revenge;8 3) those 
who inflict additional wounds upon prisoners of war must be subjected to 
SXQLVKPHQWLQWKH/LHEHU&RGH¶VFDVHthe death penalty);9 4) if prisoners 
RIZDUDUHWRZRUNIRUWKHEHQHILWRIWKHLUFDSWRU¶VJRYHUQPHQWVXFKZRUN
must fit their rank and condition;10 5) prisoners of war cannot be forced to 
give war-related information to their captors11; and, finally, 6) nor can 
they be punished for providing their captors with false information.12 
The concept of prisoners of war inevitably creates a status-based system 
of detention, according to which those warring individuals qualified for 
being prisoners of war are to be subjected to a particular form of 
detention. However, what was the response of the Lieber Code to non-
combatants? A more difficult question then arises, namely how the Lieber 
Code viewed those who, by way of their conduct, failed to meet the 
qualifications of prisoners of war, those characterised by Gillespie as 
µLQIRUPDO FRPEDWDQWV¶ FRQVLVWLQJ RI VSLHV DVVDVVLQV ILJKWHUV ZLWKRXW
uniform and, in general, persons engaged in organised violence as a 
method of warfare.13  
The main principle of the Lieber Code regarding non-combatants was that 
WKHVHZHUHµWREHVSDUHGLQSHUVRQSURSHUW\DQGKRQRXUDVPXFKDVWKH
                                                          
6 It is imperative to mention that not all provisions of the Lieber Code (especially regarding 
POWs) bear a humanitarian character. For a detailed analysis of such provisions, see, T. 
0HURQ µ)UDQFLV /LHEHU¶V &RGH DQG 3ULQFLSOHV RI +XPDQLW\¶   Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 269, at 273. 
7 Article 56, ibid.  
8 Article 56, ibid.  
9 Article 71, ibid.  
10 Article 76, ibid.  
11 Article 80, ibid.  
12 Ibid.  
13 A. Gillespie, The History of the Laws of War: The Customs and Laws of War with Regards to 
Combatants and Captives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) at 62.  
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exigencies of war will admit¶.14 It is clear from this statement that the 
protection of civilians from certain measures of war was not absolute in 
the Lieber Code, and was dependent upon the requirements of military 
necessity. This general rule also holds true for the internment of unarmed 
citizens. Putting an emphasis on military necessity as a precondition for 
the exercise of internment of enemy non-combatants was a welcome shift 
in the Lieber Code. However, equally important is the question of how 
such a power could be exercised.  
The Lieber Code entailed an extensive appreciation of military necessity.15 
According to the Lieber Code, the existence of military necessity could only 
be determined by the subjective assessment of military commanders in 
charge. The commanders were provided with a large degree of operational 
freedom, since the concept of balancing the requirements of military 
necessity against the considerations of humanity occupied a very 
ambivalent position in the Lieber Code.16 A point made by Witt reveals a 
lot about the position of military necessity in the Lieber Code: 
/RRNHG DW LQ D GLIIHUHQW OLJKW /LHEHU¶V FRGH VHHPV QRW VR
containing after all. It authorised the destruction of civilian 
property, the trapping and forced return of civilians to 
besieged cities, and the starving of non-combatants. It 
permitted executing prisoners in cases of necessity or in 
retaliation. It authorised the summary field execution of 
enemy guerrillas and in its most open-ended provision, the 
code authorised any measure necessary to secure the ends 
of war and defend the country.17 
                                                          
14 Article 22, above note 4.  
15 See70HURQµ)UDQFLV/LHEHU¶V&RGHDQG3ULQFLSOHVRI+XPDQLW\¶Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 269, at 273.  
16 R. Giladi µ$GLIIHUHQWVHQVHRIKXPDQLW\RFFXSDWLRQ LQ)UDQFLV /LHEHU¶V&RGH¶ 
International Review of the Red Cross DW,WPXVWEHVXSSOHPHQWHGWKDW*LODGL¶V main 
argument in this piece is that a very different sense of humanity prevailed in the Lieber Code, 
alien to the modern conception of humanitarian considerations in the modern laws of armed 
FRQIOLFW$FFRUGLQJWR*LODGLµ[e]ven if absolute prohibitions FDQEHLGHQWL¿HGLQWKH&RGHDQG
if lawfulness is cumulative to necessity, nothing in the Code suggests that this is grounded in 
KXPDQLW\RUKXPDQGLJQLW\LQWKHVHQVHXVHGWRGD\¶ 
17 J. F. Witt, /LQFROQ¶V&RGH7KH/DZVRI:DULQ$PHULFDQ+LVWRU\(New York: Free Press, 
2012) at 4.  
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Apart from Article 15, which allowed the internment of non-combatants in 
the wake of the existence of military necessity, the Lieber Code 
established a separate legal identity for spies, war-traitors and war-rebels. 
None of these categories had been clearly defined by the Lieber Code. 
Protections afforded to this group were even slimmer than with other 
groups of detainees, since their exchange could not be made possible by 
DQ\PHDQVRWKHUWKDQ µa special cartel, authorised by the government¶.18 
Lincoln had in 1862 established a precedent for the non-exchangeability of 
prisoners characterised neither as prisoners of war nor as loyal citizens.19 
This happened when Lincoln made a decision to release a large group of 
Confederate prisoners on parole in order for them not to aid the enemy. 
However, Lincoln also specified that  ?ƚŚĞspies and persons, whose release 
ZRXOG HQGDQJHU WKH SXEOLF VDIHW\ ZHUH H[HPSWHG¶ 20  from this act of 
mercy. Therefore, these classes of detainees were likely to remain in 
detention permanently. How could this be made possible? The historical 
British response would be the suspension of habeas corpus. Lincoln, too, 
opted for the same solution. The only difference was that Lincoln as the 
head of the executive took the initiative, and unlike British practice did not 
await parliamentary authorisation. This by itself came to open one of the 
most controversial chapters of the institutional struggle in the political 
history of the US.  
The technique of creating categories of persons lying neither within the 
definition of PoWs nor within the category of civilians was essentially the 
same as the British use of treason in the American independence war in 
1777.21 What is important to notice here is that, in the specific context of 
                                                          
18 Article 103, above note 4.  
19 S. Halbert, µThe Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus by President Lincoln¶ (1958) 2 
American Journal of Legal History 95, at 105.  
20 Ibid.  
21 That said, it is perhaps interesting to see that the American sovereign establishment was 
very quick to reutilise the British configurations of treason. For example, Jefferson, in 
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the laws of war, the distinctive use of categories of action such as treason, 
rebellion, spying or even disloyalty to the ruling power always elevated the 
degree of discretion conferred upon the authorities. As will be seen in the 
following sections, much of the focus of this chapter is allocated to this 
intermediate category of persons.22 The point is that the Lieber Code as 
well as the British treatment of the concept of treason constituted a 
precedent for what later became one of the most troublesome practices in 
the context of the laws of armed conflict, namely, constructing 
LQWHUPHGLDWH FDWHJRULHV RI µHQHP\ FRPEDWants¶ µXQODZIXO FRPEDWDQWV¶ or 
µXQSULYLOHJHGEHOOLJHUHQWV¶infra).23  
It is also essential to notice that the detention regime of the Lieber Code 
could not operate unless the writ of habeas corpus had been suspended. 
The Lincoln Administration had, for some years before the issuance of the 
Lieber Code, employed two essential regulatory techniques by which to 
eradicate the possibility of judicial review for detainees, namely, 
suspension of habeas corpus and declaring martial law. Both of these 
regulatory frameworks for enforcing detention without trial formed the 
heritage of British colonialism.24  
2.1.  Other historical developments of the laws of war in the nineteenth 
century as regards internment of non-combatants 
In the international arena, the efforts made by such units as the 
International Committee of Red Cross (the Geneva Convention), the 
                                                                                                                                                        
countering a perceived threat from the secessionists in the south-west, referred to an 
existence of treasonable conspiracy to afford discretion to his military generals. As Dennison 
describes the situation: ³Acting on the assumption that Burr planned to separate the 
Southwest from the Union and join it with areas conquered from Spain, Jefferson finally 
proclaimed that a treasonable conspiracy threatened the Union. He ordered the general to 
proceed on the rule that µinter arma silent leges¶." While the president never urged a 
suspension of the regular law enforcement agencies, he clearly expected Wilkinson to act 
with GLVFUHWLRQ*0'HQQLVRQ µ0DUWLDO /DZ7KH'HYHORSPHQWRI a Theory of Emergency 
Powers, 1776±¶American Journal of Legal History 52, at 56.  
22 Sections 5 and 5.1.  
23 Ibid.  
24 Refer to chapter I, section 7.1.  
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Institute of International Law (Oxford Manual of 1880) and some states 
concerned by the speedy advancements in weaponry technology (St 
Petersburg Declaration 186825) have resulted in a number of documents 
on the laws of war. Up to the point of the formation of the Tokyo Draft 
Convention (infra),26 however, none of the international documents of the 
laws of war touched upon the practice of internment against non-
combatants. Possibly the closest that a document got on the matter of 
detaining persons other than PoWs was Article 21 of the Oxford Manual:  
Individuals who accompany an army, but who are not a part 
of the regular armed force of the State, such as 
correspondents, traders, settlers, etc., and who fall into the 
hands of the enemy, may be detained for such length of 
time only as is warranted by strict military necessity.27 
  
By making this statement, it seems that the Oxford Manual approves the 
detention formula of the Lieber Code, which placed military necessity as 
the main cause of detention of persons other than the actual warriors. This 
absence of reference to the permissibility of internment of enemy non-
combatants in effect left the matter to the discretion of states. It was 
discussed in chapter II that many states including Britain viewed the 
internment of alien enemies as a matter of their sovereign prerogative, 
and they reserved the right of interning alien enemies for themselves 
regardless of whether there was an existing military necessity or not.28 
3. Tokyo draft Convention: the first international law 
instrument to mention internment of non-combatants 
 
As was seen above, until 1934, no significant effort was made by 
international law actors to address the issue of internment of enemy 
                                                          
25 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 
Grammes Weight. Saint Petersburg, 29 November / 11 December 1868. 
26 Section 3.  
27 The Laws of War on Land, Oxford, 9 September 1880. 
28 Ibid.  
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civilians.29 However, this is not to conclude that there was no awareness 
on the part of the national authorities of the problem of enemy civilians. In 
the course of the Hague Conference of 1907, the Japanese delegation 
sought to include a clause in the Hague Regulations of 1907 that would 
SURWHFW µFLYLOLDQ LQKDELWDQWV RI WHUULWRU\ EHORQJLQJ WR DQ DGYHUVH SRZHU¶
from internment:30 
The ressortissants of a belligerent, inhabiting the territory of 
the opposing party shall not be interned unless the 
exigencies of war make it necessary.31 
The proposal did not appeal to other delegates, apparently because other 
delegates consideUHG µSULQFLSOH RI QRQ-LQWHUQPHQW¶ DV WRR REYLRXV D
dictum.32 For example, the then Minister of State of Netherlands, van den 
Heuvel, argued: 
If the attitude of the foreigner does not constitute a cause of 
trouble for the State in the territory of which he is a 
resident, it is evident that no one will think of disturbing 
KLP>«@33 
The problem with such a statement was that it had totally ignored the 
practice in such states as the UK and US. In fact, many cases both before 
and after the adoption of the Hague Conference of 1907 made it clear that 
LQ%ULWDLQWKHVRYHUHLJQGLGKDYH µWKHPRVWDEVROXWHSRZHUVWR LQWHUQDOO
subjects of the adverse party, even the most inoffensive¶.34 In fact, as 
McNair reflected later in respect of the common law practice on the matter 
RI LQWHUQLQJ HQHP\ DOLHQV µLW LV FRPPRQ NQRZOHGJH >«] that the 
internment of a civilian enemy does not necessarily connote any overt 
                                                          
29 Neither the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, nor the Convention of 1929 relating to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War mentioned the issue of protecting enemy aliens. 
30  J. Pictet, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Dodrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985) at 40.  
31 J. B. Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences Vol. III (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1921) at 105.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.  
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hostile attitude on his part¶.35 Such inconsistent views on the matter of 
interning alien enemies signifies that the rejection of the Japanese 
proposal on the basis of the presumed principle of non-internment was 
totally unwarranted by the practice.  
In 1934 the ICRC prepared a draft convention, whose subject matter was 
WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI HQHP\ FLYLOLDQV µZKR DUH RQ WHUULWRry belonging to or 
occupied by a belligerent¶.36 This draft was motivated by the severities 
suffered by civilians during the First World War. However, it never took the 
shape of an international agreement, since by the advent of the Second 
World War states had lost all interest in affording protections to enemy 
nationals. Nevertheless, some of the provisions of this draft convention 
remained important, insofar as they had a great impact on the Fourth 
Geneva Convention 1949 (GC IV).37  
The first important element of the Tokyo draft convention was that it 
GHILQHG WKH WHUP µHQHP\ FLYLOLDQV¶ 7KH GHILQLWLRQ RI µHQHP\ FLYLOLDQV¶
according to this draft was SHUVRQVµQRWEHORQJLQJWRWKHODQGPDULWLPHRU
air armed forces of the belligerents, as defined by international law, and in 
particular by Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the [Hague] Regulations¶,38 who [for 
the purposes of the draft convention] happen to be in the territory of a 
belligerent, or in the occupied territories. The Tokyo initiative also dealt 
with the internment of enemy aliens and posited that such persons can 
only be detained when they are eligible to be mobilised, when the security 
of the detaining power is involved and finally, ZKHQ µWKH VLWXDWLRQ RI
                                                          
35 A. McNair, The Legal Effects of War (Cambridge: CUP, 1966) at 97.  
36  Draft International Convention on the Condition and Protection of Civilians of enemy 
nationality who are on territory belonging to or occupied by a belligerent, Tokyo 1934. 
37 For a brief comparison between the Tokyo Draft Convention and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, see, -$&*XWWHULGJHµ7KH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVRI¶British 
Yearbook of International Law 294.  
38 Article 1, above note 36.  
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enemy aliens renders it necessary¶.39 These grounds for the permissibility 
of the internment of enemy aliens were broad in the extreme, and 
provided a great amount of freedom of action to the detaining authorities. 
For example, there was no particular limitation in the permissible grounds 
of the Tokyo draft by which (and in retrospect) to make a case against the 
wholesale detention of citizens of German origin during the First World 
War, as discussed in chapter II, since the British executive could and did 
justify such detention on very broad and unsubstantiated security 
grounds.40 Also, the Tokyo draft mentions nothing about the obligation of 
states to review the internment of enemy civilians.41 This absence by itself 
is an indicator of the ambivalent position of aliens in international law prior 
to the emergence of the human rights law regime. Perhaps the most 
positive contribution of the Tokyo draft was that it articulated that the 
protection of the PoWs must by analogy be extended to civilian 
internees.42 All in all, as the Second World War began, states viewed even 
the protection offered by the Tokyo draft as harmful to their interests, and 
the project of protecting civilian enemies was abandoned until the 
adoption of Geneva Conventions that occurred after the Second World 
War.43  
                                                          
39 Article 15, above note 36.  
40 Refer to chapter II, section 6.  
41  Also, as mentioned in chapter II, international law could not establish a responsibility 
mechanism for states on the basis of their reluctance to provide detainees with judicial 
review. This was mainly because states viewed the internment of aliens as an inherent part 
of their exclusive powers of sovereignty, which were by definition non-justiciable. Refer to 
chapter II, section 8.  
42 Article 17, above note 36.  
43 The most intriguing part of the Tokyo draft is its tacit approval of taking enemy civilians in 
occupied territories as hostages. Article 19(a) states: In the event of it appearing, in an 
exceptional case, indispensable for an occupying Power to take hostages, the latter shall 
always be treated humanely. Under no pretext shall they be put to death or submitted to 
corporal punishments. However as it is clear from the post-World War II hostage case, the 
7RN\RGUDIW¶VDXWKRULVDWLRQRIWDNLQJFLYLOLDQVDVKRVWDges seems to have signified the law of 
the time. The Hostage Case, US v List (The Hostage Case), Case No 7, 19 February 1948.  
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4. The paradigm shift of the laws of war in the aftermath of 
the Second World War  
  
The respective codes of the laws of war in the early phases of the 
codification of the same left much at the discretion of sovereigns. In this 
era, there was not even a compelling definition of war that would impose 
the application of the laws of war upon states. In fact, as Kolb writes,  
[t]he system of the law of war in the nineteenth century, 
and up until 1949, was based on a subjective rather than 
objective trigger for determining the applicability of that 
body of the law.44 
At the same time, the safeguards devoted to the cause of protecting war 
victims were shallow in contrast to the rights of states.45 The concern for 
WKHFLYLOLDQZDVQRWSDUDPRXQWLQWKH+DJXHODZIRUµLWZDVDODZGHVLJQHG
for military personnel and their fighting methods¶. 46  Given this, in the 
wake of the Second World War a renewed urge for clarifying the rules of 
warfare arose. This urge was also coupled with an essential need to 
strengthen the humanitarian character of the laws of war. The result was 
the Geneva branch of the laws of armed conflict in 1949, which later also 
assumed the title of international humanitarian law.47 The law of Geneva 
was mainly composed of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and was 
supplemented by the two additional protocols of 1977.  
The first major contribution of the law of Geneva was made towards the 
scope of the applicability of this branch of the laws of war.48 In terms of 
application, the law of Geneva must be distinguished from the previous 
                                                          
44 R. Kolb, µ+5/DQG,+/EHWZHHQDQGWKH7HKUDQ&RQIHUHQFH¶in R. Kolb and G. Gaggioli 
(eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Northampton: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2013) at 31.  
45 See, A. Jochnick and 51RUPDQG µ7KH/HJLWLPDWLQJRIViolence: A Critical History of the 
/DZVRI:DU¶Harvard International Law Journal 49. 
46 5.ROEµ7KH3URWHFWLRQRIWKH,QGLYLGXDOLQ7LPHVRI:DUDQG3HDFH¶LQ%)DVVEHQGHU and 
A. Peters (eds), The History of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012) at 320.  
47 Pictet, above note 30, at 2±3.  
48 See -0HXUDQW µInter Arma Caritas: Evolution and Nature of International Humanitarian 
Law (1987) 24 Journal of Peace Research 237, at 242.  
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international texts on the laws of war, or the Hague law, in the following 
respects: 1) the application of the law of Geneva is not dependent upon 
the subjective decisions of states to make a declaration of war, or to give 
express recognition of belligerency; 2) the Geneva Conventions continue 
WRDSSO\ LQ WLPHVRI µSDUWLDORU WRWDORFFXSDWLRQRI WKH WHUULWRU\RID+LJK
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed 
UHVLVWDQFH¶49 and 3) the law of Geneva stipulates that the scope of the 
application of humanitarian law is not restricted to the case of 
international armed conflicts, and some particular fragments of this legal 
regime must be applied in the course of internal armed conflicts.50  
One very important factor conducive to the paradigm shift brought about 
by the Geneva Conventions was the use of a new choice of terminology 
surrounding the state of war. On this note, the Geneva Conventions 
HPSOR\HG WKH WHUP µDUPHG FRQIOLFW¶ LQVWHDG RI µZDU¶ 7KH SKUDVH µDUPHG
FRQIOLFW¶ HSLWRPLses a juridical concept which distinguishes the legal 
appreciation of this phenomenon from other general references to the 
VWDWHRIZDU ,QRWKHUZRUGVDV.ULWVLRWLVKDVDUJXHGHYHQ WKRXJK µZDU
remains a condition known to international law, >«@ &RPPRQ $UWLFOH 
ensures that it is subsumed as part of a much broader normative 
phenomenon¶. 51  7KH LPSRUWDQW WHUP KHUH LV µQRUPDWLYH SKHQRPHQRQ¶, 
which implies an objective system of determination of when the rights and 
obligations of international laws of armed conflicts are weighted on states. 
                                                          
49 Ibid. 
50 Before the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, there was no international law document 
committed to regulating the hostilities in intra-state wars. As a result, the only channels 
through which internal armed conflicts could have possibly been recognised, and thereby 
UHJXODWHG LQ D VLPLODU VHQVH WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO DUPHG FRQIOLFWV ZHUH HLWKHU µUHFRJQLWLRQ RI
EHOOLJHUHQF\¶ RU LQ H[FHSWLRQDO FDVHV µLQWHUQDWLonal customary rules governing civil wars¶. 
See'6FKLQGOHU µ6WDWHRI:DU%HOOLJHUHQF\$UPHG&RQIOLFW¶ LQ$&DVVHVHHGThe New 
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 1979). See, A. Cassese, 
µ7KH6SDQLVK&LYLO:DUand the Development of Customary Law Concerning Internal Armed 
Conflicts¶, in A. Cassese (ed), Current Problems in International Law: Essays on U.N. Law and 
the Law of Armed Conflict (Milano: A. Giuffré, 1975), at 293±294.  
51 ' .ULWVLRWLV µ7KH :DU RQ 7HUURU DQG WKH 3UREOHPDWLTXH RI WKH :DU 3DUDGLJP¶  
Journal of Human Rights and Human Welfare 11, at 13. 
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Before we proceed any further in our analysis of internment, it is 
necessary to remind ourselves of the importance of this objective system 
of determination in the context of the laws of armed conflicts, and its 
relevance to the contemporary practice of internment.  
 4.1. Subjective and objective systems of determination  
It can be said with the utmost certainty that international law as a system 
was in a state of disarray prior to 1945, and the seemingly significant 
victories of the international community on different fronts such as 
adopting Covenant of the League of Nations or even the Hague Convention 
of 1907 were short-lived and relatively limited in their reach. 52  More 
generally, states would very rarely accept international obligations aiming 
at regulating common standards of behaviour.  
The reason for this limited grasp of international law on different issues of 
international affairs has been remarked on numerous occasions in this 
thesis, and that is the dominant position of the VRYHUHLJQ¶V VXEMHFWLYH
authority on matters touching upon its vital interests.53 Lauterpacht was 
among the very first international law jurists who noticed the 
shortcomings of the prevailing place of the sovereign authority to the rules 
of international law. At the very beginning of a book dedicated to 
analysing this predicament, he wrote: 
Within the community of nations [«] the rule of law is 
constantly put in jeopardy by the conception of the 
sovereignty of States which deduces the binding force of 
international law exclusively from the will of each individual 
member of the international community. This is the reason 
why any inquiry of a general character in the field of 
                                                          
52 See & * )HQZLFN µ7KH ³Failure´ RI WKH /HDJXH RI 1DWLRQV¶   The American 
Journal of International Law 506, and Jochnick and Normand, above note 45.  
53 Refer to chapter II, section 2. 
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international law finds itself at the very start confronted with 
the doctrine of sovereignty.54 
Therefore, in matters touching upon vital political interests of states, 
international law was often treated as an issue of second-class importance 
to the will of sovereigns. Framed in this way, international law often fell 
short of providing objective criteria, which would bind states to take a 
particular path corresponding to the legal character of a certain situation. 
This lack of binding objective criteria would usually be followed by a two-
fold process. Firstly, treating a given matter as merely political, sovereigns 
would make decisions on the basis of their self-judgement.55 Secondly, 
sovereigns would ascribe a non-justiciable character to the matter in 
dispute in order to preserve the authenticity of their subjective decision.56 
Thus, as explored in the second chapter of this thesis, in England any 
matter falling within the ambit of the prerogative would lose it liability to 
be justiciable.57 :KHQ VHHQ LQ WKLV OLJKW /RFNH¶V FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQ RI WKH
prerogative makes perfect sense: 
The power to act was according to discretion, for the public 
good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes 
even against it.58 
In terms of the laws of war, this formulation of the interaction between 
international law and the sovereign authority entailed the following 
implications: a subjective approach to the existence of war, the 
broadening of the concept of military necessity, and the exclusion of the 
                                                          
54 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford: OUP, 1933) 
at 1. 
55 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 
1870±1960 (Cambridge: CUP, 2001) at 358.  
56 0.RVNHQQLHPLµ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶WR+/DXWHUSDFKWThe Function of Law in the International 
Community (Oxford: OUP, 1933, edition 2011) at xxxvii. See DOVR&*UD\ µThe Use and 
Abuse of the International Court of Justice: Cases Concerning the Use of Force after 
Nicaragua¶European Journal of International Law 867.  
57 Refer to chapter II, section 8.  
58  J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government, first published in 1690 (Indiana: Hacket 
Publishing Company, 1980) at 84.  
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entrance of civil courts upon matters concerning military decisions.59 In 
the particular case of internment, prior to 1945, this meant absolute 
freedom of sovereigns to intern the subjects of adverse sovereigns, with 
their decisions on the subject of internment being veiled by a claim of non-
justiciability. In such an environment, even when attempts were made to 
constrain the conduct of sovereigns, the sovereign establishment would 
find a tactic to curtail or remove the constraints in part or in their totality. 
The German conception of kriegsraison is also an example of such 
efforts.60 Drawing on this, one cannot but deduce the following conclusion 
about the ambivalent position of the laws of war before the Geneva 
Conventions:  
The subjective approach of the nineteenth century 
augmented the gaps in law. Not only was the law of warfare 
incomplete in itself (gaps within the law), it was also easy to 
escape its application [«], thus creating a second type of 
gap (gaps in the application of the law).61 
The evolving trend in international law in general in the wake of the 
Second World War has moved in the direction of leaving a comparatively 
smaller space for the subjective determination of sovereigns. This was 
made possible by laying down more objective criteria by the relevant 
international treaties, and a continuous updating, clarifying and elevating 
of those criteria by the institutions ruling on different issues arising from 
international humanitarian law. This move towards laying down an 
objective system of determination has continued both through the treaty-
based law of Geneva and the rulings of such entities as the International 
Court of Justice and the ad hoc tribunals. This is not to conclude that the 
subjective element present in different spheres of the laws of armed 
conflict has totally disappeared. However, their mode of practice has 
                                                          
59 Hussain, above note 2, at 117, and also refer to chapter I, discussion on the Marais case 
onwards.  
60 W. G. Downey, The Law of War and Military Necessity (1953) 47 American Journal of 
International Law 251, at 253.  
61 Kolb, above note 44, at 33±34.  
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changed. For example, the use of language concerning the exclusive right 
or rights of sovereign discretion in the context of the laws of armed 
conflict has significantly decreased. At the same time, on matters where 
the exercise of subjective decisions is inevitable for belligerents in armed 
conflict, certain objective criteria have been introduced so as not to leave 
the decision on such matters only to the good faith of the belligerents. For 
H[DPSOH WKH FRQFHSW RI µVXEMHFWLYH FHUWDLQW\¶ LQ LGHQWLI\LQJ WKH PLOLWDU\
objectives in an international armed conflict hints at some objective 
prerequisites guiding the subjective decision of sovereigns. 62  The most 
important implication of this move towards objective criteria is that states 
cannot give so much credibility to an outright claim of military necessity as 
to override their obligations en bloc. Furthermore, the political importance 
of a practice cannot shield it from the scrutiny of supervisory and judicial 
bodies in domestic and international law.   
However, an alarming alertness must be raised on the natural tendency of 
states to reclaim their absolute power of self-judgement on their 
obligations under any system of international law.63 The realist school of 
international relations clearly tells us why states are preoccupied with the 
urge to twist the letter of law in a manner paving the way for their 
subjective judgments, to secure their own interests and ends. 64 
Consequently, states tend to exploit certain interpretative means to 
                                                          
62 S. 2HWHU µ0HWKRGVDQG0HDQVRI&RPEDW¶ LQ7*LOO and D. Fleck (eds), The Handbook of 
the International Law of Military Operations (Oxford: OUP, 2008) at 209.  
63  ,Q H[SODLQLQJ /DXWHUSDFKW¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH ILHOG RI SXEOLF LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ
Koskenniemi reflects on this important dimension of interpreting the rights and obligations of 
states on the basis of their own self-MXGJHPHQW µ/DZLVKRZLW LV LQWHUSUHWHG/DXWHUSDFKW¶V
modernity lies in his constant stress on the primacy of interpretation to substance, of process 
to rule in a fashion that leads him into an institutional pragmatism that is ours, too. Such 
nominalism liberates lawyers to create international order by imagining that it already exists. 
However, it raises the further question of power, about who it is that is invested with the 
interpreting meaning-giving authority? Thereby it creates what for Lauterpacht became the 
single most important problem of the existing international legal order, the problem of self-
judging obligations, the StatH¶V DELOLW\ WR LQWHUSUHW IRU LWVHOI ZKDW LWV REOLJDWLRQV DUH¶
Koskenniemi, above note 55.  
64  & - 'LDV µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 5HODWLRQV DQG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ IURP FRPSHWLWLRQ WR
FRPSOHPHQWDULW\¶LQ7-%LHUVWHNHUet al, International Law and International Relations (New 
York: Routledge, 2007) at 279. 
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circumvent the letter of law to the effect of rendering easier the fulfilment 
of their self-perceived interests. When read in this light, one can make 
sense of the many clashes of interpretations and the intended results of 
such interpretations in certain areas of international law resulting in many 
cases in a complete dismantling of the application of international law. 
Throughout the twentieth and the first decade (and half) of the twenty-
first centuries, the foregoing pattern has broken loose in encounters as 
broad-ranging as the Second World War WRWKH$PHULFDQµZDURQWHUURU¶.  
The explanation supplied above sheds light on the recent American 
experience in its so-FDOOHGµZDURQWHUURU¶, and decodes the legal strategies 
of the American executive, summarised by Luban in these terms: 
by selectively combining elements of the war model and 
elements of the law model, Washington is able to maximize 
its own ability to mobilize lethal force against terrorists  
while eliminating most traditional rights of military 
adversary, as well as the rights of innocent bystanders 
caught in the crossfire.65 
The intended result of this approach is to establish a sovereign ownership 
over the entire security apparatus, including the practice of internment.66 
How precisely does such pattern operate with regard to the practice of 
internment? In order to answer this question, it is perhaps useful to avail 
ourselves once again of the lessons of the history of detention without 
trial, as provided in the previous chapters.   
Recall some of the historical enquiries in the first chapter of this thesis. In 
the eighteenth century, the primary tactic of the British sovereign for 
establishing monopolistic sovereign ownership on the issue of interning 
individuals and how to treat them was a high utilisation of criminal notions 
                                                          
65 '/XEDQµ7KH:DURQ7HUURULVPDQGWKH(QGRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶Philosophy and 
Public Policy Quarterly 9, at 10. 
66 A. W. Neal, Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism: Liberty, Security and the 
War on Terror (London, Routledge, 2010) at 128. 
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VXFK DV µWUHDVRQ¶ DQG µSLUDF\¶ 67  This had the advantage of precluding 
detainees held on the suspicion of treason or piracy from being entitled to 
the writ of habeas corpus. Furthermore, if these internments were 
captured in the course of war, they could not be categorised as PoWs. As 
explored in chapter I, the sovereign establishment in Britain employed this 
tactic extensively against American combatants for independence. As 
mentioned above, the strategy of using such categories as war treason 
was later developed by the Lieber Code, again with the purpose of placing 
persons held on the suspicion of treason at the mercy of the sovereign. 
This would in turn enable the executive to act in an unbridled manner 
away from the interference of the judiciary or the scrutiny of other legal 
organs. 
With the adoption of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, the tactic 
of using such labels as treason or piracy encountered a very serious 
problem. This happened because these two treaties defined two types of 
protected persons, PoWs and civilians, and nowhere in the respective 
treaties was it stipulated that the violation of the rules of the laws of 
international armed conflicts would place the violators outside the 
protection of the laws of armed conflict. In other words, GC III and IV 
defined an all-inclusive objective binary between the status of PoWs and 
civilians. It was thus that the law of Geneva limited the discretion of states 
in treating these individuals by defining a rather detailed set of rules 
governing their internment. In as much as this was a progressive move, it 
did not conform to the classic view of such states as Britain and the US. 
The result was the creation of intermediary categories between PoWs and 
civilians. The function of these categories would be to juxtapose a person 
held on the suspicion of violating the laws of armed conflict outside the 
                                                          
67 Refer to chapter I, sections 7.1 and 7.3.  
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protective bounds of Geneva Conventions, and place them at the 
subjective discretion of the detaining powers. The US Supreme Court had 
made this possible some years before the adoption of the Geneva 
Conventions by devising a peculiar category of persons referred to as 
µXQODZIXO FRPEDWDQWV¶ infra).68 Also, in subsequence to the adoption of 
the Geneva Conventions, the British Privy Council drew on the writings of 
Baxter, and recognised a very similar concept to that of unlawful 
FRPEDWDQWV µXQSULYLOHJHG FRPEDWDQWV¶ 69  However, the precedent 
established by the US Supreme Court came to aid the US executive in 
order to make a case for the existence of a group of detainees not 
protected by the Geneva Conventions. In other words, the US executive 
resorted to a constructed intermediary status for establishing its self-
professed exclusive authority over detainees captured in the context of its 
counter-terrorism measures.70 The principal argument on the part of the 
American executive was that there is a gap in the international laws of 
armed conflict as to the protection of persons not respecting its 
requirements. This would mean that the matter of how to deal with this 
category of persons is bestowed upon the subjective discretion of states.71 
In a moment of frankness, some central legal figures of the Bush 
Administration acknowledged the recourse of the executive to this 
strategy:  
During the time that we served in government, we believe 
the United States erred by straining to take advantage of 
gaps in international law in order to avoid applying 
                                                          
68 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S Supreme Court. 
69 Mohammad Ali and Another v. Public Prosecutor, (1968) 3 All E. R. 488. 
70  This self-proclaimed case for the purpose of establishing an exclusive authority over 
matters already regulated by international law treaties is best echoed in the term 
µH[FHSWLRQDOLVP¶ZKLFKZLOOEHGLVFXVVHGLQGHWDLOLQWKHQH[WFKDSWHURIWKLVWKHVLV.  
71  US Department of Justice, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban 
Detainees, January 2002.  
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important protections for detainees as elements of its post-
9/11 detention policy.72 
This assumption about the existence of some gaps in the laws of armed 
conflict really forms the crux of the recent internment practices. Some 
decades before the advent of the so-FDOOHGµZDURQWHUURU¶ and in the heat 
RIWKH(XURSHDQVWDWHV¶SUHSDUDWLRQIRUWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DU/DXWHUSDFKW
identified the claim of the existence of gaps in international law as one of 
the principal methods by which states take the matters to their own 
GLVFUHWLRQDQGWKHUHIRUHUHIXWHVRPHRIWKHPRVWµIXQGDPHQWDODVSHFWV¶RI
international law.73 Interestingly enough, in the context of the so-called 
µZDU RQ WHUURU¶, hardly any defence of the US executive measures ensue 
without having first identified some large lacunas in international law. 
These alleged gaps are as broad-ranging as not having a body of law 
governing the alleged interim states between peace and war in counter-
terrorist operations, to the lack of an updated body of law governing the 
internment of persons falling between PoWs and civilians.74 The unspoken 
conclusion implicit in most of such works is that until international law 
adjusts itself to the newly emerging challenges, it is not only sensible but 
also necessary to deal with such matters as internment using the exclusive 
powers of sovereign.  
Identifying gaps is not necessarily and analytically misleading. However, 
LGHQWLI\LQJJDSVZLWKWKHSXUSRVHRIFUHDWLQJDµOHJDOEODFNKROH¶RQDJLYHQ
subject eradicates the very foundations of international law, and of course, 
internment in the wake of the war on terror came to represent one of the 
                                                          
72 J. Bellinger and 9 0 3DGPDQDEKDQ µ'HWHQWLRQ 2SHUDWLRQV LQ &RQWHPSRUDU\ &RQIOLFWV
Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and other ExLVWLQJ /DZ¶ American 
Journal of International Law 201, at 204.  
73 Lauterpacht, above note 54, at 89.  
74 See, for example, G. Blum and P. B. Heymann, Laws, Outlaws and Terrorists: Lessons from 
the War on Terror (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010), C. A. )RUG µ/LYLQJ LQ WKH ³1HZ1RUPDO´
Modern War, Non-6WDWH $FWRUV DQG WKH )XWXUH RI /DZ¶ LQ & $ )RUG and A. Cohen (eds), 
Rethinking the Law of Armed Conflict in an Age of Terrorism (Maryland: Lexington Books, 
2012), C. Blum, The Necessary Evil of Preventive Detention in the War on Terror: A Plan for a 
More Moderate and Sustainable Solution (New York, Cambria Press, 2008). 
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most notorious practices susceptible to becoming a legal black hole. 75 
Taking this into consideration, it is fair to say that the legal battlefield 
ensuing the abovementioned cycle of arguments was fought between two 
different interpretations of the laws of armed conflict. This legal battle can 
be cast in terms of an asserted exclusive authority of states in dealing with 
a certain type of detainee in armed conflict versus the objective system of 
determination articulated in the Geneva Conventions on the matter of 
interning protected persons. The following sections of this chapter purport 
to clarify the different dimension of this interpretative conflict, and at the 
same time, a case will be made on the substance of the objective 
obligations embodied in the Geneva Conventions. In other words, we will 
consider what the existing laws are, how they have been shaped, how 
they must be interpreted and where the history of detention without trial 
stands in all of this.  
5. The Laws of Internment: International Armed Conflicts: 
Status-based detention 
  
Historically, there has existed a distinction between captured combatants 
and non-combatants. Captured combatants were regarded as prisoners of 
war, whose internment was governed by a very specific set of rules 
squarely devoted to this category of internees. On the other hand, non-
combatants, who owed allegiance to an adverse party, were characterised 
as alien enemies (or enemy aliens) and could still be detained at the 
discretion of sovereigns. Nevertheless, the issue of characterising the 
status of different actors prior to the Geneva Conventions not only 
resulted in establishing a dichotomy between prisoners of war and alien 
enemies. As was seen in the context of the Lieber Code, different rules 
ZHUH FRQILJXUHG IRU D µJUH\ FODVV¶ RI SHUVRQV IRU ZKRP GLIIHUHQW OHJDO
                                                          
75 F. Johns, Non-Legality in International Law: Unruly Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2013) at 71±80.  
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terms have been applied, namely those whom *LOOHVSLH FDOOHG µLQIRUPDO
FRPEDWDQWV¶76 and are normally referred to in modern legal literature as 
µXQODZIXO FRPEDWDQWV¶ 77  These terms continue to be used against 
individuals who commit or are about to commit acts in violation of the 
laws of war.  
7KH WHUP µXQODZIXO FRPEDWDQWV¶ ZDV LQ WKH PRVW H[SUHVV PDQQHU
formalised by the US Supreme Court in the famous case of Ex Parte Quirin 
for proving the legality of internment and military commissions. 78  This 
case concerned eight German saboteurs (two of whom possessed dual 
citizenship for Germany and the US), who had illegally entered the US for 
the purpose of targeting the US military industry (whilst being in civilian 
dress) in an attempt to exhaust the American war effort during the Second 
World War. After an incidental encounter between four of the eight 
saboteurs and an American Coast Guardsman, all eight men were arrested 
in different places and characterisHGDV µXQODZIXO FRPEDWDQWV¶ E\ WKH86
SupremH&RXUW&UXFLDOO\WKHWHUPµXQODZIXOFRPEDWDQWV¶LQWKLVFDVHZDV
exploited by the court against the background of the Hague Convention IV 
1907, in which the lawful qualifications of belligerents was enumerated: 
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, 
but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following 
conditions:  
 
1. To be commended by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
3. To carry arms openly; and 
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war.  
 
                                                          
76 Gillespie, above note 13.  
77 See IRU H[DPSOH & -HQNV (7 -HQVHQ µ,QGHILQLWH 'HWHQWLRQ 8QGHU 7KH /DZV 2I :DU¶
(2011) Stanford Law and Policy Review 101, S. C. Blum, The Necessary Evil of Preventive 
Detention in the War on Terror: A Plan for a More Moderate and Sustainable Solution (New 
<RUN&DPEULD3UHVV6 -6FKROKRIHU µ&KHFNVDQG%DODQFHV LQ:DUWLPH$PHULFDQ
%ULWLVK DQG ,VUDHOL H[SHULHQFHV¶   Michigan Law Review 1906. More examples of 
literature will be viewed and analysed shortly hereinafter.  
78 Ex parte Quirin, above note 68.  
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In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or 
IRUPSDUWRILWWKH\DUHLQFOXGHGXQGHUWKHGHQRPLQDWLRQµDUP\¶.79 
 
The US Supreme Court understood the terms of this article to specify 
qualifications for lawful belligerency, and it posited that the failure of 
combatants to meet these conditions would lead to their characterisation 
DVµXQODZIXOFRPEDWDQWV¶. According to the US Supreme Court, the offence 
of violating the laws of war, which led to the characterisation of the 
detainees in question as unlawful combatants, µwas complete when with 
that purpose they entered or, having so entered, they remained upon [US] 
territory in time of war without uniform or other appropriate means of 
identification¶.80 Therefore, the US Supreme Court postulated that unlawful 
combatancy would lead to the indefinite internment of the perpetrators in 
that it suspends their entitlement to the constitutional guarantee of 
habeas corpus, and at the same time unlawful combatancy brings the 
military commissions into play. 81  The rationale provided by the US 
government and the Supreme Court in the Quirin case was that 
protections of the laws of war are only reserved for those who act in 
compliance with the legal standards of warfare. In the absence of any 
protections afforded by the laws of war to this category of persons, the US 
official position was that these persons fell under the full discretion of the 
sovereign, and the bridge to these exclusive powers was the concept of 
µXQODZIXO FRPEDWDQF\¶ In asserting the reach of these discretionary 
powers, the US Attorney General went as far as saying that: 
[w]hatever privilege may be accorded to such enemies, is 
accorded by sufferance, and may be taken away by the 
President.82 
The Attorney General further went on to say that: 
                                                          
79 Article 1, Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Ibid. 
82 Ex parte Quirin above note 68, at 14. 
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[t]KH 3UHVLGHQW¶V power over enemies, who enter this 
country in time of war, as armed invaders intending to 
commit hostile acts, must be absolute.83 
Of course, this language bore striking similarities to the decisions of the 
UK Courts in the 1910s in cases involving alien enemies, which, as in the 
case of Quirin, sought to establish absolutism of the sovereign power 
against specific categories of persons such as alien enemies (or even alien 
friends), or as in the case of Quirin, unlawful combatants.84 The difference 
was, however, that in the case of Quirin, the reliance on the alien 
character was much less, since two of the so-called Nazi saboteurs 
possessed American citizenship.  
Neither the Hague Convention nor any other authoritative documents in 
the laws of war had mentioned anything remotely close to the term 
µXQODZIXO FRPEDWDQWV¶ for better or worse, the Geneva Conventions also 
did not touch upon the term. Nevertheless, the precedent established by 
the Quirin case continued to govern the US conception of the rights of a 
certain category of persons. Most notably, in the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration relied heavily on the 
Quirin FDVHµto create military tribunals to try suspected terrorists and the 
DXWKRULW\WRGHWDLQµXQODZIXO¶RUµHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶.85 
5.1. Unlawful FRPEDWDQWVRUµXQSULYLOHJHGEHOOLJHUHQWV¶" 
In a very important article in 1951, Baxter, a respected legal scholar, 
DUJXHGWKDW µXQODZIXOEHOOLJHUHQF\¶ LVQRWSXQLVKDEOHE\LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ
+RZHYHU DW WKH VDPH WLPH µLQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ DIIRUGV QR SURWHFWLRQ¶ WR
µXQODZIXO EHOOLJHUHQWV¶. 86  Thus, the formula proposed by Baxter was 
altogether not that different from the one adopted by the US Supreme 
                                                          
83 Ibid.  
84 Refer to chapter II, section 5. 
85 6,9ODGHFNµ7KH'HWHQWLRQ3RZHU¶Yale Law and Policy Review 153.  
86  5 5 %D[WHU µ6R-called ³Unprivileged Belligerency´ 6SLHV *XHUULOODV DQG 6DERWHXUV¶
(1951) 28 British Year Book of International Law 323.  
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Court in Quirin.87 The crux of the issue in Baxter¶VYLHZ is that no matter 
what status is prescribed to belligerents falling outside the scope of PoWs 
and peaceful civilians, such persons have by their own conduct deprived 
themselves of the privileges which would have otherwise been afforded to 
them by international law. Therefore, such individuals are more 
unprivileged belligerents under international law than unlawful 
combatants, and consequentially, they are punished on the basis of the 
municipal laws of the adverse party, in which hands they eventually find 
themselves and not on the basis of their status DVµXQODZful combatants¶. 
However, with the hindsight of having the Third Geneva Convention 
respecting the protection of PoWs before him, Baxter argued that in order 
IRU D SHUVRQ WR EH FRQVLGHUHG DQ µXQSULYLOHJHG EHOOLJHUHQW¶, judicial 
determination is a necessity, and it is only in consequence to a judicial 
determination of his status that a person can be subjected to the 
municipal law or discretionary power of the detaining authority. 88  This 
formulation, in one form or another, found support among different 
sectors of authority in Britain.89 
 
Also, ZLWKH[SOLFLW UHIHUHQFHV WR%D[WHU¶V DUWLFOH WKH%ULWLVK3ULY\&RXQFLO
applied this formula in 1968 to a case concerning two members of the 
armed forces of Indonesia responsible for the explosion of a non-military 
building in Singapore.90  
The template below enumerates the different legal shortcomings arising 
IURP%D[WHU¶VIRUPXODWLRQRIXQSULYLOHJHGEHOOLJHUHQF\DQGWKHQuirin case 
FRQVWUXFWLRQRIµXQODZIXOFRPEDWDQWV¶. 
 
                                                          
87 Ibid., at 343.  
88 Ibid.  
89 The UK War Office, The Law of War On Land, the Manual of Military Law 1958.  
90 Mohammad Ali and Another v. Public Prosecutor, above note 69, at 494±495. 
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Both formulas share the denominator of denying the protection stemming 
from international law to those who would fail to meet the requirements of 
belligerency, enunciated in the respective treaties of international 
humanitarian law. This proposition has not been devoid of support among 
some international law scholars. For example, Dinstein has argued that: 
[a] person who engages in military raids by night, while 
purporting to be an innocent civilian by day, is neither a 
civilian nor a lawful combatant.91 
 
Based on this assumption, Dinstein concludes that: 
 
[u]nlike war criminals (who must be brought to trial), 
unlawful combatants may be subjected to administrative 
detention without trial and without the attendant privileges 
of prisoners of war.92 
 
The question which must be posed to Dinstein is that being subjected to 
administrative detention is one thing, but being deprived of the protections 
attached by international humanitarian law to such a practice is quite 
another. Is the administrative detention of the so-FDOOHG µXQODZIXO
EHOOLJHUHQWV¶ LQtertwined by their exclusion from the protections of 
international humanitarian law? It was seen above that the answer of the 
                                                          
91  Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2004) at 29.  
92 Ibid., at 31.  
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commissions) 
No If the 
detaining 
authority 
desires so 
No Yes 
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US Supreme Court and the UK Privy Council to this question lies in the 
positive. However, the truth of the matter is, that such exclusion cannot 
be justified under international humanitarian law unless it corresponds to 
the views taken by the treaty law governing international armed conflicts.  
5.2. Internment of PoWs  
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 do not prohibit the exercise of 
internment. On the contrary, they explicitly recognise and regulate two 
different regimes of internment: internment of PoWs, and internment of 
civilians. The Third Geneva Convention (GC III) is devoted in its entirety to 
the cause of protecting PoWs, and therefore spells out an ample degree of 
protection to which PoWs are beneficiaries.93 As was mentioned above, the 
purpose and particular protection attached to the detention of PoWs 
distinguishes this internment regime from other exercises of detention 
without trial. As Admiral Cannaris noted in the Nuremberg Trials, in order 
to make a case for penalising the Nazi regulations regarding PoWs: 
The purpose of keeping PoWs in captivity is neither revenge 
nor punishment, but solely protective custody, the only 
purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of war from 
further participation in the war.94 
 
This rationale has clearly manifested itself in different provisions of GC 
III.95 The clearest proof that the internment of PoWs cannot assume a 
retributive character is that, according to Article 118, Po:V µVKDOO EH
released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active 
hostilities¶. At the same time, Po:V¶ LQWHUQPHQW PXVW EH GLVWLQJXLVKHG
from the security internment of civilians, in that PoWs are only obliged to 
                                                          
93  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva 
Convention), adopted on 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135. 
94 &LWHGLQ70HURQµ*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVaV&XVWRPDU\/DZ¶American Journal of 
International Law 348.  
95  For the most detailed analysis of the Third Geneva Convention, see, N. Rodley, The 
Treatment of Prisoners of War under International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009).  
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SURYLGH WKHLU µQDPHV UDQN DUP\ UHJLPHQWDO SHUVRQDO RU VHULDO QXPEHU
and date of birth to the detaining power, and no interrogation can be used 
WRµVHFXUHIURPWKHPLQIRUPDWLRQRIDQ\NLQG¶.96  
The GC III enumerates in great detail the different categories of 
individuals that must be treated as prisoners of war upon capture.97 In this 
UHJDUGDV5RJHUVKDVPDLQWDLQHGµWKHJHQHUDOUXOHLVWKDWPHPEHUVRIWKH
enemy armed forces, other than medical personnel and chaplains, are 
entitled to prisoners of war status on capture¶.98 However, asserting this 
entitlement is not always easy. More often than not, groups such as 
paramilitary fighters, persons with no uniform and armed civilians create 
difficulty in ascertaining the status of belligerents as PoWs. Additionally, 
sometimes the criteria of membership can itself be troublesome. Here, 
Article 5 of the GC III provides a supplementary provision to the 
requirements of Article 4:  
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having 
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands 
of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in 
article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the 
present Convention until such time as their status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal.99 
 
These requirements of the presumption of PoW status and a determination 
RI RQH¶V status in cases of doubt, as laid down in Article 5, explicitly fly 
against the formulation of the US Supreme Court in the Quirin case, which 
had advanced no such requirements. This is perhaps why the UK and US 
DW ILUVW IRXQG LWKDUGWRDFFHSW$UWLFOHDQG µfavoured the withdrawal of 
Convention protection as soon as a prima facie case was made out against 
                                                          
96 Article 17, above note 93. 
97 Article 4, above note 93.  
98 A. P. V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996) at 
59.  
99 Article 5, above note 93. 
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them¶. 100  Nevertheless, the ICRC succeeded in pushing the content of 
Article 5 into the final draft of the GC III.101 
Of notable importance in determining the status of PoWs is the fact that 
on some occasions, neither the criterion of membership nor the 
presumption of PoWs can be very clear. In this regard, some interesting 
cases arose in England during the Gulf War, when thirty-five Iraqi 
residents in the UK, who were allegedly members of the Iraqi armed 
forces, were arrested. Upon the outbreak of military operations against 
Iraq, these detainees were detained and viewed as PoWs. The Iraqi 
detainees objected to the prescription of PoW status, since they had not 
been arrested on the battlefield, and more importantly, their subscription 
to the Iraqi military was seriously disputable.102 In such situations, the 
correct position seems to have been illuminated by Article 50 of the First 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (AP I),103 which stipulates 
WKDWµ[i]n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be 
FRQVLGHUHGWREHDFLYLOLDQ¶7KLVSULQFLSOHFDQEHRIJUHDWJXLGDQFHLQFDVHV
where a detainee challenges his status as a PoW and his participation in 
hostilities and membership within the army forces are matters of dispute. 
As to the fate of the Iraqi detainees, they were divided into five different 
categories: 1) members of the Iraqi armed forces; 2) ranked officers of 
the Iraqi armed forces; 3) discharged officers of the Iraqi forces; 4) 
deserters; and 5) those with no military connections. In short, after 
considering the cases of individuals belonging to these five categories, the 
British Commandment with the advice of a board of enquiry decided that 
                                                          
100 G. Best, War and Law since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 137.  
101 Ibid. 
102 See ) +DPSVRQ µ7KH *HQHYD &RQYHQWLRQV DQG WKH 'HWHQWLRQ RI &LYLOLDQV DQG $OOHJHG
3ULVRQHUVRI:DU¶Public Law 507.  
103 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 
3.  
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thirty-three of the detainees were PoWs and therefore must remain liable 
to the practice of internment.104 
Interestingly, the GC III stipulates that PoWs found to be guilty of 
breaching the laws of conflict must still remain entitled to the benefits of 
the PoW Convention.105 The effect of this protective provision is that even 
war criminals must benefit from the same standards of treatment as PoWs 
in such matters as hygienic requirements, food, accommodation and 
periodic visits by the ICRC or delegates of a protecting power.106 Article 85 
of the GC III shows that this convention does not leave anyone falling 
within its subject matter outside its protective measures.  
5.3. The internment of civilians under the law of Geneva  
The position of civilians in international armed conflicts is regulated by the 
GC IV, and some parts of the AP I. Crucially, the definition of civilians is of 
direct relevance to the application of GC IV, and some parts of the AP I. 
+RZHYHU *& ,9 GLG QRW VXSSOHPHQW D GHILQLWLRQ IRU WKH WHUP µFLYLOLDQV¶, 
since there was a major disagreement among the drafters of GC IV as to 
those civilians who took up arms or who became involved in sabotage 
against the enemy state without being entitled to do so, and the effects of 
such acts upon the protections offered by GC IV. Accordingly, the UK 
representative in the second meeting of the third Committee mentioned 
this problem: 
[...] there should be laws for combatants and separate laws 
for non-combatants. The whole concept of the Civilian 
Convention was the protection of civilian victims of war and 
not the protection of illegitimate bearers of arms, who could 
                                                          
104 *5LVLXVµ3ULVRQHUVRI:DULQWKH 8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶LQ35RZHHG), The Gulf War 1990±91 
in International and English Law (London: Routledge, 1993) at 296±297, the procedure upon 
which cases of the Iraqi detainees were decided, were subjected to some serious criticism, 
LOOXVWUDWHGLQ+DPSVRQ¶VDUWLFOHDERYH 
105 Article 85, above note 93.  
106 Best, above note 100, at 100.  
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not expect full protection under the rules of war to which 
they did not conform.107 
 
As it is documented in the Final Record of the Geneva Diplomatic 
Conference, not all delegates found themselves in agreement with the 
SURSRVLWLRQ RI WKH 8. GHOHJDWH 6RPH LQVLVWHG RQ GHILQLQJ µWKH FLYLOLDQ
populatLRQ¶ILUVWVLQFHLWZDVRQO\WKHQWKDWWKHH[FOXVLRQRIVRPHJURXSV
from the scope of GC IV could be made possible.108 These divisions, in the 
ZRUGV RI WKH $XVWUDOLDQ UHSUHVHQWDWLYH FUHDWHG µWZR VFKRROV RI WKRXJKW¶
among the drafters of GC IV.109 In such an environment, the only solution 
left was to reach a compromise. This clearly manifested itself in the silence 
of GC IV as to the definition of civilians. Another site of compromise is 
Article 5 of GC IV, which deals with the internment of civilians suspected 
RIHQJDJHPHQWLQµDFWLYLWLHVKRVWLOHWRWKHVHFXULW\RIWKHVWDWH¶RUFLYLOLDQV
detained as spies or saboteurs.110 
Finally, the AP I took on what seemed an impossible task in the process of 
drafting GC IV. That is to say, the AP I provided a definition for the term 
µFLYLOLDQV¶, and in so doing, the drafters of the AP I drew on the model of 
the Tokyo Draft Convention, namely, defining civilians in negative terms. 
According to Article 50(1) of the AP I, it is stated that:  
[a] civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the 
categories referred to in Article 4 (A)(1), (2), (3) and (6) of 
the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In 
case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person 
shall be considered to be a civilian.  
 
In HIIHFW$UWLFOHRIWKH$3,LPSOLHVWKDWµDSDUWIURPWKHPHPEHUVRI
the armed forces, everybody physically present in a territory is a 
                                                          
107 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 Vol. II, at 621.  
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid., at 622.  
110  . 'RUPDQQ µ7KH /HJDO 6LWXDWLRQ RI ³Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants´¶  
International Review of Red Cross 45, at 57.  
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civilian¶. 111  This all-embracing understanding of civilians is of great 
importance in coming to terms with the particularities of the internment 
regime designated by GC IV and the AP I for this specific group of 
protected persons. Equally important are the effects of the momentary 
transformation of civilians into direct participants in hostilities on their 
status and the protections attached to their internment.  
6. The involvement of civilians in hostilities and the 
criterion of direct participation  
 
It was not until the adoption of the AP I that better clarification was 
provided with regard to civilians who directly participate in hostilities. The 
AP I articulated that the ultimate test for realising when civilians can have 
their immunity forfeited from being targeted by a hostile party is the 
standard of direct participation. According to the standard of direct 
participaWLRQ FLYLOLDQV PXVW EH SURWHFWHG IURP µWKH GDQJHUV RI PLOLWDU\
operation¶ µXQOHVV DQG IRU VXFK WLPH DV WKH\ WDNH D GLUHFW SDUW LQ
hostilities¶. 112  Therefore, the suspension of the protections attached to 
civilians cannot be realised without having identified whether the conduct 
of a civilian amounts to a direct participation in hostilities.  
Despite its pressing importance, the AP I did not go further than 
mentioning the standard as the only criterion, by which to detect the 
permissibility of targeting some civilians.  Thus far, the most important 
development in terms of decoding the concept of direct participation has 
FRPH IURP WKH ,&5& LQ  WKURXJK LWV µLQWHUSUHWDWLYH JXLGDQFH RQ WKH
nation of direct participation¶. Therein, the cumulative criteria of direct 
participation consists of the following:  
                                                          
111  C. Pilloud et al, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 (Geneva: 
International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987) at 611.  
112 Article 51(3), above note 103.  
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1) The attack must be likely to adversely affect the military operations 
or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict, or alternatively, 
to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects 
protected against direct attack (threshold of harm);  
2) There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm 
likely to result either from the act, or from a coordinated military 
operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct 
participation); 
3) The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the 
detainment of another (belligerent nexus).113 
This understanding of the test of direct participation places a causal 
relationship and proximity between the acts of civilians and the damage 
they inflict on the enemy. It is by virtue of discerning this proximity that 
an essential distinction between direct participation in hostilities and acts 
in support of war efforts by civilians can be made possible.114 Civilians 
taking direct part in hostilities forfeit their immunity from being lawfully 
targeted and are therefore excluded from the considerations of 
proportionality in an armed attack. This is while civilians engaged in war 
efforts still maintain all the privileges of their civilian status, except they 
may expose themselves to the danger of becoming collateral damage to 
the armed attacks of enemy. 115  One important result of this vital 
distinction is that direct participation cannot necessarily be defined by 
either membership in an organisation or even intentional material support 
for that organisation, whose modus operandi is to harm the security of a 
hostile party to an international armed conflict. As will be explored in the 
QH[W FKDSWHU WKLV LV H[DFWO\ZK\ WKH%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V WUHDWPHQW RI
WKHFRQFHSWRI µHQHP\FRPEDWDQW¶RU µXQODZIXOFRPEDWDQW¶ZDVIODZHGRQ
the point of the laws of armed conflict. As Goodman has noted, the 
reliance on an all-HPEUDFLQJXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHWHUPµHQHP\FRPEDWDQW¶
as with the Bush AGPLQLVWUDWLRQ FRXOG QRW EXW UHVXOW LQ µa fundamental 
                                                          
113 ,&5&¶V ,QWHUSUHWDWLYH *XLGDQFH RQ WKH 1RWLRQ RI 'LUHFW 3DUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ +RVWLOLWLHV XQGHU
International Humanitarian Law (2009) at 46. 
114 R. *RRGPDQµ7KH'HWHQWLRQRI&LYLOLDQVLQ$UPHG&RQIOLFW¶American Journal of 
International Law 48, at 52±53.  
115 Ibid.  
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category mistake¶ ZKLFK LQYROYHG µJURXSLQJ GLIIHUHQW DFWRUV XQGHU D
heading that correctly applies only to some of them¶.116  
 
Another question that arises regarding the issues surrounding the 
standard of direct participation is whether a non-combatant who directly 
participates in hostilities has spontaneously transformed his status from a 
civilian into a combatant. The answer to this question does not bear so 
much importance for the purpose of targeting as it does for the issues 
relating to their internment, for it is possible to target a hostile civilian as 
soon as his direct participation is ascertained in the heat of a conflict. 
However, it is not so clear what safeguards govern the internment of such 
persons, whether they are captured on the battlefield or in the course of a 
belligerent occupation. To repeat some central questions asked previously 
in this chapter: Is the detention of persons taking direct part in hostilities 
to be governed by those standards of internment which GC IV devoted to 
the protection of civilians? If so, what are those standards, and if not, 
what rudimentary safeguards must replace those standards? Are these 
individuals, as the Lieber Code and Bush Administration in different 
periods maintained, placed at the mercy of the enemy in which hands they 
find themselves?117 
One must read the relevant terms of GC IV and the AP I in concert. In this 
regard, Article 5 of GC IV is an indicator of the GC IV treatment of those 
who could not by their conduct be treated as PoWs. According to the first 
paragraph of Article 5 of GC IV: 
Where, in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is 
satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely 
suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security 
of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to 
                                                          
116 Ibid., at 60.  
117 Not to mention the British executive bills of treason in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
FHQWXULHVDQGWKHLUµIUHH-VWDQGLQJ¶DQGHPHUJHQF\ODZVLQWKHFRORQLHV 
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claim such rights and privileges under the present 
Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such 
individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such 
State.  
 
Article 5 relates to the derogation of some of the protections of GC IV for 
WKHSXUSRVHRI LQWHUQLQJD µprotected person¶, insofar as saboteurs, spies 
and those engaged in activities hostile to the security of a warring party 
are concerned. To these groups, Article 5 still applies the language of 
protected persons, and therefore it is clear from the wording of this article 
that any persons who do not fall within the category of PoWs are 
considered civilians within the meaning of GC IV. The only groups 
excluded from the broad auspices of the civilian category are as follows: 
1) µ1DWLRQDOV RI D QHXWUDO DQG FR-EHOOLJHUHQW VWDWH¶ ZKLFK PDLQWDLQ
µQRUPDO GLSORPDWLF UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ LQ WKH 6WDWH LQ ZKRVH WHUULWRU\
they are¶. 
2) In the case of occupation, nationals of the occupying power.118 
 
Article 5 offered a persuasive compromise between the interests of the 
parties to a conflict and the status-based protections of the Geneva 
Conventions. The meaning of this compromise was that such groups of 
persons as spies or saboteurs must not be deprived of their status as 
FLYLOLDQVEXWµXQGHUVWULFWFRQGLWLRQV¶VRPHRIWKHSURWHFWLRQVRI*&,9FDQ
be derogated with regard to the referred categories in Article 5.119 We will 
return to these protections to evaluate the modalities governing the 
practice of internment. However, at this stage, it must be concluded that, 
unlike the Lieber Code and the historical Anglo-American case law, GC IV 
does not recognise an intermediary status between PoWs and civilians. 
The ICRC Commentary on Geneva Conventions could not support this 
conclusion more explicitly than when stating: 
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under 
international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as 
such, covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by 
                                                          
118 Article 4; also the GC IV stipulates that nationals of a state which is not bound by the 
&RQYHQWLRQVKDOOQRWEHLQFOXGHGZLWKLQWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµSURWHFWHGSHUVRQV¶. However, given 
the universal acceptance of the GC IV, this no longer seems to be possibility. 
119 Dormann, above note 110, at 50.  
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the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical 
personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First 
Convention. There is no intermediate status; nobody in 
enemy hands can be outside the law. We feel that this is a 
satisfactory solution ± not only satisfying to the mind, but 
also, and above all, satisfactory from the humanitarian point 
of view.120 
 
The same conclusion is supported by the wording of the relevant articles of 
the AP I. The AP I loosened the scope of categories of PoWs and 
civilians.121 This in itself signifies the distaste of the AP I for the possibility 
of restricting the application of the protections of the laws of armed 
conflict on the basis of devised intermediate categories such as unlawful 
and unprivileged combatants.122 In terms of its view of the category of 
PoWs, by placing momentum on an expansive understanding of 
µFRPEDWDQWV¶ WKH$3 ,SXWV µUHJXODUDUPHG IRUFHVRIVWDWHVDQGWKHPRUH
ORRVHO\RUJDQL]HGJXHUULOODRUPLOLWLDDUPHGJURXSV¶123 on an equal footing 
in terms of their entitlement to the protection of the PoWs.   
The AP I adopts the same inclusive view as the scope and meaning of the 
FDWHJRU\RIµFLYLOLDQV¶. First of all, the AP I defined the civilian population in 
negative terms, which implied that anyone who does not meet the 
required qualifications for being a combatant must be treated as a non-
combatant, and therefore is a civilian. The AP I did not stipulate that 
civilians who directly take part in hostilities lose their civilian status. 
However, it did mention that the immunity of hostile civilians from being 
WDUJHWHG LV VXVSHQGHG µIRU VXFK WLPH DV WKH\ WDNH SDUW LQ KRVWLOLWLHV¶.124 
Nevertheless, since the hostile civilians125 still maintain their position as 
                                                          
120 J. S. Pictet (ed), ICRC Commentary on Geneva Conventions Vol. IV (Geneva: International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 1960), at 51.  
121 See, C. H. %*DUUDZD\ µ&RPEDWDQWV ± 6XEVWDQFHRU6HPDQWLFV"¶ LQ0 6FKPLWW and J. 
Pejic (eds), International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultiness, Essays in Honour 
of Yoram Dinstein (Leiden, MNP, 2007), at 326±327. 
122 Article 44, above note 103. 
123 50XUSK\ µ3ULVRQHURI:DU6WDWXVDQGWKH4XHVWLRQRI WKH*XDQWDQDPR%D\'HWDLQHHV¶
(2003) 3 Human Rights Law Review 257, at 269.  
124 Article 51(3), above note 103.  
125 Once again, hostile civilians are those who directly take part in hostilities without being 
entitled to do so.  
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µSURWHFWHG SHUVRQV¶ ZLWKLQ WKH PHDQLQJ RI *& ,9 XSRQ FDSWXUH WKHLU
internment must be governed by the standards of GC IV.  
Also, Article 75 sets out a number of standards which directly or indirectly 
relate to the practice of internment, such as the general prohibition of 
torture, or that detainees must promptly be informed of the cause of their 
internment. Article 75 in its totality runs counter to the claim that those 
misguidedly characterisHGDV µXQODZIXO¶RU µXQSULYLOHJHGFRPEDWDQWV¶KDYH
by their conduct placed themselves outside the protective domain of 
international law in general and the laws of armed conflict in particular.126  
It must be noted that the authoritative bodies of international law have 
also made it clear that there cannot be a third alternative status to those 
of PoWs and civilians.127 In making this argument, the ICTY cited the ICRC 
Commentary on GC IV,128 and once again noted that the humanitarian 
component of the laws of armed conflict must preclude the exclusion of 
any persons from falling outside its protection by way of designing a 
separate category other than PoWs and civilians.129 
7. Standards governing the internment of civilians 
(internment in territory of party to conflict)  
  
The first question regarding the governing paradigms of internment in 
international armed conflicts is, under what conditions is the internment of 
civilians permissible? In answering this question, it is necessary to turn to 
the wording of Articles 42 and 78 of GC IV. Article 42 relates to the 
detention of civilians in the territory of a party to the conflict. The first 
paragraph of this article stipulates that: 
                                                          
126 For a general analysis of Article 75, see:+7DIW,9µ7KH/DZRI$UPHG&RQIOLFW$IWHU
6RPH6DOLHQW)HDWXUHV¶Yale Journal of International Law 319, at 321±322. 
127 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al, ITǦ96Ǧ21ǦT, Decision, 1 July 1998, para 271. 
128 Ibid.  
129 Ibid.  
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[t]he internment or placing in assigned residence of 
protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the 
Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary. 
 
The important phrase here is µDEVROXWHO\QHFHVVDU\¶, which implies that the 
recourse to internment must be reserved as a measure of last resort, or, 
DV *RRGPDQ KDV DUJXHG µFRPSHOV WKH GHWDLQLQJ SRZHU QRW RQO\ WR
establish that a given civilian poses a threat to its security, but also to 
ascertain that detention is the only means available [«] to defend [the 
detaining power] against the threat posed by the conduct¶.130 It is crucial 
WRQRWHWKDW*&,9SODFHVWKHFLYLOLDQV¶FRQGXFWDVWKHRQO\SUHUHTXLVLWHIRU
the practice of internment, and unlike some of the views at the time of its 
adoption, it did not consider the national origin of civilians in the territory 
of a party to the conflict as enemy aliens as plausible grounds for 
subjecting them to internment. 131  It seems that the requirement of 
µDEVROXWHO\ QHFHVVDU\¶ DV EXLOW ZLWKLQ $UWLFOH  RI *&,9 VLJQLILHV D
departure from the classic doctrine (pre-1949) which considered enemy 
civilians in the territory of a hostile party as ready targets of internment.  
Another phrase of interest in the context of Article 4 LV µWKHVHFXULW\RI
WKH 'HWDLQLQJ 3RZHU¶ *& ,9 GLG QRW SURYLGH D GHILQLWLRQ IRU WKH WHUP
µVHFXULW\¶; nor did it specify authoritative examples through which the 
tenor of security could be specified.132 However, a turn to other areas of 
laws of armed conflict can assist one in coming to grips with some criteria 
by which to intern civilians. It was mentioned above that FLYLOLDQV¶direct 
participation in hostilities renders them a lawful object of armed attacks. It 
goes without saying that civilians taking direct part in hostilities can also 
be interned. In terms of internment, the same principle holds true for 
those engaged in the war efforts of enemy states, such as those working 
                                                          
130 Goodman, above note 114, at 55.  
131 See, Dormann, above note 110. 
132 ICRC Commentary, above note 120, at 51.  
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in munitions factories, and whose activities adversely affect the security of 
a warring state. Article 27 of GC IV supports the legality of the detainment 
of the civilians engaged in the war efforts in armed conflicts by stating 
that: 
[t]he Parties to the conflict may take such measures of 
control and security in regard to protected persons as may 
be necessary as a result of the war. 
2QHDJDLQLWLVZRUWKHPSKDVLVLQJWKDWWKHSKUDVHµDVPD\EHQHFHVVDU\
DVD UHVXOWRI WKHZDU¶ FDQQRWEH LQWHUSUHWHG VR ORRVHO\DV WR LPSO\ WKDW
alien enemies can be detained in their entirety, or be subjected to other 
restrictive measures, since their mere presence in the territory of a party 
to the conflict endangers the security of that state. Such a wholesale 
GHSULYDWLRQ RI OLEHUW\ PXVW EH FRQVLGHUHG DV DQ DFW RI µFROOHFWLYH
punishment¶, which qualifiHV DV D µJUDYH EUHDFK RI WKH ODZV RI DUPHG
conflict¶.133 
Also, the ICRC Commentary mentions that membership in particular 
groups may be considered as a reliable criterion for the practice of 
internment, since: 
[s]omeone may be detained because he is a member of a 
particular group, regardless of whether he undertakes 
specific hostile acts that threaten the security of the 
state.134 
,IPHPEHUVKLSLQDµJURXS¶LVFRQVLGHUHGDSODXVLEOHWULJJHUIRUWKHSUDFWLFH
of internment, a clear and narrow understanding of the WHUP µJURXS¶ will 
be of the utmost importance. Membership in a group cannot mean 
belonging to a particular religious faith. In the same vein, membership in a 
particular political party (in situations of international armed conflict) 
cannot by itself result in the internment of civilians. This particularly holds 
                                                          
133 -3HMLF µ3URFHGXUDOprinciples and safeguards for internment/administrative detention in 
DUPHG FRQIOLFW DQG RWKHU VLWXDWLRQV RI YLROHQFH¶  International Review of the Red 
Cross 375, at 381.  
134 ICRC Commentary, above note 120, at 257.  
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true for states with a one-party political system, since such states usually 
have a compulsory membership requirement for benefiting from particular 
social advantages. For example, it is hard to make a case for arguing that 
membership in a non-military wing of the Baath party in Iraq during 
6DGGDP+XVVHLQ¶VUHLJQZDVVXIILFLHQWWRVXEMHFWDQ,UDTLFLYLOLDQUHVLGHQW
in the UK to internment in the course of the Gulf War or the Iraq invasion.  
7.1. Internment in occupied territories  
Another point in which GC IV articulates when a practice of internment 
against civilians can be permissible is Article 78, which regulates the 
permissibility of internment in the context of occupation. The first 
paragraph of this article reads as follows:  
If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for 
imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures 
concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject 
them to assigned residence or to internment. 
 
The language of Article 78 is not exactly the same as Article 42: instead of 
VD\LQJ WKDW LQWHUQPHQW RI FLYLOLDQV LV SHUPLWWHG ZKHQ µDEVROXWHO\
necessary¶, Article 78 permiWV LQWHUQPHQW RQ WKH EDVLV RI µLPSHUDWLYH
reasons of security¶DQGVWLSXODWHVWKDWWKHSUDFWLFHVRI µLQWHUQPHQW¶DQG
µDVVLJQHGUHVLGHQFH¶PXVWEHSHUFHLYHGDVWKHIXUWKHVWHQGRIWKHIUHHGRP
of occupying powers in taking safety measures against protected persons. 
This threshold for the permissibility of internment is stated by the ICRC 
Commentary to be higher than that established by Article 42. 135 
Notwithstanding the establishment of a seemingly higher threshold for 
exercising internment, 136  Article 78 essentially suffers from a lack of 
greater determinacy with regard to the meaning of security, as did Article 
,WLVQRWFOHDUZKHWKHUWKHWHUPµLPSHUDWLYH¶LVLQWHQGHGWRGHOLYHUWKH
                                                          
135 ICRC Commentary, above note 126, at 367.  
136 See, for example, A. 6 'HHNV µ$GPLQLVWUDWLYH 'HWHQWLRQ LQ $UPHG &RQIOLFW¶  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 403. 
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VDPHPHDQLQJDV µDEVROXWHO\¶DVXVHG LQ$UWLFOH2QHRI WKHYHU\ IHZ
authorities that noticed this lack of clarity was the Israeli Supreme Court 
in the case of Ben Zion v. IDF Commander of Judea and Samaria et al, in 
which Justice Shamgar VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH DGMHFWLYH µLPSHUDWLYH¶ EH
LQWHUSUHWHGLQDV\QRQ\PRXVPDQQHUWRWKDWRIµDEVROXWH¶LQ$UWLFOH 
7KHUH LV QR GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ µDEVROXWH¶ DQG µLPSHUDWLYH¶
security necessity, both terms conveying the same essential 
meaning, namely granting the Military Commander 
discretion taking all legal measures he deems necessary for 
ensuring security and order in an occupied area for which he 
is responsible.137 
 
In other words, and as some authors have argued, such qualifications as 
µDEVROXWHO\ QHFHVVDU\¶ RU µLPSHUDWLYH UHDVRQV RI VHFXULW\¶ PXVW EH
XQGHUVWRRG WR KDYH SXW LQ SODFH D WKUHVKROG IRU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ µPLOLWDU\
QHFHVVLW\¶ in a specific situation.138 In this sense, the primary function of 
VXFK WKUHVKROGV DV µDEVROXWHO\ QHFHVVDU\¶ RU µLPSHUDWLve reasons of 
VHFXULW\¶EHFRPHWKDWPLOLWDU\QHFHVVLW\ZKHQFRQFHUQLQJWKHLQWHUQPHQW
of civilians, must be understood and applied with greater care, and this is 
GXHWRWKHHPSKDWLFQDWXUHRIFULWHULDVXFKDVµDEVROXWHO\¶RUµLPSHUDWLYH¶ 
7.2. The indeterminacy of the laws of internment in the law of 
Geneva and its effects in practice 
GC IV does not specify a set of circumstances in which the practice of 
internment can be justified, and this gave rise to important challenges as 
to when and for what purposes interment can be justified. For example, it 
is not clear whether internment for the purpose of intelligence-gathering is 
a permissible practice under GC IV. On one hand, some authors have 
argued that internment for intelligence-gathering cannot find a place 
                                                          
137 Ben Zion v. IDF Commander of Judea and Samaria et al, HC. 369/79 cited in (1980) 10 
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 342, at 344.  
138 E. Debuf, Captured in War: Lawful Internment in Armed Conflict (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2013) at 318.  
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within the scope of Articles 42 or 78.139  On the other hand, it is not 
unreasonable to imagine that a practice of internment for the purpose of 
intelligence-gathering is not in compliance with the language of 
µLPSHUDWLYHUHDVRQVRIVHFXULW\¶. In this regard, DGRSWLQJ3HMLF¶VDUWLFOHRQ
the procedural protections attached to internment, the ICRC notes that: 
,QWHUQPHQW >«@ IRU WKH VROH SXUSRVH RI LQWHOOLJHQFH
gathering, without a person involved otherwise presenting a 
real threat to state security, cannot be justified.140 
 
However, even if one accepts that internment for the sole purpose of 
intelligence-gathering cannot be justified, states can easily circumvent this 
obligation by attaching the rationale for a given exercise of internment to 
a general claim of investigation. It is not uncommon among states to 
justify internment for the purpose of investigation. For example, the Israeli 
Supreme Court in the case of Marab et al ruled that: 
[d]etention for the purpose of investigation infringes the 
liberty of the detention. Occasionally, in order to prevent the 
disruption of investigatory proceedings or to ensure public 
peace and safety, such detention is unavoidable.141 
 
In short, without a clear list of lawful grounds for internment, it would be 
extremely hard to ascertain the purpose underlying a practice of 
internment. States often assert a variety of vague and general purposes 
for exercise of internment, and they often hesitate to disclose the grounds 
of internment in a transparent and specific fashion. Furthermore, in so 
doing, they frequently invoke the very language of GC IV. A clear example 
of this approach to internment is the Israeli practice. A clear manifestation 
of this subjective understanding of the security concerns resulting in 
internment can be found in the relevant Israeli executive orders and 
                                                          
139 Id and also see, 5*RRGPDQµ5DWLRQDOHVIRU'HWHQWLRQ6HFXULW\7KUHDWVDQG,QWHOOLJHQFH
9DOXH¶International Law Studies 1.  
140  ,&5& LQVWLWXWLRQDO JXLGHOLQHV µ3URFHGXUDO 3ULQFLSOHV DQG 6DIHJXDUGV IRU
,QWHUQPHQW$GPLQLVWUDWLYH 'HWHQWLRQ LQ $UPHG &RQIOLFW DQG 2WKHU 6LWXDWLRQV RI 9LROHQFH¶
International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts 11, 
30IC/07/8.4 (Oct. 2007).  
141 Marab et al v IDF Commander in the West Bank et al, HCH 3239/02.  
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legislations relating to the practice of internment in the Palestinian 
occupied territories. For example, Article 1 of Order Regarding 
Administrative Detention No. 1591 states: 
:KHUH WKH >PLOLWDU\@ FRPPDQGHU RI ,') IRUFHV >«@ KDV
reasonable cause to believe that reasons of security of the 
region or public security require that a particular person be 
detained, he may, by order under his hand, direct that such 
person be detained for a period not exceeding six months, 
stated in an order.142 
 
Here, a short return to the history of detention without trial cannot be 
devoid of interest. As was explored in the first chapter of this thesis,143 the 
ODQJXDJH RI KDYLQJ µD UHDVRQDEOH FDXVH WR EHOLHYH¶ RQ WKH SDUW RI WKH
detaining powers predates the adoption of Geneva Conventions 1949, and 
was commonplace in British legislations regulating the detention powers. 
It was discussed there that this language was used to formalise and 
recognise the subjective decisions of the executive without a need to enlist 
particular grounds for detention on the part of the executive. Another 
effect of this language in the pre-Geneva Convention era was that it 
frustrated the judicial intervention, because the judicial authorities at 
home and in the colonies entertained themselves with the restraint that 
WKH\FRXOGQRWDVVHUWZKDWFRQVWLWXWHG µUHDVRQDEOHFDXVH¶ LQ WKHPLQGRI
the detaining power, unless the oIILFLDOV¶ JRRG IDLWK FRXOG EH FDOOHG LQWR
question. 144  The principal point here is that the broad and undefined 
security thresholds of GC IV unfortunately make possible very broad 
resorts to the powers of internment.  
Even more interesting is that Article 3 of the Israeli order explicitly 
employs the language of Article 78 of GC IV by stating that: 
                                                          
142 Israel Defence Force, Order Regarding Administrative Detention (Temporary Order) (No. 
1591), 5767 ± 2007. 
143 Refer to chapter I, section 10.2.  
144 See, R. (Zadig) v. Halliday, [1917] A. C. 260 and Liversidge v. Anderson [AC] 1942; this 
is of course an impossible endeavour to be fulfilled by a detainee.  
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[a] military commander shall not exercise authority under 
this Order unless he believes that the action is necessary for 
imperative security reasons.  
 
In practice, one can discern that the only entities relied upon in the said 
Israeli order are the good faith and conventional wisdom of the military 
commanders. The question is whether the good faith and subjective 
decision of a detaining power can be challenged by detainees on account 
of the procedural safeguards provided by GC IV. This is perhaps why the 
procedural safeguards of GC IV may provide a better guide on the issue of 
internment than the legal basis for internment, as articulated in GC IV.  
 
7.3.  Case-by-case decision on internment  
Article 78(2) of GC IV explicitly recognises the importance of the 
procedures leading to a practice of internment. It provides: 
Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment 
shall be made according to a regular procedure to be 
prescribed by the Occupying Power in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Convention. This procedure shall 
include the right of appeal for the parties concerned. 
Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay. In the 
event of the decision being upheld, it shall be subject to 
periodical review, if possible every six months, by a 
competent body set up by the said Power.  
These procedural safeguards available to individual detainees are meant to 
guarantee that the internment of each detainee is not part of a broader 
scheme targeting enemy civilians as a collective entity. Accordingly, the 
prohibition of the practice of internment as a collective measure or 
punishment can easily be extrapolated from Article 75(2)(d) of the AP I.145 
The prohibition of mass internment of civilians has firmly been asserted by 
international and domestic judicial bodies. In the Delalic case, the ICTY 
ruled that: 
                                                          
145 Pejic, above note 133, at 382.  
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On the other hand, the mere fact that a person is a national 
of, or aligned with, an enemy party cannot be considered as 
threatening the security of the opposing party where he is 
living and is not, therefore, a valid reason for interning him 
or placing him in assigned residence. To justify recourse to 
such measures, the party must have good reason to think 
that the person concerned, by his activities, knowledge or 
qualifications, represents a real threat to its present or 
future security.146 
The principal question is how the detaining power supports its claim of 
having good reason for detaining an individual. Of course, the simple 
answer is implicit in the passage cited above, by indicating that the 
detainee¶V LQWHUQPHQW LV QHFHVVLWDWHG E\ KLV µDFWLYLWLHV NQRZOHGJH RU
TXDOLILFDWLRQV¶:KHQVHHQLQWKLVIUDPHWKHTXHVWLRQEHFRPHV: how is the 
authority tasked with reviewing internment to assign credibility to the 
claim of the executive? Is the reviewing authority to accept the subjective 
DXWKRULW\ RI WKH GHWDLQLQJ SRZHU LQ DVFHUWDLQLQJ WKH µJRRG UHDVRQ¶
supporting a practice of internment, or must this be done on the basis of 
credible evidence presented to the reviewing authority in an open manner? 
Despite the pressing importance of this question, the governing rules of 
the laws of armed conflicts are silent on the issue. However, one can take 
two significant points as to the review mechanism of the practice of 
internment to extrapolate how a body charged with reviewing internment 
is to go about assigning plausibility to the claims of the detaining power. 
First of all, there is great emphasis on the necessity of reviewing 
internment orders in the laws of armed conflict (infra).147 This emphasis 
would practically be absurd if the reviewing body were to defer to the 
subjective authority of the detaining power in its claims as to the security 
posed by a detainee. Secondly, there is great emphasis on the objectivity 
of the review mechanism of internment (infra).148 Objectivity must always 
be viewed as a test purporting to strike a balance between the standard of 
                                                          
146 Delalic et al, above note 127, para 577. 
147 Section 7.4.  
148 Ibid. 
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lawfulness and the subjective discretion of authorities in detaining 
civilians. A deferential view to the subjective authority of an interning 
power would not take into consideration an internment decision on the 
merits of law.  Therefore, a review embraced by deference to the decisions 
of authority falls a long way short of objectivity. Once again, the decisions 
of the British judiciary described in the historical chapters of this thesis 
form a classic example of internment reviews of the kind untouched by 
objectivity.149 The following section provides some further details as to the 
different features which must govern the issue of reviewing internment 
orders.  
7.4.  Review mechanism for internment 
Articles 43 and 78 put in place an obligation for the detaining power to 
review the internment of civilians. The importance of having a review 
mechanism for internment is such that the ICTY noted that the lack of a 
review mechanism invalidates the legality of an initially lawful internment 
ab initio.150 This confirms the view of the law of Geneva as to the fact that 
no internment order can possibly remain unreviewable, even though GC IV 
did not specify what shape this review must take. This non-specification of 
the necessity of judicial review as the primary and favoured mechanism of 
review seems to be a compromise made on the part of GC IV to reconcile 
the necessity of having at least a review mechanism and the exclusive 
powers of sovereignty.151 We will consider the effects of this compromise 
shortly in the analysis that follows. However, in short, this compromise, 
even with its potential shortcomings at the time, seemed like a victory. 
This is especially true when one considers the suggestions of the 
representative of the UK government at the Diplomatic Conference to 
                                                          
149 See, &3&RWWHUµ(PHUJHQF\'HWHQWLRQLQ:DUWLPH%ULWLVK([SHULHQFH¶±1954) 6 
Stanford Law Review 238. 
150 Delalic, above note 127, para 578±582. 
151 ICRC Commentary, above note 120, at 260.  
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champion a case for the absolute prerogative of the UK sovereign in 
dealing with internment issues, and to maintain an advisory character for 
the tribunals reviewing internment decisions of the UK sovereign.152 
GC IV gives a degree of freedom to choose the channels through which a 
VWDWH¶V REOLJDWLRQ WR UHYLHZ WKH LQWHUQPHQW RI FLYLOLDQV PD\ IORZ
Nevertheless, it is documented in the ICRC Commentary that: 
[t]he Article lays down that where the decision is an 
administrative one, it must be made not by one official but 
by an administrative board offering the necessary 
guarantees of independence and impartiality.153 
 
Impartiality implies independence of the supervisory body from the 
detaining power. At the same time, it seems that objectivity can 
potentially be taken as synonymous to what in the context of the human 
rights standards governing review of internment is referred to as 
µPHDQLQJIXO UHYLHZ¶ 154  One of the most important components of 
objectivity is adherence to the question of whether grounds justifying 
LQWHUQPHQW DUH FRPSOLFLW WR WKH WKUHVKROG RI µDEVROXWHO\ QHFHVVLW\¶. For 
example, Hampson examined British practice during the Gulf War, when 
some Iraqi citizens residing in the UK were detained. Britain devised an 
administrative body characterised as the µWKUHH ZLVH PHQ¶ SDQHO 7KLV
panel was tasked with examining whether the internment of the Iraqi 
FLYLOLDQV ZDV µFRQGXFLYH WR WKH SXEOLF JRRG LQ the interests of national 
security¶ $V+DPSVRQ QRWHV µ>W@KDWZRXOG appear to be less strict than 
absolutely necessary¶. 155  Finally, an objective review cannot merely 
possess an advisory function. Such review must bind the interning 
authority to a particular course of action.   
                                                          
152 Above note 107, at 660.  
153 ICRC Commentary, above note 120.  
154 See, for example, M. Hakimi, µInternational Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: 
Moving beyond the Armed Conflict±&ULPLQDO'LYLGH¶ Yale Journal of International 
Law 369, at 403±406.  
155 Hampson, above note 102, at 514.  
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7.5. Can martial courts/military commissions be used to review 
internment orders? 
It seems that there is no explicit prohibition of the use of martial courts or 
military tribunals/military commissions for adjudication on the internment 
of civilians. The topic of martial courts necessitates a return to the 
regulatory mechanisms underlining the practice of detention without trial. 
It was seen in chapter I that the use of martial courts must not be viewed 
beyond the essential components of practising martial law in a given 
area.156 Even though there existed a great deal of confusion about the 
practice of martial law in Britain in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the conventional understanding of this subject in Britain defined 
at least one threshold ± the closure of ordinary courts. Unfortunately, the 
American executive in the nineteenth century consecutively misinterpreted 
the meaning of martial law and the function of martial courts,157 as did the 
British colonial authorities (as argued in the first chapter) in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 158  However, these maligned 
resorts of martial law have not changed the contemporary understanding 
of this concept. Therefore, even today, the twenty-first-century scholars of 
the laws of armed conflict have argued that: 
[m]ilitary trials might be permitted only when civilian courts 
are closed or unavailable ± in circumstances such as 
occupation or martial law ± so that resort to the military 
system is essentially unavoidable.159 
 
If a resort is made to martial courts, structure and judges sitting in this 
court must be designed and appointed in a way such that the 
independence of the martial court can be ensured, even though such 
proposition may seem an unlikely alternative to many because of the poor 
                                                          
156 Refer to chapter I, section 9.  
157 See, M. E. Neely, The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (Oxford: OUP, 
1991) at 35±36.  
158 Refer to chapter I, section 9.1. 
159 Goodman, above note 114, at 59.  
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records of martial law in the past. In this regard, the UN Human Rights 
Committee has on more than one occasion asserted that military tribunals 
must be treated as a suspect category of bodies with a judicial function, 
whose use could only be reserved for extremely occasional 
circumstances.160 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has gone a 
step further and argued that producing civilians before military tribunals 
violates the human rights principles of the American Convention, in 
particular Article 27.161 Finally, the International Commission of Jurists in 
very concrete terms drew on the incompatibility of martial courts and the 
standards of judicial review and fair trial stemming from international 
human rights.162 
7.6.  Article 5 and the derogation scheme of GC IV 
At the time of its adoption, Article 5 of GC IV seemed to be the only 
solution for bringing two different schools of thought at the Diplomatic 
Conference of 1949 to a compromise.163 The solution built into of Article 5 
consisted of keeping the choice of status as a binary between PoWs and 
civilians, whilst providing the parties to the Convention with the freedom 
to derogate from some provisions of GC IV. The first two paragraphs of 
Article 5 are as follows: 
Where, in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is 
satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely 
suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security 
of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to 
claim such rights and privileges under the present 
Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such 
individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such 
State. 
                                                          
160  UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General comment no. 32, Article 14, Right to 
equality before courts and tribunals and to fair trial, 23 August 2007, CCPR/C/GC/32, para 
22, See also, -3DXVWµ$QWLWHUURULVP0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQV&RXUWLQJ,OOHJDOLW\¶±2002) 
23 Michigan Journal of International Law 1. 
161 Castillo Petruzzi, Merits, Judgement, Inter-Am, CT. H.R., Ser. C. No. 52 (May 30, 1999). 
162 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPLVVLRQRI-XULVWV$VVHVVLQJ'DPDJH8UJLQJ$FWLRQ´5HSRUWRI(PLQHQW
Jurist Panel) on Terrorism, Counter Terrorism and Human Rights, at 59.  
163 See, Dormann, above note 110. 
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Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is 
detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite 
suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying 
Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute 
military security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited 
rights of communication under the present Convention. 
 
Right from the beginning of the first paragraph, one can discern the 
impact of the Anglo-Saxon language pertinent to the matter of internment, 
DQG WKLV EHFRPHV FU\VWDO FOHDU ZLWK WKH SKUDVH µLV VDWLVILHG¶. As 
demonstrated earlier in this thesis, the British authorities extensively used 
this phrase in order to emphasise the subjective authority of the executive 
when it resorts to detention. For example, recall regulation 18b of the 
Emergency Defence Act 1939, which conditioned the practice of 
internment to the subjective satisfaction of the Secretary of State.164 This 
language inevitably tips the balance in favour of the subjective 
determinations of the detaining power. 165  Suppose that instead of the 
SKUDVHµLVVDWLVILHG¶WKHGUDIWHUVRI*&,9HPSOR\HGWKHSKUDVHµLVDEOHWR
LQGLFDWH¶RUDGLIIHUHQWFRQGLWLRQLQJSKUDVHZLWKDVLPLODUPHDQLQJ,QWKDW
case, the detaining power would be more compelled to support his 
subjective determination with some criteria enabling it to indicate the 
security threat posed by a given detainee. Interestingly, the impact made 
by Britain and the US in the wording of this article has also been noted by 
the ICRC Commentary.166  
In a similar manner to Articles 42, 43 and 78, Article 5 approves the 
practice of internment under a definite suspicion and RQO\ µZKHUH WKH
absolute military security so requires¶. However, it also stipulates that 
civilians who fail to observe their obligations under the law of Geneva have 
forfeited some of their rights and privileges under GC IV. The scope of 
                                                          
164 Refer to chapter I, section 10.2.  
165 Ibid.  
166 More importantly is the fact that this is mentioned explicitly in the article itself. ICRC 
Commentary, above note 120, at 52.  
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rights suspended under Article 5 cannot go beyond those rights of 
detainees, which relate to matters of communication. As mentioned in the 
ICRC Commentary: 
[t]he rights referred to are not very extensive in the case of 
protected persons under detention; they consist essentially 
of the right to correspond, the right to receive individual or 
collective relief, the right to spiritual assistance from 
ministers of their faith, the right to receive visits from 
representatives of the Protecting Power and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross.167 
 
In fact, Article 5 upholds the essential obligations of states towards 
detainees, in particular, the obligation of reviewing internment orders. As 
a result, no legal loopholes remain as to the essentials of protecting 
detainees.  
The threshold of definite suspicion is also of great importance in 
considering the requirements of Article 5. 168  This threshold seeks to 
ensure that an invocation of Article 5 for the practice of internment must 
be based on the premise that criminal proceedings will follow for hostile 
civilians. 169  Therefore, the necessity of putting a criminal procedure in 
place ensures that detainees interned under the authority of Article 5 are 
not placed at the mercy of the interning power. This obligation signifies 
one of the major differences of the law of Geneva from its preceding law 
                                                          
167 Ibid., at 56.  
168 ICRC Commentary, above note 120, at 58.  
169 This reading is also consistent with the initial draft proposals for Article 5. The first draft of 
Article 5, which, according to the initial order of drafting was Article 3A, put emphasis on 
actual proof and presumptive evidence, which may result in criminal charges. µ:KHUHLQWKH
territory of a Party to the conflict, there is actual proof or serious presumptive evidence that 
a given person, protected under the present Convention, is engaged in activities hostile to 
the security of the State, such person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges 
under this Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such person, be prejudicial to 
the security of such State.  
Where, in occupied territory, an individual protected person is detained on a charge, based 
on actual proof or serious presumptive evidence, of espionage, sabotage or activity aimed at 
endangering the security of the Occupying Power, such person may, in those cases where 
absolute military so requires, be deprived of the rights of communication under this 
Convention; the notification prescribed in Article 123, second paragraph, and its transmission 
as provided for in Article 123A may not be delayed beyond a reasonable period.  
Such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity and in case of trial shall not be 
deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by this Convention. They shall also 
be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person under this Convention at the 
earliest date consistenWZLWK WKHVHFXULW\RI WKH6WDWHRU2FFXS\LQJ3RZHU¶Final Record of 
the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 Vol. III, at 102±103.  
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originating from the Lieber Code. The Lieber Code would accredit the 
sovereign with absolute latitude in dealing with wrongdoers in times of 
war; however, Article 5 of GC IV remains mindful of the rule of law, whilst 
FRQFHGLQJPDUJLQDOGHURJDWLRQVµWRVWDWHH[SHGLHQF\¶.170 
 
8. The interaction between human rights and laws of 
armed conflict on the subject of internment: the move 
towards humanitarianism in the laws of armed 
conflicts 
 
Both protocols either implicitly or explicitly embraced the standards of the 
human rights law regime as a complementary set of rules to the laws of 
armed conflict. Articles 72 and 75 implicitly recognise the need to refer to 
other applicable rules of international law in the view of their respective 
subject matters. More explicit acknowledgement of the operation of 
applicable human rights norms can be found in the Second Additional 
Protocol 171  (AP II), where the preamble to the AP II recalls the basic 
SURWHFWLRQ RIIHUHG E\ WKH µLQWHUQDWLRQDO LQVWUXPHQWV UHODWLQJ WR KXPDQ
ULJKWV¶ WR DOO LQGLYLGXDOV LQ JHQHUDO DQG WR WKH YLFWLPV RI LQWHUQDO DUPHG
conflicts in particular.  
More recently, extensive use of human rights law in the context of armed 
conflicts has been made by the international tribunals. The classic 
examples of making allusions to human rights by an international tribunal 
DUHWKH,&-¶VWZRDGYLVRU\RSLQLRQVRQWKHFDVHVRINuclear Weapons and 
the Israeli Security Wall.172 In the former, the ICJ put emphasis on the 
continued application of human rights law in times of armed conflict, but it 
                                                          
170 ICRC Commentary, above note 120, at 58.  
171 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 
UNTS 609.  
172 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or the Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] ICJ 
Rep. 226, ICJ Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 9 July 2004. 
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also noted the possibility of norm conflict between IHL and IHRL. To 
resolve this conflict, the ICJ suggested the doctrine of lex specialis, to 
which we shall return shortly hereinafter. In the same mode, the ICJ 
supported the application of human rights in times of occupation but in the 
latter case, and once again put forward lex specialis as a solution to the 
problems arising from the cumulative application of human rights law and 
laws of armed conflict.  
The standards regulating the practice of internment under IHL and IHRL 
bear notable similarities and differences. Neither human rights law nor the 
laws of armed conflict prohibit the practice of internment per se. Both 
regimes place necessity as the ultimate generator of internment, and, 
more importantly, they impose a set of substantive and procedural limits 
on the power of states to intern. 173  However, at the same time, the 
differences between the two systems remain significant. Unlike human 
rights treaties, the authoritative agreements in the laws of armed conflict 
KDYH QRW HPSOR\HG D ODQJXDJH RI µDUELWUDULQHVV¶ WR UHIHU WR LQWHUQPHQW
Furthermore, even though GC IV has put in place an obligation for review 
of internment orders, this, under the laws of armed conflict, does not 
necessarily have to be judicial. This is in contrast to some human rights 
treaties and bodies which have stressed that judicial review of internment 
orders must be considered as an inexplicable component of this 
practice.174 The following section takes on these differences and evaluates 
the suggestions made to reconcile the differences of the legal regimes in 
question.  
                                                          
173 Hakimi, above note 154, at 390±394.  
174 Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2) and 7(6) of the American Convention 
on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, January 30, 1987, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 
No. 8 (1987) and Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency 
(article 4), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001). 
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9. Test of arbitrariness and the question of lex specialis 
 
8QOLNH KXPDQ ULJKWV LQVWUXPHQWV WKH µ*HQHYD ODZ¶ GRHVQRW WRXFK XSRQ
the WHUP µDUELWUDU\¶ 1HYHUWKHOHVV WKLV DEVHQFH KDV QRW SUHYHQWHG WKH
WHUPµDUELWUDU\¶IURPDSSHDULQJLQOHJDOODQJXDJHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHODZV
of armed conflict. 175  In this view, an important question arises as to 
whether WKHWHUPµDUELWUDU\¶EHDUVWKHVDPHPeaning in the laws of armed 
conflicts as in human rights law. This question in a different context (the 
right to life) came to the attention of ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case, in 
which the Court ruled that: 
[i]n principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one¶s 
life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary 
deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by 
the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in 
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of 
hostilities.176 
 
TKHRQO\ZD\WRXQGHUVWDQGWKHPHDQLQJRIµDUELWUDULQHVV¶LVWRPHDVXUHD
given practice of internment against the substantive and procedural 
safeguards provided by the laws of armed conflict. However, even having 
recourse to IHL for understanding the meaning of arbitrariness cannot 
entirely resolve the problem. First of all, if we base our understanding of 
arbitrary internment in the context of human rights law on Article 9 of the 
,&&35WKH+XPDQ5LJKWV&RPPLWWHHKDVVWDWHGWKDWWKHULJKWWRµMXGLFLDO
reviHZRILQWHUQPHQW¶bit of Article 9 represents a non-derogable obligation 
of states. 177  In such situations, the determination of which legal 
prescriptions are lex specialis becomes very difficult, if not impossible. One 
possible solution is to break a general situation into its underscoring sub-
pieces in order to shed light on the legal context for the purposes of 
                                                          
175 Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, at 108, 118, 305, 336, 340, and 344.  
176 Advisory Opinion, above note 172, para 25.  
177  S. Joseph et al, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases and 
Materials and Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2004) at 809-810.  
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applying lex specialis. 178  Based on this assumption, let us provide an 
imaginary scenario. Suppose Australia enters into an international armed 
conflict against New Zealand. Both states are obligated under Article 9 of 
the ICCPR to refrain from practising arbitrary arrest or detention. 
Meanwhile, Australia exploits the derogation scheme of Article 4 of the 
ICCPR and derogates from Article 9. Additionally, by a plea of military 
necessity and in compliance with Article 42 of GC IV, Australia interns a 
large number of New Zealand civilians in Australia, and creates review 
boards in order to have their internment examined. At the same time, 
some civilian detainees invoke their non-derogable right of judicial review 
and apply for the writ of habeas corpus. Can Australia deny issuance of 
the writ of habeas corpus to the detainees by having recourse to lex 
specialis and honour its obligations under the GC IV? If so, what happens 
WR$XVWUDOLD¶VQRQ-derogable obligation of judicial review under the ICCPR 
segment of human rights law? In this light, it seems that a solution to the 
conflict of norms can hardly go beyond four suggestions: 
  
1) IHL rules on internment displace those of human rights 
The most readily available solution is to argue that the laws of armed 
conflict on internment are lex specialis to human rights on the matter of 
internment. The predictable outcome of this solution is the displacement of 
certain obligations of states, which are considered non-derogable or 
inalienable human rights of individuals. A clear example of this approach 
was set by the US practice of internment in Guantanamo, in which one of 
the baselines of the US government in denying the right of judicial review 
to detainees was the lex specialis argument.179 Of course, the continuous 
                                                          
178 M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and 
Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2011) at 233.  
179 See, the US Government¶V response to the precautionary measures suggested by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 12 April 2002 available at: www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/legal/september_11th/docs/4-15-02GovernmentResponse.pdf. 
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outcry of international community180 againVW WKH86JRYHUQPHQW¶V OLQHRI
argument on lex specialis leaves little room for assigning credibility to this 
solution. This outcry manifested itself in the report of the UN Group on the 
situation of detainees at Guantanamo, when it stated that: 
[t]he lex specialis authorizing detention without respect for 
the guarantees set forth in article 9 of ICCPR therefore can 
no longer serve as basis for that detention.181 
 
2) A combined understanding of IHL and IHRL on the matter of 
internment  
 
The second suggestion for reconciling the human rights standards and the 
laws of armed conflict on detention without trial is to argue that our 
understanding of arbitrariness in internment practices during international 
armed conflicts must be predicated upon a combination of some parts of 
Article 9 of the ICCPR and the relevant parts of GC IV. This suggestion has 
appealed to some scholars, and the result has been a general emphasis on 
the complementary nature of the human rights law regime to the laws of 
armed conflict. 182  However, what really matters is not a generalised 
characterisation of the interaction between IHRL and IHL, but rather, the 
modes in which particular conflicting norms supplement or supersede each 
other. To resolve this problem in a cumulative contribution of IHRL and 
IHL in understanding the meaning of arbitrariness in international armed 
conflict, it can only be said that whilst the guarantees of GC IV do not 
totally displace those of the ICCPR, the only acceptable form of review of 
internment must be judicial review.  
 
                                                          
180 15RGOH\µ'HWHQWLRQDVD5HVSRQVHWR7HUURULVP¶LQ$06'H)ULDVet al (eds), 
Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford: OUP, 2012) at 461.  
181Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, (sixty-second 
session) E/CN.4/2006/120, at 14, See DOVR 81 +XPDQ 5LJKWV &RPPLWWHH µ&&35 *HQHUDO
Comment No. 31: The Nature of General Legal Obligations Imposed on State Parties to the 
&RYHQDQW¶&&35&5HY 
182 See, V. Gowlland-Debbas and **DJJLROLµ7KH5HODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQ
5LJKWV DQG +XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ $Q 2YHUYLHZ¶ LQ 5 .ROE and G. Gaggioli (eds), Research 
Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2013) at 85.  
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3) Looking at other means for resolving norm conflicts in 
international law  
The third way of resolving the conflict of norms between IHL and IHRL 
looks at the general strategies other than lex specialis developed by 
international law to resolve the problematique of conflicting norms existing 
in its different sub-branches. Milanovic counts four methods of resolving 
norm FRQIOLFWVLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZµjus cogens; 2) Article 103 of the UN 
Charter; 3) conflict clauses in treaties; and 4) lex posterior¶183 All of these 
methods aim to provide one norm with priority over another.  
As regards jus cogens, we noted in chapter III that there have been some 
suggestions on the part of the Human Rights Committee and some 
scholars to the effect of viewing the obligation of judicial review as a jus 
cogens norm of international law.184  The previous chapter discerned that 
these suggestions cannot but be considered as misguided, especially when 
one considers the relevant rules of treaty interpretation. These rules 
dictate that when a treaty-driven rule is in contrast to a jus cogens norm 
of international law, that particular rule, as well as the treaty giving birth 
to it, must be considered void.185 This implies that if we take seriously the 
proposal that the obligation of judicial review has represented a 
peremptory norm of international law, GC IV loses its applicability not only 
with regard to Article 42, but in its entirety. Therefore, among the 
methods mentioned above, the only one which could hold some currency 
as regards the relationship between the standards of IHRL and IHL on 
internment, is Article 103 of the UN Charter, according to which: 
[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter 
and their obligations under any other international 
                                                          
183 Milanovic, above note 178, at 237.  
184 Refer to chapter III, section 12.1.  
185 Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1155. 
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agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall 
prevail.186 
 
A practical example has been provided by the SC Resolution 1546, by 
which even in the aftermath of the termination of the Coalition occupation 
of Iraq, the coalition forces were authorised to practise internment.187 This 
authorisation was treated by the House of Lords, in the words of Baroness 
Hale, as a qualifier to the human rights obligations of the UK under Article 
5.188 Needless to say, in a different scenario such resolutions are perfectly 
able to give priority to IHRL obligations over those of IHL. A vital point to 
note here is that the issuance of a SC resolution on a particular issue 
cannot be interpreted to mean a total displacement of the relevant rules of 
bodies such as IHL or IHRL. In his reasoning on the case of Al-Jedda, Lord 
Bingham referred to this aspect of SC resolutions:  
There is in my opinion only one way in which they can be 
reconciled: by ruling that the UK may lawfully, where it is 
necessary for imperative reasons of security, exercise the 
power to detain authorised by SCR 1546 and successive 
resolutions, bXWPXVWHQVXUHWKDWWKHGHWDLQHH¶VULJKWVXQGHU
article 5 are not infringed to any greater extent than is 
inherent in such detention.189 
 
7KHUHIRUHWKHTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUDUHVROXWLRQVXFKDV6&µGLVSODFHV¶
RU µTXDOLILHV¶ WKHGHWDLQLQJSRZHUV¶ REOLJDWLRQVXQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQ
ULJKWV ODZ /RUG %LQJKDP¶V VWDWHPHQW DV PHQWLRQHG DERYH DV ZHOO DV
implicit statements made by other judges in the case of Al-Jedda (notably 
Baroness Hale), lean towards the qualification of the relevant human 
rights obligations and not their entire displacement. This view also found 
support in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights on the 
appeal of Al--HGGDDJDLQVWVRPHSDUWLFXODUDVSHFWVRIWKH+RXVHRI/RUGV¶
                                                          
186 Article 103, Charter of the United Nations 1945 1 UNTS XVI. 
187 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1546 (2004) [on formation of a sovereign 
Interim Government of Iraq], 8 June 2004, S/RES/1546 (2004). 
188 R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) v. Secretary of State for Defence 2007 58, para 
126.  
189 Ibid., at para 39.  
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decision.190 The Strasburg Court stated that the SC resolution 1546 did not 
create an obligation for the forces in Iraq to intern suspects without 
charge, which in turn means no displacement of human rights obligations. 
On this note, the conclusion drawn by the European Court was that in the 
absence of a pre-H[LVWLQJGHURJDWLRQµWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VGHWHQWLRQFRQVWLWXWHG
D YLRODWLRQ RI $UWLFOH ¶191 However, it seems that this conclusion as 
well as the reasoning behind it cannot but be problematic. That is to say, 
linking the issue of obligation to the violation of Article 5(1) does not seem 
reasonable. A state can be authorized to intern individuals and yet, be 
under no obligation to do so. The question of authorization must 
distinctively be differentiated from obligation. It seems that the pressing 
problem with the long internment of Al-Jedda was not whether the 
detaining power could intern him or not, but that in the view of a pre-
existing authorization, what particular safeguards should have been 
applied to his internment. However, this important question was ignored 
both by the House of Lords and the Strasburg Court. In this regard, 
Messineo writes,  
        nothing was said of the rest of Article 5. And there is no sufficient 
information available to evaluate whether his internment violated 
any other part of Article 5 or other applicable rules of 
international human rights or humanitarian law. For example, 
was he promptly informed of the reasons for his internment, as 
both human rights and humanitarian law provide? Was he 
allowed a due process of law established by the MNF-I in 
accordance with Article 78 GC-IV?192  
 
 
On this note, it is preferable for a SC resolution to state not only an 
existing authority for the practice of internment, but also a set of vital 
safeguards adhering to a practice of internment. Otherwise, such 
resolution may carry a danger of being interpreted by states as being so 
                                                          
190 Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom (Application no. 27021/08).  
191 Ibid., para 110.  
192 )0HVVLQHRµ7KH+RXVHRI/RUGVLQ$O-Jedda and Public International Law: Attribution of 
Conduct to Un-Authorized Forces and the Power of the Security Council to Displace Human 
5LJKWV¶1HWKHUODQGV,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ5HYLHZDW 
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broad as to give them licence to practise the mosW µRGLRXV¶ IRUPV RI
internment.193 
 
4) Using other creative legal solutions to resolve the problem of 
norm conflicts 
There seems to emerge an increasing awareness that the lex specialis 
principle does not necessarily guide us towards a more coherent, 
consistent and constructive solution in many situations.194 On the specific 
topic of how to regulate internment, a limited number of proposals have 
been made by some scholars to discover a unified approach to internment. 
Some of these proposals swing between political and legal solutions, and 
have been enshrined against the background of the US detention policy in 
the µZDURQWHUURU¶$OVR LWPXVWEHQRWHGWKDWWKHVHSURSRVDOVKDYHQRW
necessarily been formulated as a direct response to the problem of norm 
conflict, but they carry the potential to be used in that context as well. For 
example, Wittes has argued that importing due process from other areas 
of law (by which he supposedly means human rights or criminal law) 
serves as an incentive for governments to head towards an increased 
targeted killing policy.195 His proposed solution is to rely on the paradigms 
RI PLOLWDU\ GHWHQWLRQ LQ ZKLFK µdue process [«] is somewhere between 
rudimentary and non-existent precisely to ensure that detention is easy¶. 
196 The truth of the matter is, that it is very hard to assess proposals like 
the one made by Wittes on their legal merits. One can make a case for 
their political expediency or otherwise, but insofar as the legal obligations 
of states are concerned, the utility of such proposals does not count for 
much.  
                                                          
193 Ibid. 
194  L. Doswald-%HFN µ%DFNJURXQG 3DSHU 3URFHHdings of the Expert Meeting on the 
Supervision of the Lawfulness of Detention dXULQJ$UPHG&RQIOLFW¶ (July 2004).  
195  See, B. Wittes, Detention and Denial: the Case for Candor after Guantanamo 
(Washington, Brooking Institution Press, 2010). 
196 Ibid., at 26.  
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A more serious suggestion has been made by Hakimi. She identifies some 
of the difficulties in the relationship between IHL and IHRL on the 
questions RI LQWHUQPHQW DQG WDUJHWLQJ DV LQKHUHQW ZLWKLQ µWKH GRPDLQ
PHWKRG¶ XVHG E\ VWDWHV WR GLVFHUQ WKH DSSOLFDELOLW\ RI GLIIHUHQW GRPDLQV
such as IHL and IHRL.197  The domain method, Hakimi explains, is the 
result of the compartmentalisation of international law, and different 
domains were originally devised to govern different contexts such as 
peace or armed conflict.198 Hakimi argues that the domain method is likely 
to confuse decision-makers on internment issues, as it hardly provides a 
unified set of principles. Against this background, Hakimi refers to three 
PD[LPV WKDW VKH ODEHOV DV µOLEHUW\-VHFXULW\ PLWLJDWLRQ DQG PLVWDNH¶,199 
which can potentially resolve the shortcomings of the domain method on 
internment issues. The liberty-security principle is very similar to what in 
the literature on counter-terrorism is generally characterised as the 
balance metaphor.200 It dictates that in every operation of internment, the 
costs for security and liberty must carefully be examined. If the freedom 
of a suspect endangers security such that the liberty costs can be 
outweighed, only then can internment be authorised. The mitigation 
principle looks at other less restrictive means of intrusion into individuals¶ 
rights, and discerns if their availability overrules the practice of 
LQWHUQPHQW)LQDOO\WKHPLVWDNHSULQFLSOHSRVLWVWKDWµstates must exercise 
due diligence to avoid mistakes and establish a reasonable and honest 
belief that their conduct is lawful¶.201 
A number of observations can be made on the three maxims mentioned 
above. In the first place (and this is not meant to represent a counter-
                                                          
197 M. Hakimi, µA Functional Approach to Targeting and Detention¶ (2011±2012) 110 Michigan 
Law Review 1365, at 1367.  
198 Ibid., at 1373.  
199 Hakimi, above note 154, at 391.  
200 For a comprehensive survey on the balance metaphor, see, D. Moeckli, Human Rights and 
Non-GLVFULPLQDWLRQLQWKHµ:DURQ7HUURU¶ (Oxford: OUP, 2008). 
201 Hakimi, above note 197, at 1396±1397.  
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argument to the principles mentioned by Hakimi), the dominant legal 
frameworks in the domain-method already accommodate these maxims in 
DYHU\H[SOLFLWPDQQHU)RUH[DPSOHWKHWHVWRI µDEVROXWHO\QHFHVVDU\¶ LQ
GC IV by default dictates that internment must as such be a measure of 
last resort. This automatically reinforces a liberty versus security 
calculation and entails a mitigation principle as well. More importantly, the 
three maxims may resolve the problems of the domain method at best in 
terms of guiding states to understand when to practise internment, but 
they do very little to help them identify how to practise it. The 
fragmentation of international law on the issue of internment, or, in 
+DNLPL¶V ZRUGV WKH GRPDLQ PHWKRG DW OHDVW LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO DUPHG
conflicts creates no difficulty or confusion with regard to the question of 
when to practise internment. This fragmentation, however, becomes 
troublesome when one is to assess what substantive and procedural 
guarantees apply once internment is practised.  
Suppose that we were to implement the three maxims to the question of 
whether an internee must become entitled to judicial review. Is it accurate 
to say that in a given situation, the liberty-security principle dictates that 
the judicial review of an internment has a higher cost to security than to 
liberty, thereby denying the issuance of habeas corpus or any other 
instrument of judicial review to a detainee? Can this argument be 
accepted as legally sound in the face of a pre-existing obligation of judicial 
review? Is this argument not already being exploited by the US in several 
different stages regarding the judicial review of detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay? Furthermore, which state institutions can be entrusted with the task 
of making such assessments as liberty-security, mitigation or mistake in 
the scenario mentioned above? The example of judicial review shows that 
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at least with regard to some of the safeguards attached to internment, we 
must inevitably go back to the domain method.  
Since one of the cornerstones of this thesis has been the historical analysis 
of internment, it is of some interest to make allusions to the history of 
VWDWHV¶ UHDFWLRQ WR IUDJPHQWHG ODZV ,Q WKHFKDSWHURQ WKH LQWHUQPHQWRI
aliens, it was mentioned that different bodies and schools of international 
law had subscribed to very different ideas as to whether aliens could be 
interned without due process and only on the basis of sovereign powers. 
The reaction of (most) states to increasingly differing schools was simple ± 
rudimentary references to selective quotations from some authorities in 
international law and reinterpretation of the question in a manner to tip 
the balance towards exclusive sovereign powers.202 In other words, one of 
the lessons of the history of internment is that when states are exposed to 
conflicting obligations originating from the varying regimes or bodies of 
international law, they take the question at their own discretion and opt 
for a solution which would fit their own interests. Unsurprisingly, such a 
technique does not remain bound in the history of internment. The US 
experience in the µwar on terror¶ is another clear testimony to the classic 
response of some states to the existing indeterminacies arising from such 
problems as norm conflict and fragmentation.203 
10. Internment in internal armed conflicts: the silence 
of Common Article 3 and the AP II on internment  
 
Common Article 3 stipulates that some minimum humanitarian 
prescriptions and proscriptions must be extended to conflicts of non-
international character, which had previously been viewed as an exclusive 
                                                          
202 Refer to chapter II, section 4.  
203 In the next chapter, we will thoroughly examine some of the techniques used by states to 
question the validity of the explicit obligations arising from the international letter of law 
governing internment.  
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internal matter for states. Such qualifications of Common Article 3 has, in 
the words of the ICJ, UHQGHUHG WKLV DUWLFOH D OLYLQJ DUWLFXODWLRQ RI µWKH
elementary considerations of humanity¶ VHUYLQJ DV µD PLQLmum 
\DUGVWLFN¶204 for the laws of armed conflict. Also, as an important part of 
the humanitarian shift in the laws of armed conflict, commenced in the 
wake of the Tehran Conference in 1968, the AP II came into being in 1977 
as the first and thus far only treaty focused on the laws of internal armed 
conflicts. However, it is common knowledge that neither Common Article 3 
nor the AP II entails a comprehensive set of principles for regulating 
hostilities in internal armed conflicts. Obligations put forward in Common 
Article 3 lack specificity, and are couched in a very general language.205 
The AP II hardly signifies any more clarity. 206  Notably, both Common 
Article 3 and the AP II neglect the question of internment in internal 
armed conflicts. They do not touch upon an acceptable legal basis for 
internment of non-combatants in conflicts of non-international 
character.207 What is more, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court does not even include the crime of unlawful confinement in its 
enlisted war crimes in the course of internal armed conflicts.208 Of course, 
this absence of provisions on internment in internal armed conflicts cannot 
be interpreted as a prohibition of internment in internal armed conflicts. 
Therefore, an interpretative search for seeking a legal remedy to this 
absence becomes necessary.  
 
10.1. Different interpretative methods in internal armed conflicts  
                                                          
204 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. US) Merits, 1986 
ICJ Rep. 14 (Judgement of 27 June), para 218. 
205  5 0XOOHUVRQ µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ LQ ,QWHUQDO $UPHG &RQIOLFWV¶ (1997) 2 
Journal of Armed Conflict Law 109, at 113. 
206  ' )RUV\WKH µ7KH /HJDO 0DQDJHPHQW RI ,QWHUQDO :DU¶   American Journal of 
International Law 272, at 286. 
207 The AP II comes close to the question of the permissibility of internment in Article 5, but 
even there, no explicit reference is made to the practice of internment. Rather, at best, a 
tacit approval of internment can be extrapolated. 
208 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 
2010), 17 July 1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6, Article 8.  
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Insofar as the interpretative methods for resolving this deficiency go, 
three immediate solutions stand out: 1) an expansive interpretation of 
Common Article 3 in light of customary humanitarian law and human 
rights law standards, 2) a direct import of customary humanitarian law, 
and 3) reliance on human rights standards.  
As regards the first solution, a number of attempts have been made to 
stretch the scope of Common Article 3. 209  Of direct relevance in this 
regard are the broad requirements and prohibitions of Common Article 3, 
which make possible expansive interpretations of this provision. Two of 
these requirements and probations are the requirement of humane 
treatment and the prohibition of cruel treatment. With regard to the 
particular case of internment and the probation of unlawful confinement by 
Common Article 3, the argument is that unlawful confinement is prohibited 
by customary humanitarian law. This must be used as a guide to interpret 
µFUXHO WUHDWPHQW¶ LQ WKHVHQVH WKDWXQODZIXOFRQILQHPHQWFRQVWLWXWHVRQH
of the sub-pieces of cruel treatment.210 The ultimate result of this line of 
UHDVRQLQJ LV WKDW µXQODZIXO FRQILQHPHQW¶ PXVW EH FRQVLGHUed cruel 
treatment, and therefore prohibited by Common Article 3. This approach, 
even though progressive and useful at times, signifies a laborious and 
exhaustive interpretative method, in that it necessitates a constant return 
to customary humanitarian law to guide the interpretation of Common 
Article 3. As Sivakumaran has pointed out, a direct import of customary 
KXPDQLWDULDQ ODZ LV OLNHO\ WR FUHDWH FOHDUHU UHVXOWV µWKDQ to use such 
                                                          
209 &*UHHQZRRG µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ DQG WKH7DGLü&DVH¶  European 
Journal of International Law 265, at p. 268. 
210 J. Dingwall, µUnlawful Confinement as a War Crime: The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslav 
Tribunal and the Common Core of International Humanitarian Law Applicable to 
&RQWHPSRUDU\$UPHG&RQIOLFWV¶Journal of Conflict and Security Law 133, at 151.  
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standards as a guide in interpreting the requirements of Common Article 
3¶.211 
During the last two decades, customary humanitarian law has been 
invested with an increasing importance as an alternative to compensate 
for the deficiency of the laws of internal armed conflict.212 This emphasis 
on customary humanitarian law has been channelled through two 
particular developments in the laws of armed conflict: the jurisprudence of 
the ICTY and the ICRC study of customary international humanitarian 
law.213 As for the ICTY, this tribunal on a number of occasions employed 
its best efforts to reduce the normative gap between the laws of 
international armed conflicts and internal armed conflicts by frequently 
resorting to customary humanitarian law.214  
Another significant development in the field of customary humanitarian 
law occurred with the publication of the ICRC study of customary 
international humanitarian law, in which it was shown that the majority of 
the rules in international armed conflict apply to internal armed conflict in 
the form of customary humanitarian law.215 For example, the Rule 128 (C) 
of the ICRC study states that: 
Persons deprived of their liberty in relation to a non-
international armed conflict must be released as soon as the 
reasons for the deprivation of their liberty cease to exist.216 
 
                                                          
211 6 6LYDNXPDUDQ µ&RXUWV RI $UPHG 2SSRVLWLRQ *URXSV )DLU 7ULDOV RU 6XPPDU\ -XVWLFH¶ 
(2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 489, at 503. 
212 -0+DQHFNDHUWV µ6WXG\RQ&XVWRPDU\,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ$&RQWULEXWLRQ
WR WKH 8QGHUVWDQGLQJ DQG 5HVSHFW IRU WKH 5XOH RI /DZ LQ $UPHG &RQIOLFWV¶  
International Review of the Red Cross 175, at 178  
213  S. SivakumDUDQ µHow to Improve upon the Faulty Legal Regime of Internal Armed 
&RQIOLFWV¶LQ$&DVVHVHed), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 
2012) at 528. 
214 Tadiü Interlocutory Decision (2 October 1995) para 119. 
215  See, D. Kritsiotis µ5HYLHZ RI -HDQ-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), 
International Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary International Humanitarian 
/DZ9RO,5XOHV9RO,,3UDFWLFH¶American Journal of International Law 692.  
216  ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 451.  
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Nevertheless, none of these bodies of law draws on the customary 
humanitarian law to provide a legal basis for internment in the conflicts of 
non-international character. Nevertheless, understanding what the laws of 
internment could look like by importing the rules of internment in 
international armed conflicts as customary humanitarian law to shape a 
legal basis for internment in internal armed conflicts requires no excess of 
imagination. In fact, the Inter-American Commission hinted at this point in 
a non-international armed conflict context when it stated: 
[i]nternational humanitarian law also prohibits the detention 
or internment of civilians except where necessary for 
imperative reasons of security.217 
 
One may criticise this formulation of the Inter-American Commission, 
since the binary of combatants/prisoners of war and civilian/protected 
persons is non-H[LVWHQWLQLQWHUQDODUPHGFRQIOLFWV<HWWKHWHUPµFLYLOLDQV¶
in the passage mentioned above can easily be replaced by such terms as 
µnon-fighters¶RU simply µpersons¶DQGVWLOOWKHWHVWRIµLPSHUDWLYHUHDVRQV
RI VHFXULW\¶ DV D OHJDO EDVLV IRU LQWHUQPHQW will make sense in internal 
conflicts. However, it must be noted that once this test is imported in the 
realm of non-international armed conflicts, all of its associated features 
mentioned in the ICRC Commentary will follow.  
The import of the standards governing internment from international 
armed conflicts into internal conflicts as customary humanitarian law 
cannot remain limited to the point of the legal basis for internment. 
Rather, such obligations as the review of internment orders, periodic 
reviews and other procedural protections must also be afforded to 
internees in internal armed conflicts.  
 
                                                          
217 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Special Report on the Human Rights 
Situation in Colombia (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 9, rev. 1 999). 
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In view of the silence of the laws of internal armed conflicts on some 
crucial issues, some writers have argued that a reliance on human rights 
principles in internal armed conflicts is not only desirable but necessary.218 
Also, a turn to human rights for guidance in internal armed conflicts 
carries with it an additional advantage, which is that the application of 
human rights cannot be affected by intensity thresholds of the kind 
triggering the application of IHL. Therefore, human rights standards come 
to fill the normative gap arising from doubts on whether a given situation 
meets the thresholds for categorising a certain situation as an internal 
armed conflict. 219  Shifting to human rights instruments for exploring 
relevant standards of conduct in internal armed conflicts is welcomed by 
the AP II preamble. 
Naturally, a direct application of human rights standards in internal armed 
conflicts cannot be accomplished without resolving some important 
challenges standing in its way. On this note, two pervasive challenges can 
be identified: 1) the application of human rights will inevitably bring us 
back to the conceptual and practical difficulties associated with the lex 
specialis principle, and 2) the human rights law regime has traditionally 
been considered as binding only with regard to states, not armed 
groups.220 Due to the limited scope of this thesis, we must place our focus 
on the first barricade to the direct import of internation.al human rights 
law in internal armed conflicts.  
                                                          
218 See, :$EUHVFKµ$+XPDQ5LJKWV/DZRI,QWHUQDO$UPHG&RQIOLFWWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI
+XPDQ5LJKWVLQ&KHFKQ\D¶European Journal of International Law 741. 
219 See, L. Doswald-Beck and S. Vité, µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ DQG +XPDQ 5LJKWV
/DZ¶ (1993) 293 International Review of the Red Cross 94. 
220 As was mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, scrutinising the mode in which the 
conduct of armed groups is regulated in internal armed conflicts goes beyond the scope of 
this thesis, as this research is focused on VWDWHV¶DXWKRULW\. On this subject, one can refer to a 
wealth of literature with very divergent views on the subject. The following books and articles 
can be of interest to those keen to explore this topic further: 1 5RGOH\ µ&DQ $UPHG
2SSRVLWLRQ *URXSV 9LRODWH +XPDQ 5LJKWV"¶ LQ . 0DKRQH\ and P. Mahoney (eds), Human 
Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A Global Challenge (Dordecht, Martinis Nijhoff Publishers, 
1993), L. Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2002), A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligation of Non-State Actors (Oxford, 
OUP, 2006), and S. Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford: 
OUP, 2012). 
230 
 
10.2. Lex specialis in internal armed conflicts  
It was argued in the last section that the conventional law of internal 
armed conflict has fallen silent on many issues with a prevalent use in 
such conflicts. This silence, according to some scholars, paves the way for 
direct reliance on human rights standards in internal armed conflicts and 
where the relevant treaty law of such conflicts does not provide us with 
more concrete guidance. Abresch, for example, has argued that: 
[t]he rationale that makes resort to humanitarian law as lex 
specialis appealing ± that its rules have greater specificity ± 
is missing in internal armed conflicts.221 
 
Based on this, he draws the conclusion that the silence and the bitter 
generality of many treaty-based rules of internal armed conflicts give rise 
to the appealing possibility of applying human rights norms as lex 
specialis. This argument is shared by some other legal scholars of IHL and 
IHRL as well. 222  The only serious authority for this proposition has 
emerged from the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, where a mixed 
vocabulary shared by human rights law and the laws of armed conflict was 
used (in the cases of Isayeva et al v. Russia and Isayeva v. Russia)223 and 
at the same time, no direct reference was made to IHL for the court 
judgments. Nevertheless, the crux of the issue in such cases is that there 
is no indication on the part of the Strasburg jurisprudence to signify that it 
actually viewed the context in which those cases came into being as an 
internal armed conflict.224 Certainly, it is hard to argue that an explicit 
                                                          
221 Abresch, above note 218, at 747. 
222 See))0DUWLQµ8VLQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQ5LJKWV/DZIRU(VWDEOLVKLQJD8QLILHG8VHRI
)RUFH5XOHLQWKH/DZRI$UPHG&RQIOLFW¶Stockholm Law Review 347.  
223 Isayeva et al v. Russia Application Nos 57947-48-49/00 February 2005, Isayeva v. Russia 
Application No. 59750/00, February 2005.  
224 66LYDNXPDUDQ µ5H-HQYLVDJLQJ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZRI LQWHUQDO DUPHG FRQIOLFWV¶ 
22 European Journal of International Law 219, at 235.  
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preference for human rights law to the laws of internal armed conflict as 
lex specialis could be inferred from the rulings of the ECtHR.225 
Moreover, on the condition of accepting such an argument, one would still 
be compelled to deal with the relationship between customary 
humanitarian law as imported from the laws of international armed conflict 
and human rights law, which would revive the most sophisticated 
techniques of interpretation to resolve a second layer of questions 
associated with lex specialis as to whether human rights law trumps 
customary humanitarian law in application or vice versa. Here, Abresch 
argues that the invocation of human rights law in the AP II preamble 
discloses the explicit preference of the drafters of the AP II for human 
rights over customary humanitarian law. 226  Therefore, the brief 
appearance of human rights law in the AP II creates a hierarchy of norms. 
In this new order of norms, human rights law is placed above customary 
humanitarian law. Whilst this argument is both progressive and 
forthcoming, a question persists: would states accept such a 
groundbreaking conclusion on the basis of a rudimentary reference to 
human rights law in the AP II preamble?  
A recent document of a soft law nature with regard to the practice of 
GHWHQWLRQDVXQGHUWDNHQE\ µVWDWHVRU LQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ LQnon-
international armed conflicts has shown a great propensity to use human 
rights law language regulate the laws of internment.227 For example, the 
Copenhagen Principles articulate that detainees must be treated humanely 
µZLWKRXWDQ\DGYHUVHGLVWLQFWLRQIRXQGHGRQUDFHFRORXUUHOLJLRQRUIDLWK
political or other opinion, national or social origin, sex, birth, wealth or 
                                                          
225 For gaining some general insight into the Human Rights Committee and Inter-American 
&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶ VWDQFHRQ WKHVXEMHFWRI lex specialis, see, Human Rights, General 
Observations, No. 31, CCPR/C.21/Rev.21 (2004) and Velasquez case, Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, No. 70.  
226 Abresch, above note 218, at 749±751.  
227 The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations. 
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other similar status¶.228 7KH &KDLUPDQ¶V &RPPHQWDU\ WR WKH &RSHQKDJHQ
Principles becomes even more explicit in terms of their invocation of the 
human rights rules and concepts governing internment:  
As an important component of lawfulness detentions must 
not be arbitrary. For the purposes of The Copenhagen 
3URFHVV3ULQFLSOHVDQG*XLGHOLQHV WKH WHUP µDUELWUDU\¶ UHIHUV
to the need to ensure that each detention continues to be 
legally justified, so that it can be demonstrated that the 
detention remains reasonable and lawful in all the 
circumstances.229  
Once again, these general emphases on the language of human rights law 
can only be useful to the extent that they are accompanied by a set of 
specific obligations. For example, even the said document registers no 
definite answer to the question of whether the importance of human rights 
law in non-international armed conflicts renders the judicial review of 
detention the only acceptable form of supervising detention orders. It is 
fair to say that unless a general preference for the direct application of 
human rights law is intertwined with coherent, consistent and specific 
content, it does not matter much if one gives more credit to IHRL or 
customary humanitarian law for the purpose of regulating the law of 
internment. The reason for this is simple. Both IHRL and customary 
humanitarian law possess very similar features in their view of the general 
governing paradigms of internment, and it is only with regard to such 
particularities as the obligation of judicial review that they differ.    
Also, an important possibility must not go unnoticed. It has been said that 
the silence of the treaty laws of internal armed conflicts is not necessarily 
a weakness. Rather, this silence must at times be seen as a deliberate act 
so as to give weight to domestic laws of states regarding their conduct of 
hostilities. 230  Unfortunately, the importance of national laws in internal 
                                                          
228 Ibid., para 2. 
229 &KDLUPDQ¶V&RPPHQWDU\WRWKH&RSHQKDJHQ3URFHVV3ULQFLSOHVDQG*XLGHOLQHVSDUD 
230 Sivakumaran, above note 224, at 241.  
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armed conflict has largely been ignored in the literature surrounding 
humanitarian law.231 It may be argued that these domestic laws cannot be 
formulated in such a way that they overlook the requirements of human 
rights. However, it is one thing to say that domestic laws of states must 
live up to the requirements of human rights and quite another to postulate 
human rights law as the direct and dominant source for regulating internal 
armed conflicts. Again, a pre-condition for the validity of domestic laws 
from the vantage point of international law is at least the observance of 
the non-derogable core of human rights, and this non-derogable core can 
differ depending on the human rights treaties ratified by states.232  
11. Conclusion 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, reference was made to an underlying 
dichotomy between two eras in the history of internment which would help 
us to come to grips with the evolution of the practice of detention without 
trial. In a similar manner to other parts of this thesis, an attempt was 
made to accentuate the differences and similarities of these two different 
phases in the development of the laws of internment in international law. 
Therefore, this chapter took the Lieber Code as the starting point of its 
analysis, as many subsequent advancements in the international laws of 
armed conflicts took their cue from this. Inasmuch as the Lieber Code had 
a mitigating effect on some of the extremities of war, it left a very large 
space for the discretion of the sovereign. One of the sites in which this 
technique of the Lieber Code could be seen in an explicit manner was the 
internment of hostile civilians, regarding whom the Lieber Code virtually 
enumerated no protection. This conception of the rights of some groups of 
                                                          
231 On the importance of national laws in internal armed conflicts, see35RZH µIs There a 
Right to Detain Civilian by Foreign Armed Forces during a Non-international Armed Conflict"¶
(2012) 61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 697.  
232 Refer to chapter III, section 13.  
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internees was symptomatic of the era in which the Lieber Code came into 
being. However, as the shift towards internationalism began, this heritage 
of the older era could not be completely dismantled. As a result, even the 
µ*HQHYD ODZ¶ GLVFHUQHG WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI GHURJDWLRQ IURP VRPH RI WKH
protections of GC IV, albeit to a limited degree. Incidents such as the µwar 
on terror¶ and the re-FUHDWLRQ RI WKH VKDGRZ\ FDWHJRU\ DV µXQODZIXO
FRPEDWDQWV¶ are strong indications of the tendency of some states to 
return to the techniques of the era in which sovereign authority could 
either trump the rule of law or the rule of law was conceived in such a way 
that would only benefit the sovereign. The legal antagonists to this thesis 
have employed every interpretive means in the laws of armed conflicts to 
strengthen the grip of international law on the protection of civilian 
internees. However, inasmuch as these efforts have proved admirable and 
plausible, some areas of the laws of armed conflicts on internment remain 
unclear and thereby offer a revolving door to the intrusion of sovereigns 
into civil liberties. Moreover, the fragmentation of international law has 
itself led to further confusion. This chapter has sought to clarify the 
standpoints of the laws of armed conflicts on internment, and in so doing 
has punctuated those areas that may require further attention by the 
authoritative bodies of international law; at the same time, it has signified 
the perceived links between modern practices of internment and their 
historical antecedents.  
Based on the queries raised in this chapter, some of the areas which have, 
since the adoption of Geneva Conventions, served as the Achilles¶ heel of 
the laws of armed conflict on the issue of internment can be identified as 
follows:   
1) Intermediary status between PoWs and civilians. 
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2) The legal basis for internment. That is to say, inasmuch as the 
SKUDVHV µDEVROXWHO\ QHFHVVDU\¶ RU µIRU LPSHUDWLYH reasons of 
VHFXULW\¶ SURYLGH VRPH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH OHJDO EDVLV IRU
internment during armed conflicts, they suffer from a lack of 
greater specificity. 
3) The question of what types of derogation from the protections 
provided by GC IV can be viewed as acceptable, since Article 5 of 
GC IV is still considered extremely vague on the issue of 
internment.  
4) The issue of whether the modern developments of international 
human rights law on the review of internment render the judicial 
review the only acceptable form of review in armed conflicts as 
well.  
5) The lack of some specific and binding obligations as regards 
internment in internal armed conflicts. 
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Chapter V 
Detention without Trial and the War on Terror: 
The Experience of the United States 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In the previous two chapters, we examined the meaning and effects of the 
many objective1 criteria that international law has recognised and revised 
through the regimes of IHRL and IHL with regard to the practice of 
detention without trial. It was emphasised that this objective system of 
determination points to the normative standards, principles and rules of 
international law aimed at restraining and regulating the exclusive and 
subjective discretion of states. This objective system of determination is 
an anti-thesis to the invocation of sovereignty as the basis of an 
uncontrolled discretion of states.2 The scope of this system covers areas 
as broad as the rules of jurisdiction, thresholds of applicability of different 
regimes of international law, individual rights, international law checks and 
balances on the powers of the executive and of course defining standards 
IRUVWDWHV¶FRQGXFW LQGLIIHUHQWDIIDLUVRIVWDWH  At the same time, one of 
the central arguments this thesis in its entirety has been that the value of 
these objective criteria cannot fully be appreciated without realising first 
that states generally tend  to establish a monopolistic ownership in the 
process of interning individuals deemed to threaten their security. The 
most remarkable effect of establishing a monopoly over the law of 
                                                          
1 Refer to chapter IV, section 4.1.  
2 /+HQNLQ µ7KDW 6:RUG6RYHUHLJQW\ DQG*OREDOL]DWLRQ DQG+XPDQ5LJKWV (W&HWHUD¶
(1999-2000) 68 Fordham Law Review 1, at 4-7.  
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detention without trial has been to create a zone of immunity for the 
subjective determination of the executive. With the revitalisation of 
international law in the post-WW II era, there emerged some predictable 
tensions between the subjective and objective systems of determination. 
The US counter-terrorism policies signify the latest version of these 
WHQVLRQV EHWZHHQ WKH VWDWHV¶ SUHGLVSRVLWLRQ IRU IDVKLRQLQJ D UHDOP RI
absolute authority with regard to detaining certain individuals and the 
standards of international law.  
One of the implications of thHSKUDVHµ$PHULFDQH[FHSWLRQDOLVP¶ZKLFKKDV
turned into a term of art in the spheres of international law and 
international relations)3 is to capture the tendency of the US executive 
among others to exempt itself from the burdensome obligations of 
international and domestic rule of law. Drawing on this background, this 
chapter denotes the channels through which the US executive has 
attempted to refute the requirements of international law and the reaction 
of the US judiciary to these advances. Accordingly, we will endeavour to 
identify the threads of historical continuity between some of the legal 
strategies and conceptions described in the first two chapters of this 
thesis. Discerning these particular threads help us to configure a pattern of 
behaviour for the US executive, and also the US judiciary. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first part explores 
some of the main characteristics deployed in the narrative of the so-called 
µZDU RQ WHUURU¶ SURFODLPHG E\ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV DQG KRZ VXch 
characteristics were employed to construct a particular security apparatus 
for the sovereign in its encounter against detainees. Having done that, we 
shall discern how different parameters of this security apparatus have 
                                                          
3 See, M. Byers, G. Nolte, 8QLWHG6WDWHV¶+HJHPRQ\DQGWKH)RXQGDWLRQVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ
(Cambridge: CUP, 2003). 
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manifested themselves in the schHPH RI µHQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ GHWHQWLRQ, 
which contains two dimensions and for the purposes of our analysis, the 
subjective element of the practice of detention (decisions of the detaining 
power on the matters of detaining who and under what conditions) and 
the objective element (the standards of international law to the effect of 
denoting who can be interned and under what conditions). The overall aim 
of this chapter is to highlight how these two elements interacted with each 
other in the detention practices uQGHUWDNHQ LQ WKH $PHULFDQ µZDU RQ
WHUURU¶ 
 
2. Ǯǯ 
 
One of the central lines signalled by the US officials in the immediate 
DIWHUPDWKRIDWWDFNVZDVWKHLGHDRIµFKDQJH¶4 According to President 
George W. Bush and such figures as Vice-President Cheney, the 9/11 
attacks were not only an indicator of a new wave of animosity against the 
86 EXW DOVR SUHVHQWHG µD QHZ NLQG RI HQHP\¶ $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH %XVK
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ WKH µQHZQHVV¶ RI WKLV HQHP\ PHDQW WKDW Lt could not be 
GHDOWZLWKE\WKHµROG¶PHDVXUHV7KHUHIRUHµDQHZW\SHRIZDU¶ZDVLQWKH
making,5 one which would change and re-write the rules of game. To the 
legal mind, these statements were but tantamount to the often 
exaggerated and dramatically charged political rhetoric, much like those 
                                                          
4  See, for example, President Bush remarks on state of union available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ More explicit in this regard are 
WKHUHPDUNVRI9LFH3UHVLGHQW&KHQH\µ$QGLQDVHQVHVRUWRIWKHWKHPHWKDWFRPHVWKURXJK
repeatedly for me is that 9/11 changed everything. It changed the way we think about 
threats to the United States. It changed recognition of our vulnerabilities. It changed in terms 
of the kind of national security strategy we need to pursue, in terms of guaranteeing the 
VDIHW\DQGVHFXULW\RIWKH$PHULFDQSHRSOH¶ 
5 µ7KHPLQGVHWRIZDUPXVWFKDQJH0U%XVKVDLGRQ:HGQHVGD\ µ,W LVDGLIIHUHQW W\SHRI
EDWWOHILHOG ,W LV D GLIIHUHQW W\SH RI ZDU¶ 7KH EDWWOHV KH VDLG µZLOO EH IRXJKW YLVLEO\
sometimes, and VRPHWLPHVZH
OOQHYHUVHHZKDWPD\EHWDNLQJSODFH¶ Seeµ%XVKWDONVRID

GLIIHUHQW NLQG RI ZDU¶ DYDLODEOH DW
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/afghanistan.september1113.  
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XQGHUSLQQLQJ VXFK SKUDVHV DV µFROG ZDU¶ DQG µZDU RQ GUXJV¶6 But soon, 
WKHVHVHHPLQJO\GUDPDWL]HGSROLWLFDOSURMHFWLRQVFDPHWRIRUPDµODZIDUH¶7 
intended to create new concepts, refute a considerable corpus of the pre-
existing rules, and deliver results more compatible with the will of the 
American sovereign rather than the letter of law. To this end, a unique 
language was devised to describe the counter-terrorism policies of the 
Bush Administration. New terms came into existence, and on some 
occasions, the old terms were drained of their previous meanings and new 
definitions were assigned to them. 8  The invention of these new terms 
VWDUWHGZLWKµZDURQWHUURU¶EXWLWGLGQRWVWRSWKHUH,WZHQWRQWRLQFOXGH
an entire apparatus full of concepts with a half political and half-legal 
architecture. This new language was not, however, tasked with the neutral 
reflection of an outside reality, but to create a discourse of its own. As 
Jackson has very aptly explained:  
7KH ODQJXDJH RI WKH µZDU RQ WHUURULVP¶ LV QRW VLPSO\ DQ
objective or neutral reflection of reality, nor is it merely 
accidental or incidental. [...] Rather, it is a deliberately and 
meticulously composed set of words, assumptions, metaphors, 
grammatical forms, myths and forms of knowledge ± it is a 
carefully constructed discourse ± that is designated to achieve a 
number of key political points.9 
The point here is that this language does not confine itself to the political 
sphere. Rather, it runs through the realm of the political to create a legal 
DJHQGD RI LWVRZQ2I FRXUVH WKH WHUP µOHJDO¶ KHUH LVQRWXVHGZLWK WKH
VDPHPHDQLQJDVµODZIXOQHVV¶; rather it is employed in a very similar sense 
                                                          
6  See, & *UHHQZRRG µ6FRSH RI $SSOLFDWLRQ RI +XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ¶ LQ ' )OHFN (ed), The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (Oxford: OUP (second edition), 2009). 
,QWHUHVWLQJO\ QRW ORQJ DIWHU WKH DSSHDUDQFH RI WKH UKHWRULF RI µZDU RQ WHUURU¶ FRQIXVLRQV
VXUIDFHG DV WR ZKHWKHU WKLV FRXOG PHDQ D GHFODUHG ZDU -RDQ )LW]SDWULFN µ-XULVGLFWLRQ RI
0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQVDQGWKH$PELJXRXV:DURQ7HUURULVP¶American Journal of 
International Law 345, 350.  
7 R. Jason, $PHULFD¶V:DU on Terror: The State of the 9/11 Exception from Bush to Obama 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 8.  
8 A good example of a very significant concept, which became empty of its normal legal 
PHDQLQJLQWKH86µZDURQWHUURU¶LVµFRPEDWDQW¶RUHYHQPRUHUDGLFDOO\WKHFRQFHSWRIµZDU¶
itself. Refer to chapter IV, section 6. More on this will be said in this chapter.  
9  R. Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism 
(Manchester: MUP, 2005) at 2.  
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WR+DOH¶VDQG%ODFNVWRQH¶VGHVFULSWLRQVRIPDUWLDOODZµLQWUXWKDQGUHDOLW\
QRODZ¶EXWYHLOHGXQGHUDQDSSHDUDQFHRIODZ10 
A two-layered implication emerge from the inclusion of this language. 
First, such concepts present the post-9/11 era as a point of departure in 
KLVWRU\$VRQH86RIILFLDORQFHVDLGµWKHUHZDVDEHIRUHDQGWKHUH
ZDV DQ DIWHU  $IWHU  WKH JORYHV FRPH RII¶11 According to this 
QDUUDWLYHVLQFHZHDUHOLYLQJLQµDQHZDJHRIWHUURU¶12 DQGDUHILJKWLQJµD
different kind of ZDU¶13 the old rules²whether they are governing armed 
conflicts or the most fundamental guarantees against torture²lose their 
relevance as well as normative value. Framed in this way, the new 
H[HFXWLYH UXOHV GHSOR\HG LQ WKH ODQJXDJH RI µZDU RQ WHUURU¶ DQG its 
surrounding features are taken to be lex posterior to the pre-existing 
international legal obligations of the US.14 Such sentiments were in the 
clearest manner manifested in the internal memorandums of the Bush 
Administration to free the US executive from its international law 
obligations.15 To discern this, it is useful to pay attention to the following 
SDVVDJHH[WUDFWHGIURPDPHPRUDQGXPRQWKHµ$SSOLFDWLRQRI7UHDWLHVDQG
ODZVWRDO4DHGDDQG7DOLEDQGHWDLQHHV¶ 
Al Qaeda is merely a violent political movement or organisation 
and not a nation-state. As a result, it is ineligible to be a 
signatory to any treaty. Because of the novel nature of this 
conflict, moreover, we do not believe that al Qaeda would be 
                                                          
10 Refer to chapter I, section 8.1.  
11 Citation fURP'/XEDQµ(LJKW)DOODFLHVDERXW/LEHUW\DQG6HFXULW\¶LQ5$VKE\:LOVRQ(ed), 
+XPDQ5LJKWVLQWKHµ:DURQ7HUURU¶ (Cambridge: CUP, 2005). 
12 See, for example, B. A. Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an 
Age of Terrorism (Boston: Yale University Press, 2006) at 43, 92.  
13 :KLWH+RXVH3UHVV&RQIHUHQFH1RYHPEHUµWKH3UHVLGHQWKDVVDLGWRWKH$PHULFDQ
people that this is a different kind of war, with a different kind of battlefield, where known 
political boundaries, which previously existed in traditional wars do not exist in the war on 
terrorism. The President has talked about a shadowy war where terrorists are going to try to 
hide, and terrorists will try to -- when they emerge, were going to be on the lookout for them 
when they emerge. The President has been very up-IURQW DERXW WKDW¶ $YDLODEOH DW
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=47444. 
14 See, for example, American Society of International Law, United States: Response of the 
United States to Request for Precautionary Measures-Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
(April 12, 2002). 
15 See, K. J. Greenberg et al, The Enemy Combatant Papers: American Justice, the Courts, 
and the War on Terror (New York: CUP, 2008).  
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included in non-international forms of armed conflict to which 
some provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply.16 
The strategy described above has also been shaped in another narrative 
less radical in form, but with the same effect. This narrative is focused on 
some perceived gaps in such regimes as IHL and IHRL, and posits that 
these regimes did not emerge with having actors such as Al-Qaeda in 
mind.17 From there, it only takes a small step to argue that the problem of 
WRGD\¶VWHUURULVPPXVWEHH[HPSWHGIURPIRUPHU legal paradigms, in that 
the very nature of contemporary terrorism epitomises some unfathomable 
gaps in international law.18 As explained in the previous chapter, these 
alleged gaps are in turn used to maximise the powers of the executive 
with the purpose of rendering the executive the law-maker, the law-
executor and the sole judge of its cause.19 This pattern of interpretation 
clearly manifested itself in two areas regarding the practice of internment. 
7KHILUVWDUHDZDVEROGLQYRFDWLRQVRIWKHFRQFHSWRIµHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶
designed to replace the two categories of detainees, namely PoWs and 
civilians.20 The second technique was to make a manoeuvre around the 
territorial dimensions on the concept of jurisdiction in order for the 
detaining authority to immunise its practice of internment as well as its 
treatment of detainees from the reach of courts. The result was the 
transfer of a large number of detainees to Guantanamo.21 It must not go 
unnoticed that these measures were not merely tailored to block the reach 
of international law protections to the practice of internment. Rather they 
also meant to insulate the executive detention authority from the 
                                                          
16 US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for William Haynes II, 
General Counsel, Department of Defense, J. Yoo, R. J. Delahanty, at 1-2.  
17 See, for example, C. E. Hardy, The Detention of Unlawful Enemy Combatants during the 
War on Terror (El Paso: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2009) at 28.  
18  For a criticism of the perceived gaps, see IRU H[DPSOH ) 1 $RODLQ µ7KH 1R-Gaps 
$SSURDFKWR3DUDOOHO$SSOLFDWLRQ LQ WKH&RQWH[WRI WKH µ:DURQ 7HUURU¶  Israel Law 
Review 563, at 584  
19 Refer to chapter IV, section 4.1.  
20 Refer to chapter IV, section 5.  
21 See, F. De Londras, 'HWHQWLRQ LQ WKH µ:DU RQ 7HUURU¶ Can Human Rights Fight Back? 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2011).  
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application of the US domestic law. In fact, to borrow a phrase from a 
famous judgment in 1960s, the Bush Administration did use its alleged 
µZDU SRZHUV¶ µDV D WDOLVPDQLF LQFDQWDWLRQ WR VXSSRUW DQ\ H[HUFLVH RI >@
SRZHU¶22 ,WZDVWKXVWKDWWKHµOHJDOEODFNKROH¶FDPHWRUHSUHVHQWRQHRI
WKHQLFNQDPHVRI µ*XDQWDQDPR%D\¶ LQWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\OHJDOGHEDWHRQ
internment.23 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the process described above 
can also be cast in terms of the move by states from refuting the 
applicability of the objective system of legal determination to designating 
a broad apparatus for the subjective decisions of the executive.24 What 
happens as a result is the creation of a unique legal apparatus, which 
totally departs from the objective prerequisites of law. Here, we count 
some of the most prevalent characteristics of this apparatus, and will later 
in this chapter draw the historical parallels of such practices based on the 
previous discussions.  
Firstly, the executive authority in building up its own realm is normally 
driven by the referent or mother legislation, which authorises the 
executive to take all the appropriate measures to restore security and 
order. In the common law tradition, the classical examples of these types 
of regulations stemmed from the British Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) 
in 1914.25 Certainly, one can place the US Patriot Act26 and the AUMF27 
(2001) within the same group as DORA. What these enactments share in 
common is to either recognise or reaffirm a broad periphery of powers for 
the executive to act upon its own discretion. Even though such acts are 
                                                          
22 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S 258, 263-264 (1967).  
23 R (Abbasi) v. Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 1958, See DOVR - 6WH\Q µ*XDQWDQDPR%D\7KH
/HJDO%ODFN+ROH¶International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1.  
24 Refer to chapter IV, section 4.1. 
25 Refer to chapter I, section 10.  
26 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001. 115 Stat.272.  
27 Authorisation for Use of Military Force. 115 Stat. 224. 
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traditionally required to lay down the precise limits of the executive power, 
the limits, extent, scope and time frame of the executive discretion are 
often left open.28 They take an extremely generous approach in specifying 
the limits of the executive power. Take the AUMF for instance, which 
DXWKRULVHV WKH 86 3UHVLGHQW WR WDNH FRHUFLYH DFWLRQ DJDLQVW µQDWLRQV
organisations, persons, he determines, planned, authorised, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harboured such organisations or persons in order to prevent any future 
acts of international terrorism by such nations, organisations, or 
SHUVRQV¶29 Nowhere in the said act is the authority of the US President to 
make determination and take actions upon such determination, limited or 
qualified by the relevant rules of international law.30  
Secondly, the executive security law apparatus does not ascribe itself to 
one particular legal regime. Rather, it is composed of selective invocations 
of different legal frameworks. Luban has aptly described the function of 
these selective subscriptions to different concepts from different areas of 
law: 
By selectively combining the elements of the war model and 
elements of the law model, Washington is able to maximise its 
own ability to mobilise lethal force against terrorists while 
eliminating most traditional rights of military adversaries [..].31 
The immediate effect of this selective combination of various elements 
from different models is to devise concepts with innovative linguistic 
architecture and very peculiar meanings.32 In order to come to grips with 
                                                          
28 See2.ULFKKHUPHU µ/HJDOLW\ DQG/HJLWLPDF\  LQ:(6FKHXHUPDQ The Rule of 
Law under Siege (London: University of California Press, 1996) at 49.  
29 Authorization for Use of Military Force Sep 14, 2001 (107th Congress, 2001±2002).  
30 )RUDJHQHUDODQDO\VLVRIWKLVPDWWHU'-LQNV'/6ORVVµLVWKH3UHVLGHQW%RXQGE\WKH
*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQV¶-2005) 90 Cornell Law Review 90, at 162.  
31 D. Lubanµ7KH:DURQ7HUURULVPDQGWKH(QGRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶Philosophy and 
Public Policy Quarterly 9, at 10. 
32 See, Jackson, above note 9.  
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WKH IXQFWLRQ RI WKHVH FRQFHSWV LW LV XVHIXO WR SD\ DWWHQWLRQ WR .ULWVLRWLV¶
analysis of the act of characterisation in law:  
Our calling of something might also occur within the context of 
an overarching judicial framework and vocabulary, so what we 
are doing is actually arguing for a particular appreciation of 
events, of a specific legal condition ± something that might 
affect the status of the parties, or their interests, entitlements 
and obligations, or evHQWKHRXWFRPHRIDJLYHQGLVSXWH>«@33 
,WZLOOEHLQWHUHVWLQJLIZHDSSO\.ULWLVLRWLV¶GHVFULSWLRQRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI
µRXU FDOOLQJ RI VRPHWKLQJ¶ WR WKH WHUP µHQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ 34  On the 
surface, this term presupposes the existence of a legal paradigm 
emanating from (or at least consistent with) the laws of armed conflict. 
Yet, the use of this concept in the context of the American exercise of 
internment does not correspond to a conventional application of the laws 
of armed conflict. For example, on some occasions, American citizens were 
designated as enemy combatants. 35  7KLV UHDGLQJ RI µHQHP\¶ LV QRW
consistent with the laws of armed conflict. Here, one may argue that the 
concept of µHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶ LVQRW DQDUPHG FRQIOLFW UHODWHG FRQFHSW
Rather, it signifies a criminal title. If this possibility is to be taken 
seriously, then it will follow that individuals charged with this so-called 
crime must be subjected to punishment and not internment, which of 
course has not been the case.36 7KHUHIRUHQHLWKHU WKHZRUG µHQHP\¶QRU
WKHWHUPµFRPEDWDQW¶ LQWKHFRQVWUXFWRI µHQHP\FRPEDWDQW¶ZHUHDSSOLHG
in the same sense that these words (enemy and combatant) were 
separately employed in the Geneva Conventions and the two additional 
protocols.  
                                                          
33 ' .ULWVLRWLV µ7KH :DU RQ 7HUURU DQG WKH 3UREOHPDWLTXH RI WKH :DU 3DUDGLJP¶  
Journal of Human Rights and Human Welfare 11, at 12-13.  
34 )RUWKHDQDO\VLVRIWKHFRQFHSWRIµXQODZIXOHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶UHIHUWRFKDSWHU IV, section 
5.   
35  See *RYHUQPHQW¶V $QVZHU LQ Padilla v. Commander C. T. Haft C/A. 02:02-2221-26AJ, 
8/30/2004.  
36 See0-$XNHUPDQµ:DU Crime, or War Crime? Interrogating the Analogy between War 
DQG &ULPH¶ LQ ' /LQQDQ (ed), Enemy Combatants, Terrorism, and Armed Conflict Law: A 
Guide to the Issues (Westport: Praeger, 2008).  
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6XFK WHUPVDV µHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶ UHSUHVHQWDQDPDOJDPDWLRQRIZRUGV
with multiple dimensions aimed at inventing different, all-inclusive and 
hybrid categories of persons. At the same time, the executive apparatus 
employs a multitude of different law models in a separate manner to fulfil 
its purposes in its counter-terrorism operations. As regards the particular 
case of internment, the US executive has used the three schemes of 
µHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶µLPPLJUDWLRQGHWHQWLRQ¶DQGµZLWQHVVPDWHULDO¶37 Due 
to the limited space of this thesis, we must pay attention to the scheme of 
µHQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ LQ WKDW it holds a closer proximity to the historical 
enquires of this thesis. Through exploring the particularities of these 
schemes, we will establish a pattern for discerning the historical 
continuity, and also explore the modes in which the US executive 
apparatus in counter-terrorism has operated in the last decade.  
3. Internment of Enemy Combatants  
 
Soon after 9/11, it became clear that the US was intent on pursuing a 
war/armed conflict approach in its counter-terrorism operations. In legal 
terms, this meant a marginalisation of the criminal justice system in 
favour of a security apparatus.38 Inevitably, this military response to the 
problem of terrorism had implications of its own. One such implication was 
that instead of reliance on a system of law enforcement for neutralising 
criminals, it would subject the perceived enemies/criminals/terrorists to 
measures such as targeting and internment. This choice of legal 
framework was by itself problematic, because of the counter-terrorism 
dimension to the military operations of the US. The problem was that 
counter-terrorism had always been viewed as a law enforcement issue in 
                                                          
37 See, D. Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on 
Terrorism (New York: New Press, 2003) at 18-46.  
38 SeeIRUH[DPSOH(30\MHU1':KLWHµ7KH7ZLQ7RZHUV$WWDFN$Q8QOLPLWHG5LJKWWR
Self-GHIHQFH¶Journal of Conflict and Security Law 5.  
246 
 
international law.39 This was not compatible with the view taken by the US 
officials, since they had by the time of invading Afghanistan made it clear 
that their counter-terrorism measures was to large degree part of a 
broader military response model. As Brownlie has pointed out:  
There is no law of terrorism and the problems must be 
characterised in accordance with the applicable sectors of public 
international law; jurisdiction, criminal justice, state 
responsibility and so forth.40  
What this means in tKHFRQWH[W RI µZDURQ WHUURU¶ LV WKDWQRPDWWHUKRZ
pervasive the American claim of counter-terrorism in places such as 
Afghanistan, the legal framework governing such matters as internment 
must be driven from the specific legal model designated to govern specific 
conditions (IHL in the case of Afghanistan). Unfortunately, the Bush 
Administration could not give countenance to the idea of bringing its 
internment operations under the parameters of the laws of armed conflict. 
This was particularly true for the internees transferred to Guantanamo Bay 
and assigned with the innovative status of enemy combatants. There were 
a number of reasons for the reluctance of the Bush Administration to 
submit to the IHL standards on internment. Firstly, the Bush 
Administration was intent not to include the persons detained in 
Guantanamo Bay in the categories of persons in the Geneva Conventions. 
In its view, terrorist suspects with alleged ties to Al Qaeda and Taliban 
were neither PoWs nor civilians within the meaning of Geneva 
Conventions. This is a very similar technique as that used by the Lieber 
&RGHLQRUGHUWRSODFHWKRVHKHOGRQWKHVXVSLFLRQRI µVS\LQJ¶ µGLVOR\DOW\¶
DQGµZDUWUHDVRQ¶RQWKHDEVROXWHGLVFUHWLRQRIWKH$PHULFDQH[HFXWLYH41 
                                                          
39 See / 9DQ 'HQ +HULN 1 6FKULMYHU µ7KH )UDJPHQWHG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /HJDO 5HVSRQVH WR
7HUURULVP¶ LQ / 9DQ 'HQ +HULN 1 6FKULMYHU (eds), Counter-Terrorism Strategies in a 
Fragmented International Legal Order (Cambridge: CUP, 2013).  
40 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008) at 745.  
41 6RPHZULWHUVKDYHJRQHIXUWKHUWRDUJXHWKDWXVLQJWKHODQJXDJHRIµWHUURULVWV¶RUµXQODZIXO
HQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI H[FOXGLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV GHVFULEHG DV VXFK IURP WKH
protections of IHL bears a resemblance to a historical point in the US, when the predominant 
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Also, the fact that these individuals are placed at the discretion of the 
detaining power and are exempted from particular guarantees of 
constitutional and international law had explicitly been recognised in the 
case of Quirin.42 This argument was in different forms made by the Bush 
Administration in cases emerging from the Guantanamo Bay.43  
Another reason for the Bush Administration to avoid applying the 
standards of IHL was that it could give the US executive a freehand on 
both the interrogation of detainees and detaining individuals on the basis 
of their intelligence value. In this regard, it is vital to note that IHL puts 
some concrete restraints on the power to interrogate PoWs.44 However, 
the matter of interrogation of civilians in the laws of armed conflict is very 
ambiguous. The ICRC position, as articulated in the previous chapter, has 
been that internment cannot be done with the sole purpose of intelligence 
gathering.45 In fact, as Goodman has forcefully argued: 
the implications of allowing intelligence value as an 
independent ground for long-term or indefinite detention are 
intolerable. Doing so might permit the confinement of 
individuals, such as the children or other family members of 
combatants, who have no engagement in hostilities but have 
personal knowledge about the combatants.46 
                                                                                                                                                        
OHJDOGHEDWHZDV µKRZ WR ILJKW VDYDJH WULEHV¶$$QJKLH Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2004) at 289.  
42 Ex parte Quirin, 317 US Supreme Court. Also, refer to the statements of the US Attorney 
General in the case of Quirin as cited and analysed in the previous chapter.  
43 )RU H[DPSOH ZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH HQWLWOHPHQW RI WKRVH FKDUDFWHULVHG DV µXQODZIXO HQHP\
FRPEDWDQWV¶WKH%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VODZ\HUVDUJXHGµDQ\VXJJHVWLRQRIDJHQHUDOL]HGGXH
process right under the Fifth Amendment could not be squared with, inter alia, the historical 
XQDYDLODELOLW\RIDQ\ULJKWWRSURPSWFKDUJHVRUFRXQVHOIRUWKRVHKHOGDVHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld ±  *RYHUQPHQW¶V 0RWLRQ WR 'LVPLVV DQG ZLWK UHJDUG WKH
application of Geneva Conventions, the position of the Bush Administration is captured in the 
following terms, as expressed in the case of Hamdan (infra µ>H@YHQ LI WKH *HQHYD
Conventions were judicially enforceable, it is inapplicable to the ongoing conflict with al 
4DHGDDQGWKXVGRHVQRWDVVLVWSHWLWLRQHU¶ Hamdan v. Rumsfeld - 2/23/2006.  
44 Refer to chapter IV, section 5.2. 
45 Refer to chapter IV, section 7.2.  
46 5*RRGPDQµ5DWLRQDOHVIRU'HWHQWLRQ6HFXULW\7KUHDWVDQG,QWHOOLJHQFH9DOXH¶
International Law Studies available 1, at 8.   
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Once again, these standards could not satisfy the endeavours of the Bush 
Administration, since it viewed the issue of interrogation and intelligence 
gathering as the strongest driving force of many internment practices.47 
Drawing on this, it is clear that using the IHL schemata would seriously 
minimise the freedom of the American executive in its resorts to 
interrogation in general and its peculiar assertion of permissible coercive 
interrogation techniques in particular. Here, the problem of merging a 
counter-terrorism framework with that of IHL can clearly be highlighted. 
The counter-terrorism model is intertwined with the sphere of criminal 
justice. The reason for this is almost tautological. Terrorism is a crime, and 
addressing it implies bringing the penal system into play. Under this 
system, interrogation is a natural means of fighting crime and establishing 
evidence.48 On the other hand, IHL is focused on reducing the excesses of 
warfare, and providing a set of permissible means for conducting 
hostilities without disproportionately affecting humanitarian 
considerations. The IHL mechanism hardly has anything to say on either 
the criminal law issues or the methods of fighting crime. Its concern lies in 
minimizing the degree of harm inflicted upon civilians, including civilian 
detainees, whilst at the same time accepting enough flexibility for states 
to have recourse to particular practices such as internment. Given the 
somehow incompatible nature of the IHL and criminal justice models, the 
US executive built its apparatus of detaining authority in between IHL and 
criminal justice models. To this end, a heavy reliance was made on the 
FRQFHSW RI µHQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ ZKLFK RQ WKH VXUIDFH UHVHPEOHV D WHUP
                                                          
47 0 & :D[PDQ µ$GPLQLVWUDWLYH'HWHQWLRQ ,QWHJUDWLQJ6WUDWHJ\ DQG ,QVWLWXWLRQDO 'HVLJQ¶
(2008) published by the Brookings Institution, at 12.  
48 See IRU H[DPSOH 0 & :D[PDQ µ'HWHQWLRQ DV 7DUJHWLQJ 6WDQGDUGV RI &HUWDLQW\ DQG
'HWHQWLRQRI6XVSHFWHG7HUURULVWV¶Columbia Law Review 1366, at 1373-1379.  
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belonging to the realm of IHL, but in practice entails some important 
elements of criminal law.49  
7R XQGHUVWDQG WKLV IXQFWLRQ RI WKH WHUP µHQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ LW LV
QHFHVVDU\WRVHHWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶DVSURYLGHGE\WKH
Military Commission Act of 2006 (MCA): 
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully 
and materially supported hostilities against the United States or 
its co-belligerents who is  not a lawful enemy combatant 
(including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or 
associated forces);  
 
(ii) or a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment 
of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined 
to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established 
under the authority of the President or the Secretary of 
Defense.50 
2QHRIWKHQRWHVRILQWHUHVWLQWKHDERYHSDVVDJHLVµPDWHULDOVXSSRUW¶,W
is noteworthy that neither the treaty-based rules of IHL, nor any 
authoritative interpretation of such rules has eveUOLQNHGµPDWHULDOVXSSRUW¶
DVDTXDOLILHUIRUµFRPEDWDQF\¶LQDUPHGFRQIOLFWV51 At the same time, the 
86)HGHUDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW¶VSURYLVLRQVRQµDLGLQJDQGDEHWWLQJ¶LQWKHFULPH
RI WHUURULVPEHDUVWULNLQJVLPLODULWLHV WR WKHHOHPHQWRI µPDWHULDOVXSSRUW¶ 
SUHVHQWLQWKHVXSSOLHGGHILQLWLRQRIµHQHP\FRPEDWDQW¶52 
Creating this hybrid category of persons could provide the US executive 
with two distinct advantages. In the first place, on the basis of the close 
SUR[LPLW\RIWKHFRQFHSWXDOGHVLJQRIWKHWHUPµHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶WRWKH
vocabulary of IHL, the US government could assert a broad authority to 
                                                          
49  See IRU H[DPSOH $ 0 'DQQHU µ'HILQLQJ 8QODZIXO (QHP\ &RPEDWDQWV $ &HQWULSHWDO
StoU\¶   Texas International Law Journal  RU - *ULIILWK µ7KH 7HQVLRQV EHWZHHQ
µ&ULPLQDO¶DQGµ(QHP\¶DV&DWHJRULHVIRU*OREDOL]HG7HUURULVP¶International Journal 
of Applied Philosophy 107  
50 S. 984a, Military Commissions Act Of 2006, Public Law 109±366²OCT. 17, 2006. 
51 In this regard, it is also useful to bear in mind the question of associated forces. See, M. 
/HGHUPDQµ$VVRFLDWHG)RUFHVKDVDOHJDOPHDQLQJ«EXWLW¶VQRWµHYHU\JURXSWKDWFDOOVLWVHOIDO
4DHGD¶DYDLODEOHDWhttp://justsecurity.org/2014/02/04/associated-forces-has-legal-meaning-
not-every-group-calls-al-qaeda/.  
52 Danner, above note 49, at 9-10. 
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intern individuals under IHL.53 The assertion of this broad authority under 
IHL serves multiple purposes. Firstly, it would erect a wall against the 
possibility of judicial review, since under IHL, there exists no obligation of 
judicial review. This would in turn give the executive a freedom to put 
administrative bodies in place for reviewing the necessity of internment 
practice. 54  The preferred method of the US in this regard was using 
military commissions. Finally a reliance on the rules of IHL would, 
according to the US government, result in a displacement of the IHRL 
based on the US understanding of the principle of lex specialis.55  
The second advantage of having this intermediate area is that bringing 
FULPLQDOODZHOHPHQWVZLWKWKHIDEULFRIµHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶IDFLOLWDWHVWKH
resort to such measures as interrogation and intelligence gathering. At the 
same time, this hybrid category broadens the category of persons 
VXVFHSWLEOH WREHGHVLJQDWHGDV µHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶7KHUHIRUHHYHQ86
citizens were not exempted from being detained indefinitely and even as 
                                                          
53 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*RYHUQPHQW¶V6XSUHPH&RXUW%ULHI 
54 Refer to chapter IV, section 7.4. 
55 De Londras, above note 21. Of course, as was mentioned above, another argument that 
both the Bush and Obama Administrations have exploited to prevent the application of 
human rights is the territorial limits of jurisdiction. However, it seems that even some State 
'HSDUWPHQW¶VOHJDl advisers had thrown doubts into the legal accuracy of this argument. For 
example, it appears from a leaked legal memorandum that Koh had warned the US executive 
WKDW D GLVWLQFWLRQ PXVW EH PDGH EHWZHHQ µUHVSHFWLQJ¶ DQG µHQVXULQJ¶ WKH KXPDQ ULJKWV
obligations of states. According to Koh, the US may not be in a position to ensure the 
fulfilment of its human rights obligations outside its territory, but it is certainly obliged to 
UHVSHFW WKHP 0 0LODQRYLF µ+DUROG .RK¶V /HJDO 2SLQLRQV RQ WKH 86 3RVLWLRQ RQ Whe 
Extraterritorial Application RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV 7UHDWLHV¶ DYDLODEOH DW 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/harold-kohs-legal-opinions-on-the-us-position-on-the-extraterritorial-
application-of-human-rights-treaties/  
More recently, the Human Rights Committee criticised the US government for its view of the 
extra-territorial inapplicability of international human rights law. In this regard, the 
Committee noted:  
The Committee regrets that the State party continues to maintain its position that the 
Covenant does not apply with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction but outside its 
territory, despite the contrary interpreWDWLRQ RI $UWLFOH  VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH &RPPLWWHH¶V
established jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and state 
practice. Human Rights Committee  
Concluding observations on the fourth report of the United States of America (Unedited 
Version) March 2014 available at  
http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/UN-ICCPR-Concluding-Observations-
USA.pdf.  
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EHLQJ FKDUDFWHULVHG DV µHQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ 56  Once again, the final 
outcome of this setting is a sharp increase in the discretion of the US 
executive at the expense of both IHL and criminal justice systems.  
Before ending this section, it is useful to refer to what may well be a 
KLVWRULFDODQWHFHGHQWWRWKHFDWHJRU\RIµHQHP\FRPEDWDQW¶GHWDLQHHV²and 
that is detainees held on the suspicion of treason. As mentioned on 
several occasions in this thesis, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, 
%ULWLVK HPHUJHQF\ OHJLVODWLRQ PDGH DQ H[WHQVLYH XVH RI µWUHDVRQ DQG
FRHUFLRQ DFWV¶ WR VXVSHQG WKH ZULW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV +RZHYHU, one 
SDUWLFXODU XVH RI WKH FULPH RI µWUHDVRQ¶ LQ WKH HLJKWHHQWK FHQWXU\ EHDUV
VRPH VLPLODULWLHV ZLWK WKH $PHULFDQ FRQFHSWLRQ RI µJUH\ DUHDV¶ RI UXOHV
concepts and persons and that is the suspension bill of 1777, which would 
DXWKRULVH WKH NLQJ µWR GHWDLQ and secure persons charged with/or 
suspected of high treason committed in North America or on the high 
VHDVRU RISLUDF\¶&OHDUO\%ULWDLQZDV LQDZDUDJDLQVWD IRUPHU FRORQ\
purporting to gain its independence. But at the same time, to call the 
AmericaQ GHWDLQHHV FDSWXUHG LQ WKLV FRORQLDO ZDU µSULVRQHUV RI ZDU¶ ZDV
tantamount to recognising their claim of independence. To avoid this far-
reaching consequence, the British colonisers relied on a concept which 
somehow oscillated between an act of war and a crime, namely that of 
treason. 57  Also as was examined in the previous chapter, the term 
µXQSULYLOHJHG EHOOLJHUHQWV¶ DV GHYLVHG E\ %D[WHU JDLQHG VRPH VXSSRUW LQ
Britain in 1950s.58 As discussed in detail in the previous chapter, the legal 
connotations of the FRQFHSW RI µXQSULYLOHJHG EHOOLJHUHQWV¶ ZDV VLPLODU WR
                                                          
56  M. Henn, Under the Colour of Law: The Bush Administration Subversion of US 
Constitutional and International Law in the War on Terror (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010) 
at 171.  
57 Refer to chapter I, section 3. 
58 55%D[WHUµ6R-FDOOHGµ8QSULYLOHJHG%HOOLJHUHQF\¶ 6SLHV*XHUULOODVDQG6DERWHXUV¶
28 British Year Book of International Law 323. Also refer to the discussion on this topic in 
chapter IV. 
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µXQODZIXO FRPEDWDQWV¶ LQ VRPH UHVSHFWV DQG GLIIHUHQW LQ RWKHUV 59 
,QWHUHVWLQJO\ZKHQFULWLFLVPVDJDLQVWµXQODZIXOFRPEDWDQWV¶PRXQWHGWKH
2EDPD $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ WHPSRUDULO\ XVHG WKH WHUP µXQSULYLOHJHG HQemy 
EHOOLJHUHQWV¶60 +RZHYHU WKLV VKLIW WR WKH WHUP µXQSULYLOHJHG EHOOLJHUHQWV¶
did not prove to last long.     
3.1. Enemy Combatants in Guantanamo Bay  
In the opening phases of the conflict in Afghanistan, when the first wave 
of  individuals with alleged ties with the Taliban had fallen into the hands 
of the US troops, the Presidential Military Order on Detention Treatment 
and Trial of Certain Non-&LWL]HQV LQ WKH :DU DJDLQVW 7HUURULVP¶ ZDV
issued.61 In this order the President reserved for himself the authority to 
determine which individuals can be subjected to the PMO (Presidential 
Military Order). Less than three months later, the first group of detainees 
were transported to Guantanamo, a naval base in Cuba under the control 
of the US. Much has been written on the legal status of Guantanamo and 
there is no need for us to repeat and analyse this issue again.62 What is 
important is the rationale behind the tactical move of transferring 
detainees to an overseas location, thereby preventing the application of 
the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus for Guantanamo 
detainees.63  
As mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis, sending detainees to 
remote overseas areas for preserving the detention authority from the 
scrutiny of the writ of habeas corpus was an often-used British technique, 
                                                          
59 Refer to chapter IV, section 5.1. 
60 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, § 948a(7), Pub. L. No. 111-84, 
123 Stat. 2190, 2575. 
61 Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War against Terrorism.  
62  See, IRU H[DPSOH ' &ROH µ5LJKWV Rver Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and 
*XDQWDQDPR%D\¶Cato Supreme Court Review 47.  
63 For viewing more details on the historical debate on the concept of territoriality in the 
American constitutional law, see, K. Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag: the 
Evolution of Territoriality in American Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009).  
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LQYHQWHGE\&URPZHOO¶VFRXQFLO7KHUHDVRQIRUWKLVDVDUJXHGLQWKHILUVW
FKDSWHUZDV&URPZHOO¶VDZDUHQHVVRIWKHMXGLFLDODXWKRULWLHV¶UHVLVWDQFHWR
his claim of possessing sweeping detention powers. 64  As Halliday has 
observed µ&URPZHOO¶V SURWHFWRUDO UHJLPH KDG KRSHG WKDW ZDWHU DQG
PLOLWDU\ FRQWURO RI ,VODQG FDVWOHVZRXOG SXW SULVRQHUV EH\RQG WKH FRXUW¶V
VXSHUYLVLRQ¶65 2QHFDQUHSODFHWKHSKUDVHµ&URPZHOO¶VSURWHFWRUDOUHJLPH¶
LQ +DOOLGD\¶V GHVFULSWLRQ ZLWK µWKH %XVK $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶ DQG DSSO\ WKH
exact same formula to the situation in the Guantanamo Bay. This 
technique survived after Cromwell, 66  DQG WKH %XVK $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
decision to transport the detainees captured in different places to 
Guantanamo Bay represents the latest version of this tactic to escape from 
the intervention of the most important writ of common law, habeas 
corpus.67  
In America, ranging from the application of the US constructional 
guarantees in Philippines in the wake of the American-Spanish War68 to 
the habeas corpus cases emerging from the Far-East in the wake of the 
Second World (infra), to the legal situation of American citizens settled in 
the American military stations abroad,69 to the legal status of Guantanamo 
detainees, the issue of the extra-territorial coverage of the US 
constitutional guarantees such as habeas corpus has signified one of the 
most enduring legal challenges of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
In short, to understand the legal basis of the policy of the Bush 
Administration in transporting detainees to Guantanamo, it is vital to pay 
regard to a case that found favour with the Bush Administration, Johnson 
                                                          
64 Refer to chapter I, section 5. 
65 P. D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2010) at 231.  
66 Ibid.  
67 It must not be forgotten that the US Supreme Court had in early 1950s considered the 
reach of the writ of habeas corpus as extending to American detainees held abroad. See, 
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).  
68 Anghie, above note 41, at 281-282.  
69 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).  
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v. Eisentrager.70 This case concerned twenty-one German nationals, who 
had been convicted by military commissions in &KLQDµRIYLRODWLQJODZVRI
war by engaging in, permitting, or ordering continued military activity 
against the United States after surrender of Germany and before 
VXUUHQGHURI-DSDQ¶71 The German detainees applied for the writ of habeas 
corpus in the District Court. Their case finally reached into the Supreme 
Court of the United States, which refuted the possibility of their 
entitlement to the writ of habeas corpus, on the basis that petitioners 
were non-resident enemy aliens.72 In the absence of the existence of the 
$PHULFDQFLYLOFRXUWV¶ MXULVGLFWLRQRYHUWKH LQWHUQPHQWDQGSXQLVKPHQWRI
the non-resident enemy aliens, the US Supreme Court concluded that the 
American military commissions established by the US in China did have 
MXULVGLFWLRQµWRDFFXVHWU\DQGFRQGHPQ¶WKH*HUPDQGHWDLQHHV 
In the eyes of the Bush Administration, the issue of the availability of 
habeas corpus to the Guantanamo detainees was governed by the 
Eisentrager precedent. Therefore, in response to the first wave of habeas 
petitions filed by the Guantanamo detainees, the US executive position 
ZDVWKDW µEistenrager controls this case and makes clear that there is no 
EDVLVIRULQYRNLQJIHGHUDOMXGLFLDOSRZHULQDQ\GLVWULFW¶73 The difficulty was 
that petitioners in Eisentrager were enemy aliens, whilst many detainees 
held at Guantanamo were not nationals of a country with which the US 
was at war. 74  Here, the executive lawyers made an interesting 
REVHUYDWLRQ µ7KH NH\ >LQ WKH FDVH RI Eisentrager] was that prisoners 
                                                          
70 Johnson v. Eisentrager 339 U.S. 763 (1950) 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid.  
73 Rasul v. Bush *RYHUQPHQW¶V 0RWLRQ WR 'LVPLVV  LQ . *UHHQEHUJ et al, The 
Enemy Combatant Papers above note 15 (Cambridge: CUP, 2008) at 26-30.  
74 On different interpretations of Eisentrager, see5+)DOORQ'0HOW]HU µ+DEHDV&RUSXV
-XULVGLFWLRQ 6XEVWDQWLYH 5LJKWV DQG WKH :DU RQ 7HUURU¶   Harvard Law Review 
2032, at 2056.  
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before [the Supreme Court] ZHUH KHOG DEURDG¶75 At the same time, the 
Bush Administration argued that the petitioners were enemy aliens for the 
purposes of Eisentrager.76 7KH86H[HFXWLYH¶VFODLPVLQWKHFDVHRIRasul 
v. Bush were entertained by the circuit court.77 Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court took a completely different approach to the question of the 
availability of habeas corpus to the detainees in Guantanamo. The 
different approach of the US Supreme Court first and foremost manifested 
itself in assuming a distinction between the case before it and that of 
Eisentrager:  
Petitioners here differ from the Eisentrager detainees in 
important respects: They are not nationals of countries at war 
with the United States, and they deny that they have engaged 
in or plotted acts of aggression against this country; they have 
never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less charged 
with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years 
they have been imprisoned in territory over which the United 
States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.78 
Therefore, the US Supreme Court rejected the territorial argument of the 
%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQDQGSRVLWHGWKDWWKH86H[HUFLVHGµXQFKDOOHQJHGDQG
LQGHILQLWHFRQWURO¶RYHU*XDQWDQDPR%D\79 An equally important argument 
by the Supreme Court rested on the indeterminacy of the status of 
prisoners held in Guantanamo Bay. In the words of Justice Kennedy:  
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay are being held indefinitely, and 
without benefit of any legal proceeding to. determine their 
status.80 
The most significant aspect of Rasul v. Bush was the defeat of the US 
executive on the subject of the territorial limits of habeas corpus. 
However, it also entailed another consequence that could be read to mean 
that insofar as no procedure had been established to determine the status 
                                                          
75 Rasul v. Bush, above note 73. 
76 Ibid.  
77 Above note 73. 
78 Rasul et al v. Bush, US Supreme Court, 03-334-343, 2004, at 2.  
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid.  
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of the Guantanamo detainees, their entitlement to habeas corpus could 
not have been challenged. The Bush Administration shifted its strategy in 
the light of the ruling of Rasul v. Bush. However, this was also motivated 
by another decision of the US Supreme Court delivered on the same day 
as Rasul v. Bush, namely, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.81 Here, we must shortly 
describe the relevant facts in Hamdi to arrive at the rationale behind some 
of the legal strategies of the Bush Administration.  
Yaser Hamdi possessed dual citizenship of the US and Saudi Arabia. In 
2001, he was captured in Afghanistan in possession of a Kalashnikov, 
according to the US government. The US government also asserted that 
Hamdi EHORQJHGWRD7DOLEDQXQLW+HZDVDOOHJHGO\GHWHUPLQHGE\µWKH86
PLOLWDU\VFUHHQLQJ WHDPWRPHHW WKHFULWHULD IRUHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶ DQG
subsequently, was transferred to Guantanamo Bay.82 Upon learning that 
Hamdi was a US citizen, The US government transported Hamdi to a naval 
EULJLQ6RXWK&DUROLQD+DPGL¶VIDWKHUILOHGDSHWLWLRQIRUDZULWRIKDEHDV
corpus, and asserted that 1) the US executive did not have authority to 
detain an American citizen and that 2) Hamdi was entitled to challenge the 
grounds of his detention.83 After being exchanged several times between 
the fourth district court and the court of appeal, finally, the US Supreme 
Court decreed that the US executive possessed the authority to detain 
citizens. Nevertheless, the Court held that the detained citizens were 
entitled to the writ of habeas corpus because of the absence of a 
congressional suspension of habeas corpus.84 
However, two conspicuous features stood out in the course of the 
UHDVRQLQJRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQHamdi. First of all, the Court 
                                                          
81 US Supreme Court, Hamdi v. Rumslfeld, No. 03-6696. 
82 Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defence for 
Policy, 24 July 2002. 
83 Hamdi v. Rumslfeld, above note 81.  
84 Ibid.  
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GLGQRWVKRZDQ\GLVFRPIRUWZLWKWKHXVHRIWKHWHUPµHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶
by the US executive. In fact, the Court did not say anything about the 
DEVHQFHRIWKHFDWHJRU\RI µHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶LQ*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQV85 
Instead, the Court in a very vague manner put some emphasis on the 
standards of the third Geneva Convention governing internment of 
PoWs. 86  6XFK HPSKDVHV PDGH WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ DOO WKH PRUH
confusing, since Hamdi was a US citizen.87 Of course, this reluctance of 
the US Supreme Court to question the legality of constructing a category 
of persons not mentioned in Geneva Conventions and labelling an 
American citizen as such could and did find favour in the Bush 
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V SUDFWLFH RI FRQWLQXLQJ WR LQYRNH WKH WHUP µHQHP\
combatDQWV¶$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKH866XSUHPH&RXUWUHSHDWHGO\LQYRNHG
its judgment in Quirin case, which as some dissenting judges mentioned, 
µZDVQRW>WKH@&RXUW¶VILQHVWKRXU¶88 
Secondly, even though the Court accepted the entitlement of Hamdi to the 
writ of KDEHDV FRUSXV LW DOVR UHVHUYHG D SRVVLELOLW\ WKDW µD SURSHUO\
FRQVWLWXWHG PLOLWDU\ WULEXQDO¶ FRXOG SURYLGH GXH SURFHVV IRU GHWDLQHHV 89 
This was quite compatible with the ruling of the US Supreme Court in 
Rasul, which emphasised the necessity of having a procedural mechanism 
to determine the status of Guantanamo detainees.90 However, both in the 
cases of Rasul and Hamdi, the Court did not enter into the matter of 
                                                          
85 See DOVR ' 0RHFNOL µ7KH 86 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V µ(QHP\ &RPEDWDQW¶ 'HFLVLRQV $ µ0DMRU
9LFWRU\IRUWKH5XOHRI/DZ¶"¶Journal of Conflict and Security Law 75, at 81-83.  
86 There also exists another possibility, that is, the US Supreme Court took the statuses of 
PoWs and enemy combatants to have the same meaning, and it was not necessarily 
LQWHUSUHWLQJWKHWHUPµHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶ LQWKH OLJKWQuirin WHUPLQRORJ\QDPHO\ µXQODZIXO
HQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶See, J. %ORFKHUµ&RPEDWDQW6WDWXV5HYLHZ7ULEXQDOV)ODZHG$QVZHUVWR
WKH:URQJ4XHVWLRQV¶-2007) 116 Yale Law Journal 667. Unfortunately, the matter was 
not clarified in the subsequent judgment of the US Supreme Court, and to this date, it 
remains a subject of confusion.  
87 One possible explanation from this reasoning of the US Supreme Court emanates from its 
produced jurisprudence in WW II, when some of the US citizens at arms against the United 
6WDWHV¶ZHUHWUHDWHGDV3R:V6,9ODGHFNµ$6PDOO3UREOHPof Precedent: 8 U.S.C. 4001(a) 
DQGWKH'HWHQWLRQRI86&LWL]HQ(QHP\&RPEDWDQWV$3ROLF\&RPPHQW¶-2003) 112 
Yale Law Journal 961, at 967.  
88 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, above note 81.  
89 Ibid.  
90 Moeckli, above note 85, at 92.  
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µVSHFLILFVRIWKHUHOHYDQWSURFHHGLQJV¶DQGDVVXFKOHIWDEURDGVSDFHIRU
the peculiar interpretations of the executive. In the following section, we 
shall examine how the Bush Administration understood this obligation of 
according due process to detainees.   
3.2. The response of Bush to the rulings of the US Supreme Court and the 
issue of military commissions  
Just a few days after the judgment of the US Supreme Court on Rasul v. 
BushDPHPRUDQGXPIRUµ(VWDEOLVKLQJ&RPEDWDQW6WDWXV5HYLHZ7ULEXQDO¶
defined enemy combatants in the following terms:  
7KHWHUPµHQHP\FRPEDWDQW¶VKDOOPHDQDQindividual who was 
part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated 
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States 
or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has 
committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities 
in aid of enemy armed forces.91 
This was the first response of the Bush Administration to remedy the lack 
of procedural guarantees for the purpose of determining the status of 
Guantanamo detainees. The procedures built in the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal were particularly shaky. 92  According to the order 
authorising the operation of this tribunal, detainees could only be informed 
RI µWKH XQFODVVLILHG EDVLV IRU WKHLU GHVLJQDWLRQ DV HQHP\ FRPEDWDQW¶ 93 
Furthermore, this tribunal was bound neither by presumption of innocence 
(or a presumptive PoW status, as required by Article 5 of the GC III), nor 
by procedures governing the credibility of evidentiary grounds.94 At the 
same time, it provided for access tR µSHUVRQDO UHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶ DQGQRW D
lawyer, and finally, it only possessed an advisory function.95 At the same 
WLPH DQRWKHU SURFHGXUH ZDV SXW LQ SODFH UHIHUUHG WR DV µ)LQDO
                                                          
91 Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, 7 July 2004.  
92 In Re Guantanamo Bay Litigation 355 F.Supp. 2d 443 (DDC 2005).  
93 Order establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, above note 91. 
94 Ibid.  
95 For the legality of tribunals with advisory function, refer to chapter IV, section 7.4. 
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$GPLQLVWUDWLYH5HYLHZ3URFHGXUHVIRU*XDQWDQDPR'HWDLQHHV¶7KLVVHFRQG
procedure was tasked with monitoring whether, in the course of time, the 
WKUHDW SRVHG E\ DQ µHQHP\ FRPEDWDQW¶ ZRXOG FRQWLQXH WR H[LVW RU
otherwise be neutralised. 96  This would complement the Military 
Commission Order 1 convened in 2002.97 Together, these parallel systems 
were appointed to replace the obligation of the US to conduct Article 5 
hearings mandated by the GC III to see whether at least some of the 
Guantanamo detainees could be considered as PoWs.98 
Immediately after commencing their operations, military commissions 
became one of the most controversial features associated with the 
Guantanamo internments. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that in 
the history of common law, there has always existed a great deal of 
sensitivity about the topic of military commissions. The principal reason for 
this sensitivity, as discussed in chapter I, is that the authorisation of 
military commissions has normally been viewed as a consequence of 
martial law. In British political culture, martial law evokes discomforting 
memories of British colonial encounters in such catastrophes as the 
Jamaican affair (1865), the Anglo-Boer war (1899-192), and the Amritsar 
massacre (1919).99 Also, in the American judicial and political system, the 
WHUPµPDUWLDOODZ¶EULQJVWRPLQG/LQFROQ¶Vbroad assertion of authority to 
detain and try citizens by military commissions.100 However in America, 
martial law also acts as a reminder of a decision of the US Supreme Courts 
                                                          
96 3UHVV5HOHDVHµ&&5FDOOV*XDQWDQDPR5HYLHZ3ROLF\µ,QDGHTXDWHDQG,OOHJDO¶LQ05DWQHU
E. Ray, Guantanamo: What the World Should Know about (Canada: Chelsea Green Publishing 
Company, 2004) at 157. 
97  Although the rules for Guantanamo military commissions had been issued as early as 
March 2002, their operation was delayed until August 2004. H. Duffy, The War on Terror and 
the Framework of International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2005) at 389. 
98 -%ORFKHU µ&RPEDWDQW6WDWXV5HYLHZ7ULEXQDOV)ODZHG$QVZHUV WR WKH:URQJ4XHVWLRQ¶
(2006-2007) 116 Yale Law Journal 667, 667-669. 
99 Refer to chapter I, section 9. 
100 See for example, B. McGinty, The Body of John Merryman: Abraham Lincoln and the 
Suspension of Habeas Corpus (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).  
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often praised in heroic words, Ex parte Miligan.101 The US Supreme Court 
held in WKDWFDVHWKDWPLOLWDU\FRPPLVVLRQVFDQQRWRSHUDWHµLQDVWDWHQRW
invaded and not engaged in rebellion, in which the Federal Courts were 
RSHQ¶102 No wonder, then, when the presidential authority in convening 
military commissions for Guantanamo detainees was challenged by 
Hamdan in the US Supreme Court, some legal historians were among the 
first groups to send amici curiae in support of Hamdan.103 The purpose of 
these submissions was to convince the US Supreme Court that its decision 
in Quirin must not be relied upon as a precedential case in its view of 
PLOLWDU\FRPPLVVLRQV,QIDFWDVVRPHRIWKHVHKLVWRULDQVRSLQHGµQuirin 
LVDSRLVRQHGSUHFHGHQW¶104 
Quirin was a troublesome case in a number of regards. Apart from 
FRQVWUXFWLQJ WKH FDWHJRU\ RI µXQODZIXO HQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ DQG WDNLQJ
µXQODZIXO FRPEDWDQF\¶ DV D EDVLV IRU D FULPLQDO OLDELOLW\105 Quirin totally 
departed from the threshold of the closure of civil courts for permitting 
military commissions to function. Here, one may ask why the Roosevelt 
Administration was compelled to appoint military commissions in the first 
place when civil courts were available. The reason was that the executive 
lawyers had speculated that prosecuting the German saboteurs involved in 
that case in the civil courts would be faced by a number of difficulties.106 
The Bush Administration took Quirin as something of a mantra both for 
XVLQJ WKH ODQJXDJH RI µHQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ DQG DXWKRULVLQJ PLOLWDU\
                                                          
101 Ex Parte Milligan 71 U.S. 2 (4 Wall.) (1866). 
102 Ibid.  
103 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld No. 05-184 (2006) 415 F. 3d 33, Brief of Military Law Historians - 
Brief of Legal Scholars and Historians) as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner_ Brief of Legal 
Scholar and Historians on effects of Quirin.  
104 Brief of Historians on effect of Quirin, ibid, at 15.  
105 0'0D[ZHOO60:DWWV µ8QODZIXOHQHP\FRPEDWDQWWKHRU\RIFXOSDELOLW\RUQHLWKHU"¶
(2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 19, at 21. More importantly, and as was 
mentioned in the previous chapter, there is no mention of the teUPµXQODZIXOFRPEDWDQWV¶LQ
WKH ,+/ WUHDWLHV )XUWKHUPRUH $UWLFOH  RI *& ,9 VWLOO HPSOR\V WKH ODQJXDJH RI µSURWHFWHG
SHUVRQV¶IRUVXFKFDWHJRULHVRISHUVRQVDVVSLHVDQGVDERWHXUV 
106 See IRUH[DPSOH:+5HKQTXLVWµ5HPDUNVRI&KLHI-XVWLFH5HKQTXLVW¶ (2002) 78 Notre 
Dame Law Review 1, at 5.  
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commissions.107 Hamdan challenged the legality of such measures against 
the Bush Administration on two major grounds; 1) the principle of the 
separation of power and its requirements 2) the law of armed conflicts. 
The US Supreme Court accepted the petition of Hamdan and ruled, the 
structure and procedures of military commission established to try 
Hamdan was at odds with both the US domestic law108 and the Geneva 
Conventions. However, in its ruling, the US Supreme Court did not 
repudiate the precedential value of Quirin. Rather, it enumerated three 
separate occasions in which military commissions could be established: 1) 
as a substitute for civil courts upon the declaration of martial law; 2) as 
part of temporary military administration of occupied territories, and, 
ILQDOO\µDVDQLQFLGHQWWRWKHFRQGXFWRIZDUSRZHU¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHRI
punishing tKRVH UHVSRQVLEOH IRU YLRODWLQJ µWKH ODZV RIZDU¶109 Quirin, the 
Supreme Court argued, is a representative of the third type of military 
commissions in the order mentioned above. Therefore, the US Supreme 
Court fully accepted the validity of its judgment in Quirin, but, also, it 
SRVLWHGWKDWWKH%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VPLOLWDU\FRPPLVVLRQVIHOODORQJZD\
short of the standards established by Quirin.  
In conveying its conclusions in the case of Hamdan, the Court drew on two 
major arguments. Firstly, it said that the crime with which Hamdan had 
been charged²namely, conspiracy²was not a violation of the laws of 
armed conflict. This in itself, the court posited, questioned the need for 
establishing military commissions.110 
7KHVHFRQGSDUWRIWKHFRXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJZDV predicated upon the question 
of procedure. In this regard, the Court focused on both the US domestic 
laws and the Geneva Conventions. As regards the former, the Court noted 
                                                          
107 See, S,9ODGHFNµ7KH'HWHQWLRQ3RZHU¶Yale Law and Policy Review 153. 
108 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 47.  
109 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, above note 103, at 32.  
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that military commissions were not meant to signify a miniature version of 
courts martial, rather as a tribunal of necessity to be employed, when the 
courts-martial lack jurisdiction. Thus, there was no need to curtail the 
ample standards of procedure built in courts-martial for trying the suspect 
military offenders from a logistical point of view. Insofar as the latter 
source of the law was concerned, the Supreme Court briefly came to grips 
with the claim of the Bush Administration that al Qaeda fighters are not 
fully entitled to the protections of Geneva Conventions. However, the 
Court made an interesting assumption. It said that assuming that the Bush 
Administration assertion to the effect of the inapplicability of Geneva 
Conventions to al Qaeda fighters holds true, there still remains an Article 
of Geneva Conventions which must be observed in the conflict against al 
Qaeda, and this was Common Article 3.111 
Among the standards of Common Article 3, the Supreme Court paid a 
special attention to the requirement of establishing tribunals conforming to 
WKH WHVW RI µUHJXODUO\ FRQVWLWXWHG FRXUWV¶ ,Q GHILQLQJ WKH FRQWHQW RI WKLV
phrase, the Court drew on the guarantees articulated in Article 75 of the 
First Additional Protocol, 112  ZKLFK HYHQ E\ WKH %XVK $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
understanding amounted to customary international law. 113  The final 
conclusion was that:  
The Commission that the President has convened to try 
Hamdan does not meet those requirements.114 
Since 2006, much has been written on the perceived strengths and 
fallacies of the US Supreme Court decision in Hamdan. Whilst considering 
many of the legal questions raised by Hamdan go well beyond the scope of 
                                                          
111 Ibid.  
112  Of course, Article 75 governs the conduct of states in international armed conflicts. 
However, there is no barrier to prevent the import of this Article as a matter of customary 
humanitarian law into the realm of internal armed conflicts. ICJ took this view in Nicaragua 
113 :+7DIW,9 µ7KH/DZRI$UPHG&RQIOLFW$IWHU6RPH6DOLHQW)HDWXUHV¶
Yale Journal of International Law 319, at pp. 321-322. 
114 Hamdan, above note 103, at 7.  
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this thesis, 115  we must evaluate one very significant aspect of this 
decision, which in a clear manner fits one of the principal arguments in 
this thesis, namely, the conflict between the subjective authority of states 
and the objective requirements of the law. In this regard, the US Supreme 
&RXUW¶V UHOLDQFH RQ&RPPRQ$UWLFOH  DV D VRXUFH RI ODZ UHVWUDLQLQJ WKH
authority of the American executive is a very strong sign of the 
importance of having a fundamental objective system for determining the 
executive obligations. That is to say, even when the application of the laws 
of armed conflict according to the Bush Administration could not be the 
case, the Court discerned that the presidential determination of the 
practicability of certain measures was not absolute and it must be done in 
compliance with the objective criteria set forth by Common Article 3 at the 
very least.116 Seen in the light of objective versus subjective systems of 
determination, Hamdan must be viewed as a landmark decision, in that 
the absolutism of the subjective decisions of the US executive was 
challenged not only by reliance on such mantras as the separation of 
power, but also by a direct reference to international law.   
The importance of Hamdan decision is multiplied when one considers that 
it also entailed the implication that the US executive cannot single-
handedly purport to interpret its treaty obligations in accordance with its 
own will. In fact, as Arend has written, µHamdan makes it clear that the 
ILQDO ZRUG RQ WUHDW\ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ FRPHV IURP WKH MXGLFLDU\¶117 This in 
itself highlights another limit upon the subjective determination of the 
executive. Alarmed with the restraining effect of Hamdan, the US 
                                                          
115 SeeIRUH[DPSOH1..DW\DOµ+DPGDQY5XVPIHOG: The Legal Academy Goes to 
3UDFWLFH¶Harvard Law Review 5)LW]SDWULFNµ,PSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKH*HQHYD
Conventions Recent Development¶Harvard Human Rights Journal 339, and J. S. 
0DUWLQH]µ,QKHUHQW([HFXWLYH3RZHU$&RPSDUDWLYH3HUVSHFWLYH¶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116 See also, C. Kannady et al µ7KH µ3XVK-3XOO¶ RI WKH /DZ RI :DU 7KH 5XOH RI /DZ DQG
0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQV¶LQ$0DULD6DOLQDV'H)ULDVet al (eds) at 675-676.  
117 A. C. Arendµ:KR
V$IUDLGRIWKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQV"7UHDW\,QWHUSUHWDWLRQLQWKH:DNH
RI +DPGDQ Y 5XPVIHOG¶   American University International Law Review 709, at 
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executive sought to introduce laws which would rule out any possibility of 
the resort to Geneva Conventions for the purpose of challenging the 
executive decisions.118 The US Congress corresponded to these concerns, 
and the result was the Military Commission Act (MCA) of 2006.119 
It is fair to say that the most salient feature of the MCA lies in its devotion 
to reclaim the power of the executive subjective evaluations by imposing 
an extremely limited interpretation of Common Article 3.120 Drawing on 
this premise, the MCA interpreted its own provisions to constitute a 
military commission of the kind compatible with the requirements of 
Common Article 3.121 The only conclusion that can be inferred from this 
self-referential provision of the MCA is that it had been designated to 
invalidate potential references to Common Article 3 for challenging the 
settings of commissions formed under its auspices. In fact, the next 
provision of the MCA makes this intended aim crystal-clear, as it sought to 
counter the very invocation of Geneva Conventions by DQ µDOLHQXQODZIXO
HQHP\ FRPEDWDQW DV D VRXUFH RI ULJKWV¶ 7KLV SURYLVLRQ WRR PDUNV D
distinct hostility towards an international system of objective 
determination. Of course, this reduction in the value of the objective 
treaty obligations could not be attained without increasing the areas of 
deference to the subjective determination of the executive. To this end, 
section 6(3)(A) of the MCA stipulates:  
>«@ WKH 3UHVLGHQW KDV WKH DXWKRULW\ IRU WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV WR
interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva 
Conventions, and to promulgate higher standards and 
administrative regulations for violations of treaty obligations 
>«@122 
                                                          
118 Ibid., at 711-712.  
119 Military Commissions Act of 2006, 109-366.  
120 - 0 %HDUG µ7KH Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and U.S 
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This would bring us to the point zero in terms of the value of the objective 
treaty obligations. To make this point clear, it suffices to submit to a 
rather obvious rationale behind Common Article 3²that is reducing the 
possibility of resorting to prohibited conducts by the executive. Trusting 
the interpretation of such rules in the hands of the very institution whose 
conduct was intended to be regulated by them could only mean providing 
a carte blanche for the executive.123  
Of course some of the complications associated with the rules of the MCA 
arises from the status of international law obligations in the US domestic 
laws. It was seen in chapter II that as early as the nineteenth century, the 
US Congress passed laws inconsistent with the US-China treaty of 
Burlingame. The legality of these laws was approved with no difficulty by 
the US Supreme Court.124 The ratio decidendi behind such an approval was 
that since international law obligations are applied within the US as 
domestic law, they can be replaced or repealed by other domestic laws 
WKURXJK WKH µODWHU-in-WLPH¶ OHJLVODWLRQV 125  This principle, some scholars 
have argued, sheds light on the validity of the MCA.126 In other words, the 
MCA does to the US obligations under Common Article 3, what the so-
FDOOHG µ&KLQHVH ([FOXVLRQ $FW¶ GLG WR WKH %XUOLQJDPH 7UHDW\127 However, 
there is also another reading of the situation, that is, the clash between 
WKH0&$DQGWKHUXOLQJRIWKH866XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQVLQHamdan is 
not that of laws, but interpretations. As Arend haV DUJXHG µ>DQ@
implication that can be drawn from the Hamdan decision is that it seems 
unlikely that Congress can impose by a statute a particular interpretation 
                                                          
123  & 0DQXHO 9D]TXH] µ7KH 0LOLWDU\ &RPPLVVLRQV $FW WKH *HQHYD &RQYHQtions, and the 
&RXUWV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American Journal of International Law 322.  
127 Ibid.  
266 
 
RQDWUHDW\¶128 This also makes sense if reads the matter in the light of the 
Charming Betsy pULQFLSOH DV FRQILJXUHG E\ -XVWLFH 0DUVKDO µDQ DFW RI
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any 
RWKHUSRVVLEOHFRQVWUXFWLRQUHPDLQV¶129 Yet, even this suggestion remains 
contested.130 According to the opponents of this argument, the MCA makes 
LW FOHDU WKDW LW LV D µODWHU-in-WLPH¶ ODZ DQG QRW PHUHO\ D SDUWLFXODU
interpretation131. It is difficult to settle for a middle ground in such a 
peculiar turn of events. However, the MCA is an alarming piece of 
legislation in that it can form a precedent for overriding not only the US 
obligations under international law, but also the judicial interpretations of 
such obligations. In other words, the MCA encapsulates in one piece 
whatever the wrong thaWH[LVWVZLWKWKH$PHULFDQµH[FHSWLRQDOLVP¶WKURXJK
a legalized process.  
The shaky rules of the MCA at times resulted in chaos in the procedures 
JRYHUQLQJ WKH WULDORI*XDQWDQDPRGHWDLQHHVRUDVVRPHKDYHSXW LW µD
system in which uncertainty [was] the norm and where the rules 
DSSHDU>HG@UDQGRPDQGLQGLVFULPLQDWH¶132 This continued until the Obama 
Administration brought about a few reforms in the setting of military 
commissions.  
3.3. The fate of Habeas Corpus after MCA and detention in Obama Years  
Both in 2005 through Detainee Treatment Act,133 and in 2006 through 
Military Commissions Act, Congress sought to limit the issuance of the writ 
of habeas corpus for Guantanamo detainees, and, instead, put a greater 
emphasis on Combatant Status Tribunal Reviews as a substitute measure 
                                                          
128 Arend, above note 117, at 735.   
129 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804 
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for judicial supervision of internments. In 2008, the US Supreme Court 
ruled that the CSRT process could not be seen as an adequate substitute 
for the writ of habeas corpus, and therefore, habeas corpus could not be 
suspended in the absence of the constitutional requirements for doing 
so.134 In Boumediene, the Court also took account of the location of the 
*XDQWDQDPR%D\DQGQRWHGWKDWµ>L@QHYHU\SUDFWLFDOVHQVH*XDQWDQDPR
is not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the 8QLWHG6WDWHV¶135 
However, notwithstanding this observation, the Court failed to address the 
issue of the old executive technique of transporting detainees to areas 
which it thinks are insulated from the reach of habeas corpus. 136 
Unfortunately, this left the door open for the US executive to choose sites 
LQ ZKLFK µDSSO\LQJ WKH 6XVSHQVLRQ &ODXVH¶ ZRXOG EH LPSUDFWLFDO¶ 137 
Consequently, the focus of the US detention practice during Obama years 
shifted from the Guantanamo Bay to Bagram.   
Very early on after assuming the presidential office, the Obama 
Administration showed its intentions to the effect of revising the US 
detention policy.138 Nevertheless, for the most part, no major change has 
yet been built in the US detention policy during the Obama years. At 
times, WKH2EDPD$GPLQLVWUDWLRQFRQWLQXHGWRLQYRNHWKHQDUUDWLYHRIµZDU
RQ WHUURU¶ DQG RQ SDUWLFXODU RFFDVLRQV 139  claimed the same sweeping 
powers that the Bush Administration had once accumulated in its 
                                                          
134 Boumediene v. Bush, No: 06-1195.  
135 Ibid.  
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detention exercises.140 The occasional continuation of using the language 
RI µZDU RQ WHUURU¶ E\ 2EDPD EULQJV WR PLQG D ZDUQLQJ PDGH E\ VRPH
scholars, who in the face of an excessive reliance on the terminology of 
µZDURQWHUURU¶DUJXHG 
>WKHGLVFRXUVHFUHDWHGE\@WKHµZDURQWHUURULVP¶KDVWDNHQRQ
a life of its own and any [A]dministration would find it 
extremely difficult to unmake or alter to any significant degree, 
even if they wanted to.141 
That said, however, it is noteworthy that the Obama Administration 
withdrew the use of (the language of) enemy combatants for Guantanamo 
GHWDLQHHV ,QVWHDG DIWHU D VKRUW ZKLOH RI XVLQJ WKH WHUP µXQSULYLOHJHG
EHOOLJHUHQWV¶ DERYH WKH2EDPD$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ LQWURGXFHG WKH VWDQGDUG
RI µVXEVWDQWLDO VXSSRUW¶142 for such groups as Taliban and Al Qaeda as a 
qualifier for internment.143  Even though the test of substantial support 
seemed more legally sound when compared to the idiosyncratic concept of 
µHQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ DQG DV VXFK ZRXOG DOORZ IRU D PRUH FRQVWUXFWLYH
legal enquiry of grounds justifying detention),144 it essentially shared some 
RIWKHVDPHDPELJXLWLHVRIWKHFULWHULRQRI µXQODZIXOHQHP\FRPEDWDQF\¶
$W WKHVDPH WLPH WKH WHVW RI µVXEVWDQWLDO VXSSRUW¶ VHHPV WRHSLWRPLVHD
YHU\VLPLODUFRQFHSWWRWKHWHVWRI µPDWHULDOVXSSRUW¶WKDWFRQVWLWXWHGWKH
core of the Bush AdministrDWLRQ¶VFRQFHSWRIµXQODZIXOHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶
$V ZDV H[SODLQHG DERYH WKH FRQFHSW RI µPDWHULDO VXSSRUW¶ SOD\HG D NH\
UROHLQUHQGHULQJWKHWHUPµXQODZIXOHQHP\FRPEDWDQW¶DK\EULGWHUP7KH
purpose of this hybrid notion was to oscillate between the laws of armed 
conflicts and criminal laws governing the subject of aiding and abetting 
with the purpose of exploiting the advantages offered by both of these 
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
Boston College Review 769.  
269 
 
regimes, and upholding the restraints of neither.145 Furthermore, the test 
of substantial support carried with it the troubling prospect of being 
interpreted so broadly as to cover (even American) journalists and writers 
whose writings could be misunderstood as lending support to the parties in 
conflict with the US. It was thus that the test of substantial support was 
challenged by some US political activists, who feared they could potentially 
be detained under the vague auspices of substantial support.146 However 
despite the early promising victory of Hedges in obtaining an injunction 
against section 1021 of NDAA, 147  the constitutionality of the test of 
substantial support was stayed by the Court of Appeal,148 and as late as 
2014, the Obama Administration has indicated no intention of introducing 
a different test.149  
1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJ2EDPD¶VHDUO\SURPLVHVRQUHVXPLQJ the criminal justice 
system for the purpose of prosecuting detainee suspects in Guantanamo 
Bay, 150  his Administration continued to bring some detainees before 
military commissions rather than civil courts. Even though the Obama 
Administration made some reforms to the system of military commissions, 
it did not supply any legal justification for the operation of this body other 
than that it would be difficult and burdensome for the US executive to 
prosecute some of the Guantanamo Bay detainees in the civil courts. What 
this meant in the words of Hafetz was the following: 
>«@ ZKHQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW EHOLHYHG LW FRXOG HDVLO\ FRQYLFW LW
brought charges in a federal court, when the government had 
some doubts about its evidence, it resorted to the more relaxed 
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150 See-/HRSDOGµ$&DPSDLJQ3URPLVH'LHV2EDPDDQG0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQV¶DYDLODEOHDW 
http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/285:a-campaign-promise-dies-obama-and-military-
commissions.  
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UXOHVRIPLOLWDU\FRPPLVVLRQVDQGZKHQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFDVH
was weakest, it disposed with a trial altogether and simply held 
the prisoners indefinitely under a theory previously unknown to 
American law: that the prisoners were too difficult to try but 
too dangerous to release.151 
The internment of the third category of persons in the text above cannot 
but highlight one of the most notorious manifestations of the exercise of 
the subjective assessment of the executive in a manner insensitive to 
principles and only responsive to expediency. 152  Indeed, the Obama 
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VUHOiance on its own subjective assessment and protecting 
LWVµVD\VR¶KDVDWWLPHVEHHQDVXQIDLUDQGDUELWUDU\DVLWVSUHGHFHVVRU153 
It must, nonetheless, be mentioned that in his State of the Union address 
in January 2014, President Obama renewed his promise to effect the 
closing Guantanamo Bay by the end of 2014. The speculations are that the 
US Congress will lift some of the restrictions on the issue of transferring 
the detainees, and therefore, the closure of Guantanamo becomes possible 
by the end of 2014.154 Following an executive order in 2011, the Obama 
Administration established the Periodic Review Board for those detainees, 
who, according to its assessment, could not be either tried or released.155 
But astonishingly, the real operation of these reviews began by a two 
years delay.156 
After inheriting a very complicated heritage from his predecessor, the 
Obama Administration made a tactical choice regarding the exercise of 
internment. It reduced the transfer of detainees into American custody as 
                                                          
151 J. Hafetz, Habeas Corpus after 9/11: Confronting APHULFD¶V1HZ*OREDO'HWHQWLRQ6\VWHP
(New York: New York University Press, 2011) at 242. 
152 Ibid.  
153 /+DMDUµ2EDPDLQKHULWVDQGHPEUDFHVDOHJDOPHVV¶SXEOLVKHGRQAljazeera, Sep. 2011 
available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/09/20119108166435928.html.  
154 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2014/01/obama-urges-guantanamo-closure-
this-year-20141293324985281.html. 
155  Executive Order 13567-- Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantánamo Bay 
Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force. 
156  $ :RUWKLQJ µ*XDQWDQDPR 6HFUHWLYH 5HYLHZ %RDUGV¶ $OMD]HHUD ZHEVLWH  'HF 
available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/12/guantanamo-secretive-
review-boards-201312862820866764.html. 
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much as possible,157 and kept the new detainees in a detention facility, 
ZKLFK FRXOG EH FRQVLGHUHG DV EHLQJ ORFDWHG LQ µD ZDU WKHDWUH¶ QDPHO\
Bagram airbase.158  In effect, Bagram airbase159  seemed to become as 
much of a legal black hole as the Guantanamo Bay.160 In a similar manner 
to the detainees in Guantanamo Bay, many of those held in Bagram had 
been transported to Bagram from different places by the US executive to 
evade judicial oversight.161 All in all, the Bagram airbase had the dubious 
advantage of being in a zone of war, which became the primary base for 
the D.C circuit court to deny the writ of habeas corpus to the Bagram 
detainees.162  
The Bagram detention facility centre has embodied a considerably higher 
number of detainees than Guantanamo Bay with much less protective 
procedures at the disposal of its detainees. Apart from the unavailability of 
habeas corpus to Bagram detainees, many other legal issues in Bagram 
also remain in a state of disarray. For example, even though the control of 
the Bagram prison was formally given to the Afghan authorities in 
September 2012,163 LW LV UHSRUWHG WKDW WKH µ86 RIILFLDOV ZLOO FRQWLQXH WR
capture and detain Afghans at Bagram for up to six months at a time, 
EHIRUH KDQGLQJ WKHP RYHU WR $IJKDQ DXWKRULWLHV¶ 164  This setting poses 
                                                          
157 -%HFNHU66KDQH µ6HFUHW µ.LOO/LVW¶3URYHVD7HVWRI2EDPD¶V3ULQFLSOHVDQG:LOONew 
York Times May 29, 2012. 
158 A. Gregory, The Power of Habeas CRUSXV LQ$PHULFD)URPWKH.LQJ¶V3UHURJDWLYHWRWKH
War on Terror (Cambridge: CUP, 2013) at 257.  
159 µ7KH%DJUDP7KHDWHU,QWHUQPHQW)DFLOLW\ZDVORFDWHGRQ%DJUDP$LUILHOGQRUWKRI.DEXO
the capital city of Afghanistan. The building structure was originally an aircraft hangar-repair 
VKRSXQWLO LWZDVWXUQHGLQWRD µPDNHVKLIWPLOLWDU\GHWHQWLRQFHQWHU¶'HWDLQHHVZHUHKHOG LQ
pens fashioned from coils of razor wire piled in stacks reaching above their heads. In 2002, it 
was used as a military collection and screening center called the Bagram Collection Point or 
BCP. The name later changed to Bagram Theater  
160  See, Rahmatullah v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2012] 
UKSC 48; [2013] 1 A.C. 614 (SC). 
161 Maqaleh v. Gates, District Court, No. 09-5265, 2010.  
162 For a supportive article on the decision of the circuit court, see0-%X[WRQµ1R+DEHDV
for You: AL Maqaleh v. GatesWKH%DJUDP'HWDLQHHVDQGWKH*OREDO,QVXUJHQF\¶
American University Law Review 519 and for a critical view, see, Irias, above note 101.  
163 Al Jazeera µ86 KDQGV RYHU %DJUDP SULVRQ WR $IJKDQLVWDQ¶ DYDLODEOH DW
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/03/201332534437116216.html 
164 Al Jazeera µZKR FRQWUROV $IJKDQLVWDQ¶V %DJUDP 3ULVRQ¶ DYDLODEOH DW
http://m.aljazeera.com/story/20129129242282621. 
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important questions as to which state is in charge of providing 
administrative safeguards for the detainees, insofar as the initial six 
months of their detention is concerned. 165  In any event, much of the 
outcry regarding the US detention policy in Afghanistan seems to have 
been silenced by the agreement between the US executive and its Afghan 
counterpart.  
As was considered above, the US courts denied the issuance of habeas 
corpus to detainees held in Bagram. However, in a rather exceptional 
case, the UK courts approved the issuance of habeas corpus for one of the 
detainees in Bagram. This was the case of Rahmatullah v. Secretary of 
State, which involved the internment of a Pakistani citizen initially 
captured and detained by the UK troops in an area under US control in 
Iraq. 166  Subsequently, Rahmatullah was handed over to the US 
authorities, who unlawfully 167  transferred him to Bagram. Rahmatullah 
applied for the writ of habeas corpus on the basis that his detention in 
Bagram breached the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the 
US and UK. This agreement required the parties involved to observe the 
relevant rules and regulations of GC III and GC IV as regards the 
detention and deportation of detainees passed into the hands of the US 
(the accepting power) from the UK (the detaining power). The UK 
Supreme Court accepted this argument and established that according to 
the MoU mentioned above, the UK µ*RYHUQPHQW KDG WKH PHDQV RI
REWDLQLQJFRQWURORYHUWKHFXVWRG\RI5DKPDWXOODK¶168 to secure his release. 
This became the basis for the granting of habeas corpus. Therefore, the 
                                                          
165 It must also be mentioned that at one point, the issue of the US detention in Bagram 
became a major source of tension between the Afghan and US governments. See, M. 
5RVHQEHUJ µ.DU]DL 'HQRXQFHV &RDOLWLRQ 2YHU $LUVWULNHV¶ 1HZ <RUN 7LPHV 6HSWHPEHU 
2012) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/world/asia/karzai-denounces-
coalition-over-airstrikes.html?ref=bagramairbaseafghanistan&_r=0.  
166 Rahmatullah, above note 160. 
167 See DOVR='HOLµ2YHUYLHZ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 297.  
168 Rahmatullah, above note 160, para 60.  
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FRXUW¶V JHQHURVLW\ LQ WKH FDVH RI 5DKPDWXOODK ZDV QRW SUHGLFDWHG XSRQ
stretching the territorial limits associated with the writ of habeas corpus, 
and hence, this decision must clearly be distinguished from the cases 
brought before the US Supreme Court.  
 
3.4. The political question doctrine, the non-justicibility of the subjective 
assessments of the executive, and the US Supreme Court  
As it was argued in chapters I and II of this thesis, one of the oldest 
techniques of sovereigns in the common law tradition to escape from 
judicial scrutiny has been to argue that a given practice of internment 
concerns an exclusive matter for the executive. 169  Historically, the 
common law courts have more or less been receptive to such a rationale. 
For example, as was argued in chapter I in maintaining the legality of 
detentions exercised by Charles I, and consequently, disarming the 
SRVVLELOLW\RIMXGLFLDOLQWHUYHQWLRQ-XVWLFH+\GHDUJXHGµ,IQRFDXVHRIWKH
commitment be expressed, it is to be presumed to be for matter of state, 
ZKLFKZHFDQQRWWDNHQRWLFHRI¶170  
Even though Hyde viewed the presumption of matter of state as one 
designed for very exceptional circumstances, this defence became 
something of an ordinary resort to British and, later on, American 
executive.  In practical terms, what this meant was that when it came to 
the matters pertaining to the sovereign decisions, the judiciary would keep 
its hands clear off any intervention.171 As a result, the common law courts 
would either refuse to issue habeas corpus in the view of a supposed 
                                                          
169 Refer to chapter II, section 2.  
170 Proceedings on the Habeas Corpus, brought by Sir Thomas Darnel et al DW WKH .LQJ¶V-
Bench in Westminister hall: Charles I A. D. 1627 in A Complete Collection of State Trials 
(1816). 
171 $ : % 6LPSVRQ µ'HWHQWLRQ ZLWKRXW 7ULDO LQ WKH 6HFRQG :RUOG :DU &RPSaring the 
%ULWLVK DQG $PHULFDQ ([SHULHQFHV¶   Florida State University Law Review 225, at 
266. 
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suspension, or when they met this procedural regularity, they would 
challenge the executive solely on its good faith which was the only 
acceptable ground for confronting the detention power.172 
Interestingly enough, and as examined in the previous chapter, a 
particular vehicle for dismantling the judicial supervisory powers 
permeated to the area of international law, and consequently, a prevailing 
view among states emerged in the early twentieth century with the 
purpose of insulating some cases from international legal adjudication. 
According to this doctrine, when there was an overwhelming political 
dimension to a case, that case could not in essence be liable to arbitration 
in its general sense. 173  This doctrine was thoroughly examined and 
critiqued by Lauterpacht in 1933.174 However, his views did not inform 
VWDWHV¶ FRnception and practice of international law until the end of the 
Second World War. 
One of the most ground-breaking results implicit in the revision of 
international humanitarian law in the wake of the Second World War and 
the adoption of human rights law treaties was that many of the states' 
decisions, albeit ingrained with political implications, could not remain 
immune from judicial scrutiny. This was true at least insofar as they would 
affect the known standards of such international law regimes as IHL and 
IHRL.  
The precedent-establishing cases emerging in the wake of Guantanamo 
Bay detentions are a notable signifier of a manifest inclination on the part 
of the US executive to prevent a judicial review of its powers from taking 
place The Bush AdministratiRQ¶V ODZ\HUV UHIHUUHG WR WKLV DV µSROLWLFDO
                                                          
172 See, Liversidge v. Anderson [AC] 1942 206. 
173 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 
1870-1960 (Cambridge: CUP, 2001) 358. 
174 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford: OUP, 1933, 
edition 2011).  
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TXHVWLRQ GRFWULQH¶ 175  Accordingly, very early on in the process of 
challenging the detention powers of the executive, the Bush 
Administration made a consistent attempt to remind the courts of the 
µVHQVLWLYHTXHVWLRQV¶ WKDW WKHLUDFFHSWDQFHRIKDEHDVSHWLWLRQVZRXOGJLYH
rise to.176 Drawing on this assumption, the Bush Administration argued on 
numerous occasions that the matter of interning individuals in the course 
RI µZDU RQ WHUURU¶ DQG WKH GHWHUPLQDWLRQV VXUURXQGLQJ LW DUH µOHIW WR WKH
3UHVLGHQW¶V VROH GLVFUHWLRQ¶ $V DUJXHG LQ YDULRXV SDUWV RI WKLV WKHVLV
ZKHQHYHUWKHZRUGµGLVFUHWLRQ¶LVXVHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRIGHWHQWLRQZLWKRXW
trial, the underlying intention is to cripple judicial review in favour of the 
subjective determinations of the executive. 177  In different forms, the 
DUJXPHQW RI µWKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V VROH GLVFUHWLRQ¶ ZDV UHSHDWHG E\ WKH %XVK
Administration.178 For example, with regard to the question of determining 
whether one meets the criteria for being classifieGDVµHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶
WKH%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VODZ\HUVRSLQHG 
Given the constitutionally limited role of the courts in reviewing 
military decisions, courts may not second-JXHVV WKHPLOLWDU\¶V
determination that an individual is an enemy combatant and 
should be detained as such.179 
In the case of Hamdi, the Supreme Court designated a balance-like test 
between its obligation of judicial review and the issue of deference to the 
decisions of the US executive. Consistent with this, the Court posited that 
deference to the subjective determination of the executive was due when 
WKH LQWHQVLW\ RI PDWWHUV FRQFHUQLQJ µIRUHLJQ SROLF\ QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\ RU
                                                          
175 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*RYHUQPHQW¶V0RWLRQIRU6WD\3HQGLQJ7ULDOLQthe Enemy 
Combatant Papers, above note 15, at 199.  
176 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*RYHUQPHQW¶V0HPRUDQGXPRI 3RLQWV DQG$XWKRULWLHV LQ6XSSRUWRI
5HVSRQGHQW¶V2EMHFWLRQVWR0DJLVWUDWH-DGJH¶V2UGHURI0D\ LQ WKHPapers, above note 
15 at 189.  
177  In this regard, see 1 /DFH\ µ7KH -XULVSUXGHQFH of Discretion: Escaping the Legal 
3DUDGLJP¶LQ.+DZNLQVed) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at 373.  
178  See IRU H[DPSOH 1 .DVVRS µ$ 3ROLWLFDO 4XHVWLRQ E\ $Q\ 2WKHU 1DPH *RYHUQPHQW
Strategy in the Enemy Combatant Cases of Hamdi and Padilla¶LQ1Mortada-Sabah and B. E. 
Cain (eds), The Political Question Doctrine and the Supreme Court of the United States 
(Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007)  
179 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 02-6895, Fourth Circuit Decision (Hamdi II).  
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PLOLWDU\ DIIDLUV¶ VR UHTXLUHV 180  At the same time, it held that the 
internment of an American citizen fails to meet such an intensity threshold 
for the purpose of exercising judicial deference. As it can be seen here 
again, in limiting the scope of the US executive subjective determination, 
the Supreme Court has followed a pattern symptomatic of almost all the 
Guantanamo Bay cases produced before it, namely, restraining the powers 
of the executive in particular respects, and yet leaving a door open for the 
convergence of exercising those powers in other areas. Based on this 
judicial conservatism of the US Supreme Court, some scholars have 
argued that the Court never went as far as it could in putting the rule of 
law limits on the presidential power. 181  Whilst this opinion holds 
substantial merits, it is, at the same time, reasonable to argue that 
compared to its previous decisions in cases such as Quirin, Korematsu,182 
and Eisentrager WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V UXOLQJV LQ WKH *XDQWDQDPR %D\
cases entailed a much more condensed version of deference towards the 
decisions of the executive. 
Notably, the US Supreme Court never relinquished the task of reviewing 
the US executive particularly during the Bush era on the basis of the high 
political stakes that might have been inherent in the Guantanamo Bay 
cases. To use human rights vocabulary, it is fair to say that the US 
Supreme Court reviews of the executive authority in the Guantanamo Bay 
cases reached the level of meaningful judicial review,183 only insofar as 
the availability of, the procedural safeguard of the writ of habeas corpus to 
the so-FDOOHGµHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶GHWDLQHHV was concerned. However, the 
same does not strictly hold true on the executive determination of the 
substantive dimensions underlying the practice of internment at 
                                                          
180 Hamdi v. Rumslfeld, US Supreme Court, above note 81. 
181 See, Moeckli, above note 85.  
182 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
183 Refer to chapter III, section 11. 
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Guantanamo. Here, the US Supreme Court rather implicitly put a stamp of 
approval on the assertions of the executive.184 For example, with regard to 
WKH XVH RI WKH WHUP µHQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ WKH &RXUW UHIUDLQHG IURP
challenging the US executive on the incompatibility of these terms with the 
Geneva Conventions,185 and it turned out to use the same vocabulary that 
had created the frame for many of the confusions inherent in the US 
detention policy. 186  Another example stems from the validity of Quirin 
appearing as a precedent for establishing military commissions invoked by 
the Bush Administration despite the wide-ranging criticisms of 
international and domestic law scholars and some legal historians.187 In 
Hamdan WKH 86 6XSUHPH &RXUW WDFLWO\ DFFHSWHG WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V
assertions to the effect of the inapplicability of Geneva Conventions and its 
additional protocols to the conflict with Taliban and Al Qaeda.  Having 
done so, the US Supreme Court shifted its attention to the minimal 
requirements of Common Article 3 to Geneva Conventions without making 
any clarifications as to what the nature of conflicts with Al Qaeda 
objectively amounted to be (and not on the basis of the determinations of 
the Bush Administration). 188  Finally, in Boumediene, the US Supreme 
Court did not make any clarifications as to whether the executive 
manipulation of detention sites for the purpose of avoiding judicial 
                                                          
184 -60DUWLQH] µ3URFHVVDQG6XEVWDQFH LQ WKH 
:DURQ7HUURU
¶ Columbia Law 
Review 1013, at 1028-1030. 
185 For the view of the Geneva Conventions on this, refer to chapter IV, section 6.  
186 It must crucially be noted that this reluctance of the US Supreme Court on challenging the 
VXEMHFWLYHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRI WKHH[HFXWLYHZDVQRWGXH WR WKHSDUWLHV¶ ODFNRI DUJument on 
point. For example, the petitioner in Hamdan made a substantial case as to why the 
GHVLJQDWLRQRI+DPGDQDVµXQODZIXOFRPEDWDQW¶ZDVDPLVWDNHQDFWµEHFDXVH3HWLWLRQHUZDV
captured on the battlefields of Afghanistan and claims PoW protection, the law of war 
UHTXLUHV WKDWKHEHDIIRUGHGWKHSURWHFWLRQVSURYLGHG WRDQ$PHULFDQVHUYLFHPHPEHU >«@
this case is thus unlike Quirin, where the saboteurs did not contest their unlawful combatant 
status >««@ WKLV FDVH LV IDU FORVHU WR WKDWSUH-existing law of Milligan than it is to Quirin. 
5HVSRQGHQWVFDOO0LOOLJDQDµFLYLOLDQ¶EXWWKH*RYHUQPHQWWROGWKH&RXUWWKHQWKDWKHZDVDQ
XQODZIXO EHOOLJHUHQWZKR µFRQVSLUHG DQG DUPHG RWKHUV¶¶ Enemy Combatants Papers, above 
note 16, at 498. 
187 Hamdan v. Rumfeld, above note 103.  
188 Ibid.  
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overview can be considered as a valid hindrance to the issuance of the writ 
of habeas corpus.189  
Once again, in terms of legal history, this signifies a familiar approach in 
the common law tradition. An innate component of this approach is to 
compromise substance in favour of procedure, or in other words, to use 
procedure as a cover to ignore substance.190 We have shown the mode in 
which this approach has aided the UK courts to avoid the questions of 
substance. In the US, however, Chief Justice Marshal has been credited 
with devising this approach for the first time in the case of Marbury v. 
Madison.191 $V &ROH KDV QRWHG WKH HVVHQFH RI WKLV MXGLFLDO WDFWLF LV µWR
HVWDEOLVK UHYLHZ LQ D FDVH ZKHUH WKH UHVXOW >FDQQRW@ EH FKDOOHQJHG¶ 192 
Depending on whether a given case concerns the matters of national 
security, the sovereign prerogative or the political question doctrine, 
different variations of this tactic have been recalled by the UK and US 
courts. It is not without interest to conclude this section with a brief 
analysis of some cases using this judicial technique in the UK courts, and 
leaving the matter to the reader to draw the obvious similarities between 
the so-FDOOHG µHQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ FDVHV DQG WKH FDVHV PHQWLRQHG
hereinafter. 
The British judiciary has not always refrained from establishing judicial 
review over the cases concerning national security or the sovereign 
prerogative. However, judicial review in the cases of this nature has been 
µFRQFHUQHG QRW ZLWK WKH GHFLVLRQ EXW ZLWK WKH GHFLVLRQ-making 
process¶.193 This dictum takes its cue from a judgment by the House of 
Lords in 1916. In that case, Lord Parker said,  
                                                          
189 N. Berardinelly, above note 136.  
190 See, Martinez, above note 184.  
191 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
192 '&ROHµ-XGJLQJWKH1H[W(PHUJHQF\-XGLFLDO5HYLHZDQG,QGLYLGXDO5LJKWV¶
Michigan Law Review 2565, at 2565-2570.  
193 Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 3 All ER 141 at 154.  
279 
 
       Those who are responsible for the national security 
must be the sole judges of what the national security 
requires. It would be obviously undesirable that such 
matters should be made the subjects of evidence in a 
Court of law or otherwise discussed in public.194  
 
This is in fact a British synthesis of the same judicial tactic that was 
appointed in the case of Marbury v. Madison. That is to say, even in the 
cases of national security, one can witness the establishment of judicial 
reviews, but of the kind concerned only with procedure and not substance. 
Vitally, the subjective determinations of the executive still go unchallenged 
in these cases, and in any event, the executive does not lose any point of 
substantive importance to judicial review. One can certainly say that the 
same observation applies to the cases associated with judicial review of 
the prerogative. In 1985 some took comfort in the fact that the House of 
Lords finally ruled that some of the executive decisions deriving from the 
prerogative of the Crown cannot remain in the shield of non-
justiciability.195 While the limited space of this thesis does not allow us to 
consider the specific facts of the GCHQ case, it suffices to say that the law 
Lords in that case established that an executive instruction arising from 
the prerogative powers can be subjected to judicial review. Yet even there, 
the Court enlisted a host of exceptions that could still be excluded from 
MXGLFLDOUHYLHZ7KHVHLQFOXGHGSRZHUVFRQFHUQLQJµWKHPDNLQJRIWUHDWLHV
the defense of the realm, the prerogative of mercy, the grant of honors, 
WKHGLVVROXWLRQRI3DUOLDPHQWDQGWKHDSSRLQWPHQWRIPLQLVWHUV¶196 To this 
must be added the limitations that national security requirements impose 
upon reviewing the executive prerogative. 197  Not infrequently do the 
                                                          
194 The Zamora Case [1916] 2 AC 77.  
195 Council of the Service Union and Others v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] IRLR 28.  
196 Ibid, Lord Ruskill¶V-XGJPHQW 
197 This has rendered the issue of reviewing the prerogative a particularly complex one, in 
that there exists no clear judicial principle for discerning when and how a subject matter 
within the realm of the prerogative powers is apt for judicial control. In a similar manner to 
its judgment in the GCHQ case and in a detention context, the Court of Appeal in the case of 
Abbasi UHLWHUDWHGWKH+RXVHRI/RUGV¶IRUPXODWRWKHHIIHFWRIWKHQRQ-existence of a firm 
judicial principle governing the review of the prerogative. This was notwithstanding the fact 
that in Abbasi, the Court of Appeal emphasised the necessity of putting some judicial 
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disputes relating to the prerogative powers bear a national security 
dimension. As a result, the seeming progress in subjecting the executive 
instructions imbued with the prerogative to judicial review has turned out 
to be more of a procedural formality than a substantive actuality. It is with 
these considerations in mind that, after a careful analysis of the judicial 
restraints put on the prerogative, Poole has discerned a continuous pattern 
in the treatment of such matters by the UK judiciary. This pattern, 
according to Poole, consists of two steps:  
    Step one, the refusal to allow the operation of a legal black 
hole. Here, the assertion of ordinary legal principles over 
prerogative lawmaking. Step two, the accommodation of 
government security and diplomatic interests, leading to 
equivocation and uncertainty in the application of those 
ordinary principles.198 
 
By paying regard to the arguments in this section, a simple but vital 
question needs to be asked: Is this two-step process not just another 
version of the same old technique that one sees unfolding in the US 
6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VKDQGOLQJRIWKHVR-FDOOHGµHQHP\-FRPEDWDQWV¶FDVHV"  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
One of the immediate reactions of the US executive to the horrifying 
HYHQWVRIZDVWRPDNHLQIODWHGVWDWHPHQWVDERXWµDQHZNLQGRIZDU¶
DQGµDQHZNLQGRIHQHP\¶$VDUJXHGLQWKHILUVWVHFWLRQRIWKLVFKDSWHU
WKLVHPSKDVLVRQ µQHZQHVV¶ZDVPHDQW WRdeliver an important message. 
This message was that the old rules of international law had reached their 
expiry date on the face of the emergence of actors such as al-Qaeda. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
constraints on exercising the prerogative in the same vein as the GCHQ case. Yet again, the 
proposition that the powers driven by the prerogative do not necessarily operate with any 
judicial fetter did not result in a tangible result in the case of Abbasi either. R (Abbasi) v. 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2003], UKHRR 76, see also, R. 
6LQJKµ7KH8VHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZLQWKH'RPHVWLF&RXUWVRIWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶
56 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 119.  
198 73RROHµ8QLWHG.LQJGRP7KH5R\DO3UHURJDWLYH¶International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 146, at 155.  
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irony in this assumption of the US executive was that the Bush 
Administration would not hesitate to resort to the most troublesome 
precedents stemming from the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court 
during the Second World War. Such a resort was by itself a strong 
indicator of the fact that the so-FDOOHG µZDURQ WHUURU¶ DQG WKHQHZ Oegal 
issues alleged to have arisen in its wake could not possibly be considered 
as the end of legal history particularly with regard to the question of 
detention without trial. Therefore, to the extent that the US executive 
sought to formalise some of its particular practices by revitalising the 
relevance of such cases as Quirin or Eisentrager, we have witnessed a 
reproduction of the earlier history of internment and can testify to the 
µVDPHQHVV¶ RI PDQ\ FRPSRQHQWV RI WKH LQWHUQPHQW SUDFWLFHV ZLWK WKHLU
counterparts in the history of detention without trial, as recounted in this 
thesis.  
However, the most interesting element in the detentions exercised in the 
FRQWH[W RI WKH $PHULFDQ µZDU RQ WHUURU¶ LV WKH GHJUHH WR ZKLFK WKH
historical precepts are merged with new definitions. Nowhere did this 
EHFRPHFOHDUHU WKDQ LQ WKH%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V LQYRFDWLRQRI WKH WHUP 
µXQODZIXO HQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ 7KLV WHUP DV DUJXHG DERYH DQG LQ WKH
previous chapter, had been borrowed from the case of Quirin. The 
linguistic architecture of this term suggests that it shall exclusively be 
concerned with the laws of armed conflict. However, the definition 
assigned to this term by the Bush Administration made it clear that it had 
been committed to form and occupy a space between the laws of armed 
FRQIOLFWDQGWKHFULPLQDOODZPRGHOV7KLVµJUH\]RQH¶ZDVPHDQWWREHRQH
in which the subjective determination of the executive operate without any 
bond to the objective criteria of law in general and international law in 
particular. Therefore, to refer to some of the arguments mentioned in the 
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previous chapter, the objective binary put in place by the legal regimes of 
,+/EHWZHHQFLYLOLDQVDQG3R:VZDVWRWDOO\GLVUHJDUGHGLQWKHµJUH\]RQH¶
of the American internment practices. Additionally, the narrow conceptions 
RIµFRPEDWDQF\¶GHILQHGE\HLWKHUPHPEHUVKLSLQWKHHQHP\DUPHGIRUFHV
or the test of direct participation were replaced by an unclear test 
borrowed from the sphere of criminal law, namely, material support. This 
amalgamation of notions belonging to different spheres of law constituted 
WKHHVVHQFHRIWKH%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VVXEVWDQWLYH determinations in its 
self-FRQVWUXFWHGµJUH\]RQH¶ 
However, this grey zone could not be maintained without the complicity of 
the US Supreme Court with the substantive determinations of the Bush 
Administration. As argued above, the US Supreme Court showed a great 
deal of fortitude199 in order not to let the Bush Administration establish a 
monopoly on determining which procedural safeguards were available to 
the Guantanamo detainees. However, when it came to the merits of the 
substantive determinations of the Bush Administration, the Court showed 
much less determination to place restraints on the determinations of the 
US executive. 
Perhaps, it is fair to argue that in terms of their contemporary and 
historical value, the decisions of the US Supreme Court in tKH µHQHP\
FRPEDWDQWV¶ FDVHV LURQLFDOO\FRQVWUXFWD MXGLFLDO µJUH\]RQH¶RI WKHLURZQ
Martinez has aptly described why such cases lie in a shadowy area in 
terms of their value: 
WR FDOO WKHVH 6XSUHPH &RXUW GHFLVLRQV µPLQLPDOLVW¶ ERWK
understates and overstates their scope. Re-H[DPLQLQJWKHµZDU
RQ WHUURU¶ FDVHV WKURXJK WKH OHQV RI WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ
                                                          
199 2QFHDJDLQWKLVµIRUWLWXGH¶LVonly visible with regard to the procedural dimensions of 
detention cases.  
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substance and procedure reveals that many of these decisions 
do both less and more than they claim.200 
That is because in terms of their emphasis on such procedural protections 
as habeas corpus, such decisions have gone far beyond their historical 
counterparts such as Quirin and Eisentrager, and yet, they have failed to 
go far enough to factor the objective requirements of inter alia, IHL into 
WKH GLVFRXUVH JRYHUQLQJ WKH LQWHUQPHQW RI µHQHP\ FRPEDWDQWV¶ 7KH
meaning of this reluctance to call into question the subjective 
determination of the US executive by relying on the importance of 
international law requirements for the Bush and Obama Administration 
was that they could maintain their own grey area of law, provided that 
they would comply with very basic procedural requirements. Interestingly 
enough, the Obama Administration, albeit with a different choice of 
vocabulary, sustained the model of formulating innovative constructs, 
which do not belong to any particular area of law. For example, instead of 
designating individuals as enemy combatants, his Administration used the 
WHVWRIµVXEVWDQWLDOVXSSRUW¶DVDqualifier for detention of individuals. Once 
DJDLQ WKH WHVW RI µVXEVWDQWLDO VXSSRUW¶ LV EURDG HQRXJK WR H[SORLW WKH
advantages offered by both the law of armed conflict and criminal law 
models, and yet, the same broadness allows this concept to stay faithful to 
the requirements of neither models. Whether this relatively new criterion 
remains the test of time or not, remains to be seen. At the time of writing 
this chapter, other than a reversed judgment referred to above, there is 
no indication that the tesWRIµVXEVWDQWLDOVXSSRUW¶ZLOOEHDERUWHGLQIDYRXU
of a criterion more consistent with the laws of armed conflict, or any other 
legal model, based on the context, in which detention without trial is 
exercised.  
                                                          
200 Martinez, above note 184, at 1029. 
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                                              Concluding Remarks 
 
1. The function of legal history 
 
Among the different departments of linguistics, etymology is focused on 
identifying the origin of words, their initial meaning, and the process which 
has shaped the substance and the structure of words as they are 
understood in their present usage. 1  Naturally, etymology does not and 
cannot specify a direction for the future evolution of words. As a general 
rule, it can be said that one of the main tasks of legal history is to apply to 
legal practices what etymology does to words. That is to say, legal history, 
in the sense invoked in this thesis, draws a map for the evolution of a 
practice. Through describing an evolving practice, legal history establishes 
a pattern, which, if repeated sufficiently and in a consistent manner, takes 
the shape of a rule, a mechanism, or an implicit but determinative 
assumption. As was mentioned in the introduction of this thesis,  
>«@LIRQHPHUHO\FROOHFWVXQUHODWHGIDFWVDQGSLOHVWKHPXSLQ
heaps of notebooks, perhaps picking out the colourful or quaint 
for public display, one has not contributed much, if anything, to 
history.2  
Accordingly, one of the most vital contributions of legal history is to 
highlight how rules took shape initially, where and under what 
circumstances they were misunderstood and misapplied, and how those 
historical conceptions and misconceptions inform a certain practice. In this 
capacity, legal history allows us to revisit the rules and practices, reaffirm 
them, or, if the need arises, repudiate or rewrite the misapplied parts of 
the rules through the appropriate legal channels. Beneath all of these acts 
there lies a continuous need to return to the past constructions of the 
                                                          
1 See, P. Dourkin, The Oxford Guide to Etymology (Oxford: OUP, 2009).  
2 -%DNHUµ5HIOHFWLRQVRQ³'RLQJ´/HJDO+LVWRU\¶LQ$0XVVRQ&6WHEELQJVMaking Legal 
History: Approaches and Methodologies (Cambridge: CUP, 2012). 
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rules, judgments, and practices. In other words, no fresh legal formulation 
can ever emerge without having first realised and acknowledged the 
modalities of historical continuity in the practice from which we intend to 
depart. Unless that realisation is made first, any attempt at departing from 
a certain legal practice amounts to either an unconscious recreation of the 
same practice, or a repetitive misconstruction of it. These central premises 
underscored the historical enquiries of this thesis. In the following sections 
of this final part, we will draw on the foregoing baselines and outline the 
concluding remarks of this thesis. 
2. Detention: An issue of the past and present  
 
It is fair to say that no draconian measure exercised by states has gained 
the attention of legal scholars as much as detention without trial. One of 
the reasons for this dedication of lawyers to the question of detention 
without trial is that this practice concerns the most central concept of the 
legal profession, the rule of law. This is precisely why many of the 
constitutional crises of the common law world, ranging from the English 
&LYLO:DUWR,QGLD¶VGHFRORQLVDWLRQKDYHVRWLJKWO\EHHQWLHGWRWKHSUDFWLFH
of detention without trial. The first chapter discerned that the close 
proximity of detention without trial and the rule of law has not merely 
been an issue for the lawyers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
Rather, such proximity could be witnessed right from chapters 29 and 39 
of the Magna Carta. Of course, the equivalent term for the rule of law in 
WKH 0DJQD &DUWD ZDV µWKH ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶ RQ WKH EDVLV RI ZKLFK 'LFH\
ODWHUIRUPDOLVHGWKHFRQFHSWRIµWKHUXOHRIODZ¶3  
Much like the rule of law, no one could pinpoint the precise attributes of 
µWKH ODZ RI WKH ODQG¶0RVW LPSRUWDQWO\ LW FRXOG KDUGO\ EH VDLGZKDW WKH
                                                          
3 N. Hussain, The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law (Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 2003) at 8. 
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modaliWLHVRI WKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKH.LQJDQG µWKH ODZRI WKH ODQG¶
ZDV:DVWKH.LQJWKHJXDUGLDQRIµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶DQG\HWERXQGWR
LWVLQVWUXFWLRQV":DVWKH.LQJFRQVLGHUHGDVWKHODZ¶VJXDUGLDQEXWRIWKH
NLQGZKRFRXOGGHSDUWIURPµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶IRUWKHVDNHRISURWHFWLQJ
LW":DVWKH.LQJDERYHµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶DQGZDVWKDWµDERYHQHVV¶RI
WKH.LQJJXDUDQWHHGE\µWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶LWVHOI",QWKHDERYHTXHVWLRQV
RQH FDQ UHSODFH WKH ZRUGV µWKH .LQJ¶ ZLWK µWKH H[HFXWLYHWKH VRYHUHLJQ¶
DQGµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶ZLWKµWKHUXOHRIODZ¶DQGDUULYHDWVRPHRIWKH
most intriguing legal questions of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
The purpose of this thesis was not, however, to answer these questions. 
Rather, it was to describe and formulate the mechanisms through which 
different conceptions of the exclusive powers of sovereign and law have 
interacted with regard to the practice of detention without trial, to which 
we will return shortly hereinafter. Once again detention without trial 
represented a site through which these questions and differing answers to 
them manifested themselves. The case of Five Knights was the first 
occasion on which the uncertainties surrounding detention without trial 
paved the way for a major political transformation in England. The issue at 
hand was the extent of the authority of the King. The institution of 
PRQDUFK\GLGQRWYLHZLWVHOIDVEHLQJERXQGWRµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶ZKHQ
the matters of state were in question. At the same time, Parliament 
opposed the absolute nature of this power, and insisted on the limitations 
LPSRVHGXSRQWKHVRYHUHLJQ¶VDXWKRULW\E\µWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶/DWHURQ
however, Parliament took the same view as the monarchy to the nature of 
the powers of the sovereign, and its imSOLFDWLRQV IRU VWDWH¶V GHWHQWLRQV
Thereinafter, the issue was what institutions were vested with this 
absolute power. 
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We must translate the dispute about the absolute powers of sovereign into 
the terms employed in this thesis. In this view, the argument of the 
monarchy in the case of Five Knights was that with regard to particular 
SUDFWLFHVWKHVRYHUHLJQ¶VVXEMHFWLYHDSSUHFLDWLRQPXVW IXOO\EHUHVSHFWHG
by the judiciary, for it holds an absolute authority in its resort to certain 
practices. The court approved this subjective appreciation or determination 
of the sovereign by showing deference to it. On the other hand, Parliament 
ZDVRIWKHYLHZWKDWµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶KDGSXWLQSODFHREMHFWLYHOLPLWV
upon the authority of the sovereign through such laws as chapter 29 of 
Magna Carta. Therefore, it is accurate to say that if we take the case of 
Five Knights as the starting point of detention without trial in its modern 
sense, right from the beginning, the crucial dilemma of detention without 
trial could be cast in terms of the subjective authority of sovereign versus 
WKHREMHFWLYHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIODZ¶WKHODZRIWKHODQG¶WKHUXOHRIODZ7KH
historical investigations of this thesis made clear four channels through 
which the conflict between the subjective and objective determination of 
detention powers in domestic law were mediated: 1) suspension of habeas 
corpus; 2) recognition of absolute authority with respect to certain 
situations; 3) recognition of absolute authority with regard to certain 
persons; and 4) projecting a procedural understanding of the rule of law.  
3. Concessions of the rule of law and the emergence of legal 
disasters 
 
The categories mentioned above did not necessarily operate in a separate 
manner from each other, and in particular situations, some of them were 
lumped together for the purpose of detention. As discussed in detail in 
FKDSWHU , WKH VXVSHQVLRQ RI KDEHDV FRUSXV IROORZHG WKH ORJLF WKDW µDV
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FLUFXPVWDQFHVDOWHU WKLQJVODZVPXVWDOWHU¶4 One of the advantages of 
the suspension technique was that it would not entrap the authorities 
LQYROYHGLQWKHGHWHQWLRQEXVLQHVVLQWKHµFKLFNHQDQGHJJSUREOHP¶DERXW
the superiority of law to the powers of sovereign or vice versa. Rather, the 
method of suspension would place necessity as a precursor to the 
temporary cessation of such safeguards as the writ of habeas corpus. The 
problem was, however, that as time passed, detention was exercised by 
increase in detention powers and not necessarily the suspension of habeas 
corpus. This offered a route to a move towards an absolutism of the 
detention powers of sovereign in particular situations.  
Martial law was the most troublesome manifestation of absolutism in the 
subjective authority of the detaining power. Martial law would authorise 
the creation of military government, suspension of habeas corpus, and 
creating new laws by the executive. Therefore, martial law would make 
LQURDGVLQWRERWKWKHVXEVWDQFHDQGSURFHGXUHVRIµWKHODZRIWKHODQG¶,WV
severe consequences had moved the drafters of the Petition of Rights to 
establish a high-intensity threshold for the authorisation of martial law, 
and that was the closure of ordinary courts. However, colonial governors 
rarely complied with the requirements of these legal thresholds. 
What distinguished martial law from other forms of response to 
emergencies was the degree to which ordinary laws were totally ignored in 
favour of a new legal order put in place by military governors. In that 
sense, all legal checks and balances became secondary to the dictates of 
the executive. At the same time, martial law created the long-lasting 
legacy of military tribunals for the purposes of adjudicating on the 
detention cases. These tribunals lived even longer than British colonialism. 
                                                          
4 W. Cobbetts, T. C. Hansard, Parliamentary History of England Vol. V (London: R. Bagshaw. 
1809) at 270.  
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Particularly in America, the use of martial courts/military commissions 
indiscreetly reached beyond the authorisation of martial law. All in all, 
PDUWLDO ODZ UHSUHVHQWHG D SODWIRUP RI VRYHUHLJQ¶V DEVROXWLVP LQ ZKLFK
VRYHUHLJQFRXOGH[HUFLVHGHWHQWLRQZLWKJUHDWFRPIRUWZKLOVWPDNLQJ µQR
ERQHVDERXWZKDWLWLVGRLQJ¶5  
Even though the powers of the executive were at their highest in martial 
law situations, the political risks carried by this form of exercising 
absolutism were too high. This led to a stronger reliance on emergency 
regulations. These types of law would normally come into existence with 
an act of Parliament, which would authorise certain practices, and at the 
same time, delegate law-making powers to the executive. Two major 
differences existed between emergency regulations and martial law. First 
of all, emergency regulations would not create military tribunals for 
passing judgments on detention cases. Rather, they would often employ 
administrative boards with an advisory function. Secondly, emergency 
regulations would not touch upon the issue of whether habeas corpus 
could be issued by courts or not. In other words, these regulations did not 
necessarily suspend habeas corpus. This particular aspect of the 
emergency regulations came to pose important questions in the wake of 
the First World War, when regulation 14B of DORA authorised detention of 
British subjects on the basis of their hostile origin or associations. Here, 
although the courts would have no difficulty with issuing the writ of habeas 
corpus, the basis for detention of subjects was so broad that habeas 
corpus could achieve nothing for the purpose of questioning the legality of 
cause of detentions. At the same time, the British courts were extremely 
deferential to the determinations of the executive.  
                                                          
5 $:%6LPSVRQµ5RXQG8SWKH8VXDO6XVSHFWV7KH/HJDF\RI%ULWLVK&RORQLDOLVPDQGWKH
European Convention on Human RLJKWV¶Loyola Law Review 630, at 634. 
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The objection here does not lie within the recognition of a subjective 
judgement or authority. After all, inherent in each act of executing the law 
is some degree of subjective judgement. What is objectionable is that the 
courts would not employ any objective criteria to challenge the executive 
on its determinations. The end result of this cycle was unfettered 
discretion, which, as examined in chapter III, in the words of common law 
VFKRODUV UDQJLQJ IURP&RNHWR'LFH\ZDV µWKH URRWRIDUELWUDULQHVV¶6 We 
shall return to the issue of arbitrariness shortly hereinafter. At this stage, 
what is important to notice is that over time, there emerged a mechanism, 
which came to justify the deferential approach of the courts to the 
executive determinations. The essence of this mechanism, in the apt 
ZRUGVRI/RUG6KDZZDVWR µJLve due formal respect to the procedure of 
WKH UHPHG\ >KDEHDV FRUSXV@ EXW WR GHQ\ WKH UHPHG\ LWVHOI¶ 7 In other 
words, this mechanism was forged by giving weight to the procedural 
dimension of the laws governing detention, whilst ignoring the purpose 
and the content of such laws.  
3.1. Detention and procedural understanding of law  
Projecting a procedural understanding of the rule of law was essentially 
composed of two components: structural and procedural. The structural 
component highlights the formation of administrative bodies for the 
purpose of adjudicating detention cases. These parallel structures included 
administrative/executive bodies to hear the detention cases. Right from 
their early uses in the Bengal Regulations, these bodies were used as a 
replacement for rigorous checks and balances on the executive powers. 
More often than not, these boards employed crude procedures, and only 
possessed an advisory role. However, since by name the executive boards 
                                                          
6 A. V. Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: 
Macmillan, 1885) at 184.  
7 R v. Halliday, [1917] A. C. 260 at 262.  
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FDUULHG D VXSHUYLVRU\ UROH WKH\ SDLQWHG D SLFWXUH RI WKH H[HFXWLYH¶V
commitment to the rule of law. It was thus that scholars such as Dicey 
often cited these administrative bodies as one of the most serious threats 
to the rule of law.8  
In terms of their legal function, the administrative bodies would frequently 
give reassurance to the judiciary for the purpose of submitting to the 
subjective determination of the executive. The basis of this reassuring role 
was the fact that the courts could comfort themselves with the assumption 
that there had already been sufficient checks and balances imposed upon 
the executive. On this note, the courts would conclude that in the view of 
the existence of these checks and balances, there would be no need for a 
robust judicial review of detention powers.  
Also, from the beginning of the twentieth century, the British courts would 
regularly issue habeas corpus for the detention cases. However, this 
formal respect to the procedure of law would not follow by a substantive 
inquiry into either the reasons of the executive for its substantive 
GHWHUPLQDWLRQRUWKHH[HFXWLYH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIODZ:KDW emerged as a 
result of these mechanisms was a procedural understanding of the rule of 
law concerned with formalities and detached from substance and purpose 
of procedures. These developments would affect the practice of internment 
as well as the very notion of law. Encountered with insufficient checks and 
balances alongside the deferential approach of the judiciary to the 
executive, one would struggle with the question of whether these semi-
UHPHGLHVDPRXQWHG WR µGXHSURFHVV RI ODZ¶ RU WKH\ZHUHPHUHO\ HQWLties 
FDUU\LQJWKHQDPHRI ODZZKLOVWSXUSRUWLQJWRHYDFXDWHWKH µGXHSURFHVV
RIODZ¶RXWRILWVPHDQLQJ2QFHDJDLQWKLVWKHVLVKDVQRWFODLPHGWRKDYH
                                                          
8 300FGHUPRWWµ,QWHUQPHQWGXULQJWKH*UHDWWar - $&KDOOHQJHWRWKH5XOHRI/DZ¶ 
(2005) 28 University of New South Wales Law Journal 330, at 334.  
292 
 
an answer for this question. However, one of the most vital promises of 
this thesis is that it is against this background that we must make sense of 
post-Second World War developments of international law with regard to 
the practice of detention without trial.  
4. ǮǯǡǮǯ 
 
It hardly needs to be recalled that the catastrophic events of the Second 
World War had caused many to view the very notion of law with suspicion. 
7KLVVFHSWLFLVPZDVSULPDULO\URRWHGLQWKH1D]LV¶WUHDWPHQWRIWKHFRQFHSW
of law, where the most abhorrent crimes had been disguised in a legal 
appearance. In the post-Second World War era, and in the international 
stage, the suspicion towards the concept of law and its syntheses (such as 
lawfulness or unlawfulness) rose to the surface in the course of drafting 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This became clear, 
when some drafters of the UDHR expressed concern to at a draft article 
ZKLFK EDQQHG WKH GHSULYDWLRQ RI SHUVRQDO OLEHUW\ µH[FHSW LQ FDVHV
SUHVFULEHGE\ODZ¶9 In this regard, the question that some drafters posed 
was, essentially, which law and whose law with what qualities can justify a 
parting of states with the physical freedom of individuals?  
The experience of all states involved in the Second World War had shown 
that law can, in times of crisis, be reduced to a cluster of formal 
procedures devoid of any inclination to erect a barrier against the desires 
of sovereigns. In other words, the experience of the Second World War 
had made it clear that law was capable of recognising an absolute 
discretion for the executive. When viewed in this light, the concept of 
unlawfulness cannot necessarily be equated with absolute and unjustifiable 
                                                          
9 D. Weissbrodt, M. +DOOHQGRUIIµ7UDYDX[3UpSDUDWRLUHVRIWKH)DLU7ULDO3URYLVLRQV--Articles 8 
to 11--RIWKH8QLYHUVDO'HFODUDWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 
1061, at 1070.  
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discretion, since even the most all-pervasive discretionary powers can be 
made lawful. In this sense, the synonym of unacceptable discretionary 
SRZHU LV WKH WHUP µDUELWUDU\¶ ,W VHHPV WKDW WKLV UHDOLVDWLRQ SOD\HG DQ
LPSRUWDQWUROHLQWKHDGRSWLRQRIWKHWHVWRIµDUELWUDULQHVV¶LQWKH8'+5LQ
the context of the prohibition of arbitrary detention.  
The interesting point is that there is an implicit reference to the issue of 
subjective versus objective systems of determination in the test of 
DUELWUDULQHVV7KLVDVSHFWRIWKHWHVWRIµDUELWUDULQHVV¶FDQRQO\EHLGHQWLILHG
E\ D UHWXUQ WR KLVWRU\ 7KH DGMHFWLYH µDUELWUDU\¶ HQWHUHG LQWR WKH (QJOLVK
language in the fifteenth century. As was mentioned in chapter III, the 
HW\PRORJLFDO PHDQLQJ RI µDUELWUDU\¶ LQ KLVWRU\ KDV EHHQ V\QRQ\PRXV WR
discretionary and uncertain. Common law writers constantly used the term 
µDUELWUDU\¶ LQ WKLV VHQVH $QRWKHU ZD\ RI SXWWLQJ WKLV LV WR VD\ WKat 
unfettered subjective discretion equals legal uncertainty, and therefore, is, 
in turn, arbitrary. If one imports this formula into the context of detention 
without trial, the inevitable conclusion will be that the focus of laws 
designated to guarantee the freedom of individuals from arbitrary 
detention without trial must be placed at limiting the discretion of the 
detaining power. To this end, the prominent human rights bodies such as 
the Human Rights Committee and the Strasbourg Court seem to have 
ascribed two dimensions to the test of arbitrariness of an action, both in 
terms of its substantive and procedural dimensions. According to the 
Human Rights Committee, as far as the substantive dimension goes, a 
non-arbitrary practice of detention must be free IURP µLQDSSURSULDWHQHVV
LQMXVWLFHDQGODFNRISUHGLFWDELOLW\¶10 It was argued in chapter III that all 
of the mentioned three pillars of arbitrariness are underscored by a lack of 
legal certainty. It was concluded in that chapter that the lack of legal 
                                                          
10 Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, Communication No. 458/1991, para 9.8. 
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certainty can manifest itself in the three areas of 
laws/legislations/executive decrees authorising detention, period of 
detention, and grounds stated to justify detention. In all of these areas, 
WKH WHVW RI µDUELWUDULQHVV¶ SRLQWV WR D WRZHUHG UHJDUG IRU WKH principle of 
legal certainty. In other words, this test is committed to reducing the 
discretion of the detaining authority to the greatest extent possible.  
4.1. The irony of the test of arbitrariness  
Notwithstanding all the foregoing arguments, there is an inherent feature 
of the test of arbitrariness, which may at times defeat the very cause that 
WKLVWHVWVHHNVWRSURPRWHDQGWKDWLVµDUELWUDULQHVV¶LVDIDFW-specific test, 
which means arbitrariness tolerates some degree of elasticity in its own 
application. The reason for this is that necessity is the other side of the 
µDUELWUDULQHVV¶HTXDWLRQDQGQHFHVVLW\FDQQRWEXWEHHYDOXDWHGRQDFDVH-
by-case basis. This is of vital importance in the narrow case of detention 
without trial. It was seen in chapters III and IV that both IHRL and IHL 
recognise necessity as a common denominator to the practice of detention 
without trial. It was also discerned that in the history of common law 
tradition, parliamentary suspensions of habeas corpus were always 
legitimised by the claims of necessity, as imprinted in social/political 
crises.  
Given the historical precedents and also the architecture of international 
legal regimes, it is reasonable to say that the claim of necessity may affect 
internment at two distinct levels, when it comes to the standards of IHRL. 
The first level of the invocation of necessity operates with regard to the 
FUHDWLRQRI WKH OHJDOFRQWH[W WKDWPD\ MXVWLI\ µGHWHQWLRQZLWKRXW WULDO¶$V
examined in chapter III, this manifests itself through the authorisation of 
derogations from certain obligations of states. The second level of the 
295 
 
invocation of necessity comes into effect with its overarching role in 
justifying the resort of detaining powers in the individual cases of 
detention without trial. As was argued in this thesis, the dominant 
interpretation of article 5 of ECHR has created a hierarchical sequence 
between the first level of the operation of necessity and that in the second 
level. This was referred to as the narrow construction of article 5, 
according to which, detention without trial can only be exercised in 
emergencies. Such a sequence does not necessarily hold true for the view 
of detention without trial under ICCPR. Regardless of the level in which the 
claim of necessity functions either for the temporary suspension of norms 
or the authorisation of a particular practice, one feature of necessity 
cannot be ignored ± the decision on the existence of necessity is 
contextual, and hence, subjective. This was mentioned above, and it is 
exactly why WKH HYDOXDWLRQ RI µDUELWUDULQHVV¶ RI GHWHQWLRQ FDQQRW EXW EH
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Here, the IHRL system is presented 
with an ever-lasting challenge, especially for the purposes of establishing 
efficiency in the judicial review of detention. The fact that a decision on 
the existence of necessity is essentially subjective always has the dynamic 
to tip the balance in favour of the detaining power.  
Based on the examinations of this thesis, it must be concluded that there 
are potential channels through which the reach of the subjective decisions 
of the executive can be challenged or limited by the bodies in charge of 
reviewing detention. First of all, as a continuous trend, international law 
has realised and imposed defined limits on both the nature of necessity 
and the extent to which it can be employed for authorising a certain 
practice. For example, Grotius, notwithstanding reserving a very broad 
margin for the reach of necessity, was of the opinion that inherent in the 
concept of necessity, there were such limits as: 1) the lack of means rea; 
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2) imminence of danger; 3) the vital nature of danger; and 4) the 
proportionality considerations as to the aim of actions caused by 
necessity.11  
The difficulty with the classic conception of necessity in international law 
ZDVWKDWVWDWHV¶MXGJHPHQWRQWKHH[LVWHQFHRIQHFHVVLW\DQGWKHDFWLRQV
justified by its invocation were very readily accepted. In the aftermath of 
its renaissance in the wake of the Second World War, and the emergence 
of its everlasting tendency to balance the subjective discretion of states 
with concrete objective limitations, international law has recognised the 
self-defined limits of the concept of necessity without becoming too 
VXEPLVVLYH WR VWDWHV¶ VHOI-judgments. As a result, Article 25 of the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V'UDIW$UWLFOHV on State Responsibility more 
or less repeats the same limitations that Grotius once enumerated for the 
function of necessity, whilst reiteUDWLQJWKDWµWKHVWDWHFRQFHUQHGLVQRWWKH
VROH MXGJHRIZKHWKHUWKRVHFRQGLWLRQVKDYHEHHQPHW¶12 This realisation 
forms the crux of the issue with regard to the judicial (or other forms of) 
review under IHRL. That is to say, the supervisory bodies must be willing 
to challenge the subjective discretions of the executive, and not simply 
assume that they cannot substantively enquire into the subjective 
determinations of the detaining power. Unfortunately, this possibility has 
very often escaped the attention of even human rights bodies. For 
example, it was shown that when it came to imposing limits upon 
immigration detention, the Strasbourg Court did not even consider the 
condition of necessity as a prerequisite for detention. Even the Human 
Rights Committee, despite its very progressive stance on detention 
without trial, has hesitated to confront states on their necessity 
                                                          
11 B. C. Rodick, The Doctrine of Necessity in International Law (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1928) at 6.  
12 Article 25, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts , fifty-
third session (2001).  
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determination in the individual cases of detention. Given that, no matter 
how generously the test of arbitrariness may have been interpreted, by 
avoiding enquiry into the subjective necessity determinations of states, 
the respective human rights bodies have inevitably recreated the exact 
same entity that the test of arbitrariness meant to defeat, that is, 
unfettered and non-justiciable discretion.  
5. IHL and the continuity of one legal battle  
 
The theme of subjective versus objective systems of determination is also 
present in the legal regime of IHL. Here too, there has existed a long-
lasting tendency on the part of states to take the matters relating to their 
conduct in wars as subjects of their own exclusive authority. This natural 
desire of states at a certain historical point resulted in the horrors of the 
Second World War. As a consequence, in the course of revising the law of 
war in 1949, the rules of warfare were reformulated in such a way that the 
subjective discretion of states was restrained more by external objective 
limits. Much like the evolution of IHRL, the move towards strengthening 
and clarifying objective rules and criteria has been continuous in IHL as 
well.  
In the particular case of internment, there were two areas before the end 
of the Second World War which most attracted the subjective discretion of 
sovereigns: internment of enemy aliens, and the internment of persons 
held on the suspicion of certain crimes such as war treason. With regard to 
the former, it was discussed in chapter II that the common law tradition 
had given the sovereign absolute authority to intern aliens owing 
allegiance to the opposite party in a conflict. In so doing, neither necessity 
nor the conduct of such aliens was considered a determinative factor in 
their internment. Rather, it was the sovereign authority and the sovereign 
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authority alone that sufficed for the purposes of interning enemy aliens. At 
WKHVDPHWLPHVLQFHVXFKLQWHUQPHQWVZHUHLPEXHGE\DFODLPRIVWDWHV¶
exclusive authority, they could not be viewed as justiciable. The second 
area of subjective discretion, as was mentioned above, concerned persons 
held on the suspicion of a certain category of crimes.  
It was examined in chapter IV that the Lieber Code was one of the first 
documents that had devised grey categories of persons such as disloyal 
citizens. However, the most explicit construction of a grey class of persons 
occurred in the case of Quirin and through the status RI µXQODZIXO
FRPEDWDQWV¶ 7KLV status is in fact meant to serve as a bridge to the 
discretion of sovereign and as an insulating cover against the protections 
attached to detainees by international law. Furthermore, the question of 
ZKR FDQ EH FDWHJRULVHG DV µXQODZIXO FRPEDWDQWV¶ LV VXEMHFWLYHO\
determined by the detaining authority. With this background in mind, one 
must view the objective tests and standards, as put in place by IHL. In 
this regard, it is vital to notice that the first contribution of the law of 
Geneva towards limiting the subjective authority of the detaining power 
was that it placed a strict necessity test as a precondition for the practice 
of internment. Therefore, it is obvious that in the view of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, reliance on the mere nationality of aliens cannot form 
a sufficient basis for their internment. The second important move on the 
part of the law of Geneva has been that it has shown no reception to the 
idea that certain persons by their illegal behaviour open a gap in the 
protections of IHL. The best indicator of this view of the law of Geneva is 
Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, where persons held on the 
suspicion of having committed such acts as spying are still referred to as 
µSURWHFWHGSHUVRQV¶&KDSWHU,9GLVFXVVHGWKDWWKHPRUHDFFXUDWHSRVLWLRQ
under the laws of armed conflict is the one which recognises no 
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µLQWHUPHGLDWHJURXS¶EHWZHHQ3R:VDQGFLYLOLDQV7KLVELQDU\RIstatus is in 
itself an anti-thesis to the tendency of states to exploit grey areas of 
concepts and grey classes of persons for giving more weight to the 
discretion of the executive in interning individuals.  
6. Ǯǯǡǡ 
  
One of the baselines of this thesis was that the conflict between the 
subjective and objective systems of determination has been a recurrent 
theme in the history of law in general and the history of detention without 
trial in particular. In the history of common law in Britain, the battle was 
redefined and recreated through such terms as order v. liberty, 
prerogative v. law, prerogative v. liberties of subjects, and discretion v. 
arbitrariness. In the history of international law, this conflict has been re-
enacted in such terms as law of nature v. sovereigns, external rules of law 
v. internal rules of law, law v. arbitrariness, sovereignty v. international 
law, constitutional law v. international law, and even states v. individual 
rights. The recent experienFHRI WKH86 µZDURQ WHUURU¶ LVVLPSO\DQRWKHU
enactment of this conflict, which, albeit in a different form, reiterates the 
essentials of the conflict between what this thesis has characterised as 
subjective and objective systems of determination. To identify this 
pattern, it suffices to recall how in the initial phases succeeding 9/11, the 
%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQHPSKDVLVHGWKH µQHZQHVV¶RIWKHVLWXDWLRQIDFLQJWKH
US. This, as argued in the last chapter of this thesis, was done with a view 
to prove a perceived insufficiency, disutility, and irrelevance for particular 
QRUPV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ 7KDW LV WR VD\ DOOHJDWLRQV DERXW WKH µQHZ¶
QDWXUH RI WKH µZDU RQ WHUURU¶ DLPHG DW GLVPDQWOLQJ WKH QRUPDWLYLW\ RI
objective rules of international law. The intended result of these 
allegations was simple and predictable, giving a monopolistic and exclusive 
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weight to the subjective determinations of the executive. Nowhere does 
this become clearer than in the explicit terms of the most important 
counter-terrorism legislation of the US history, the AUMF: 
The President is authorised to use all necessary and appropriate 
force, against those nations, organisations, or persons he 
determines, planned, authorised, committed, or did the terrorist 
attack that occurred on September 11.13  
As a result, an innovative apparatus was fostered by the Bush 
Administration, in which executive discretion was the ultimate rule, and 
objective standards of law were pushed to the margins. It must be noted 
that this apparatus possessed all the essentials for expanding the 
discretion of the executive. First of all, it did not subscribe to the rules of 
DQ\SDUWLFXODU OHJDOPRGHO5DWKHU LW LQ LWVHOI FRQVWLWXWHG µDJUH\DUHDRI
ODZ¶ LQ ZKLFK GLIIHUHQW QRWLRQV DQG WHUPV RI DUW ZHUH ERUURZHG IURP
differHQW DUHDV ,W ZDV DUJXHG WKDW WKH FRQFHSW RI µXQODZIXO HQHP\
FRPEDWDQWV¶IRUH[DPSOHHYRNHVDFRQFHSWUHODWLQJWRWKHODZVRIDUPHG
conflict. However, when looked upon closely, it becomes clear that the US 
officials had loaded this concept with elements of the criminal law model. 
Not to mention that, according to the queries of this thesis, IHL has not 
recognised any intermediate status between PoWs and civilians. Of course, 
as was mentioned several times in this thesis, the judicial origin of the 
nomenclature dates goes back to a ruling of the US Supreme Court in the 
midst of the Second World War. Here one of the most intriguing aspects of 
WKH %XVK $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V WUHDWPHQW RI ODZ DQG OHJDO KLVWRU\ EHFRPHV
clear. That is to say, how it can be possible that the Geneva Conventions 
DUH WUHDWHGDV µWKHROG ODZ¶ IRU WKHSXUSRVHVRI LGHQWLI\LQJ WKHVWDQGDUGV
governing the internment of those held on the suspicion of terrorism, and 
DW WKH VDPH WLPH WKH 6HFRQG :RUOG :DU¶V MXULVSUXGHQFH RI WKH 86
                                                          
13 Authorisation for Use of Military Force. 115 Stat. 224.  
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Supreme Court preceding the adoption of the law of Geneva is meant to 
hold more currency than this body of law.  
It was said that the apparatus built up by the Bush Administration entailed 
all the essentials of a discretionary system. Another sign symptomatic of 
this was the invention of a parallel structure of law for the purposes of 
adjudicating the detention cases. It was argued that from the beginning of 
the eighteenth century there emerged a tendency on the part of the 
British executive to relax the legal checks and balances by inventing 
parallel structures, such as the executive boards and advisory panels, as a 
replacement for the writ of habeas corpus and judicial intervention.  
7KH86 µZDURQ WHUURU¶ VLJQLILHVRQHRI WKHPRVWH[FHVVLYH LQYRFDWLRQVRI
parallel structures of law for the purpose of departure from the normal 
course of judicial supervision of detention cases. As mentioned above, the 
main function of these parallel structures was to reaffirm and reinforce the 
subjective discretion of the executive. On numerous occasions, the Bush 
Administration changed these alternative bodies and their procedures. 
However, military commissions and combatant status review tribunals 
became the two main alternative forms of adjudicating the detention 
cases. Both of these bodies entailed procedures which fell a long way short 
of due process of law. Additionally, both were used as covers to exempt 
the detainees from the writ of habeas corpus.  
7. The US Supreme Court and the inevitable return to 
history 
 
If evaluated collectively, in all the Guantanamo cases, with rendering the 
writ of habeas corpus the focal point of its arguments, the US Supreme 
Court employed various objective tests of law to restrain the subjective 
discretion of the executive. The importance of this repeated emphasis 
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must not by any means escape our attention. The writ of habeas corpus 
compels the executive to specify the grounds of detention, and as such, 
holds the executive accountable to the judiciary. In the common law 
tradition, the writ of habeas corpus has often served as the first step in 
countering an untenable degree of discretion for the detaining power. This 
by itself can explain why the US Supreme Court did not make any 
compromise as regards the availability of habeas corpus to those 
characterised as µXQODZIXOHQHP\FRPEDWDQWV¶E\WKH%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ
Nevertheless, as our historical investigations show, habeas corpus is by no 
means a sufficient safeguard against arbitrariness.  
The writ of habeas corpus is only a procedural instrument. In fact, it is fair 
to say that the writ of habeas corpus is a means to an end. It facilitates a 
VXEVWDQWLYH HQTXLU\ RQ WKH SDUW RI WKH MXGLFLDU\ LQWR WKH H[HFXWLYH¶V
interpretation of law, its authority to detain, and its subjective 
determinations in each case of detention. If the judiciary upholds the 
procedural safeguard of habeas corpus without substantively entering into 
the areas that are meant to be monitored by the writ of habeas corpus, 
the availability of this writ to detainees becomes not only insignificant, but 
also counterproductive. The history of common law reveals that the 
judicial generosity towards the availability of habeas corpus to detainees 
has often served as a cover to the judicial deference to the subjective 
determinations of the executive. As was mentioned above, this view can 
rightly be characterised as projecting a procedural understanding of the 
UXOHRI ODZRUJLYLQJ µIRUPDOUHVSHFWWRWKHSURFHGXUH¶DQGQHJOHFWLQJ LWV
very essence and purpose. Most intriguingly, this approach to the question 
of detention without trial was not dismissed by the US Supreme Court. On 
the contrary, it was to a certain degree embraced by the Court, 
notwithstanding its eagerness to uphold the writ of habeas corpus.  
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2IWHQ LQ WKH µZDU RQ WHUURU¶ GHWHQWLRQ FDVHV WKH US Supreme Court 
DGGUHVVHG RQH SDUWLFXODU DVSHFW RI WKH%XVK $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V SROLF\ DQG
refrained from addressing more substantive and problematic dimensions of 
the US detention policy. It was witnessed in the final chapter of this thesis 
that despite its occasional invocations of the Geneva Conventions, the 
6XSUHPH &RXUW DYRLGHG FKDOOHQJLQJ WKH WHUPLQRORJ\ RI µXQODZIXO
FRPEDWDQWV¶ ZKLFK DEVROXWHO\ RFFXSLHG QR SODFH LQ WKH ODQJXDJH RI
Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, the US Supreme Court missed a 
historical opportunity to repudiate one of the most problematic decisions 
of its history, namely, the case of Quirin. As discussed in chapter V, the 
Court too frequently submitted to the subjective decisions of the Bush 
Administration. Lastly, the Supreme Court did not mention anything about 
the US manipulation of detention sites for the purpose of insulating its 
determinations from judicial overview.  
Of course, when the court of highest rank shows reluctance to address the 
substantive issues at stake, the lower courts are more likely to follow the 
same pattern if only for the lack of constructive guidance. As a result, 
being stuck in a procedural understanding of law epitomises a more 
serious problem in the lower courts. For example, in one case, the circuit 
couUWSRVLWHG WKDW WKHH[HFXWLYH¶V LQWHOOLJHQFH UHSRUWVPXVWEHSUHVXPHG
to be accurate, unless proved otherwise by the detainee. 14  As the 
dissenting Judge Tatel argued in this, such a deferential approach to the 
VXEMHFWLYHµVD\VR¶DQGGHWHUPLQDWLRQVRIWKHHxecutive can be equated to 
WKH SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW µZKDWHYHU WKH JRYHUQPHQW VD\VPXVW EH WUHDWHG DV
WUXH¶15 Such an approach brings us back in terms of legal view to four 
centuries ago, when Justice Hyde treated the assertions of the English 
king in council aV WUXH DQG VDLG µ,I QR FDXVH RI FRPPLWPHQW EH
                                                          
14 Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
15 Ibid., at 779.  
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expressed, it is to be presumed for matter of state, which we cannot take 
QRWLFHRI¶16 These words summarise the essence of judicial deference to 
the determinations of the executive during the last four centuries. Ranging 
from the MPs in 1628 in England to Dicey, and to the critiques of the Bush 
Administration, many have characterised the problem of detention without 
trial as one pertaining to the issue of absolute executive discretion. Yet, 
one wonders if that discretion could ever be made institutionalised without 
the complacency of judicial bodies.  
8. Exploring the ways forward 
 
If one accepts that the most pressing problem associated with arbitrary 
detention without trial is the absolute subjective discretion of the 
executive, then he can by default be guided towards a number of potential 
solutions. Based on the historical and doctrinal investigations of this 
thesis, it must be concluded that all the potential solutions to the problem 
of detention without trial must be underlined by one simple but radical 
baseline, and that is, constraining the subjective discretion of the 
executive. The first level of creating a counter-balance to the subjective 
discretion of the executive must take place at the level of regulating its 
detention powers. This is extremely important in that it is at the level of 
legislation that the scope of the powers of the executive is recognised and 
regulated. The most extreme forms of legislation in terms of conceding a 
broad margin of authority to the executive are those which provide the 
executive with the law-making powers. In such situations, the status of 
the executive changes from the subject of law to its author. The most 
immediate effect of this is an outright shift of checks and balances in 
favour of the executive. Predictably, in such an atmosphere, rex becomes 
                                                          
16 Five Knights Case, Charles I A. D. 1627 in A Complete Collection of State Trials (1816), at 
57. 
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lex DQG WKH LGHDO RI µJRYHUQPHQW E\ ODZ¶ turns into government by 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOGLVFUHWLRQLIQRWµJRYHUQPHQWE\PHQ¶&HUWDLQO\WKHSUDFWLFH
of detention without trial, once authorised under wide discretionary powers 
of the executive, is much more likely to be arbitrary than when its exercise 
is bound by precise limits imposed upon the executive by the legislature. 
Hence, the issue of what institution creates the laws of detention always 
represents the first channel through which the emergence of absolute and 
arbitrary discretionary powers can be blocked.  
Also, the question of how detention powers are formulated bears as much 
importance as the question of who regulates them. That is to say, the 
terms on which the authority of the executive to intern is cast, are of vital 
importance for the purposes of constraining the subjective discretion of 
the detaining power. In this regard, the choice of words that determine a 
standard of proof for subjecting an individual to the practice of detention 
without trial is noteworthy. Historically, the common law regulations have 
conditioned the legality of detention orders to the satisfaction of the 
GHWDLQLQJ SRZHU WKDW WKHUH LV HLWKHU D SUREDEOH FDXVH RU µUHDVRQV WR
EHOLHYH¶ WKDWDVXVSHFWSRVHV WKUHDWV WR LWV VHFXULW\7KLV ODQJXDJHVKLIWV
the balance of security risk determinations towards the mere subjective 
appreciation of the executive. 
Furthermore, this method of formulating detention powers has historically 
made it easier for the judicial authorities to defer to the determinations of 
the executive, on the basis that they do not allegedly possess sufficient 
means to challenge the subjective satisfaction of the executive. On this 
note, one way to hold the executive accountable to the rule of law is to 
change the manner in which the latter of law with regard to detention is 
drafted. This means that legislation tasked with authorising detention 
without trial must define clearer and more objective thresholds for the 
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practice of detention without trial. For example, instead of the satisfaction 
of the detaining authority to the effect of the existence of a suspicion, the 
respective regulations can condition the practice of internment to the 
ability of the executive to indicate that there is a reliable suspicion 
ordaining one to detention. 
This simple reformulation of words can result in far-reaching implications 
for the practice of detention. First of all, it prevents the executive from 
creating a zone of immunity around its determinations, in that its 
subjective satisfaction cannot suffice for a practice of detention without 
trial. Accordingly, a more demanding threshold for making detention 
orders forces the executive to pay more attention to the balance of 
probabilities in determining the security risk that a suspect poses. At the 
same time, since the executive is compelled to indicate its evaluations of 
the balance of probabilities in a court of law, the justiciability of its 
determinations becomes much more feasible. One effect of this is that the 
judiciary cannot circumvent its task of scrutinising detention orders in the 
pretext that it cannot enquire into the subjective determinations of the 
executive.   
The importance of international law in the discourse governing detention 
without trial can by no means be ignored. This role became particularly 
important in the wake of the so-FDOOHG µZDU RQ WHUURU¶ZKHQ FULWLTXHVRI
the US detention policy with varying political and legal affinities primarily 
based their arguments on the relevant standards of IHL and IHRL. It is 
true to say that the enigma of detention practices in Guantanamo Bay 
renewed the interest of international law bodies and scholars on what 
international law has to offer on the issue of detention. Many argued, no 
matter how much complexity the issue of detention has assumed in the 
decade and a half, international law can yet fight back and mitigate many 
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of the malfunctioning attributes of arbitrary detention. Yet, in order for 
international law to survive the many challenges that lie ahead, particular 
changes and reforms are needed. More determinacy is required for the 
rules governing detention. On the front of IHRL, for example, the Human 
Rights Committee still needs to elaborate on the issue of what constitutes 
DUELWUDU\ GHWHQWLRQ 6XFK VWDWHG FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DV µLQDSSURSULDWHQHVV
injustice and lack oI SUHGLFWDELOLW\¶ DUH WRR JHQHUDO WR SURYLGH FRQFUHWH
guidance for states, which can turn any form of legal indeterminacy to its 
own advantage. 
As was discussed above, human rights bodies must show more willingness 
to challenge the executives around the world on their necessity 
determinations. As argued, the test of arbitrariness cannot be of much 
help unless the human rights bodies apply a fair amount of scrutiny to the 
necessity determinations of the detaining power. This last point is equally 
relevant for the domestic courts. That is to say, domestic courts must not 
hesitate to substantively enquire into different determinations of the 
executive. The history of common law is filled with judicial emphases on 
procedure and disregard for substance. As Justice Jackson pointed out in 
his famous dissenting opinion in Mezei,  
Indeed, if put to choice, one might well prefer to live under 
Soviet substantive law applied in good faith by our common law 
procedures than our substantive law enforced by Soviet 
procedural practices.17  
In the aftermath of 9/11, there was a sharp increase in the invocation of 
the balance test for regulating the conduct of the executive in different 
areas. This test addresses a wide area of concepts and practices ranging 
from the issue of checks and balances imposed upon the executive, to the 
mode of the executive departures from the normal safeguards of law. Yet, 
                                                          
17 Shaugnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 2. 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953).  
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it seems that the executive must not be considered as the only addressee 
of the balance test. Rather, the judiciary must equally be liable to strike a 
fair balance between its treatment of procedure and substance. Hence, 
nowhere in the judicial scrutiny of the practice of detention without trial 
must the maintenance of procedure be accompanied by indifference to 
substance of law. Of course, the particularities of designating a balance 
test between procedure and substance go well beyond the confines of this 
thesis, and present a future project to this author for formulating the 
technicalities of this enterprise with a particular regard to the case-law of 
detention in the last two centuries.  
Early in this thesis, it was said that this research holds no ambition as to 
dictating a lex ferenda for detention. Rather, the purpose of this thesis is 
to describe the historical pattern that has led to the conception of lex lata, 
as it stands today, and to provide an interpretation of lex lata on the basis 
of that historical background. Many general and specific points were made 
in the course of this research. Yet, one underlying theme seems to 
outnumber all others, and that is the constant recreation of historical 
patterns governing detention without trial. It is as if each analysis of 
detention without trial during the last four centuries constantly returns to 
the same dilemmas, issues and problems that were once faced by Charles 
I, Justice Hyde and such so-called libertarians as Edward Coke. It is as if 
the question of the executive discretion is as much of a problem today as 
it was at the time of the writings of Dicey. That we seem to have been in a 
historical vicious circle is not to conclude that no progress has been made 
on different fronts. One of the pillars of this thesis has been that the 
evolving standards of international law on detention do signify a point of 
departure in the history of detention. However, these standards can only 
assist us when appointed as a serious counter-balance to the subjective 
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discretion of the detaining power. The truth of the matter is that, unless 
this view is tightly embraced by the national and international bodies 
tasked with supervising the conduct of the detaining power, we are 
doomed to witness the reincarnation of arbitrary discretion in one form or 
another. This is the most pressing dilemma of detention, and it will most 
likely continue to be for many decades to come.  
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